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4PREFACE
The Inflexibility Trap
Frustrated Societies, Weak States and Democracy
Have the former welfare states of Southeast Europe turned into farewell
states? With state organs rapidly losing public trust and unable to deliver
on promises of prosperity, the question of citizens’ participation in
politics was the major theme of an international project entitled
Developing a Long Term Strategy for Democratization in the Balkans.
The project, inspired and financed by the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED), heralded a unique opportunity to debate the growing
risks and challenges identified by independent analysts from the region.
The West has been funding democracy building in the Balkans for the
past decade and yet the region has not been fully secured and
stabilized. Kosovo is an international protectorate; Montenegro is an
unwilling member of a non-functioning federation; Serbia is in the early
stage of political and economic reforms; Macedonia is in the process
of self-reinvention; Albania is a version of contested democracy; and
Bulgaria is in the midst of its negotiations for joining the European
Union (EU).
Democracy is fragile in Southeast Europe with each state facing
obstacles in the transition period during the past decade. To address
these issues, the National Endowment for Democracy commissioned
a report on the state of democracy by eight Southeast Europe’s major
non-governmental policy institutes. The think tanks involved in the
project are: the Centre for Liberal Strategies (Bulgaria); the Institute
for Market Economics (Bulgaria); the Albanian Institute for International
Studies (Albania); the Institute for Regional and International Studies
(Bulgaria); the Belgrade Center for Human Rights (Serbia); the Center
for Democracy and Human Rights (Montenegro); the Forum Institute
(Macedonia); and Kosova Action for Civic Initiatives (Kosovo).
The report exposes some serious problems with the current
international approach and outlines some new proposals for enhancing
regional stability and democracy building. It emphasizes that
democratization in the Balkans must become responsive not only to
international conditionalities, but also to the views of local
constituencies. The elites and the public are drifting too far apart,
allowing for the emergence of irresponsive democracies and corrupt
political systems. The near total collapse of the middle class is
5worrisome and their political alienation even more so. The ruling parties
are acquiring the perception of being “the puppets” of the West, which
is further delegitimizing their political programs, making a transition to
stable states even more difficult. Accordingly, the goal of the
international community should be to narrow the alarming gap between
the political elites and the public and to support the development of
responsible democracies.
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FRUSTRATED SOCIETIES, WEAK STATES
AND DEMOCRACY
Ivan Krastev, Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies
Elections do not change things. If elec-
tions were about changing things, they
would have been banned.
    Graffito found in Sofia
Conceptualizing the current state of politics on the Balkans is like
designing a mousetrap without knowing what a mouse is. In the political
maps, the region looks like an explosive mixture of weak states, non-
state states and present and future protectorates. In history books,
the Balkans stand for delayed modernization and incomplete state-
building processes. In policy reports, the region is described as a place
where borders (when defined) are soft, identities are hard, reform
policies have failed, and the future is unclear. What we do not know is
how many de facto states function in South East Europe, and to what
extent they function. What we know is that they are all democracies.
The Kosovo parliamentary elections on November 17 marked the stage
at which all countries and entities in the region gained their
representative assemblies. A decade ago the problem of the region
was the prevalence of non-democratic states. Now, the problem is
that we have more democracies than sovereign states, and less political
change than we hoped for.
The present Report argues the need for a basic re-thinking of the
analytical framework for evaluating the chances and risks for a
working democracy in the Balkans.
The contradictory trends and developments make the reading of
democracy’s balance- sheet an uneasy task. On the positive side, the
7major political actors in the region do not question democracy as the
only legitimate and desirable form of government. Publics are
disappointed with the status quo, but they are not attracted by non-
democratic alternatives. The military is in the barracks; Milosevic is in
The Hague; elections are regular. In comparison with Central Asian
republics, SEE shows constant progress in democratization.
On the negative side, there is a justified fear that Balkan democracies
as a whole are more fragile than we had suspected. Trust in democratic
institutions is dramatically low, with Parliaments rarely getting more
than a 20 percent approval, growing anti-party sentiments, undermined
confidence in politicians and ever fewer people going to the ballot-
box.1  The latest presidential and parliamentary elections in Bulgaria
and Romania indicated a high volatility in voters’ preferences. The
intellectual climate has deteriorated. Anti-liberal and anti-western ideas
are growing in influence. The reformist agenda of the elites is no longer
the agenda of the publics.
The latest public opinion poll conducted in Bulgaria, a country defined
by Freedom House as a consolidated democracy, shows that according
to the public the last 12 years have been a wasted time. Compared
with 1989, 50 percent of respondents claim that the situation has
worsened, 33 percent claim that it has not changed, and only 17 percent
see improvement. 62 percent of Bulgarians would prefer to live in a
different age. The figures from Macedonia are even more frightening.
Asked whether they consider that in general Macedonia is moving in
the right direction, 62 percent of the citizens of that Republic say no
and only 12 percent approve of the direction that is being taken.
The apparent gap between citizens’ perception of the status quo and
the perception of the international community promoting democracy
is at the heart of the present report. It is based on the contributions
prepared by local think tanks in Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia and tries to reflect on the chances
and risks for democracy in the Balkans. The report is neither a summary
of country reports, nor an exhaustive study of the performance of
different democratic institutions. Its goal is to construct an analytical
framework that will enable us to identify some of the invisible or
neglected risks and dangerous trends in the region. It is no secret that
governments and societies in SEE are facing grave problems, but the
question is: In what terms should we analyze the current mistrust in
1
 The approval of the Macedonian Parliament in December 2001 was 6.9 percent.
8the performance of democratic institutions and new political elites in
order to overcome it? In our view, it is more useful to analyze the
problems in terms of a crisis of democracy than in terms of
unfinished democratization.
In democratic politics perceptions are the only reality that matters,
hence our framework is focused on citizens’ perceptions. This
perspective generates a re-thinking of the dominant paradigms
governing the analyses of the political process in the region. The way
people perceive the present condition determines how they vote, how
much they save, and if they are ready to live together. In such an
analytical framework the notion of transition is not a useful one. Most
people in the Balkans are convinced that they live in imperfect
democracies, but nonetheless in democracies. They judge the
advantages of democratic regimes not on the basis of the ideal type of
democracy constructed by a political scientist, but on that of their own
democratic experience. It is naïve to believe that their disappointment
with the status quo will not affect their trust in the democratic system
itself. What is “transition” for the expert is their life for the people.
The last decade established a pattern of viewing the Balkans from the
perspective of the most endangered country. In 1993 it was Bosnia
that shaped the picture of the region. In the last two years the Balkans
were viewed through the lens of the dramatic developments in Kosovo
and Belgrade. Recently, Macedonia has become the paradigm maker.
Indeed, the media headlines dictate the analytical perspective and
this intellectual dominance of the “emergency” has its analytical price.
Analyses produced in the past ten years read like natural disaster
reports. They argue for sanctions or aid but fall short of understanding
the logic of policy failures.
In this report, we read the chances and challenges for sustainable
democracy in the region through the prism of the democratically most
developed Balkan country - Bulgaria. The logic of our analysis is that
it is more the democratic fragility of successful Bulgaria than the
democratic deficits of some of the other countries that represents the
gravest challenge facing the Balkan democracies in the medium and
long term. Bosnia in 1993, Kosovo in 1999, and Macedonia in 2001 all
are extreme cases, worst-case scenarios that have materialized.
Bulgaria, on the other hand, is viewed by many as the model not for
what Balkan democracy should be, but a model of what Balkan
democracy could be. It is the dangers of this model that we will try to
illuminate.
9This analytical framework centered on Bulgaria will not only open room
for a typology of the problems, it will also be instructive with respect to
the limits of democratic consolidation in the region. Bulgaria’s
unexpected political developments in 2001 are the other reason for
adopting the current framework. In the last six months Bulgarian citizens
voted out the most praised reformist government in the region (the
one led by Ivan Kostov) and elected a government headed by the ex-
king Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. The king’s movement took 50
percent of the seats in Parliament. In light of the fact that the movement
was constituted just three months prior to the elections, its performance
can be justifiably described as an electoral revolution (or an epidemic).
The king’s movement did not simply sweep the major political parties
- the UDF and the Socialists - aside. It also carried the majority in
every single age group, education group, and income group and in 28
out of 31 regions in the country. Then, three months after the king’s
landslide victory in the parliamentary elections, the majority of Bulgarian
citizens voted against the most praised reformist president in the region,
despite the fact that President Stoyanov was endorsed not only by the
UDF but also by the king’s movement and several other democratic
parties. The voters’ choice for president was the leader of the socialist
party, Georgi Parvanov, who just a month before had been considered
unelectable. The exotics of the Bulgarian experience should not make
us blind to the trend that was already visible in the Balkans with the
parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania: there is
consistently a protest vote. The same trend is noticeable in the opinion
polls of other studied countries.  The question is, will the protest
vote run the Balkans? Are we observing a shift towards
“delegative democracy” as experienced in Latin America? What
kind of parties, persons, and ideas will be the future incarnations
of this protest vote? Why do the so-called “reformists”
spectacularly lose elections? Is this going to be the fate of the
present Serbian government? What are the roots of public
disappointment? Was democracy weakened or strengthened by
the explosions of political volatility?
This report moves away from the beloved normative question of the
democratization paradigm: how free and fair are elections, how free
and independent are the media or judiciary, how effective is the rule of
law. It moves away from measuring and ranking democracies and
from imposing the logic of democratization on the political
developments in the Balkans. A democratization framework allows
one to compare achievements, but it rules out a comparison of
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experiences. The question we try to answer is what is happening
politically in the Balkans and what can we expect to happen? We
fear that the dominant paradigms are misrepresenting the problems
of the region and that we risk missing the challenges South East Europe
faces. The dominant paradigms consciously or unconsciously are
“normalizing” the status quo. The current report tries to go beyond this
type of normalization.
The generalization of the problems of the six “democracies” that we
analyze is also a risk itself. Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Kosovo and Serbia differ significantly. Kosovo is an international
protectorate; Montenegro is an unwilling member of a non-functioning
federation; Serbia is in the early stage of political and economic reforms;
Macedonia is in the process of self-reinvention, Albania is a version of
a contested democracy, and Bulgaria is in the midst of its negotiations
for joining the EU. The political process in Montenegro and Kosovo is
primarily centered on the problems of independent statehood while
social and economic issues dominate the political process in Bulgaria
and Albania.  Indeed, the diversity does not stop here. For the last 12
years there has been no real transfer of power in Montenegro, while
Bulgaria has completed two cycles of transfer of power from left to
right and vice versa.  The communist legacies of the analyzed countries
also differ substantially. For instance, the closed type of Stalinist society
in Albania between 1945 and 1989 was radically different from the
form of liberal communism enjoyed in Yugoslavia in the same period.
The experience of the last decade also has not brought the countries
together. It was more the dissolution of Yugoslavia than the end of
communism that shaped the agenda in the ex-Yugoslav states and
societies. The experience of violence that is common for Serbia,
Albania and Macedonia is unknown to the Bulgarians.
Diversity is evident, but some common patterns and tendencies can
also be clearly identified. An attempt to grasp these common trends
forms the skeleton of this report. All the countries included in the study
share a dramatic decline in the standard of living. None of the studied
countries, with the exception of Albania, has returned to its 1989 GDP
level. In most of them, de-industrialized economies co-exist with a
social structure characteristic more or less of advanced industrial
societies. All these societies have witnessed a rise in social inequality.
All of them suffer from the absence of a durable democratic tradition.
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All of them share a profound sense of insecurity. All of them /with the
exceptions of the Albanians/ are pessimistic with respect to the near
future. All of them see membership of the EU as their most desirable
future. It might be questionable to treat all these diverse countries in
one and the same group, but politically they are treated like that. In
many cases the most practical definition of  “a mouse” is “a small
animal that can be caught in a mousetrap.”
How Not to Think about the Balkans
Shifting away from the dominant paradigms does not mean invalidating
their findings. Each of them has its validity and usefulness, but none
of them helps us to understand what is happening politically in the
Balkans today because none of them is focused on the internal logic
of recent developments.
The decision not to think exclusively in terms of ethnicity, transition
and European integration is what outlines the perspective of the present
Report. Determined to make explicit the internal dynamics of political
instability in the Balkans, we suggest i) a critical reflection on the three
paradigms that are shaping the outsider’s perception of the region, ii)
a map of the security, and social conditions, iii) an analysis of the
political status quo seen as the interplay between the politics of
corruption and the politics of external constraints, iv) a conceptualization
of the state weakness in the Balkans today.
The Legacies Paradigm
The bad legacies paradigm was very popular in the earlier stages of
the dissolution of Yugoslavia and was rooted in historical and cultural
arguments. The report of the international commission on the Balkans
(The Unfinished Peace) published in 1996 is a classic example of this
analytical approach. It defined the major obstacles for effective
democracy in the Balkans as “legacies of war, of communism, and of
history”. Giving its recommendations, the Report focused on “the
development and revival of civil society”, regional and inter-ethnic
projects, re-writing the history textbooks in the region, and so on. The
freedom of the media was defined as a key element in promoting
democracy in the Balkans. But “freedom of media” was basically
reduced to freedom from governmental intervention. Political danger
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of special interests controlled media remained unnoticed.
The Unfinished Peace and the paradigm it embodies have influenced
most of the international democracy aid programs. The unspoken
assumption of this paradigm was that the political problem in the
Balkans was primarily ethno-political. The status of minorities became
the leading indicator for democratic achievements and the NGO
community was selected as a favorite partner for democracy building
projects. It was this ethnic- tolerance centered perspective that
contributed to the unrealistic assessment of the situation in Macedonia
before September 2000. This approach did not succeed in separating
“post-Yugoslav” problems from the problems of post-communism.
In the context of this paradigm violent nationalism was perceived as
the most prominent threat to the democratic process and political
parties and individual politicians were judged primarily on the basis of
their nationalistic or anti-nationalistic record. This explains why the
liberal elements of the former communist elite easily achieved favor
with the international community. Politics was reduced to a clash
between nationalists and non-nationalists.
This does not mean that ethnic tensions and ethnic identities have not
played a critical role in shaping the political reality of the region.
However, quite often the “only ethnicity paradigm” takes the justification
and legitimization of certain political decisions as the essence of Balkan
politics. To an extent this paradigm is already unfashionable, but it is
still used with respect to Serbia and to some extent Macedonia. It is
no longer influential with policy circles, but it still dominates the
international media coverage of the region. This paradigm is also blind
to the changes in the nationalistic platforms themselves. If a new wave
of nationalism threatens the region, it will be much more anti-Western
populism or anti-Roma xenophobia than the 19th century type of
nationalism that was characteristic of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
The Democratic Transition Paradigm
In his subtle criticism of the transition paradigm Thomas Carothers
singles out its five core assumptions: 1) any country moving away
from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition to
democracy 2) democratization tends to unfold in three obligatory stages
- from opening to breakthrough to consolidation 3) a belief in the
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determinative importance of elections 4) a belief that at the end of the
day “structural factors” - economic level, political history, institutional
environment - are not so important 5) a belief that a functioning state
is always there and that state-building and democracy-building enforce
each other.
In our understanding, the controversial aspect of “transition” is its
normative character and teleological nature. All new democracies are
supposed to follow one and the same path. Democracy is analyzed
not so much through the relations between leaders and led, but judged
by the level of its institutionalization. In its radical form, the transition
paradigm can be visualized as a global democracy promotion office
where all new democracies fill in their forms and expect to be judged
on the basis of how free and fair are their elections, how independent
is their judiciary, how free are their media and so on. Freedom House’s
“Nations in Transit” Report is a classic example of this paradigm.
Ranking democracies has replaced understanding them as the practice
in the democracy-promotion community.
The attractiveness of this approach for policy makers is two-folded.
On the one hand, the transition paradigm creates a comprehensive
framework for comparing the achievements of different transitional
countries; on the other hand, the “scores” and “democracy rankings”
are the basis for the assessment of democracy used by the international
institutions, and individual Western governments. The theorists’ dream
of hard data and regression analyses and the bureaucrats’ dreams of
results that can be reported meet happily in the transition paradigm.
However, such a measurement of democracy creates a false
expectation with respect to the accountability of democracy-building
programs.
As a result, the transition paradigm fails to understand the internal
logic of the political processes in new democracies and it is frequently
blind to the way citizens perceive their political regimes. The outcome
is that citizens vote out governments praised and “ranked” by the West.
The assumption that a functioning state is given a priori and that state-
building and democracy building reinforce each other turned out to be
especially disadvantageous with respect to the Balkans. The risk of
being non-contextual was clearly illustrated by the manner in which
the problem of Kosovo independence was treated in the transition
paradigm.
As of 1991, democratization has been viewed as the major instrument
for bringing stability to the Balkans. In its initial stages the dissolution
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of Yugoslavia was conceptualized as a specific manifestation of the
general trend of the collapse of communist regimes. The Yugoslav
wars were explained mainly through the undemocratic nature of the
old political system and as a skillfully orchestrated strategy by the old
communist elites to ensure their own survival. The orthodox policy
line was that democratization would reduce ethnic tensions and that it
was the only way to avoid the dismantling of the existing states. This
explanation has some validity, but the lessons of the last decade
demonstrate its limits.
The dissolution of Yugoslavia demonstrated that when a society has
to choose between democratization and self-determination, the latter
comes first. The expectations that democratic change in Belgrade
would eliminate the independence of Kosovo from the agenda of
Kosovars turned out to be unrealistic. History demonstrated that for
Kosovars, democracy is important. However, only within the borders
of their own state, that had to be established first. Political change in
Croatia is the other powerful example that successful democratization
is possible only after state-consolidation has been achieved.
Another key misconception of the transition discourse is that the
devolution of state power has been conceptualized as a victory for the
emerging civil society. The state, in the early years of transition, was
perceived as the major obstacle for the emancipation of society. The
victory of democracy was understood in terms of the withdrawal of the
state. It was in this analytical concept that the “NGO fashion” was
born. But can the rise in the number of NGOs – most of them sponsored
by the West – be identified with the rise and strengthening of civil
society and democratic consolidation? Can civil society flourish in a
place where there is no rule of law and a functioning state?
The transition paradigm is misleading not only because of its questioned
assumptions. In the context of the fears that constructed it, the transition
paradigm is shaped by the fear of a breakdown of democratic regimes,
defined by Schmitter as “the sudden death of democracy.” “Transition”
still thinks about democracy exclusively in its opposition to
authoritarianism. But are the threats to democracy the same now as
in the 1970s? What are the dangers for democracy at a time when
democracy does not have open enemies, and undemocratic
alternatives have retreated? It is not surprising that influenced by its
“family connections,” the transition paradigm remained blind to the
risks of a “slow death of democracy” – the erosion and de-legitimization
of democratic regimes in the institutional framework of democracy
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itself. This “slow death scenario” can be described as democracy
without politics. It is this scenario of destroying the representative nature
of democracy while keeping its institutional shell that constitutes the
major risk that the Balkans face today.
The Development/Integration Paradigm
As a policy ideology for acting in the Balkans, the development
paradigm is a latecomer. It resulted from the exhaustion of the legacy
and transition approaches. Focused on some of the economic,
institutional, and social pre-conditions for the success of democratic
politics, the development paradigm discovered that the economy
matters and incomes matter. Structural factors as the economic level
and a favorable institutional environment were recognized as critical
for securing public support for democracy. It was in this paradigm that
“the state” was re-discovered as a pre-condition and not as a result of
a functioning democracy and a functioning market. The World Bank’s
“The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South-East Europe” strategy
paper (published on March 1, 2000)2  is the best illustration of this
approach.
The Development/Integration paradigm is the most influential today,
so it is important to figure out its hidden assumption for future political
development in the region.
As in the transition paradigm, democracy is evaluated primarily
according to the level of its institutionalization. The policy choices
societies should make are radically de-politicised, so the problem is
not in policy making but in policy implementation. Strengthening
democratic institutions is perceived basically as the problem of capacity
building, creating proper legal frameworks, and training an efficient
bureaucracy. Development/Integration advocates are not interested
in who the winners and losers are in the short run, because in the long
run all are winners. All major political choices societies face are reduced
to trivial technocratic choices. Introduction of hard policy constraints
like Currency Boards or replacing local currencies by the Euro is favored
by this approach. In its radical form, the EU integration paradigm views
the political challenges in the Balkans in terms of state-building, but in
terms of building a member-state. The institutional environment in the
2
 The World Bank had been tasked by the Stability Pact with establishing the regional
policy strategy.
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region is perceived exclusively in terms of its compatibility with EU
norms and standards. The integration paradigm is the only long-term
policy vision for the region and this explains its growing influence.
However, there are several hidden assumptions behind this paradigm
that should be seriously discussed. The integration policy package
starts with the assumption that one day all Balkan countries will be EU
members, but does not pay enough attention to the period when those
countries are still not members. Secondly, perceiving democratization
as an adjustment to EU standards, this paradigm is basically suspicious
towards any genuine political process in the region. And thirdly, this
paradigm views the process of consensus-building much more as a
result of the work of conditionalities, rather than as a result of a dialogue
between different interest groups inside the studied countries. The
manner in which the international community has imposed
constitutional change in Macedonia is very instructive in this respect.
On the one hand, this was a reasonable and necessary change. On
the other hand, it was perceived as an imposing and contributed to
public mistrust in Macedonian institutions and elites.
The democratic deficit that is considered as a negative side-effect of
European integration for the member states has a much more profound
effect on the candidate countries. The legislation process is deprived
of its role as a channel for conflict-resolution and is reduced to
translation and adoption of European legislation.
This analytical re-reading of the policy paradigms shaping the views
of Balkan democracies leads to several conclusions. All three
paradigms have their usefulness and validity, but they replace the
question of what is happening in the region with a set of made answers.
The legacy approach (in judging political development in the Balkans)
is totally ethno-political in its perspective. The transition paradigm is
reduced to measuring institutions and institutional performances, and
the development/integration paradigm promotes a non-political, expert-
driven approach to the region. All conceptual frames disregard the
perspective of the citizens as the most important factor in understanding
democratic developments and all are concerned to explain why things
are not working as they should. Meanwhile, however, they fail to explain
why things are working in the way they do.
The present Report, in contrast, adopts a citizen-centered perspective
and treats citizens’ political experiences as the only meaningful point
of departure in any analytical journey designed to understand Balkan
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politics. We define democracy not so much by its institutional settings,
but through the relations between governments and citizens. For us,
democracy is a regime in which people not only take part in free and
fair elections, but can also influence policies. For us, it is important not
only what government do but what people think.
Therefore the key elements in our analysis are the widening gap
between the public and the elites, the growing distrust in the reformist
agenda, and the emergence of cynical and angered majorities. In order
to know what is happening politically in the Balkans, we pose the
questions: What makes individuals and societies so insecure? Why
are Balkan democracies so corrupt or why do their citizens perceive
them as pervasively corrupt? What are the effects of hard external
conditionalities in shaping citizens’ loyalty to the democratic regime?
The Security Condition
The security issues of the region are well explored and are usually
structured around five critical questions. What status for Kosovo? What
future for Macedonia? What chance for Dayton Bosnia? When can
the international forces leave the region? When will Bulgaria and
Romania join NATO? But the security question centered on borders,
statuses, and international guarantees does not complete the insecurity
agenda of the publics. The most probable risk scenario that faces the
region is not aggression or wars, but the collapse of the state. It is
state weakness that emerges as the major security threat for the region.
In 1992 the Badenter Commission singled out “government’s full control
over the territory” as a critical criterion for recognizing the right of the
ex-Yugoslav republics to secession. If this criterion were to be applied
today, most of the present Balkan states would not qualify for
independent statehood. Post-Milosevic Yugoslavia does not control
its territory; Serbia does not control what legally is her territory; and
the Macedonian government de facto also does not control some parts
of the country. The inability of most governments in the region to secure
the physical integrity of the state’s territory is at the core of the
international perception of the current state of affairs.
September 11 and the global war on terrorism also urge for a re-thinking
security dilemmas in the Balkan. Formulated in the language of post-
September 11 sensitivity, the problems of the region should be
structured around new type of questions. Can parts of the Balkans
be turned into terrorist safe heavens? What is the influence of
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organized crime on the politics of the governments in the region?
How should the Albanian armed groups in Macedonia be treated?
Only recently the international community realized the profound process
of the criminalization of politics and the criminalization of ethnicity that
is taking place in the region. As a legacy of war, armed groups of
different types proliferate in the Balkans. The prolonged UN embargo
on Yugoslavia facilitated the establishment of cross-border criminal
networks. Drug channels, channels for smuggling weapons, stolen
cars, cigarettes, alcohol, and people are at the center of security threats
in the Balkans. What we learned after September 11 is that terrorists’
networks often use drug and cigarette smuggling channels to spread
their activities. As recently as in 1999, 6.5 tons out of 60 tons of
marihuana confiscated in Western Europe are considered as smuggled
from Albania. Thus Albania and Morocco are considered the two major
drug suppliers to Western Europe. A number of publications in the
local and international press have documented that some of the
smuggling channels have functioned as government-run businesses.
Criminal lords are among the most devoted political donors in the
Balkans.  It is a well-documented fact that most of the local mafias are
ethnically based networks. This combination of ethnicity and criminality
is a critical element in sustaining violent accusations of other ethnic
groups. American academic Robert Hislope in a well-researched paper
claims that the brake of violence in Macedonia in year 2000 can be
directly related to the interests of the Albanian criminal groups. In his
view the combination between Albanian social criminality and the
corrupt Macedonian state is the major obstacle for the stabilization of
the country.
The criminalisation of the Balkan states and politics makes the tasks
of the international community much more difficult. The only way for
NATO and the EU to bring more security to the region is by policing
these countries, but these two organizations are inexperienced at
providing soft security. The reformulation of the security problem in
terms of policing has a significant impact on the division of labor among
the international security providers. The basic question is: Is the EU
ready to create a common police space including the Balkans. And
the answer to this question depends not on the possession of smart
weapons but on the capacity to create “smart borders” – borders open
for trade and closed for terrorists.
From the internal perspective, all public opinion polls conducted in the
past years indicated alarmingly high rates of insecurity. People feel
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insecure about their lives, their property, their communities and about
the states in which they live. The levels of physical and economic
insecurity are not much more different in the former Yugoslavia on the
one side and in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania on the other. It is the
weakness of one’s own state and not the aggressive behavior of
neighbors that is at the center of citizens’ concerns. A study of the
cost of security in the region will show that both citizens and businesses
spend huge amounts of money on security. They insure their cars with
mafia-controlled insurance agencies, pay protection money to the local
gangs, pay for security systems, and pay bribes to law enforcement
officials to motivate them to fulfill their obligations. The World Bank
calculated that 7 percent of firms’ turnover in Albania is paid as bribes.
The major complaint of citizens is that the weak state presents a threat
to their rights, which is no different from the arbitrary violence of the
communist state. In both cases citizens live in total insecurity. It is the
instrumentalization of insecurity and disorder that constitute the power
base for the collusion of polities and criminality.
The Social Condition
The decline in standards of living, the emergence of mass poverty, the
high rates of unemployment are not new to observers of the Balkans.
What remains unnoticed, however, is the dramatic rise in the physical
and social displacement of huge groups of society. In fact Balkan
democracies are the democracies of displaced people. This is obviously
true with respect to the war victims in former Yugoslavia, but it is also
true in a broader sense. How many people live in the place where they
lived 10 years ago? How many of them work in the same place? How
many of them stay in the same professional and friendly circles?
Migration to capitals and big cities and emigration to the West is a
well-documented story. But the story that remains untold is the
destruction of the old professional classes. The loss of status, no less
than the loss of income, determines the hostile attitude of huge groups
of people to the new status quo. Balkan societies are infected with
“status panic.”  Every sixth Albanian works abroad. Readiness to
emigrate has increased rather than declined in Bulgaria over the last
years. Around 52 percent of people state that if they had the opportunity,
they would emigrate from Bulgaria.
The process of social and physical displacement produces a key
20
distinction between mobile and immobile groups in the populace. Public
opinion polls in Bulgaria indicate that because of financial and
psychological constraints, the majority of respondents claim that they
have not left their town of residence for the last two years. The
localization of huge number of citizens, mainly old and disabled people,
their social paralysis and self-imposed exile is one of the sources for
the collapse of the support for the reform agenda. The destruction of
the old middle class is the structural explanation for the rise of political
volatility.
The volatility of the social framework has increased because of the
continued effects of the gap between the reform agenda and the short-
and mid-term expectations of citizens. The radical and extensive
programs of privatization and economic re-structuring have led to
unprecedented levels of unemployment and the virtual wipeout of entire
sectors of the economy and social networks underpinned by economic
activity. There has been a systemic process of impoverishment in
numerous sectors of the economy and society. In addition, there are
sectors of society that seem completely unable, in the short and
medium term, to resume employment. Economic recovery, in the
countries where it exists, has been patchy in and around the major
cities of the country. The much needed overhaul of the social insurance,
pension and health care systems has resulted in the undermining of
basic pillars of social reference and existence, producing enormous
personal insecurity and psychological volatility. This has translated into
a notable mistrust in the capacity of government to provide a set of
services and frameworks that ensure predictability and wellbeing. In
such a mindset, the political is predominantly perceived as the site of
improper redistribution and individual enrichment rather than a provider
of basic services. The social condition in the Balkans is a key factor
for volatility in individual and collective behavior. The welfare functions
of the communist state were critical for the old regime in securing a
certain legitimacy with the population. Now, when the post-communist
type of farewell state replaces the communist type of welfare state, it
naturally results in a legitimation crisis for the new democratic regimes.
But economic decline and the rise of social inequality do not translate
into rise of anti-democratic sentiments. The economic crises in the
Balkans have resulted in a demand for more and not for less
democracy. Polls indicate that people are dissatisfied with the
performance of their democratic regimes, but they do not look for non-
democratic alternatives. There are no thousands of protesters on the
streets of the Balkan capitals, there are no anti-IMF riots like in Latin
21
America. Societies seem not to have lost their patience. But the political
economy of post-communist patience should not be misread. People
are not protesting essentially because communism has destroyed their
capacity for collective action. Public criticism is expressed as criticism
of the corruption of the regime. So any citizens’ focused perspective
on the state of democracy of the Balkans should try to answer: Why
are the Balkans so corrupt, and why do governments fail to curb
corruption?
The Vicious Circle of Corruption
“Corruption is pervasive in the Balkans”. This is what you hear on the
streets, this is what Transparency International claims. Public officials
take bribes because they do not have a reason not to take bribes.
Private companies give bribes because they do not have an option not
to give. The purpose of our analysis is neither to measure corruption,
nor to focus on the structural causes of it. The last years have witnessed
a boom in anti-corruption studies. The rise of corruption has been
interpreted in cultural terms (the notion of Mediterranean corruption);
analyzed in terms of weak institutional environments, in terms of
communist legacies, and so on. We neither want to repeat the findings,
nor to question the proposed measures. Our question is: Why are
political parties engaged in corrupt exchanges and how does this affect
the democratic system? This report argues that epidemic party
corruption has to do not so much with communist legacies, post-
communist pathologies or the quality of the legal environment,
but with the increase of the cost of politics. In the early years of
transition, there was public resentment over the ideological nature of
the political process and over the extreme levels of political
confrontation. However, persistent accusations of corruption were
absent. The hypothesis we emphasize is that the process of the de-
ideologization of politics (the dissolution of the communism vs. anti-
communism axis) and the reduction of politics to a quarrel over minor
differences has resulted in a painful deficit in interest in politics and
produced a deficit of militants.
The vicious circle of corruption can be described as follows. The
massive withdrawal of the ideologically most motivated citizens from
political activities makes political communication much more expensive.
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In 1991 enthusiastic young people have been disseminating the posters
of political parties. In 1999 these young people were not enthusiastic
any more. To have their posters and leaflets distributed now, political
parties should pay. In 1991 citizens were on the streets, joining rallies
and discussion and it was quite easy for the politicians to get their
message across. In 1999 parties did not capture citizens’ imagination
any more and parties had to pay for commercials or for “friendly
coverage by the media.” Examples can continue, but they all show the
need for money that faces political parties. The result is that parties
started to sell their influence over the decision-making process. The
increased cost of politics and the effort to pay the price result in four
major consequences. First, people became even more disgusted with
politics, so the cost of politics went up. Second, the new politics led to
the promotion of new politicians, those that Della Porta called “business
politicians.” Third, the increased price of politics and massive efforts
to take money on behalf of the party reduced the moral cost of
corruption for the individual politicians. Those who perceived it as
normal to take money for the party started to take money for
themselves. Fourth, political parties decided to create a class of donors,
close to their parties. The privatization process in Bulgaria, for instance,
was turned into the instrument for promoting a UDF affiliated business
class. Privatization was not any more about what to sell, how to sell,
and at what price to sell, but to whom to sell and, in the cases of small
and medium enterprises, the investor perceived as strategic was the
friend of the party. Buying the media turned into the dream of the parties.
Thus, the need for money in the context of expensive politics is one of
the reasons why governments failed to fight corruption. It is not simply
the politicians’ greed for money, it is society’s lack of genuine politics
that drives corruption.
The second reason for governments’ inability to convince their citizens
that they are taking measures against corruption is related to the fact
that the actual level of corruption alone does not drive the anti-corruption
sentiments of the public. The corruption problem has two distinctive
faces. One is the actual level of corruption, the other is the escalation
of anti-corruption perceptions. CLS’s studies have shown that anti-
corruption sentiments in Bulgaria are driven not so much by the actual
levels of corruption, but by the total disappointment with the results of
transition and rising social inequality in general. Anti-corruption rhetoric
and anti-corruption sentiments are structurally more important for post-
communist politics than it is usually believed. In the absence of a viable
alternative to democracy and in the context of the de-politicization of
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the policy process, the anti-corruption rhetoric remains on the one
hand the only legitimate way to criticize the status quo and, on the
other hand, it is the only platform open to the anti-reformist parties. In
the case of Bulgaria, and also in other parts of the region, we can see
the emergence of the “muckraking moment” where the corrupt nature
of the elite is assumed and no one bothers to prove it. The existing
status quo is clearly illustrated by the fact that in Bulgaria in the last
decade none of the members of the political class has been convicted
for corruption, while at the same time the Prosecutors office is
investigating the 100 biggest privatization deals and most of the leading
political figures are under some sort of investigation. Up until now,
none of these investigations has been completed and the collected
evidence ends up not in court, but in the media. The result is not the
triumph of the rule of law, but a state of total insecurity and the increased
use of the Prosecutor’s office as an instrument for political pressure.
The perception of the public that everything is corrupt and everybody
is corrupt is the basic danger to Balkan democracies. Balkans are
threaten by the erosive effect of local corruption but also by the desire
of the international organizations to blame corruption for all failures of
the last decade.
In his studies Richard Rose has shown that what is common for those
who are ready to turn their back on democracy and look for alternatives
is not their incomes, their party affiliations, not former membership in
the communist party, but their conviction that their country is totally
corrupt. In this respect a democracy supportive anti-corruption
campaign should have two objectives – the one is to reduce corruption,
the other one is to make this improvement visible to the public. It is
difficult to guess which of these two objectives it is easier to achieve.
The present frustration with democracy in the region and the public
disaffection with it cannot be grasped without understanding the nature,
the logic and re-productive power of the current state weakness. The
shift to functioning democracy in the region depends on the success
of societies and governments to overcome state weakness in the
coming years. The persistence of weak states may lead to the slow
death of democracy in the Balkans.
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The Weak State
“Weak state” is a powerful term often used in the Balkan discourse. It
was never defined because there was the assumption that analytically,
but also practically, state weakness was obvious. It is enough to see
bad roads, to suffer electricity cuts or to queue for your last year’s
salary of public servants, in order to agree that the state is weaker
than it was and weaker than it should be. To the majority of analysts,
state weakness is like an elephant: you cannot exactly define it, but
you are sure that when you see it, you will recognize it.
In the current analysis of the Balkans, there are at least three different
ways to conceptualize state weakness. The strength of the state can
be measured in terms of capabilities and here, following Joel Migdal,
the state’s strength is defined as the capability of governments to
implement their policy visions, to penetrate society, to regulate and so
on. In this context, the strong state is able to collect its taxes and the
weak state fails to do so. It is in this “increasing capabilities” perspective
that most leaders in the region see the need to strengthen the state.
But the state can be efficient on the collecting side and yet a total
failure on the delivery side. So the second measure for assessment of
the state’s strength is the perception of consumers of the public goods
provided by the state. Is the state capable of delivering the rule of law?
Does it protect human and property rights? The third approach to state
weakness defines the weak state as a captured state, a state in which
particular group interests dominate the policy-making process, when
these interests in an illicit way shape the rules of the game. Russia, in
Yeltsin’s last years of power, fits perfectly with this description.
Most Balkan countries can be described as weak states in terms of
capacity, in terms of delivery, and in terms of capture. But our intention
is to conceptualize state weakness as a strategic behavior of the elites
constrained by public discontent and political conditionalities, and
involved in a predatory project of extracting resources from the state.
The devolution of state power after communism has been analyzed.
State weakness was explained as a result of a neo-liberal flirt with “the
striptease state” - the attempt to undress the state of all superficialities.
This approach does not explain a lot. Balkan states were never
governed by neo-liberals, but they nevertheless ended up naked. The
origin of the new elites and the process of the separation of party and
state basically contributed to state weakness. But it is important to
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emphasize that state weakness is not simply unintended consequence
of the reforms, it is the desired state of affairs for the significant parts
of the new elites. The claim of this report is that new democratic
elites in the Balkans have the extraction of the state as their
dominant project. The re-distribution of huge assets of state property
has as its result the transformation of political power into economic
power. The structural reason for the growing gap between the public
and the elites is that the elites do not need wealthy citizens to realize
their extraction project. To understand the logic of this process, it would
help to consider the post-communist Balkan countries as akin to oil
regimes where the role of oil is played by the huge state assets that
should be privatized. The elite’s refusal to take any responsibility for
the welfare of the people is at the heart of the crisis of the Balkan
democracies.
The paradox of transition is that the success of the reforms needs a
stable and durable policy consensus based on the long term goals of
development (economic growth, EU integration). At the same time,
the very process of transformation polarizes society, producing winners
and losers. Governments do not have a lot of room for maneuver. In
order to stay, they should follow the reform agenda prescribed by the
EU or IMF. The external constraints are institutionalized as Currency
Boards and other hard instruments. The decision of the international
factor to limit the flexibility of governments resulted from the permanent
failure of Balkan governments to keep their promises. It is the external
constraints that ensure basically the policy predictability of the region.
It is sufficient to recollect the collapse of the Albanian state, the
shattering political and economic crisis in Bulgaria in 1997, or even
simply to watch for a while the Kostunica - Djinjic war in Belgrade to
understand the desire of the West for policies binding the hands of the
elite. External constraints are aimed at arresting the extraction project
of the elites, but at the same time predatory elites use external pressure
to excuse its their lack of social responsibility. In this sense, external
conditionalities affect negatively the relations between politicians and
the public. Governments are elected after a love affair with the
electorate, but they are married to the international donors.
Viewed from below, the Balkan democracies are political regimes in
which the voters are free to change governments, but are very much
constrained in changing policies. Any pressure from below is
immediately labelled “populism.” The international factor does not see
anything wrong with parties winning elections on populist ticket and
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governing on the IMF ticket. This process is conceptualized as a
success of reforms. But if this development can be seen as positive in
the short run, it is destructive in the long run. The recurring failure of
voters to vote for a policy change can lead to three undesirable
developments: 1) it can bring to power a political party that is anti-
system in its character – Tudor, Sesel; 2) it divorces election
campaigning from the actual practice of governance and makes it
impossible to hold politicians accountable; 3) it makes political learning
ineffective.
Implications
The adoption of the citizens’ centered perspective to the analysis of
the state of democracy in the Balkans invites unexpected conclusions.
In 1995 Przeworski’s report on the chances of democracy (“Sustainable
Democracy”) predicted, “the combination of an increasing inequality
with reduced sovereignty is likely to exacerbate social conflicts and
weaken the nascent democratic institutions.” This prediction is coming
true in the Balkans.
There is a consensus that the fragility of democracy in the Balkans is
pre-determined by two sets of factors: Balkan factors and post-
communist factors. Balkan factors refer to the ethnic tensions and
historical controversies that are obstacles for co-operative behavior
and to the delayed and unfinished process of state formation in the
region.
Post-communist factors refer to the need for a parallel process of
democratization and restructuring of the economy in the conditions of
declining standards of living and economic hardship.
These factors matter. But reading the crisis through citizens’ eyes
suggests that some of the important factors contributing to the uncertain
prospects of democracy in the region are related to the general state
of politics these days. The expectation that the causes for the public
disaffection with democracy in the Balkans is caused by specific, Balkan
factors turns to be false. In its causes and manifestations the crisis of
democratization in the Balkans is not different from the crisis of
democracy in the developed countries. What can be different are the
consequences.
The growing gap between the public and political elite and the growing
mistrust in the democratic institutions is the very essence of the state
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of politics in the Balkans today.
In the elite’s discourse this growing gap is conceptualized as an
outcome of the needed but painful reforms on the one hand and the
failure of the reformist governments to communicate the reform policies
on the other hand. The policy response to the crisis is conceptualized
as a need for a more efficient communication policy. As a result, the
amount of money spent by the World Bank and EU on “communicating
reforms” is increasing considerably.
In our view the present crisis is not a crisis of communica-
tion but a crisis of representation.
Voters are in a trap. On the hand, they want the international community
to control their corrupt politicians, but, on the other hand, they want to
have a say in the policy making process. International players also
contribute to the de-legitimization of the elites. They do not punish the
elites for breaking their contracts with the voters, but on the contrary,
they encourage them to do so. The international community punishes
governments that break their promises to the IMF, but is not interested
to what extent politicians are keeping their promises to the voters.
In the stream of the current analytical conclusions, this report argues
for radical re-thinking of the current democracy assistance paradigm.
The focus of a possible new approach will aim at replacing the current
democracy without politics into a real political democracy. The major
policy objective should be to strengthen democracy, re-connecting the
agenda of reforms and the public agenda and re-gaining the trust of
the people for democratic institutions.
Re-thinking the democracy assistance strategies can result in different
policy packages for the different Balkan countries, but they necessarily
assume
• A re-thinking of the impact of different electoral systems on
the chances of the voters to promote policy change.
International community has consciously been in favor of PR
representation in the Balkans. It is time now to look for changes
in the existing electoral systems that will help re-connect the
representatives and represented.
• A re-thinking of the dominance of the experts’ perspective as
the only legitimate perspective in shaping transition policies.
• A re-thinking of the hostile view on the instruments of popular
democracy like local and national referendums. In a situation
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in which EU integration limits the power of the citizens to influ-
ence certain policy areas it is of great importance to turn mu-
nicipalities into real homes of genuine politics. De-centraliza-
tion should be designed and promoted as an instrument for
re-politicizing society.
• A re-thinking of the effect of external constraints on political
process. There is a need for designing special policies to com-
pensate for the democratic deficit created in the process of
EU accession.
• A re-thinking of who are the real agents of democratic con-
solidation. In our view assistance to political parties and re-
forms of the political parties must be a priority.
• A re-thinking of the best strategy to use NGOs as catalyst for
open democratic politics. In our opinion there is a need to re-
consider the view that civic activities should be de-politicized.
The only way to re-connect elites and the public is through bringing
politics back in and promoting conflict and the democratic manner of
conflict resolution as the source of democracy’s strength. Democracy
should not be afraid of politics, without genuine political process
democracy cannot survive in the Balkans.
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ANNEX 1
Corruption Indices
Countries 1998 1999 2000 2001
  Albania - 2,3 - -
  Bulgaria 2,9 3,3 3,5 3,5
  Macedonia - 3,3 - -
  Yugoslavia 3,0 2,0 1,3 -
Source: Transparency International
ANNEX 2
Unemployment Rate (%)
Countries 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
  Albania 19.6 16.9 12.4 14.9 17.8 18.0 17.1 15.0*
  Bulgaria 12.8 11.1 12.5 13.7 12.2 16.0 17.9 17.3
  Macedonia 31.4 37.7 31.9 36.0 34.5 32.4 32.1 30.5
  Montenegro - - - - - - 40.0 -
  Yugoslavia 23.1 24.6 25.7 24.5 23.1 32.6 40.5 -
* Of the Labor force
Source: Nations in Transition 2001, Freedom House
National Employment Agency, Bulgaria
Statistical Office of Macedonia
INSTAT Bulletin “Konjktura”, Albania
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ANNEX 3
Confidence in Parliament
December 2001
Countries Confidence No confidence
  Bulgaria 27.0 55.0
  Macedonia 6.8 91.8
  Yugoslavia * 41.8 52.8
  Montenegro ** 31.6 53.3
* Federal Parliament
** January 2002
Source: BBSS Gallup International
ANNEX 4
Support of the Democratic System
Does the country heading the right direction?
2001
Countries Right Wrong
  Bulgaria 31.0 20.0
  Macedonia 17.2 80.6
  Yugoslavia 39.7 37.9
Source: BBSS Gallup International
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BALKAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: CRISIS,
POLICY AND BUSINESS
Martin Dimitrov, Petya Platikanova and Krassen Stanchev,
Institute for Markets Economics, Sofia3
Tacit beliefs
The key question to answer about Balkans is: what will happen if and
when peacekeeping and stabilization troops withdraw from the
Balkans?
There are three intuitively possible, a priori answers: “folks there will
start fighting again”4 , “the crisis predisposition will disappear due to
the progress to date”, and “existing tensions are to sustain with
reoccurring periods of co-existence and war”.
There is no direct answer to this question, but there are international
policies aiming to improve the situations on the peninsula.  Meanwhile,
there is no debate on what was the past; everybody knows there were
3
 This paper is prepared for National Endowment for Democracy/CSIS/DPI workshop-
conference in Washington DC on February 5, 2002.  It is based on the IME eight years
of research and reforms promoting experience in the Balkans, including cooperation
with leading think tanks from the region.  Most of the background materials are available
on the IME website (www.ime-bg.org/Balkans and CEE).  The constitutional overview,
comparison and analysis was undertaken two years ago with the support of the Open
Society Fund – Sofia, the preliminary work was performed by Petya Mandova,
researcher at IME.  The institutional, macroeconomic and trade perspectives use some
data from SEE Trade and Institution, a paper drafted by Martin Dimitrov and Krassen
Stanchev, which is due to appear on The Vienna Institute for International Economic
Studies - WIIW website (www.wiiw.ac.at) in March 2002.  The company perspective,
reflected briefly here, is taken from the recent book: Margot E. Machol, Neil Cohen
(editors), Obstacles to Trade, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness. Ten Cases
on Balkan Businesses, Sofia, The Balkan Network, 2001 (it is also available on:
www.balkannetwork.org, downloading is encouraged, notification appreciated:
info@balkannetwork.org).
4
 In the last seven years, we witnessed three principal peace accords: the Dayton
Accord of 1995, the Kumanovo Agreement of 1999, and the Ohrid Agreement of 2001.
None of these seemed have stopped the spread of violence and violation of international
humanitarian norms.
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crises in the recent and more distant background.5
The international initiatives, e.g. the Stability Pact6 , assume that
there are two key policy responses to the crises of the past:
• Economic exchange and freedom would boost prosperity;
• And becoming rooted in election and representative democ-
racy would set institutional preconditions for both economic
development and human rights.
The very fact there is a concerted (or at least pretending to be
concerted) international effort suggests that the implicit assumption
is: “they will start again.”  The motivation behind the initiatives is to
avoid unthinkable consequences from previous conflicts.  The key
idea of this report is to provide insights that would, perhaps, help in
answering the above question.
We do not mean that basic values underlying the political thinking and
improvisation about contemporary Balkans are incorrect or inapplicable;
the problem is that they are right but irrelevant to the situation.  The
Balkans and the international initiatives about them look as if they are
running on different orbits and at different paces around the same
value centers.
True, democracy will rather produce responsible government and bring
normalcy back to the region and would eventually integrate it
internationally.  But the real politics of the day prove that democratization
of Serbia has little to do with provisional resolution of the status of
Kosovo, and ethnic self-determination in Kosovo does not necessarily
mean liberal democracy, protection of human rights and non-militant
“constitution making” in Macedonia.
 5
 In the 20th century most countries have used some form of “soft” ethnic cleansing;
e.g., the last pre-Yugoslavian case was the expulsion of Bulgarian ethnic Turks in
May-June 1989 to neighbouring Turkey (after they were deprived of their property
rights).  Similar events or negotiated “exchanges” of population, not very different from
cleansing and deprivation, have been reoccurring in the last 120 years or so.  Memories
are alive while there is no critical mass of orientation towards the future.
6
 There is an analogy with the EU phrase about “stability and growth pact”, which
designates the agreement that if in the euro-zone a government runs a fiscal deficit of
above 3% of respective country’s GDP it must be fined up to 0.5% of GDP.  The
Stability Pact for SEE lacks such a strong “enforcement treat” but it contains a treat of
anticipated humiliation of a country (leadership, politicians) that fails to demonstrate
its commitment to the Pact’s values.  In a sense, the Stability Pact for SEE enforcement
mechanism is more rooted in the political ritual rather than political decision-making.
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There is also a tacit belief that if economies are more interdependent
and governments and people trade more with each other, they are
less likely to resort to violence, since companies and citizens have
much to lose.
Unfortunately, neither the Stability Pact nor the EU Stabilization and
Association Agreement managed to prevent the March – August 2001
crisis in Macedonia.
In the pages that follow we make an attempt to summarize the situation
with real-life conditions that could support or counteract the working of
the prosperity and democratization ideas towards resolution of the
conflicts of the Balkans.  In doing so, we focus – in a comparative
perspective - on two sets of conditions: a) the role, the sizes and the
constitutional design7  of the Balkan governments, and b) the habits
and options in trading and business with and within the region.
Those who trade, fight?
Global economic divisions are different from those the world lived in
even one decade ago.  Reform leaders coped with legacies of the
COMECON and re-oriented their capital and trade flows.  These
economies seek a niche in the global economy.  The political process
of building a nation state in the mid-late nineteenth century manner,
when mono-centric European alliances were presumed and conceived
as territorial expansion of economic influence, is rather odd.  Then,
the territorial identity was perceived as a precondition of prosperity, as
governments’ bargaining chip to seek rents from one alliance or
another.  Balkan nations, then, had fallen victims of these notions,
fighting several wars with one another.
Now, prosperity depends on competitiveness and innovation, on
whether a national economy falls into the group of technology-producing
or technology-consuming economies.  Balkan governments and
businesses try their best to qualify for inclusion in the EU protectionist
framework.  If in the nineteenth century it was somehow politically
justifiable to fight for territorial influence on the Balkans, at the end of
the twentieth it was not.  The region does not provide for natural
resources on which other economies would depend, and, thus, there
would be no need to protect investment and trade routes.
7
 In the paragraphs below we deal with issues of property rights and government
machinery, there is supplementary report on the constitution making in the region.
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In comparison to reform leaders, Balkan countries faced different
challenges.  Slovenia from day one has 60% trade with EU.  Bulgarian
COMECON-trade in 1970 - 1980’s averaged around 60%, in
Czechoslovakia it was 51-52%, Romania - less than 30%, Hungary
and Poland - 40% and 50%.8   There is no principal difference between
Balkan and EU accession countries in terms of volumes trade with
Europe:in either case it is above 65%.  Former Yugoslav economies
face the challenge of competing on EU markets and restoring links
with former fellow members of the Communist Yugo-federation.  Non-
transition Balkans, Greece and Turkey, are also different – one being
a part of the EU single market, and the other - in a free trade agreement
with EU and virtually free trade relationship to Middle East (and Israeli)
markets.  The issue is whether and how it is possible to convert this
diversity into mutual benefit.  The Balkans does not constitute an
economic notion, rather a political one.
As mentioned, the EU is the biggest trading partner for all Balkan
economies.  On the other hand, in 1998 (the best trade year), transition
Balkans together had merely 1.6% of EU imports and 4.4% of exports.
It is no major market for EU.  Excluding Bulgaria and Romania, it is
less than 1% of EU imports.  The alternative Balkan market has its
own peculiarities.
There is a strong pattern of gravity –dependence on geographic location
and proximity.9
For Bulgaria, the proximity matters in the trade with Greece, a third
partner since 1994 and EU member.  Bosnia and Herzegovina, FR
Yugoslavia and Macedonia have around 1/5 or higher portions of their
trade with a neighbouring country from the Balkans.  Croatia until 1999
(i.e. the end of Tudjman’s rule and related difficulties negotiating with
EU) exports rather extensively to the neighbouring countries.  Again
Bosnia and Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia and Macedonia have relatively
high neighbour shares in their exports.  Data for different years do not
suggest a different picture.10   In 1999 and 2000, the total internal Balkan
8
 Rumen Dobrinski, Transition Failures: Anatomy of the Bulgarian Crisis, Vienna,
WIIW, 1997, p.7.
 9
 A series of special WIIW surveys (which are to pasted on the website in March
2002) confirms this estimate.
10
 The constellations have changed with regard to Bulgaria: in 2000 its Balkan trade
tripled, due to petroleum exports to FR Yugoslavia and the free trade agreement with
Macedonia, which in 2000 equaled Russia in Bulgarian exports.
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is rather negligible as a volume: 4.5-4.7%11 of the aggregated regional
GDP (including Greece, Slovenia, and Turkey).  If we exclude these
three countries and account for unregistered trade, the Balkans’ trade
to GDP ratio is 11-12%.
At the same time, it is obvious that the three most trading countries
are those that experienced internal civic conflict and violence.
This coincidence of larger regional trade exposure and internal conflict
may be explained by a different hypothesis.
One is the above-mentioned competition on the grounds of the
nineteenth century economic and influence patterns: the greater the
trade, the greater the temptation to resort to physical (direct) control
over trade routes and territories, in order to extort taxes.
Another one is the accumulation of trade deficits, a fact often interpreted
in these countries as almost equal to invasion that put in jeopardy
domestic businesses (and prosperity).
As the graph below shows that, besides Macedonia (where the deficit
results from the Kosovo crisis),the current account deficits are quite
typical, not only for transition Balkans, but for other ex-central-planning
economies as well.
In economic reality, these deficits reflect the underlying restructuring
process of economies that produce goods, which even domestic
customers do not buy; i.e. a situation when liberalization of imports is
11
 Figures quoted for 2000 are estimates since data is  incomplete; source: national
statistics offices and central banks, data for Bosnia and Herzegovina are missing.
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the only way to overcome shortages, allow for purchasing cheaper
produce and force outdated industries to restructure.  But then – in
political reality - idle or privilege-driven businesses could attempt
influencing the government (or para-governmental groups) to protect
“the nation” or to compensate for the losses.  Thus, the body politic
could embark on enforcement of protection and rent/tax-extortion
through the use of force.  This must not be actual; but it should, however,
be taken into account as one of the ideas to support formation of nation-
states, a sovereign polity that presumably would better protect the
interest “of the people”.
Government role: the constellations of 2001
A factor whose impact is difficult to foresee in detail is the September
11 terrorist attacks.  Options before individual Balkan governments
and economies are changing.  We assume that the following new
realities must be taken into account:
1. There is a coincidence of different impacts: the economic slow-
down and in EU and USA, the crisis in Macedonia and Sep-
tember 11.
2. The general reasoning suggests that the former two impacts
are direct and would be more significant for the economies of
the Balkans, in the short-medium term.
3. The combined impact will be less FDI, at least in a medium-
term perspective: SEE is being considered a risky region, and,
under current circumstances, this image would still be scar-
ing investors away.
4. Balkan capital markets are in status nascendi, this underde-
velopment would prevent direct impacts related to the so-called
capital flight to quality.  (The reorientation of portfolio invest-
ment would hardly have an impact on SEE; it never enjoyed
such investment.)  Only two countries, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia12 , are exposed to international financial markets where
they trade their foreign debt securities and Eurobonds.
5. Economic performance would depend more on the perfor-
12
 Attempts to raise funds directly on the market are typical also for Croatia (there are
issues of government US dollar denominated T-bills, depositary receipts of Zagrebacka
banka, etc.) but respective amounts are negligible and maturity is short term (for T-
bills average maturity is less than a year.)
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mance on the reform front, but countries that will provisionally
tap international sovereign debt (or corporate credit) market
will face difficulties.  Due to the lack of portfolio investment
and the flight to quality, the indirect (but important) impact of
September 11 will be that the borrowing for the needs of the
Balkan economies will be more expensive.
6. The countries can hope for finance predominantly from de-
velopment banks: IMF, IBRD, EIB and EBRD.  In other words,
typical government involvement in transition and development
issues would remain relatively high.  This is also true the role
of the government borrowing and the role of IFI’s.
7. The nature of the war on terrorism does not suggest it would
be instantaneous.  There will be a longer-term reallocation of
both equity and fixed-income investment toward companies
and sovereigns that would spend more on the prerequisites
of this war and on industrial sectors that serve security is-
sues.
8. Balkan economies have limited if no presence in such indus-
tries, but governments will be expected to ensure needed
security surveillance, i.e. to spend more on army and security
activities.
9. There is also an obvious shift in the political attention and in
aid provision, on which Balkan countries tend to rely.
10. Constraints on aid-provision could be interpreted as a posi-
tive development, while the re-focus of political attention is
probably not.  The international consensus to curb terrorism
is a political, though not practical, treat to Balkan paramilitary
groupings13 .  Perhaps September 11 will have the result that
the violence would not be supported to serve as a catalyst for
constitutional changes.
Most of these constellations impose challenges before Balkan
governments.  In the two paragraphs below, we attempt a comparison
of different measurements of government economic tasks and the
constitutional designs that would presumably provide or prevent
prosperity and efficient functioning of the government machinery.
13
 They would probably not enjoy good-meaning names after September
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Government role and size
It is almost impossible to have a unified notion outlining typical features
of Balkan governments.  Countries are at different situations in relation
to the outside extra-regional world, e.g. EU, NATO, and even UN.
Total expenditures in general government budget / GDP in %
a – Excludes municipal government operations for Republika Srpska and military
expenditures financed by external grants
b – Excluding local budgets
Source: Statistical Background Data, WIIW, 2000; IMF Country Reports; IME own
calculations
Measured as a percent of expenditures to GDP, Balkan government
sizes are not exceptionally large.  The “smallest” government is that of
Albania, while the largest is the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
and there are rather obvious explanations of this fact.  There are no
comparable data for 2000 and 2001.  The regularity, however, is that
there is no significant change in either direction, and that countries in
the region sustain relatively big governments.  It makes sense to what
these governments do.
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999
Albania 32.6 29.5 30.7 31.6
B&Ha 49.7 41 53 50.5
Bulgaria 43.7 35.6 40.3 43.3
Croatia b 29.2 28.3 30.7 34
Macedonia 36.9 35.3 41.6 44
Romania 34.1 34.3 38.3 40.4
Yugoslavia 47.7 53.3 40.1 n.a.
Greece 42.7 40.3 39.7 35.2
Hungary 49.3 49.7 48.3 47.9
Slovenia 42.4 43.2 43.7 44.4
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Country Economic Freedom of the World 2001
(Fraser Institute) a
Index of Economic Freedom
(Heritage)
2002
Government
Consumption as a
% of Total (1999)
Transfers and
Subsidies as a % of
GDP (1999)
Government Intervention c
Albania 9.0  (9.6b) 7.8  (8.6b) 3.0
Croatia 2.8 (30.5) 4.8 (19.5) 3.0
Bulgaria 6.7 (17.1) 6.5 (13.3) 3.0
Macedonia n.a n.a. 3.0
Romania 6.7 (17.4) 6.7 (12.4) 3.0
Yugoslavia n.a. n.a. 3.0
Hungary 7.5 (14.4) 4.7 (20) 1.0
Poland 7.1 (16) 3.7 (23.5) 2.0
Czech
Republic
3.8 (27) 2.8 (27.1) 2.0
Slovenia 3.8 (27) 1.0 (33.7) 3.0
Germany 4.5 (24.9) 4.5 (20.8) 2.0
Greece 6.6 (17.5) 8.6 (5.6) 2.0
Hong Kong 7.8 (13.5) - 2.0
Switzerland 6.0 (19.5) 5.5 (17.2) 2.5
USA 5.4 (21.8) 5.6 (16.5) 2.0
Governments in business
a – Scores from 0 to 10 (10 - Benchmark representing maximum economic freedom)
b – Government Consumption as a % of  Total and Transfers and Subsidies as a % of
GDP
c – Scores from 1 to 5 (1 – Benchmark representing maximum economic freedom);
The measure comprises both government consumption and government production
Source: Economic Freedom of the World, Heritage Index of Economic Freedom
The above table makes an attempt to summarize available
data on government’s size and role in the economy.  It gives an
opportunity to compare Balkan countries (except Bosnia and
Herzegovina which, for obvious reasons, is not monitored) with core
EU accession countries and five relatively well performing leaders of
economic liberty.
The data is for 1999, the year that gives background for comparison;
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for lack of space, previous years are omitted (but there are no significant
differences from previous years).  Both indexes are far from perfect,14
but they give an opportunity to neutralize dramatic political
developments, which fit the overall inertia of economic phenomena,
including that of economic freedom.
In both indexes, Balkan governments demonstrate relatively high levels
of government interference, combined with, naturally, low levels of
economic activity.  This situation is significantly different from countries
that maintain comparable levels of expenditures, transfer and subsidies,
but regularly demonstrate a higher degree of economic freedom.  An
exception is Albania.  Its government is rather small, but it lacks reliable
market institutions, which ranks the country relatively unfree.
Economic freedom is understood as liberty to engage in business and
accumulate prosperity, restrained only by the need to sustain this
opportunity.
The table below exhibits a comparison between one of the economic
freedom indexes and the latest Transparency International CPI for
five Balkan countries,15  including Greece (EU and NATO member)
and Slovenia (reforms, prosperity and EU accession front-runner, in
comparison with the rest transition Balkans), plus Hungary (NATO
member and EU accession leader).
Economic freedom and corruption in 2001
a – Scores from 0 to 10 (10 - Benchmark representing maximum economic freedom)
b – Scores from 0 to 10 (10 – Benchmark representing minimum level of corruption)
Country Economic Freedom of the
World
(Fraser Institute) a
Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions
Index b
Bulgaria 5.9 3.9
Croatia 5.2 3.9
Romania 3.8 2.8
Greece 7.3 4.2
Slovenia 6.2 5.2
Hungary 7.1 5.3
14
 These indexes use data of the one or two years back and give higher weight to
background years in comparison to last or current year.
15
 TI does not monitor other countries.
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Usually, there is a strong correlation between the perception of
corruption and the lack of economic freedom, although the latter is
measured objectively.16   Balkan countries are no exception.
Balkan Polities: a constitutional comparison
Many constitutions in the region prevent flexibility on ethnic issues in
their concept of statehood, envisage a constituent nation,17  ban
autonomy,18  restrict foreigners from owning land, or prohibit political
representation of ethnic and religious minorities.19   To this list one
should add constitutional provision for inefficient government
machinery, protected monopolies and the ambiguous manner to
impose duties on its citizens through minor government acts.
Central Europe did not need to build statehoods; they focused on
division of powers and fixing government machinery.  Romania and
Bulgaria, due to not breaking with the past during the 1990 elections,
embarked on constitution making as a form of legitimising a new
political establishment, both communist and non-communist.
Besides building nation-state political establishments and societies in
transition, the Balkans had to encounter more severe economic
challenges.  All of them (i.e. former Yugoslav countries and territories
plus Romania and Bulgaria) lost (except Slovenia) more markets than
any of the other transition countries.  This prevented prompt
liberalization of prices and trade (esp. imports), preventing pressures
on domestic businesses to restructure, but sustaining attempts to gain,
16
 See: Krassen Stanchev, Bureaus, investment and honest policies, IME Newsletter,
vol. 5, 1998, November.
17
 E.g., the Croatian Constitution says: “Croatia, the nation-state of the Croatian people
and the state of other nationalities and minorities which are its citizens”; the Macedonian
Constitution used to contain quite a similar statement: “Macedonia, the national state
of the Macedonian people, which guarantees the complete civic equality and perma-
nent cohabitation of the Macedonian people with the Albanians, Turks, Roma, and
other nationalities living there.”  The Bulgarian Constitution states that “the official
language is Bulgarian” (Article 3), while 10% of the citizenry has the Turkish as mother
tongue.
18
 E.g., Article 21 of the Bulgarian Constitution.
19
 E.g., in the Constitution of Bulgaria one may find the statement that “the traditional
religion [in the country] is the Orthodox Christian congregation” (Article 13.2), and that
political parties established on “ethnic, racial or religious lines” are not allowed (Article
11.4), while such parties exist de facto and it is almost impossible to implement this
provision de jure.
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seek rent and prosper at the expense of the others with the help of the
government.  Incorporation and entry barriers are more costly, the
business environment is worse, and FDI much lower than in Central
Europe.  Eventually, these developments were incorporated in
respective constitutional and basic legal arrangements.
A complete constitutional perspective is beyond the capacity of this
report.  I would limit the discussion to themes that are presumably
more or less directly related to prosperity and functions of democracy.
Property rights
As explained by Epstein20 , property rights are protected not only when
the holders of these rights are free from physical invasion or the threat
thereof, but also if they may transfer them legally at lower costs.
Balkan constitutions are preoccupied with protection of property rights,
but this is a relatively common feature of many post-Communist
constitutional arrangements.  All constitutions proclaim to protect private
property rights. In the constitutions of Bulgaria (Article 17.1), Macedonia
(Article 30.1), Poland (Article 21.1 and 64), Slovakia (Article 20.1),
Slovenia (Article 33) and Yugoslavia (Article 51) the state protects not
only property rights, but also inherited property rights.  There are similar
provisions in the constitutions of Germany (Article 14.1), but not in
such a detail.  Albania’s constitution even lists the ways of acquiring a
property (“by gift, inheritance, purchase or any other classical means
provided by the Civil Code” - Article 41.2).  At the same time, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Czech Republic and Croatia do not stipulate in explicit
wording that the property rights are sacred, but this fact does not
necessarily mean lack of their protection.
There are many provisions that protect private property from invasion.
In all constitutions there are rules on the privacy of the home.  The
home is “inviolable” (e.g. Bulgaria; Article 33.1); it is a part of private
life protected by the constitutions (Bosnia and Herzegovina; Article
3).21   The court can intervene in private property only when there are
concerns that a crime was committed there (Croatia; Article 34.2).
The property rights might be violated if there is a statutory stipulation,
20
 Epstein, R. The Public Trust Doctrine, Cato Institute, Cato Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2
(Fall 1987).
21
 From all transitional constitutions only those of Slovenia and Czech Republic there
are not exclusive provisions on the home inviolability.
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in case of a need to protect “public order or health”, or “the rights and
liberties of others” (Estonia; Article 33 and Macedonia; Article 26).
There might be other arguments, as is stipulated in the constitution of
Romania, “to defend national security or public order” (Article 27.2,3).
The constitution of Slovakia is rather vague; the conditions under which
private property might be violated are: if this is “inevitable in a
democratic society” and it is done to protect “lives, health, or property”,
or “public order”.22
However, there are different stipulations on the conditions that the
state might divert private property rights.  Only in “the public interest”
the state might limit or expropriate property (Albania; Article 41.3).
The property rights should be infringed by law (Estonia; Article 32)
and/or after final judgment of the court (Poland; Article 46).  If public
benefits are higher than costs of violating property rights, then the
state can limit or expropriate private property (Romania; Article 41).
The state might define not only the public interest, but also the needs
of society and the national economy, which can justify the restrictions
imposed on the property rights (Slovakia; Article 20).  The property
rights impose duties to be used not only in private but also in the public
interest, as is stated in the Macedonian constitution; for public interests
they might be diverted (Article 30).  In the constitution of Slovenia, it is
also stated that the property rights must be regulated and the benefits
from them are supposed to be economic, social and environmental
(Article 67).  In the constitution of Hungary it is stipulated that it can be
done only in the public interest, but if there are exceptional cases (Article
13).  The property rights can be diverted when there are state or
municipal needs, which “shall be effected only by virtue of a law,
provided that these needs cannot be otherwise met” (Bulgaria; Article
17).  In the constitution of Poland it is stipulated also that in a state of
emergency there might be compensation for diverting property rights
(Article 228).  The public interest might direct the state in diverting
property rights when rendering public services.  In the constitution of
Slovakia the state controls natural resources, which are excluded from
other constitutional provisions on property rights (Article 4).  The
property rights might be restricted if public services are rendered.
However, there are also constitutional rules, which provide a
discretionary power of the government to control how they are used
22
 In the Slovak constitution one can also find that if “the tasks of public officials”
require that, the inviolability of the home, which is used for performing different
economic activities, might not be defended (Article 21.3).
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(Slovakia; Article 20.3).
Land is believed to be of the highest national value.
The property rights are protected if they can be transferred legally at
lower costs.  There are different provisions on property rights over
land.  As already mentioned, in Bulgaria “arable land shall be used for
agricultural purposes only” (Article 21.2).  There are other legal barriers
to obtain property rights over land: constitutions ban foreigners from
buying agriculture land, as it is in Bulgaria23  and Romania (Article 41.2).
In many other (but not only Balkan) constitutions, the conditions are
stipulated b law under which foreigners may acquire property (which
makes it difficult or illegal): Croatia (Article 48), Estonia (Article; 32.3),
Macedonia (Article 31) and Slovenia (Article 68.1).  In Bulgaria, there
is also a law on protecting land, which repeats the constitutional
directive that the arable land should be used only for growing agricultural
products.  In fact, around 40% of the agriculture land is not used at all.
Constitutions and crisis
Every representative democracy requires a set of rules for peaceful
changes of government.  Perhaps given the background of the region,
Balkan constitutional fathers have paid particular attention to the rules
of changing the government in times of political crisis.  It does not
seem very efficient in the area of real politic.
Article 99 of Bulgaria’s constitution gives an opportunity for three
consecutive attempts to form a cabinet in case of failure (resignation,
non-confidence vote), the first assigned to the political faction that
failed, while the head of state is almost obliged to submit the mandate
to it.  In addition, there is no deadline in between the attempt ofr all
three of them in order to end the crisis and/or opt for fresh elections.
In fact, the constitution provides for a sort of second try for the
incumbents (who just resigned or deserved no confidence) to form a
new executive and for endless bargaining that in principle could be
repeated several times during the mandate.  In reality, both scenarios
happened after the adoption of the constitution, in 1992 and in 1997.
The procrastinated crisis of 1992 stopped the reforms and brought
about ad hoc majorities in the parliament.  The crisis of 1996-early
1997 was resolved only thanks to the successful attempt of President
23
 “No foreign physical person or foreign legal entity shell acquire ownership over
land, except through legal inheritance” (Article 22.1).
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Stoyanov and the National Security Council to convince the then-
incumbent Socialists not to opt for a second cabinet.
Before the recent amendments, the constitution of Croatia did not
contain the hypothesis that the president is, among other thing, a mortal
human being.  In the period preceding the elections of 2000, Romania
had been twice brought to the verge of a constitutional crisis due to
the fact that the constitution does contain an indisputable mechanism
for replacing the prime minister.  This did not prevent, however, a
development which allowed President Constantinescu and the chaotic
parliamentary majority to replace two heads of the cabinet and to
reshuffle a number of times key ministers.
None of the Balkan constitutions (exception is Yugoslavia, article 82)
deals with a political crisis necessitated by a failure to adopt a budget.
Such a fiscal inefficiency, however, is a key hypothesis of in the case
of Poland (atricle 225).
Adopted after the statehood crisis of 1997, the Albanian constitution is
probably the most specific on these procedures.  Articles 87, 90, 91,
96, 104 and 105 envisage five failures (reoccurring in a one-week
time) of the legislature to elect a council of ministers; a repetition of
this failure after fresh elections; procedures to impeach the head of
state for “serious violations of the constitution”; three reoccurring in
periods of 10-day failures of the parliamentary majority to vote the
prime-minister and two 15-day-attempts of the majority to elect a prime
minister in an event of non-confidence.  Perhaps the most (among
Balkan countries) interestingly designed procedure to tackle a political
crisis on a federal level is provided by the Federal republic of Yugoslavia
(articles 82-84, 97-98 and 103-104): the legislature “shall be dissolved
at the request of the federal government” (article 83.1) but may not
happen if “if the procedure for a vote of confidence in the federal
government has been initiated” (article 83.2).
Some conclusions
As Stefano Bianchini comments, all of the post-communist constitutions
guarantee the right to private property.  The role of the state, however,
is not only in adopting legal rules but also in protecting specific rights
that are basic for reinforcing the national sovereignty of the Balkan
countries.  These rights are a part of the security doctrines.  All that
can be found in the constitutional provisions, in which restrictions are
imposed on foreigners to own land.  The state and the land are used
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as synonyms.  The explanation for these constitutional rules, which is
provided by Bianchini, is that for the politicians in the Balkans, the
control over the land is a conditio sine qua non for avoiding any “semi-
colonial status”.  The property rights are also related to the unresolved
problem of the ethnic minorities.24
The analysis from government monitoring results by different
organizations reveals the following repetitious Balkan features of the
size and the involvement of the government:
• There are relatively large governments,
• There are high levels of government transfers and subsidies,
• Comparatively low levels of economic freedom are rather
common,
• And there is a high level of perception of corruption.
The general conclusion is that the majority of the Balkan transition
governments are big in terms of interference and weak in promoting
and/or allowing prosperity to work.  The constitutional set up of the
Balkan countries often does not provide by itself for either efficient
government or for effective protection of property rights.  However,
constitutions of other reform countries are not much better, while the
governments are basically two times more effective in terms of
prosperity.  As we shall see below: Balkans restore their pre-reform
national income twice as slowly in comparison with countries of Central
Europe.  The impression is that individual countries were preoccupied
to curb the memories of central planning and the lack private
perspective but failed to secure condition for prosperity.
In comparison, the basic laws of Hungary, Czech Republic or Poland
deal less with property rights and relatively little with political crisis
hypothesis.  Some constitutions, as the ones of Albania and Bulgaria,
seem to have designed their government machinery with the idea to
provide for political stability.  The manner in which they do so is to
stabilize the incumbent government, making internal political transitions
costly and difficult to control.
24
 Bianchini, Stefano, “The Idea of State in Post-Communist Balkan Societies”, In
State Building in the Balkans. Longo Aditore Ravenna. 1998. p. 64.
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The size of the region (backgrounds of being of interest)
The dependency on international initiatives, constellations and
agreements and the inability to cope with the past legacy in Balkan
countries is jeopardized by the low income of these economies.
Bulgaria’s GDP per capita is 1/5 of the EU lower rank economies.
The average SEE GDP per capita at market exchange rates in 1998
(before the Kosovo crisis) was USD 1,793.  The lowest GDP per capita
was in Albania (USD 1,110).
The highest nominal GDP per capita in the same year was in Croatia
- USD 4,635.  The total SEE GDP was USD 94.92 billion.  It is 0.32%
of the nominal value of the 1998 world output.  If we exclude Romania
(which is roughly 40% of the total SEE), the remaining SEE GDP for
1998 is USD 58.12 billion, i.e. 0.2% of the world output. (Average per
country means 0.033%).  Excluding Romania, the total SEE GDP was
roughly 1/12 of the combined 1998 public procurement budget of the
EU member states.
In terms of PPP, however, the differences are not so drastic (see the
table below).
A GDP per capita comparison suggest that between 1870 and 1989,
neither market nor central planning could generate prosperity at best
available standards.  The CEE countries did not change their relative
position vis-à-vis Western Europe and the West in general.  The
situation of the Balkan countries is likely to be worse than in CEE.
CEE Per Capita GDP as Percentage of the West25
After more than ten years of transition to a market economy, the SEE
countries have restored between 70 and 80% of their pre-reform GDP
25
 Ivan T. Berend, From Plan to Market, From Regime Change to Sustained Growth in
Central and Eastern Europe, Economic Survey of Europe, UNECE, 2000, No 2/3, p.
49, a quotation of A. Madison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992, OECD,
Paris, 1995, p. 212.
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levels.  As a result of the complicated situation in Serbia (in economic
and political aspect in the last few years) this indicator has lower value
there, compared to the other countries in the region.  B&H, as a newly
emerged country, is a statistical exception with 621,8% GDP growth in
1994 - 2000.  (In terms of real GDP growth per capita, it is a fairly
typical SEE country).
GDP per capita in USD at PPP (Purchasing Power Parity)26
When comparing the Central European countries’ growth with those
in SEE, we cannot miss the point of restoration of 1989 GDP per capita
levels.  In 2000 the Central European countries had with almost no
exception reached the level of 1989.  The pace of SEE is roughly
twice as slow.  (The unique exception is Albania although it is because
of the very low benchmark of 1989 and remains the among the lowest
in the region.)
If we compare Bulgaria with Ireland - a country, which made a difference
in terms of fast convergence, aggressive pro-growth policies and pro-
FDI policies (after 1987) and reasonable use of EU structural funds,
Bulgaria in terms of nominal GDP per capita is below Ireland in 1960.
When Ireland started its acceleration toward higher income EU
countries in the early 1990, its nominal GDP per capita was 6.7 times
higher than Bulgaria’s in 2001.
A recent research of WIIW allows an attempt to foresee the capacity
of the two biggest Balkan countries (Romania and Bulgaria) to catch
up with the EU and make a comparison with Hungary and Russia.
Bulgaria’s GDP per capita at PPP is 24% of EU average in 2000.  For
26
 Source: Wiener Institut fuer internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW)
Database
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Albania 2571 1277 2692 2893 n.a n.a.
B&H n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bulgaria 5390 4990 4790 4950 5170 5610
Croatia 5610 6330 6730 7040 7110 7600
Macedonia 4060 4170 4260 4380 4530 4920
Romania 6210 6630 6330 6030 5920 6240
Yugoslavia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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comparison, the Central European transition economies have two or
three times higher value of the indicator.
Is convergence to EU really happening?  The forecast for 2015
presumes that Bulgaria will have 32% of the EU average GDP per
capita (if GDP growth is twice as fast as the EU, at 4% per annum).  If
we attempt to speculate on the provisional EU conversion terms (in
GDP levels), assuming 8% growth for Bulgaria and 2% for EU
countries, we predict that the convergence will actually happen in 25
years.
GDP per capita at current PPPs (ECU/EUR), from 2001
constant PPPs27
27
 Source: The Transition Economies: Externally Conditioned Improvements in
2000, Slowdowns and Adjustments Likely in 2001 and 2002, WIIW, 2001, p. 34
* Projection assuming 4% p.a. GDP growth and zero population growth p.a.
** Projection assuming 2% p.a. GDP growth and zero population growth p.a.
1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015
Bulgaria 4862 4657 5007 4600 4378 4583 4823 5160 6278* 7638* 9293*
Romania 5339 5165 5768 6113 5785 5576 5526 5736 6712* 8167* 9936*
Hungary 7215 7790 8330 8613 9086 9735 10437 11237 13935* 16955* 20628*
Russia 8418 6167 6164 6074 6177 5991 6386 7001 8600* 10463* 12730*
Germany 15052 18695 19886 19928 20420 21197 21905 22584 24934** 27529** 30395**
Austria 16043 18953 19970 20681 21084 22016 22929 23732 26202** 28929** 31940**
Greece 8821 11020 11917 12323 12447 13046 13787 14352 15846** 17495** 19316**
EU (15) average 14753 17032 18113 18538 18948 19740 20553 21251 23463** 25905** 28602**
Japan 16777 19702 21038 22142 22455 22177 22617 22934 25321** 27956** 30866**
USA 21899 25142 26116 27181 28507 29957 31538 33146 36596** 40405** 44611**
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1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015
Bulgaria 33 27 28 25 23 23 23 24 27 29 32
Romania 36 30 32 33 31 28 27 27 29 32 35
Hungary 49 46 46 46 48 49 51 53 59 65 72
Russia 57 36 34 33 33 30 31 33 37 40 45
Germany 102 110 110 107 108 107 107 106 106 106 106
Austria 109 111 110 112 111 112 112 112 112 112 112
Greece 60 65 66 66 66 66 67 68 68 68 68
EU (15)
average
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Japan 114 116 116 119 119 112 110 108 108 108 108
USA 148 148 144 147 150 152 153 156 156 156 156
Convergence of Some Emerging European Economies with
EU (15) average=100
Sources: The Transition Economies: Externally Conditioned Improvements in 2000,
Slowdowns and Adjustments Likely in 2001 and 2002, WIIW, 2001, p. 34
Reforms and economic development
After Balkan countries have been experiencing more than 10 years of
transition to a market economy, they continue reforms with often vague
or even contradictory success.  Some of them (Yugoslavia or Serbia)
have just made their first step into the reforms.  It is not only a question
of pace but also of direction, which still needs to be confirmed, if not
for the insiders but for the international public opinion.
It is obvious, however, that in all the countries the development (as
reflected in GDP) has been lead by the private sector.  This is a common
denominator for the region and is clearly observed in individual
countries.  The graph below summarizes the role of private and public
sector growth in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania,
in 1993-1999.  Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) are not
included due to missing data on private sector in GDP.
The first year, 1993, reflects the end of the “explosive” emergence of
the private sector in SEE.  In 1994-1999, we observe a gradual
slowdown in the private sector growth rates, which put together with
the stabilization of the slowdown in the public sector during 1997-1999,
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appears to be indicator for restructuring of these economies.  The
leading role of the private sector is obvious - 70-80% of GDP in all
countries, and it often compensates for the decline in the public sectors.
By the end of the 1990’s, the public and private shares in economic
growth tend to converge but country-level data still indicate the leading
role of the private sector.  In this sense we may assume that the
direction of reforms – private sector based market economy – is, by
and large, established.
SEE and CEE GDP growth: 1990-200028
Source: National statistics and own calculations
GDP growth
(in %)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Index
1989=100%
Albania -10 -28 -7.2 9.6 8.3 13.3 9.1 -7 8 8 6.5 101.9
Bulgaria -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.9 -10.1 -7 3.5 2.4 5.8 71.9
Croatia -7.1 -21.1 -11.1 -8 5.9 6.8 5.9 6.8 2.5 -0.3 3.8 81.3
Macedonia -10.2 -3.2 -6.6 -7.5 -1.8 -1.1 1.2 1.4 2.9 2.7 5.1 83.1
Romania -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.1 -5.4 -3.2 1.6 76.8
Serbia -7.9 -11.6 -27.4 -29.6 8.5 7.0 7.8 10.1 1.9 -18.3 7 51.1
Czech
Republic
-1.2 -11.6 -1.1 0 2.2 5.9 4.8 -1.0 -2.2 -0.8 2.7 96.6
Hungary -3.5 -11.9 -3 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.4 5.5 104.8
Poland -11.6 -7 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6 6.8 4.8 4.1 4 126.6
Slovak
Republic
-2.5 -14.6 -6 -3.5 4.9 6.7 6.2 6.2 4.1 1.9 2 103.2
28
 Source: National statistics, WIIW Database, own calculations.
52
A comparison of SEE and Central European emerging economies
shows that Balkans restore their pre-reform GDP level at (roughly)
twice slower pace than leading EU accession countries.
Peculiarities of doing business
Besides the leading role of the private sector, economies and company
structures are not well positioned to prevent external constraints to
regional and indigenous development.  Most economies are led by
private sectors and services they are rarely competitive.  Foreign direct
investment is negligible in absolute and in per-capita terms.  The level
of foreign ownership in Spain is 42%, in Poland 12%, and in Romania
6%.29   Economic interdependence (besides Croatia in Bosnia-
Herzegovina) is no factor.  Co-operation and, hence, stability in SEE
must have a structure that supports them.  Since, as we shall see
below, Balkans rarely trade with itself, co-operation requires networks
of capital allocation and information.
Company demographics
In an unknown business environment, more transparent companies
and/or partners are expected to be joint-stock companies while
partnership, limited liability, and sole proprietorship would rather fall in
the category of less transparent ones.  More transparent companies
would find partners easier, they will be relatively easier to identify and
make business with, and they would constitute a given economy engine
of growth.
29
 Source: Heriot-Watt University, UK, quoted by: Francis Harris, “Join at your Peril,”
Business Central Europe, March, 1999, p. 12.
30
 Source: Country national statistics.  The total number of the companies in Bulgaria
is quite high, due to the number of sole proprietors.  It reflects the favourable tax-
treatment of this organizational form, especially given the opportunities to reduce
mandated social welfare benefits or pay a patent (lump) tax for operating a profession.
The only division of companies, which is used in Albania, is to juridical and physical
bodies, as only 26% (16,554) of all the companies are juridical bodies.  Unlike in other
countries, in Albania the legislation does not envisage creation of Limited liability
companies and Joint-stock companies, which limits the possibilities of business
organization.
In Romania, the companies’ organization is quite specific.  In practice, there is no
difference between sole proprietorship companies and limited liability companies.  State
monopolies are classified in a separate chapter under the title – regies autonomes
and their number in 1998 is 183.  Moreover, there exists additional division in companies
of co-operative and non-co-operative.
SEE companies ownership structure in 200030
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SEE companies ownership structure in 200030
* The total number of firms in Albania is 63,670, of which 74% are physical
persons and 26% are juridical persons
** Number of active companies in Croatia
*** According to Romanian legislation and practice, there can be no distinction
between sole proprietorship companies and limited liability companies. As of
1998, total 318,376, of which: regies autonomes-183 (state-owned companies
of strategic importance); stock companies-12,422; limited liability companies-
291,106; other types of non-cooperative companies-12,429; cooperative
companies-2,236.
Generally speaking, there is a small number of joint-stock companies
and a high density of sole proprietorships.  This reflects underdeveloped
company demographics, lack of trust in the economies and the lack of
institution that would support it through contract enforcement, e.g.
(functioning) public registries, arbitration, courts, etc.  On the other
hand, there are cumbersome incorporation procedures: in Ireland it is
25 times cheaper to establish a joint stock company than in Bulgaria.
The company demographics of low-income economies might be
considered as typically consisting of three groups of companies:
• Subsistence firms, in which there is little distinction between
household and firm’s finance, and which have high “social” value
added, but little sense for the economy.
• Survival companies, they are incorporated, niche filling, relatively
immobile, dependent on “single” suppliers or markets.
• Competitive companies, which are driven by productivity and quality
of operations and are mobile, adjustable to the demand of a
sophisticated market.
From these three groups, it is likely that the first prevails in SEE, while
the share of the third group is negligible.  In this demographics, sole
Country Total
number
Sole
proprietorship
companies
Limited
liability
companies
Joint-stock
companies
Year
Albania* 63,670 - - - 2000
Bulgaria 769,969 533,512 101,350 23,472 May 2001
Croatia 189,576 30,474** 51,993** 1,927** 2000
Macedonia 128,802 68,662 35,071 812 2000
Romania*** 318,376 - - 12,422 1998
Serbia 268,167 122,842 81,135 1,490 2000
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proprietorship are more likely to belong to the first category.  In Bulgaria,
one of the relatively well established Balkan economies, the picture is
the following.  85% of the registered enterprises are sole
proprietorships.  150 000 (i.e. roughly 1/3) might be considered active
(i.e. pay taxes or report more profits than losses), of them 140 000
patent (lump) taxpayers (BGN 357 on average in 199931 ).  The share
of the competitive companies of all registered is - 5-7%.  In 1999 and
2000, the economic sense of the size is that those enterprises, which
by law are considered SMEs produced 35% of  the country’s gross
value added in 1999, while large companies produced 65%.
Political weight
It is difficult to underestimate the political influence of this company
population.  Subsistence companies could be a subject of welfare
policies and usually in high-income economies of the EU they are.
Votes are with the majority: there is pressure to support survival and
subsistence companies at the expense of competitive ones.  In Bulgaria
and the Balkans, they advocate welfare-like policies, requesting
subsidies and protectionism and their demands often serve as
substitutes for the economic rationale of domestic and international
policies.
Payment system
A recent study of 125 firms trading in the region from five countries
and territories (Albania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro)
provided evidence that payment system in the Balkans is in status
nascendi.  There is abundant anecdotal evidence that it is not much
different in Serbia’s trade and that it is lacking formal institutionalization
between Republica Srpska and Yugoslavia.
One third of all payments to trade in the Balkans are claimed to be in
cash.  A possible explanation of this situation is that thus tax payment
is avoided, and moreover, if the money’s origin is illegal, using banks
is not an alternative at all.  Together with barter, the non-bank
component in the payment system equalizes the bank segment.  It
31
 The current exchange rate to the US dollar is 2.15.
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looks as if, however, the system operates through correspondent links
with banks outside the region or at least through branches of institutions
located in Greece and Turkey.  Preferable payments are in DM
(respectively Euro).  Local currencies are used three times less than
DM (41% of the payments) and USD (26% of the payment).
Trade with the neighbors
Although the trade statistics are far from perfect, it gives some insights.
* The statistical information is provided by the National Statistic Services of the SEEC
The peculiarities of the registered flows are interesting.  For instance,
there is a 2.6 fold difference between Macedonia‘s exports to
Yugoslavia (USD 333.3 million) and official Yugoslavian figures for
imports from Macedonia (USD 130 million). This is a reflection of the
trade between Kosovo and Macedonia, and gives a hint as to the size
of the stake of those who would eventually control this exchange.
The obvious explanation is the low competitiveness of goods and
services produced in the Balkans.  On a policy level, this situation
leads often to attempts to foster exports through artificial measures:
direct and indirect subsidies and protection to “sustain” domestic
industries, jobs, etc.  Such policies are very difficult to apply toward
major markets; in the Balkans case, toward the EU.  For this reason,
they take place in other directions, including Balkans itself.  At the
same time, the omni-presence of trade deficits is to some extent natural;
it reflects restructuring.  An indicator here is the import of so-called
investment goods.  In the Standard Industrial Trade Classification
(SITC) they are reflected in the following categories: manufactured
goods classified by materials, machinery and transport equipment and
miscellaneous manufactured articles.  For the entire period in question
    SEE inter-regional trade 2000 (in million USD) *
Albania Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Romania Yugoslavia
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.
Albania 0.078 26.4 - - 1.42 12.89 2.54 24.7 0.23 5.98 7.26 9
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. - - n.a. n.a. 110.3 25.8 86.3 230.2 374.5 23
Croatia 10.1 0.4 4.2 7 - - 59 54.9 3.3 19.2 107.2 30.6
Macedonia n.a. n.a. 26.9 97.4 47.7 57.4 - - n.a. n.a. 333.3 189.7
Romania 10.4 0.1 289.5 87.8 19.2 3.7 14.2 1.9 - - 137.9 65.3
Yugoslavia 0.3 1.1 23 324 19 43 210 130 23 145 - -
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for all the countries, the imports exceed 50% of all the imports.32
Pressures to restructure and attract FDI that might compensate for
the lack of competitiveness and shortages of capital must be
considered as a part of the foundation to cooperate.  In is not clear,
however, whether it may come from the Balkan economies and
businesses themselves.
Trade policies and realities
In order to understand specifics of trading with the EU and the Balkans,
and to make a case for the existing co-operation and trade opportunities
in the region, we focus on Bulgaria.
Bulgaria deserves this attention and may serve as a representative
example of the region due to the following circumstances: a) it is an
average country in terms of demographics, nominal and PPP GDP
per capita;  b) it lacks extraordinary events and conflicts, which could
deviate major patterns of economic policies and behaviour; and c) it
has the average history of economic reforms, with its ups and downs
and attempts to rely on different reform philosophies.
Bulgaria’s case outlines the regularities of changing trade partners in
the second half of the nineties and deficiencies and disadvantages of
different trade directions, and highlights the role of the Balkans.  In
addition, we provide detailed analyses on revealed comparative
advantages for different commodity groups, nine of them altogether
and where possible we give a five-year time service (from 1995 to
1999).  This approach helps us to identify sectors where the Balkan
market plays a special role vis-à-vis the EU and CEFTA.  We omit any
discussion of services, although transport and tourism are the sectors
with the fastest growing share in Bulgaria’s exports.  We also avoid
discussing Bulgaria’s performance on markets other than the EU,
CEFTA, CIS and the Balkans because we think that such analysis
would add details to the description of Bulgaria’s trade performance
but will contribute a little to the deliberation on regional co-operation
and its status for supporting stabilization.
From 1990 to 1991, Bulgarian exports contracted four times in absolute
terms.  This is a unique case of such a shock in the Balkan’s recent
32
 See, for instance, data on imports by commodity groups for SEE for 1999 in:
Vladimir Gligorov, Vasily Astrov, Prospects for Development in South-East Europe,
Vienna, WIIW, Bank Austria, 2000, p. 20.
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economic history; exports shrank in other countries as well but only by
a fifth or a quarter.  In the reform years, exports grew in absolute
terms only in Romania.33   Bulgaria behaved like all the other countries
of the region.
Trade and economic growth depend on the development prospects of
major markets.  Bulgaria, similar to other Balkan countries, depends
seriously on international trade.  Presumably, in the years to come,
the growth prospects of the EU and other major partners would be of
vital importance to the growth potential of the country.  The same is
true for all the countries in the region.  Another peculiarity here is that
Bulgaria enjoys beneficial asymmetric 10-year trade agreements with
the EU, signed in 1993.  By 2003, some preferences will fade away.
Another important factor is the non-tariff barriers of the EU, which
could impose a serious obstacle for Bulgarian companies (industrial
and higher value added goods mostly), but there is a need for special
and highly specific research on the matter.  Available sources allow
for only general impressions34 .  Other Balkan countries have signed
similar, although not identical, agreements lately and they would
presumably face similar challenges.  Bulgaria’s performance might
hint at patterns to be avoided or followed.
To demonstrate all these, we need to discuss some peculiarities of
the so-called revealed comparative advantage (RCA).  A positive and
high value of RCA for a particular commodity approximates the take
off point, which companies may (or may not) convert into better
competitiveness of different commodities on different markets.  The
calculation of RCA is according to the conventional formula:
 33
 See a comparative table in Vladimir Gligorov, Vasily Astrov, Op.cit. p. 21.
34
 See, for instance: Stanislav Daskalov, Dimitar Hadjinikolov, The Impact of
Technical Barriers to Trade on Bulgaria’s Exports to the EU and to the CEFTA
countries, Sofia, European Institute, 2001.
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EU CEFTA SEEC
95 96 97 98 99 95 96 97 98 99 95 96 97 98 99
SITC 0 + + - + + ++ - - - - - +++ ++ ++ ++ +++
SITC 1 + ++ ++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ ++ + - - +
SITC 2 + + ++ + ++ + - - - - - ++ + 0 +
SITC 3 + ++ ++ - + ++ - - ++ + + +++ +++ ++ ++ +++
SITC 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +++ +++ +++ +++ +++
SITC 5 - - 0 - - - - - - - - - +++ ++ ++ ++ ++
SITC 6 + + + + - -- - - - - - - - + ++ ++ ++ +++
SITC 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - + + - - ++ ++ +++ ++ ++
SITC 8 + + + + ++ - - + - - - - + +++ +++ +++ +++
*Legend:                                                           SITC 0 - Food and live animals
RCA values between 0.7 and 1 (+++) SITC 1 - Beverages and tobacco
RCA values between  0.35 and 0.7 (++) SITC 2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
RCA values between 0 and 0.35 (+) SITC 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
RCA value 0 (0) SITC 4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
RCA values between 0 and -0.35 (-) SITC 5 - Chemical and related products
RCA values between -0.35 and -0.7 (- -) SITC 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material
RCA values between  -0,7 and -1 (- - -) SITC 7 - Machinery and transport equipment
SITC 8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles
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RCA on Bulgaria’s trade: Summary* 35
The table gives the opportunity for some conclusions, which could be
relevant in a regional context.
• The more is the value added, the less is the RCA on EU and
CEFTA markets.
• The concentration of RCA is yet more frequent on EU mar-
ket, presumably because of the asymmetric agreement still in
force.  Even on those remaining RCAs, the intensity is very
minimal, and perhaps temporary.
• The SEE market is a concentration of Bulgaria’s RCAs; it com-
pensates for lack of position in other directions; however, the
current account situation shows that the Balkans serve as a
compensatory market only in the sense that it harbours rem-
nants of non-competitive products to other markets and from
the legacies of the past industrial structures.
• Bulgaria’s presence on the SEE market is diverse and hardly
specialized.  It covers almost evenly the entire SITC classifi-
cation.  Although there is an obvious interest to maintain this
presence, the improved restructuring of other economies will
result in a challenge to improve the competitiveness of Bul-
garian companies trading in the Balkans.
• The 2001 crisis in Macedonia, to which Bulgaria’s exports al-
most equal those to the USA or Russia, is a warning about
the risks associated with greater Balkan exposure and must
signal political efforts to maintain stability in the region as a
pre-condition for trade and cooperation.
Conclusions
The countries of the region have embarked on the integration path in
different years and have different statuses vis-a-vis the European Union
and the European market, often resolving sovereignty issues no
international body wanted to deal with comprehensively.
The only consecutive EU foreign policy is trade policy.  Even asymmetric
benefits from the  EU are not necessarily good. Companies would use
 35
 See upcoming: Krassen Stanchev and Martin Dimitrov, SEE Trade and  Institutions,
IME, p. 23
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them as a refuge from the need to restructure and extort privileges
from the government.
Balkan markets only temporarily compensate for lacking competitive
positions in all other directions. Eventually trading only with neighbors
keeps you poor, while most companies compete on the same
advantages. Those countries that earlier qualified for EU protectionism
seek to benefit at the expense of the late-comers.
Regionalism in thinking and the interest in regionalism exist as an
intellectual fashion or, at the best, as an international community
expectation.
Companies (local and foreign) that have stakes in the regional market
may seek protection from opening up the region and may have vested
interests in maintaining risks and impediments to doing business in
the Balkans.
For this reason, the critical political mass of influence regional policies
and approaches is missing; business frameworks are diverse and
barriers to outsiders are, by and large, supported.
At the end of the day, there is little domestic will to set pre-conditions
to trade and cooperate.
Regional initiatives are inevitably extra-regional and must not be
perceived as a substitute for core market and democratic (and
constitutional) reforms.  On the constitutional front, hurdles to reforms
were set by sustained government controls and by costly political and
administrative transfers of power.
A condition is to avoid divisions of legitimate execution of power in the
Balkans, support representative and dialogue- (negotiation) based
mechanisms of public governance.
Otherwise, the philosophy of all (governments, firms and chetniks)
would remain that nations (not companies) compete; seeking rents
from others and that the vital issue is “the ethnic competition to whom
the state belongs” [Arben Xhaferi’s words].  Negotiation and responsible
presentation are not present on an inter-ethnic and/or international
level because they are not established on the home soil.
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BALKAN CONSTITUTION MAKING
IS THERE A PECULIARITY AND WHAT IS TO
BE EXPECTED?36
Krassen Stanchev, Petya Platikanova,
Institute for Market Economics
Introduction
This report focuses on the constitutional foundations of Balkan
countries.  It deals with indigenous sovereigns and avoids discussion
of constituent arrangement of countries and territories established by
international negotiations, i.e. it is not considering constitutional
frameworks of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
These constitutions are not necessarily common as a phenomenon or
peculiar as a solution.  However, we believe that the analysis of the
constitutional matters would provide an insight into what a pattern of
functioning democracy is likely to emerge from the diverse Balkan
political establishments.  It also highlights some specific features of
the rule of law and the reforms in these countries.  We discuss the
constitutional provisions in economics and politics, which ideally would
structure relatively stable social arrangements.
The objective is to find whether there are common peculiarities and
what are the enduring structures of the economy and society provided
by certain Balkan constitutions.
As far as we know, this is one of the first attempts to compare the
Balkan constitutions in such a comparative manner.  So far, the
discussions on this issue were limited to academic circles with negligible
influence on public debate.  Although some constitutions were adopted
through referenda, constitutional vision was often limited to political
elites and political parties that initiated drafting. We do not know of a
36
 The National Endowment for Democracy has commissioned this report. Edited by
Raicho Bojilov, a student at Grinnell College and an intern at the Institute for Market
Economics.
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NGO (or think tank) effort to analyze Balkan constitutions in a
comparative prospective.   Pioneering analyses and research were
available from outside the region, though they have utilized substantial
local expertise.37
Backgrounds: Why Reflecting on Balkan constitutions?
The first reason is that a region-wide constitution making is anyhow
underway or is about to take off for different reasons. The first reason
is that region-wide constitutional making has been taking place in the
1990s.  The crisis of 1990 started with an act regarding the constitutional
status of a province in former Yugoslavia, – the dismantlement of
Kosovo’s autonomy in 1987-198938 .  It sparked migration, civic
disobedience, and the seeds of ethnic conflict that eventually spread
over former Yugoslavia.
Although, the recent constitution making in Macedonia is a by-product
of the Macedonian crisis of 2001 and the Ohrid Agreement of August
200139 , its basic principles are embedded in the original 1991
37
 See, e.g. the East European Constitutional Review, originally started by the Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School, and then sustained by the New York University School of
Law and the Central European University.  Mostly political parties involved drafted
blueprints for new constitutions of the emerging democracies.  Some individual au-
thors proposed universal drafts (see, e.g.: Bernard H. Siegan, Drafting a Constitution
for a Nation or Republic Emerging into Freedom, Fairfax, Virginia, George Mason
University Press, 1994).  With the emergence of constitutional crisis individual think
tanks dared to promote their constitutional vision; the most typical case in point is the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: The Institute of Strategic Studies and Prognosis in
Podgorica is an active participant in the constitutional debate (see: www.isspm.org ).
In Belgrade, too, think tanks offered constitutional solutions (see, e.g.: Vojin Dimitrijevic
(preface), Constitutional Reform in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Proposals by an indepen-
dent group of experts. Belgrade, Belgrade Center for Human Rights, 2001.  Thomas
Fleiner, Hans-Peter Schneider, Ronald L. Watts, Constitutional Reorganization of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, CLDS, 2002,  Bosko Mijatovic, Dragoljub
Popovic, Slobodan Samardzic, The Union of Serbia and Montenegro Proposal for the
Constitutional Reconstruction of FRY, Belgrade, CLDS, 2000.)
 38
 Misha Gleny argues that Milosevic’s “real aim was not to end Kosovo’s autonomy”
but rather to alter the federation into a unitarist state (Misha Gleny, The Balkans:
1804-1999. Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, London, Granta Books, 1999,
pp. 627, 627-628). Either objective required and resulted in a non-constitutional alter-
nation of the basic foundations of Yugoslavia, and in wars and interethnic conflicts.
See also “Kosovo and Southern Serbia” by Nebojsa Covic, September 2001.
39
 For a detailed overview of the Macedonian constitutional amendments see Country
Report for Macedonia. The author, FORUM – Centre for Strategic Research and Docu-
mentation, mentions that “the parties of the Albanians even though they were clearly
against the newly adopted Constitution they based their further political life on the
provisions of the Constitution and the legislative practice emerging from it” .
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constitution (then, Albanian members of Parliament did not vote for
the constitution because of the preamble).  In the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the issues of autonomy and federation, of sovereignty and
co-existence, and of pro-democracy government machinery are already
fueling a constitutional debate.
In addition, the so-called Western Balkans is on the way to implement
their individual stabilization and association agreements with the
European Union.  Croatia is promptly catching up on most of the issues
preventing her from being an equal partner in the EU integration.  Most
of the constitutions in the region were born either to promote nation-
building aspirations or to reflect constellations of early post-communist
reforms.
Romania and Bulgaria have already embarked upon the route to the
EU.  Constitutional arrangements here should eventually allow for free
movement of capital, goods and services, including the right of
foreigners to buy land.
All these processes require constitutional thinking and debate on
existing constitutions.
Currently, however, there is an obvious lack of open discussion.
Unfortunately, this may result in reproduction of features of existing
frameworks, which are far from perfect.
Second, constitution making in the Balkans is a broader process than
in the other transition countries.  All ex-Yugoslav countries needed to
construct their statehoods.40   In the socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the period after the Second World War to 1989 can be
described as a continuous constitution making: new constitutions
appeared every decade: in 1946, in1953, in 1963, and in 1974, with
significant amendments in between (especially in 1967-1971, and in
1981).41
In comparison, Central Europe countries did not need to build
40
 This need reflected also in efforts to establish other identities - in history, language, etc.
In most of these areas there was already a tradition, which we would like to avoid discuss-
ing.  (On the tradition in searching language identities see: Christian Voss, Sprach- und
Geschichtsrevision in Makedonien. Zur Dekonstruktion von Blaze Koneski, Osteuropa,
Jahrgang/HEFT 8/August 2001 (www.oseuropa.rwth-aachen.de/frame.html).
41
 See for details: Jovan Djordjevic, The Creation of the 1974 Constitution of Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in: Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman (editors),
Constitution Makers of Constitution Making, Washington D.C., AEI, 1983, p. 185, 190,
and p. 213.
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statehoods. They focused on the division of powers and fixing
government machinery.  The situation in Romania and Bulgaria could
have been similar, but these countries failed to promote non-communist
majorities in the first free elections of 1990.   They turned to be the first
to adopt entirely new constitutions because the constitution making
served as a mechanism of legitimation of newly emerged political
players and renamed communists.42   The ultimate outcome was that
the communists managed to recycle their image and gain stability of
party structures and voting constituencies.
Thus, in the Balkans, though for different reasons in different countries,
the drafting of the constitutions coincided with the core of the real
politics.  Until literally few days ago, the constitutional issues of the
union, respectively the dismemberment of the federation between
Serbia and Montenegro dominated the politics in Montenegro and
preoccupied the EU initiative in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
an initiative which became one of the few instances of common foreign
policies of the EU43 .  The two processes in normal conditions, however,
are substantially different.  The interplay between the two reduces the
constitutional framework to the level of everyday politics and, hence,
hampers the legitimacy of the basic law.  Eventually, this raises the
issue of efficient implementation of the constitutional provisions.  This
is especially visible in the examples of identity and sovereignty issues.
Many constitutions in the region limit flexibility on ethnic issues in their
42
 In Romania, the decision to draft a new constitution was taken after the election.  In
Bulgaria, this was the choice of the Round Table Talk between communists and the
opposition: neither of them was confident in the elections outcome, so they agreed to
held elections for Constitutional Assembly, thus guaranteeing to either party the role
of, at least, a blocking power on important (constitutional) issues with 1/3 of the seats
in the legislature.  Bulgarian Round Table Talks (January-April 1990) preceded in the
following manner: communists and non-communists were hammering out agreements
on fundamental issues – multiparty system, elections, head of state, etc., and the
communist Parliament was adopting needed amendments without any argument.  Other
countries faced similar issues but they were resolved via “interim” design of govern-
ment machinery, especially the presidency since parliaments’ balances of post-com-
munist over ex-communist political parties were already established (see: Andras Sajo,
Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism, Budapest, Central Euro-
pean University Press, 1999, p. 180).  The interim design of the constitution of Bul-
garia was enforced between April 1990 and July 1991 and it was the communist con-
stitution of 1971 but without the ruling role of the communist party and with multiparty
elections and a president (elected by the Parliament) as a substitute of the State
Council.
43
 Country report for Montenegro, prepared by CEDEM – Centre for Democracy and
Human Rights in Podgorica, outlines political stakes of the parties participating in the
debate.
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concept of statehood, envisage a constituent nation,44  ban autonomy,45
restrict foreigners from owning land, or prohibit political representation
of ethnic and religious minorities.46  As the developments in Macedonia
in 2001 and those in Croatia in 1995 have demonstrated, identity
provisions may serve as “casus beli”.
Besides building nation-state political establishments and societies in
transition, the Balkans had to encounter severe economic challenges.
All Balkan countries (i.e. former Yugoslav countries and territories plus
Romania and Bulgaria) lost (except Slovenia) more markets than any
other transition country.  This development prevented prompt
liberalization of prices and trade (esp. imports) and, thus, decreased
the pressures on domestic businesses to restructure.
Unfortunately, this development sustained attempts to gain, seek rent
and prosper at the expense of the others with the help of the
government. As a result, incorporation and entry barriers are more
costly, the business environment is worse, and FDI is much lower
than in Central Europe.  Eventually, these developments were
incorporated in respective constitutional and basic legal arrangements.
The third reason for studying the Balkan constitution making is the
expectations related to international initiatives in the Balkans.  They
assume that the right political and institutional choice, taken at the
right moment would make the representative democracy irreversible.
Hopes arise from the expectation that the right constitutional
establishment would prevent tensions in future.  However,  the real
politics of the day prove that democratization of Serbia has little to do
44
 E.g., the Croatian Constitution says: “Croatia, the nation-state of the Croatian people
and the state of other nationalities and minorities which are its citizens”; the preamble
of Constitution of Macedonia used to contain quite a similar statement: “Macedonia is
established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as
citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Alba-
nians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and other nationalities living in the Republic of
Macedonia” (because of this preamble members of the Parliament of the Albania
decent did not vote the constitution).  The Bulgarian Constitution states that “the offi-
cial language is Bulgarian” (Article 3), while 10% of the citizenry has the Turkish as
mother tongue.
45
 E.g., Article 21 of the Bulgarian Constitution.
46
 E.g., in the Constitution of Bulgaria one may find the statement that “the traditional
religion [in the country] is the Orthodox Christian congregation” (Article 13.2), and that
political parties established on “ethnic, racial or religious lines” are not allowed (Article
11.4), while such parties exist de facto and it is almost impossible to implement this
provision de jure.
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with a provisional resolution of the status of Kosovo, and the ethnic
self-determination in Kosovo does not necessarily mean a liberal
democracy, protection of human rights, and non-militant “constitution
making” in Macedonia.47   International ideas about SEE post-crisis
establishments rarely meet their local owners.  The international ideas
often deal only with specific aspects of institutional and legislative
arrangements and with democratic, stability and statehood and
prosperity issues as if these issues constitute separate segments of
the public life.
Last but not least, the forth reason is that the future normalization of
the Balkans has no other acceptable means besides fixing
constitutional rules in order to provide foundations for stability.  The
reflection on the constitutions would help to recognize basic rules in
place and constellations, which may require future improvement.
Unfortunately, the international response to various Balkan crises in
the1990’s did not originate from such a precautionary reflection.  Such
a reflection was also missing in the countries of the region.  Eventually,
all players were forced by the circumstances to compensate for the
lack of constitutional framework.
Design and reform in constitutions
As mentioned in the regional report on the Balkan political economy,48
the key topic for discussion about the future of the Balkans after the
termination of the international mediation and assistance is what are
the factors that may safeguard democracy, peace, and public order.
Due to their basic nature, constitutions are, presumably, difficult to
amend.  The main subject of our analysis is the rules dealing with less
disputable matters than national identities and statehood building
issues. In addition, we would like to avoid a philosophical deliberation
on nation building and the contribution of the constitution making to
this process in the Balkans.
47
 As it is known, in November 2001 the Macedonian Parliament passed the
constitutional amendments required by the Agreement signed on 13 August, which
expanded the rights of the minorities and assured equitable representation of
communities in all central and local public authorities.  Arben Xhaferi, leader of the
Democratic Party of Albanians, welcomed the constitutional changes, said in an
interview for BBC: “We repaired the constitution and now we have to repair the mentality
that created ethnic conflicts.”
48
 See Krassen Stanchev, Balkan Political Economy: Crisis, Polity and Business,
Sofia, Washington D.C., NEC/IME, 2002, p. 31.
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Methodologically, these matters are difficult to identify: the Balkans
represent an example of establishing constitutional rules and reforming
them.  James Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan outline the distinction
between these two procedures.49   When there are no effective
preexisting rules, the choice among different rules in order to achieve
certain outcomes is all that is relevant.  However, when changing
existing rules is at stake, i.e. a constitutional reform, then preferred
rules might not actually be those in force; the design is under revision,
and principles are taken for granted, so existing rules might be
reexamined or simply rejected.  On the other hand, existing rules are
those that set procedures for revising provisions applied.  The general
principle applied in the research is that in order to function rules require
stability: if they were continually under revision, then the results would
be the poor performance of the established system of the rules.
The broad theoretical background of our undertaking is the so-called
public choice theory and its by-product - constitutional economics.  It
was rarely applied to reflect regional peculiarities.  As one can see
from the analysis of the report on the Political Economy of the Balkans,
the Balkans it is a region-in-making with respect to its economic
development.  The objective of this report is to outline the peculiarities
of its constitutional background.
The flux of constitutional reforms can presumably reside in some
relatively stable social institutions.  Below, we undertake a review of
the Balkan countries’ constitutional order addressing two separate
issues.  We examine constitutional provisions dealing less with
mentalities of national identity (in Xhaferi’s words) but with institutions,
such as private property rights (vis-à-vis state property and exclusive
rights, e.g. “natural monopolies”, natural resources), and the definition-
function of government machinery (in terms of automatic functions
and transfers of duties, deadlines and delays in hypothetical
discontinuity of government – such as in the case of deaths - and in
event of political crisis).  We assume that analysis of these provisions
sheds light on the status of the civil society (classic) structures: the
individual, his/her property and other immediate relations.
Reflecting the Balkans, we start from the design, i.e. from the creation
of the constitutional rules in terms of the Buchanan-Brennan
terminology. These are the provisions that:
49
 Buchanan, J. and Geoffrey Brennan, “The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political
Economy”, Cambridge University Press, 1985, 10.1.35.
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• Provide for private property and freedom to engage in
business.
• Regulate the movement of capital, including landownership.
• Legalize “ownership” over citizenship.
• Set the stability of the government machinery.
• Then, we discuss a constellation of provisions that fix differ-
ent government machineries.  The hypothesis is that these
rules could highlight the political prerequisites for reforms and
adjustments, as a constitutionally designed response to chal-
lenges to change.
Property rights
Property rights are supposed to guarantee   the individual and civic
(civil society) independence from government.  They also serve as a
constraint to the government.  All Balkan constitutions of the 1990’s
give emphasize the sanctity of property rights and promote rules that
limit any government attempt to alter property rights or to interfere
with their transfer.  As Epstein50  points out, property rights are not only
protected when they are endangered by any physical invasion or the
threat thereof, but also when holders want to transfer them legally at
low costs.
Freedom from invasion
As Epstein maintains, applying constitutional rules may lower costs of
defending and transferring property rights only if they reduce bargaining
problems related to moving the asset to its high-valued use.
Similarly to many other post-Communist constitutional arrangements,
Balkan constitutions are preoccupied with protection of property rights.
(All constitutions claim to protect private property rights).  According
to the constitutions of Bulgaria (Article 17.1), Croatia (Article 48),
Macedonia (Article 30.1), Poland (Article 21.1 and 64), Slovakia (Article
20.1), Slovenia (Article 33) and Yugoslavia (Article 51) the state protects
50
 Epstein, R. “The Public Trust Doctrine”, Public Choice and Constitutional
Economics, Jai Press Inc., 1988.
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not only property rights but also inherited property rights.
There are similar provisions in the constitutions of Germany (Article
14.1), but not in such a detail.  Furthermore, Albania’s constitution
even lists the ways of acquiring property (“by gift, inheritance, purchase
or any other classical means provided by the Civil Code” - Article 41.2).
At the same time, although Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech
Republic and Croatia do not stipulate in explicitly that the property
rights are sacred, this omission does not necessarily mean lack of
such a protection.
 In addition, there are many provisions that protect private property
from invasion.  All constitutions provide rules on the privacy of the
home.  The home is “inviolable” (e.g. Bulgaria; Article 33.1); it is a part
of private life protected by the constitutions (Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Article 3).51   The court can intervene in private property only when
there are concerns that a crime was committed there (Croatia; Article
34.2).  In case of a need to protect “public order or health” or “the
rights and liberties of others” (Estonia; Article 33 and Macedonia; Article
26), the property rights might be violated if there is a statutory stipulation,
In addition, there might be other arguments; for example, the
constitution of Romania stipulates that property right might be violated
in order “to defend national security or public order” (Article 27.2, 3).
At the same time, the constitution of Slovakia is rather vague because
the conditions, under which private property might be violated, are as
follows: if this violation is “inevitable in a democratic society” and it is
done to protect “lives, health, or property”, or “public order”.52
However, there are various stipulations on the conditions that the state
may divert private property rights.  The state may limit or expropriate
property only in “the public interest” (Albania; Article 41.3).
The famous fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States
stipulates a three-fold test for property deprivation (legal procedure,
public use and just price): “No person shall be… deprived of… property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”  Section 3 of the above-
mentioned article 14 of the Constitution of Germany is even more
51
 From all transitional constitutions only those of Slovenia and Czech Republic there
are not exclusive provisions on the home inviolability.
52
 In the Slovak constitution one can also find that if “the tasks of public officials”
require that, the inviolability of the home, which is used for performing different eco-
nomic activities, might not be defended (Article 21.3).
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specific.  “The taking of property is only permissible in the public weal.
It may be imposed only by or pursuant to a statute regulating the nature
and extent of compensation.  Such compensation has to be determined
by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and
the interests of those affected.  Regarding disputes about the amount
of compensation, recourse to the courts of ordinary jurisdiction is
available.”  The key difference between these constitutional provisions
is the notions of “public weal” and “equitable balance” between private
and public interest.53
It seems that Balkan constitutions tend to resemble the resolution on
this matter given by the Germany’s Grundgezetz.  If public benefits
are higher than the costs of violating property rights, then the state
can limit or expropriate private property (Romania; Article 41).  The
state might define not only the public interest but also the needs of
society and the national economy, which can justify restrictions imposed
on property rights (Slovakia; Article 20).  As the Macedonian constitution
states, property rights impose responsibilities to be performed not only
in private but also in the public interest, so they might be diverted for
public interests (Article 30).  The constitution of Slovenia also states
that property rights must be regulated and the benefits from this
regulation are supposed to be economic, social and environmental
(Article 67).  Bulgaria’s article 17.5 of the constitution, the only one
that speaks of “forcible expropriation”,54  refers to “state and municipal
needs”, “provided that these needs cannot be otherwise met”, and
refers to the law and “fair compensation”.  The Yugoslavian Constitution
(Article 69.3) refers to “public interest”, “fair compensation” and “market
value”.  Current ideas of constitutional amendments in Yugoslavia do
not challenge this tradition.
Central European and Baltic constitutions are more general on the
discussed matters but not very different in principle.  Property rights
could be infringed by law and under “appropriate compensation”
(Estonia; Article 32) and/or in effect (or as a result) of a completed
court decision (Poland; Article 46).  The constitution of Hungary says
that a piece of property might be taken only in the public interest, if
there are “exceptional cases” (Article 13).  In the constitution of Poland,
53
 It does not necessarily mean that, in the second half of the twentieth century, the
notion of “public use” in the American Constitution has not been broaden to the limits
of “public weal” from the quoted German provision.
54
 The Bulgarian wording has a connotation close to “compulsory” or “coercive”
deprivation.
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it is stipulated also that in a state of emergency there might be
compensation for diverting property rights (Article 228).  Here, the public
interest must again guide the state in diverting property rights when
rendering public services.
In the constitution of Slovakia, the state controls natural resources,
which are excluded from other constitutional provisions on property
rights (Article 4).  In addition, property rights may be restricted if public
services are rendered.  However, there are also constitutional rules
that provide a discretionary power of the government (Slovakia; Article
20.3): “the law will specify which property other than [ the “national
wealth” and waters]… is essential to meet the needs of society, the
development of the national economy, and the public interest can be
owned only by the state, community, or designated juridical persons.”
(The issue of the so-called “national interest” is discussed separately
below.)
Clearly, there is a need of further research to find how, in terms of
Buchanan-Brennan interpretation, the constitutional design described
above is being reformed via amendments, constitutional court
interpretations, and laws applying constitutional provisions.  To some
extent, however, the private property provisions, as well as others in
the system of a given constitution, are implemented through the integrity
and complementarities of other constitutional hypotheses.
Protection of the property rights
The principle of compensation of private owners in case of state
acquisition for a just compensation supposes the right of the individual
to be protected from abuses of state power.
Obviously, the constitutions of the (former) Yugoslavian countries repeat
the concept of a market-valued compensation when private property
rights are diverted.  If there is a public interest, the state violates property
rights in return to a compensation that must be fair and “not lower than
its market value”.  Such provisions are included not only in the
Yugoslavian constitution (Article 69) but also in the Macedonian (Article
30.4) and Montenegrin constitution (Article 45).
Some additional preconditions to protect private ownership are
stipulated in constitutions of other transition countries.  There is a
requirement to be assured in advance that the needs of the state cannot
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be satisfy through any alternative way (Bulgaria; Article 17.5).  In
addition, many constitutions envisage litigation of the government for
presumed unjust compensation and violation of private property by
public bodies.  This is the spirit of the Albanian (Article 41.5) and
Romanian (Article 41.1) constitutions.  In the latter, the provision states
that a complaint about the provided compensation may be “filed in
court” and that the compensation “shall be agreed upon with the owner
or by the decision of the court when a settlement cannot be reached”.
The constitution of Estonia says that, if the property has been
expropriated by the state for public interests, the court may repeal
legal acts that violate property rights (Article 32.1).  There may be
other constitutional provisions, such as Article 120.1 of the Bulgarian
constitution: “the courts shall supervise the legality of the acts and
actions of the administrative bodies” (e.g. Bulgaria; Article 120.1).  If
not stipulated explicitly, courts may not confirm the claim against unjust
expropriation.
On the balance, however, the impression from reading these
constitutions in the plight of provisional applicability of property
rights enforcement standards are as follows:
a) The triple test of protection (law process, public use and com-
pensation) is enforceable, perhaps, without any problem with respect
to the latter two; it is easy to dispute the compensation but not the
hypothesis of the right to give up the property;
b) According to some constitutions, the government would be in a
position to expropriate a piece of property and only after that meet any
challenges in the court;
c) The conclusions above are not characteristic neither for the
Balkan constitutions nor the constitutions of the other countries in tran-
sition.  The above-mentioned provisions of the German constitution
speak for themselves and similar issues arise with respect to the US
constitution.55
Taxes
Taxes, as a form of government takings, may serve as a reference
case in the comparison between Balkan and other constitutions.  The
55
 Richard A. Epstein. Op. cit. pp. 318, 322.
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conclusion is that there is nothing specific to the Balkans.
As it is stipulated in several of the examined constitutions,56  only law
(i.e. via consent of the tax payers) must levy.  Albania (Article 146) and
Bulgaria (Article 60.2) have almost identical provision: “any tax
reductions or exemptions shall be established by law”.  Retroactive or
ex-post-facto laws must not be passed by the legislatures (e.g. Greece;
Article 78.2 and Albania; Article 146).  In the constitution of Greece it
is stated that the law, which imposes taxes, shall determine the subject
of the tax, the revenue, the kind of property, the expenses and
transactions, or the categories thereof to which the tax relates (Article
78.1).  In the constitution of Estonia, there is a paragraph, in which it is
stipulated that state taxes, fees, levies, penalties, and compulsory
insurance payments are imposed by law (Article 113).57   Ina addition,
various topics related to the budget, taxes, the financial obligations of
the state, the ratification of foreign treaties, and the enactment and
ending of a state of emergency may not be put to referendum (Estonia;
Article 106).  The rate of the tax, tax reductions, or exemptions cannot
be delegated legislative authority (Greece; Article 78.4).
Property rights: free to transfer
The property rights are protected if they can be transferred legally at
low costs.  Most of the countries in transition have been slow to liberalize
capital flows.  At different stages of reforms, there have been restrictions
on trade, money transfers, profit repatriation and movement of capital.58
However, no constitution, limits international trade and capital flows.
In terms of capital in-flows, say, such as FDI’s, countries often
56
 Albania (Article 146); Bulgaria (Article 60.1; 1991); Macedonia (Article 33; 1991);
Greece (Article 78.1; 1975); Slovakia (Article 59.2; 1992); Yugoslavia (Article 64;
1992)
57
 The Estonian constitution is most specific on these matters among all transition
countries.  Estonia is used as a reference case in the report on the Balkan Political
Economies given its advantageous position in trade liberalization, government expen-
ditures and interference (as identified by economic freedom monitors).
58
 See, for instance: Simon Johnson, Private Business in Eastern Europe; Kenneth A.
Froot, Foreign Dirext Investment in Eastern Europe: Some Economic Considerations;
Dani Rodrik, Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe’s Transition: Early Results, in: Olivier
Jean Blanchard, Kenneth A. Froot, Jeffrey D. Sachs (editors) The Transition in East-
ern Europe, volume 2, Restructuring, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago
Press, 1994, pp. 245-292, 293-318, 319-356.
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implement regulations that are less restrictive to foreign investment
than to domestic capital use in privatization, etc.  These regulations
often contradict not the letter but the spirit of respective constitutional
provisions of equality of the various forms of capital and ownership.59
Of course, the real picture differs from country to country in terms of
attracted FDI and informal impediments to the inflow and outflow of
capital.
Landownership
There is one common exception: the land is believed to be of supreme
national value.
As already mentioned, the Bulgarian constitution maintains that “arable
land shall be used for agricultural purposes only” (Article 21.2).  There
are other legal barriers to obtain property rights over land: constitutions
ban foreigners from buying agriculture land, as it is in Bulgaria60  and
Romania (Article 41.2).  In many countries, constitutions require that
conditions should be further stipulated by law under which foreigners
may acquire property (which makes it difficult or illegal): Croatia (Article
48), Estonia (Article; 32.3), Macedonia (Article 31) and Slovenia (Article
68.1).  In Bulgaria, there is also a law on protecting land, which repeats
the constitutional directive that the arable land should be used only for
growing agricultural products.  In fact, around 40% of the agriculture
land is not used at all.
As Stefano Bianchini comments,61  all of the post-communist
constitutions guarantee the right to private property.  The role of the
state, however, is not only to adopt legal rules but also to protect specific
rights that are basic for reinforcing the national sovereignty of the Balkan
countries.  These rights are a part of the security doctrines.  All that
can be found in the constitutional provisions, in which restrictions are
imposed on foreigners to own land.  The state and the land are used
as synonyms.  The explanation for these constitutional rules, provided
by Bianchini, is that for the politicians in the Balkans, the control over
the land is a conditio sine qua non for avoiding any “semi-colonial
59
 Kenneth A. Froot, Op.cit. p. 294, 295.
60
 “No foreign physical person or foreign legal entity shell acquire ownership over
land, except through legal inheritance” (Article 22.1).
61
 Bianchini, Stefano, “The Idea of State in Post-Communist Balkan Societies”, In
State Building in the Balkans. Longo Aditore Ravenna. 1998. p. 64.
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status”.  The property rights are also related to the unresolved problem
of the ethnic minorities.
The property might be obtained not only with a contract of transferring
rights but also it might be inherited.  In the constitutions included in the
study, property rights are split from right of inheritance.  In the
constitutions of Bulgaria (Article 17.1), Croatia (Article Macedonia
(Article 30.1), Poland (Article 21.1 and 64), Slovakia (Article 20.1),
Slovenia (Article 33) and Yugoslavia (Article 51), the state protects not
only property rights but also property rights if they have been inherited.
The constitution of Albania lists several ways of acquiring property:
“by gift, inheritance, purchase or any other classical means provided
by the Civil Code” (Article 41.2).  We also review other CEE and SEE
constitutions.   Similar provisions are included in the constitutions of
countries that are not from the region (e.g. Germany; Article 14.1;
1949).  Only in the constitutions of the ex-socialist Bosna and
Herzegovina and the Czech Republic, it is not explicitly stipulated that
the property rights are protected but the property rights if inheritance
are protected as well.
“Exclusive” rights
Similarly to landownership, the restriction on free capital flows stems
from exclusive government right over (natural) resources and ex-public
services, i.e. monopolies that are remnants of pre-reform central
planning.
We think that these exclusive rights, exercised over a sovereign
territory, provide the main “incentive” to seek controls over governments
and separation of territories into separate nation-states.  In the report
on the Balkan Political Economy, we have pointed out that “the political
process of building a nation state in the mid-late nineteenth century
manner, when mono-centric European alliances were presumed and
conceived as territorial expansion of economic influence, is rather odd.
Then, the territorial identity was perceived as a precondition of
prosperity, as governments’ bargaining chip to seek rents from one
alliance or another.  Balkan nations, then, had fallen victims of these
notions, fighting several wars with one another…  If in the nineteenth
century it was somehow politically justifiable to fight for territorial
influence on the Balkans, at the end of the twentieth it was not.”
The notion of public goods (i.e. a good, which everybody uses but no
76
one in particular pays the total price for the use) explains the abstract
(in the light of the constitutional law and economics) justification why
there are certain types of activities that cannot easily be provided
through market transaction principally because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to restrict consumption to those who pay for the service.
In reality, however, the constitution making on exclusive rights was,
perhaps, more concerned with retaining government controls.  In the
early 1990’s, across Central and Eastern Europe, it basically meant
retaining position of ex-communist management in substantial sectors
of domestic economies.62
According to Richard Epstein, the public trust theory key assumption
is that property should be subject to that form of ownership that
minimizes the bargaining problems associated with moving the asset
to its highest-valued use.  The desirability of this system of first
possession changes radically when we consider, for example, natural
resource, waters, the use of navigable rivers and lakes for
transportation.63   In this case, any system of divided private ownership,
based on first possession, tends to create bargaining and holdout
problems that the institution of private property is designed to overcome.
The risk is that the owner of one segment of the resource would hold
out against all the others, so that bargaining breakdown will prevent
any use of the resource at all for exploitation of the resource.  Thus, in
any event the economic sense of the exclusive government rights over
resources is “only to police the rule whereby is acquired and transferred”
to private parties and users with extensive administrative costs.64
Now, we would like to discuss transition and Balkan constitutions in
the light of the above-said.
We exclude the rights, which stem from the exclusivity of jurisdiction
upon a sovereign territory, such as protecting national borders and
implementing external policy priorities.  Instead, we focus on those
related to the use of and the decision about resources available on the
sovereign territory.
62
 One of the authors of this report was a member of the Bulgarian Constitutional
Assembly of 1990-1991 and signed the new constitution with a special opinion on
provisions on government’s exclusives rights.  Proceeding of this assembly prove that
ex-communist members drafted and advocated those provisions, while non-commu-
nist were either indifferent or oppose them.
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 See Richard Epstein, Op.cit. p. 319.
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 Ibidem.
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Perhaps, the most extensive coverage on these matters is provided
by the constitution of Bulgaria.   Article 18 lists twenty-two exclusive
rights of the state and stipulates which are the monopoly rights over
“railway transport, the national postal and telecommunication networks,
and the use of nuclear energy, the manufacturing of radioactive
products, armaments, explosives, and powerful toxic substances by
law” (18.4).  The state shall exercise its exclusive rights to protect
and/or exploit the “continental shelf …and the biological, mineral, and
energy resources therein as well” (Article 18.2).
In Romania, “subsoil riches of any nature, ways of communication,
the air space, waters with hydropower availabilities, and those which
can be used for the public interest, beaches, territorial waters, natural
resources of the economic zone, and the continental shelf, as well as
other assets established by law” are exclusively public property (Article
135. 4).  The constitutional rules of Croatia protect natural resources
in exclusive provisions: “the sea, seashore, and islands, waters, air
space, mineral wealth, and other natural resources, as well as land,
“forests, fauna, and flora, other parts of nature, real estate, and others
cultural, historical, economic, or ecological resources, which are
specified by law as of public interests” (Article 52).  Exclusive rights
established by law may be transferred to private parties, if it is stipulated
in the constitution.  Only in the constitutions of Bulgaria (Article 18.5)
and Romania (Article 135.5), “they [public-owned assets] may be taken
over for administration by self-managed public companies or public
institutions, or may be leased or granted in concession, in accordance
with the law”.  In the constitutions of both countries it is stipulated
explicitly that the state may require certain conditions in providing rights
over public property by law.  In Bulgaria, the state may give rights to
perform economic activities, which are its exclusive rights, not only
opening a concession procedure but also regulating it with regulatory
regimes (e.g. licenses).
Constitutions of Central European transition countries are not so
specific; they refer to a law that should implement the rights to use
natural resources.  In Hungary, different economic activities, which
are performed exclusively by the state, are to be set by law (Article
10).  The constitutional provisions of Poland allow monopoly to be
established by law; these exclusive rights are listed in the part on public
finance (Article 216.3).
Similarly, although there are some exceptions, the constitutions of EU
member states approach the issue from the same perspective. As it is
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stipulated in the constitution of Greece, special laws determine the
conditions of providing property rights over “mines, mineral waters,
freely flowing and subterranean waters, and the subterranean natural
resources” (Article 18.1).  The exclusive property rights of the state to
obtain natural resources are provided in other constitutional provisions
as well: the shoals and large lakes and those relating in general to the
disposition of the areas reclaimed through the draining thereof are
under special protection by law (Article 18.2).
In Germany, Article 20a requires that the state, “in its responsibility for
future generations”, protects the natural foundations of life...” The
constitution of Spain (Article 132) provides protection of “the property
in the public domain and community property” similar to the protection
of private property in other constitutions.  The most peculiar and similar
to Balkan, especially Bulgarian, constitutions is the Portugal.  Its Article
84 deals with the “Public Domain” that lists all natural resources and
suggests a separate provision (84.1,f) on “other property classified as
[public domain] by the law.”
In general, we think that the following observations are relevant.
• Balkan constitutions are far more concrete on outlining specific
government exclusive rights than those of Central Europe, the EU or
the United States.  They resemble the basic laws of Portugal and Spain:
the former – in terms of the concrete level of description, and the latter
– in terms of outlining inviolability of public monopolies and rights on
natural resources.
• As mentioned above, the very exclusiveness of the rights on natural
resources, (conventionally entitled to the governments world-wide due
to externality effects of their exploitation) does not necessarily require
government management of those resources and does not prohibit
transferability of these rights (users rights) to private parties, end users,
etc.  This concept justifies attention on law processes related to these
rights, as it is the case with the constitutions of EU member states,
Central Europe and EU.  The devil, however, is in the details:
irrespectively the constitutional hypothesis, laws regulating these rights
can create enough hurdles to legal transferability procedures.  On the
other hand, the inflexibility of constitutional provisions, as it seems to
be the case with most Balkan constitutions, is more likely to imply
difficult and costly legal process.
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• In most constitutions, the notion of exclusives is most frequently
used to describe competencies with the division of powers, as it is
obvious in the constitutions of Spain and Germany.  The constitution
of Poland specifies one “exclusive” right, to issue banknotes.  The
Balkan constitutions often specifically use the term in relation to natural
resources and monopolies.  Romanian constitution specifically
mentions that resources should be used in “national interest” (see
below for exact quotation).
• In the wording and visioning of Balkan basic laws on natural
resources, there is a characteristic similar to the one observed by
Stefano Bianchini.  Resources are perceived as national “treasure” or
resource.  The English phrase of the Romania constitution is “Subsoil
Riches”.  A recent constitutional blueprint for Serbia and Yugoslavia
states,65  “national resources owned by the Republic of Serbia shall be
inalienable” [italics – ours].66   In a system of basic believes, it would
mean that nations and governments handle resources, not individual
companies and end users under the due process of law.
Freedom to engage in business
The constitutional order might be maintained only if there are legal
rules, which protect economic rights, property rights and contract
enforcement.  There are many legal constitutionally introduced
obstacles, some of them justified by intentions to improve the economic
development of a country.
Constitutional rules might constrain free market transactions through
regular regulatory control over economic activities.  Such provisions
are those that might impose costs of complying and especially those
related to free competition.
In all constitutions, there are paragraphs that presumably protect the
freedom to engage in business.
65
 The Romanian phrase of Article 134. 4 is: “Bogatiile de orice natura ale subsolului…”;
in the available English translations the exclusiveness of public property on natural
resources is not as visible as in the Romania text, which says the these are “fac
obiectul exclusiv al proprietatii publice ».
66
 Vojin Dimitrijevic, Op.cit., p. 27.
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Free enterprise “per se”
The general rule is that free enterprise is defined on a very broad
(principal) level.  In the constitution of the United States it is implied by
the fifth and (to some extent) fourth amendments.  The constitution of
Germany has its famous preamble about the “Soziale Marktwirtschaft”.
Portugal (61.1) protects the rights of free enterprise (in the framework
of the constitutions, the law, and “with due account of the general
interest”).
Only in the former socialist countries, there are explicit constitutional
rules maintaining that the right to enterprise and the right to compete
on the market are protected by the constitution.  There are provisions
not only about the rights to perform on the market but also about basic
economic principles, which the constitution must protect.  They are
usually listed in the same paragraph with the economic rights.  Only
few constitutions stipulate that the market economy is an economic
system that will be applied in the country.  In some, these provisions
are rather abstract; in others there is a great deal of details and
possibility for diverse interpretation.  In the constitution of Croatia it is
even stated explicitly that foreign investors are free to do whatever
they want with the profit and capital investment, including transferring
or repatriating it (Article 49.5).
According to Yugoslavia’s Article 13.2, [in the republic] “economic
activities shall be pursued according to the principles of a market
economy”.  The blueprint for a new constitution provides a new editing:
“The economy of the Republic of Serbia shall be a social market
economy”.67   We think in conformity with the common constitutional
vision of the Balkans and ex-Yugoslavian countries, the market
principles are those, on which the economy of Macedonia is based
(Article 8).
Bulgaria (Article 19.1) explicitly declares that the economy of the country
is based on the free economic enterprise and states, in the preamble,
that the intention of constitution makers was to “create a democratic,
law-governed and social state”.  However, article 19.1 has been rarely
used in the debates on economic reform legal frameworks while the
wording of the preamble surfaces quite often.
In the constitution of Romania, there are several paragraphs related
to market economy.  It is the most redundant in wording from all con-
67
 Ibidem.
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stitutions with reviewed for the preparation of this report.  On one hand,
it says that its economy is a “free market economy” (Article 134.1).
On the other, it requires that “the state must secure: a) a free trade,
protection of law and competition, provision of a favorable framework
in order to stimulate and value every factor of production; b) protection
of natural interest in economic financial and currency activity; c) pro-
motion of national scientific research; d) exploitation of natural re-
sources in conformity with national interest; e) environmental protec-
tion and recovery as well as preservation of ecological balance; f) cre-
ation of all necessary condition so as to increase the quality of life”
(Article 134.2).
If we turn now to the constitutions of Central Europe we will find, again,
that they adhere to the general treatment of the subject of free
enterprise.
In the constitution of Hungary, there is a paragraph, in which it is
stipulates that the market economy is the economic system of the
country and that rights to enterprise and compete on the market are
protected by the constitution (Article 9.1).  The constitution of Slovakia
also says that the rights to perform on the market without being
constrained are guaranteed.  It is declared also that the principles of
market economy will be applied only if they comply with the social and
environmental policy of the government (Article 55.1).  These provisions
resemble those of the constitution of Romania but are far less concrete.
In the constitution of Poland, there is a statement that the market policy
of the state will be social.  The principles of this policy are based on
rights to enterprise and social dialogue between “social partners”
(Article 20).  The Estonian constitution is rather concise in the
constitutional reading of similar provisions: Estonian citizens (Article
31) “shall have the right to engage in commercial activities and to form
profit-making associations and leagues;” “the law may determine
conditions and procedures for the exercise of this right”; “unless
otherwise determined by law, this right shall exist equally for Estonian
citizens and citizens of foreign states and stateless persons who are
present in Estonia.”
Competition and economic activities
The concrete approach of the constitutional interpretation presupposes
that certain provisions that the state might restrict rights to enterprise.
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The state may intervene on the market, if there are economic activities
that do not correspond to the adopted market principles or when these
activities contradict the reviewed above exclusive rights of the state.
The approach used in these constitutions implies that the government
may intervene not only by imposing entry barriers but also by regulating
competition and market ethics.
In the constitutions of former socialist countries, the right to enterprise
is protected not only by the provisions on freedom to engage in business
but also by other constitutional rules that deal with abuses of market
position.  These constitutional provisions are included for preventing
the so-called market failures.
For instance, according to certain statements, the competition on the
market may result in monopoly positions.  This is a strong theoretical
hypothesis.  It motivates constitution maker to construct rules of
organizing economic activities and protecting competition. This is the
case with the constitution of Macedonia, which stipulates that the state
may restrict the rights to perform on the market and may take
“measures against monopolistic positions and monopolistic conduct
on the market” (Article 55.2).   The constitution of Bulgaria has similar
provisions.  It explicitly mentions that, in order to protect the rights of
all entrepreneurs to perform in economic activities, “the law shall
establish and guarantee equal legal conditions for economic activity
to all citizens and corporate entities by preventing any abuse of a
monopoly status and unfair competition and by protecting the
consumer” (Article 19.2).  The criteria for doing so is explained in the
next provision, which deals with different hypothesis: “the law shall
establish conditions favorable to the setting up of cooperatives and
other forms of association of citizens and corporate entities in the pursuit
of economic and social progress” (19.4).
The constitution of Croatia includes not so specific but similar provi-
sions in, in which it is stated that the right to engage in business is
protected and all forms of a monopoly are restricted (Article 49.2).  In
the constitution of Yugoslavia, there are a few paragraphs on free
trade.  Any forms of a monopoly do not comply with the constitutional
provisions on the right to perform on the market without constrains, so
they are prohibited (Article 74.3).  In the same provision, it is stated
not only that the competition shall be free but also that the right to
engage in business under equal conditions is protected by the consti-
tutional rules.
The simplest constitutional arrangement is that of Slovenia: “(1) Free
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enterprise shall be guaranteed. (2) The establishment of businesses
shall be regulated by statute. Any business activity in conflict with the
public interest may not be pursued. (3) Restrictive trading practices
and other practices which restrict free competition, as specified by
statute, shall be forbidden” (Article 74).  The Slovakian constitution
states that the principle to be applied is that economic activities are
based on free competition (Article 55.2).
Although it is difficult to extrapolate without a specific country research
into specific constitutional economies, some general observations are
relatively justified.
• The more specific is the constitutional interpretation of economic
and business matters, the more complicated could be the implemen-
tation.  The constitutions of Bulgaria and Romania exemplify this prin-
ciple.  The former (Article 19), besides provisional intention to level
the playfield, contains different hypothesis for different market play-
ers.68   The latter (quoted Article 134) contains hypothesis that are, if
not contradictory, at least difficult to consolidate.
• As it was pointed out in the previous section of this report, although
constitutional standards aim at restricting government interference in
private transactions, constitutions, remain fairly protective on issues
presumed as public (national, government) interests.  Besides the
quoted Romania’s provision, these hypotheses are explicit in the
constitution of Yugoslavia, though this constitution excludes the results
of activities regarding the environment that may infringe other person’s
interest: “the industrial activities might be controlled if it is in the public
interest to impose restrictions on the right to enterprise” (Article 57).
• These provisions are rather exceptional by international standards.
Again, the constitutions of most Central European countries are far
less specific and some of them (Estonia) provide for equal treatment
of domestic and outside economic entities and investment.  Balkan
constitutions are either vague on this issue (Bulgaria) or imply national
preference (Romania).  This constellation does not necessarily mean
68
 Article 19.3 deals with this issue, it says that “investments and economic activity by
Bulgarian and foreign persons and corporate entities shall enjoy the protection of the
law” but it fails to differentiate between investment undertaken at own responsibility
and between this protection and principle protection of property right; at the same time
it does not equalize domestic and foreign entities before the law, as it is the case with
the constitution of Estonia.
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that either option is applied as policy mix in economic reforms.  The
only EU constitution with similar thinking on these matters is again
Portugal.69
Stability of the government machinery
Constitutions and crisis
Every representative democracy requires a set of rules for peaceful
changes of the government.  Perhaps, given the background of the
region, Balkan constitutional fathers have paid particular attention to
the rules of changing the government in times of a political crisis.
However, it (the Balkan constitutions) does not seem very efficient in
the area of real politics.
Article 99 of Bulgaria’s constitution gives an opportunity for three
consecutive attempts to form a cabinet in case of a failure (resignation,
non-confidence vote). The first is assigned to the political faction that
failed, while the head of state is almost obliged to submit the mandate
to it.  In addition, there is no deadline in between the attempts to form
a new government, a provision that may facilitate the end of the crisis
and/or opt for fresh elections.  In fact, the constitution provides for a
sort of a second try for the incumbents (who just resigned or deserved
no confidence) to form a new executive and for endless bargaining
that in principle could be repeated several times during the mandate.
In reality, both scenarios happened after the adoption of the constitution,
in 1992 and in 1997.  The procrastinated crisis of 1992 stopped reforms
and brought about ad hoc majorities in the parliament.  The crisis of
1996-early 1997 was resolved only thanks (or due) to the successful
attempt of President Stoyanov and the National Security Council to
convince the then-incumbent socialists not to opt for a second cabinet.70
Slovenia (Article 110 and 111) has a more comprehensive approach
69
 See Article 81 of the constitution, which list thirteen specific instances of “prime
duties of the state in economic and social sphere”.
 70
 The constitutional option of Bulgaria during political crisis has been a subject of
reflection by international scholars.  Andras Sajo have recently noted that: the consti-
tution of 1991 “invest the president, who has almost no formal power, with the legiti-
macy of a directly elected president…”; the term in office is longer than those of the
legislature – five years; this “increased legitimacy strengthens the president’s role in
protecting the constitutionalism, and as such, it is neither superfluous nor destabiliz-
ing”, an, in reality, it was necessary “to solve the political crisis that occurred in 1997.”
(Andras Sajo, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism, Budapest,
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to form a cabinet in terms of a crisis: it sets a deadline of fourteen
days for a second attempt to elect a new prime minister, and specifies
how many members of the Parliament should propose a candidate,
equalizing the right of the president and elected deputies in selecting
a cabinet.  In case of a failure, the legislature is to be dissolved by the
president, but there is a new, forty-eight hours option that “the National
Assembly decides by a majority of votes cast by those deputies present
to hold new elections for President of the Government, whereby a
majority of votes cast by those deputies present is sufficient for the
election of the candidate”.  In this case, during the “new elections a
vote is taken on candidates individually in order of the number of votes
received in the earlier voting and then on the new candidates proposed
prior to the new vote, wherein any candidate proposed by the President
of the Republic takes precedence”.
There are clear deadlines in case of confidence and no-confidence
votes, and the president may require a no-confidence vote; if in the
latter case the newly proposed cabinet “does not receive the support
of a majority vote of all deputies”, the parliament “must elect within
thirty days a new prime minister,” “in a new vote express its confidence
in the incumbent”, or “failing this, the President of the Republic dissolves
the National Assembly and calls new elections.”  The president may
“tie the issue of confidence to the adoption of a law or to some other
decision in the National Assembly”; “if such decision is not adopted, it
is deemed that a vote of no-confidence in the Government has been
passed” (Article 117).
Before the recent amendments, the constitution of Croatia did not
contain the hypothesis that the president is, among other thing, a mortal
human being.  In the period preceding the elections of 2000, Romania
had been twice brought to the verge of a constitutional crisis due to
the fact that the constitution does not contain an indisputable
mechanism for replacing the prime minister.  However, this omission
did not prevent a development that allowed President Constantinescu
and the chaotic parliamentary majority to replace two heads of the
cabinet and to reshuffle a number of times key ministers.  Romania’s
(Article 89) constitutional mechanism of crisis is not very specific in
principle: “after consultation with … both Chambers and the leaders of
Central European University Press, 1999, p. 180.  Bulgaria constitutional imperfection
(Article 99) in time of political crisis is the lack of deadlines, which may lead to costly
procrastinations of the crisis and abuse of power.  (One of the authors of these lines
signed this article with a special opinion).
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the Parliamentary groups, the President of Romania may dissolve
Parliament, if no vote of confidence has been obtained to form a
government within 60 days after the first request was made, and only
after rejection of at least two requests for investiture.”  The president
does not have the right to dissolve the legislature twice in one year,
and he or she cannot do so “during the last six months of the term of
office of the President of Romania, nor can it be dissolved during a
state of siege or emergency” (89. 2 and 3).
In his country report on Serbia, Vojin Dimitrijevic identifies a common
phenomenon for most of the Balkan countries: “A serious weakness
of the parliamentary system is the fact that under the existing election
laws deputies represent their own parties and not voters directly, so
that the link between the electorate and the parliament is lost and
there exists loyalty to parties and their leaders, rather than to voters”
(p. 12)  Vojin Dimitrijevic also finds that there is a crisis rooted in the
Serbian parliamentary system which stems from internal diversities in
the ruling majority faction (p. 12-13).  Prof. Sinisa Rodin considers
that this conclusion can be applied easily to Croatia as well.  We think
this situation resembles the situation in many countries that have first
democratically elected parliament in many countries, such as Bulgaria,
Poland and Czech Republic.
Although very few of the Balkan constitutions deal with a political crisis
necessitated by a failure to adopt a budget, such a fiscal inefficiency,
however, is a key hypothesis in the case of Poland (Article225).  In
Croatia, the President of the Republic may dissolve Parliament if the
national budget is not adopted within 120 days after the budget bill
was submitted by the government (Article 104).  Romania’s (Article
137), Slovenia’s (Article 148) and Yugoslavia’s constitutions (Article
82) have similar provisions.
In Macedonia, the executive cabinet resigns in case of ordinary
hypothesis (vote of no-confidence, it has submitted its resignation,
expired term in office due to expired term of the legislature, and its
dissolution) but “remains on duty until the election of a new
Government” (Article 93).  It does not list any specific occasion (e.g.
passing the budget) that would require a confidence procedure and it
does not specifies the role of the president in a case of coinciding
resignation and dissolution of the parliament.
Adopted after the statehood crisis of 1997, the Albanian constitution is
probably the most specific on these procedures.  Articles 87, 90, 91,
96, 104 and 105 envisage five failures (reoccurring in a one-week
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time) of the legislature to elect a council of ministers, a repetition of
this failure after fresh elections, procedures to impeach the head of
state for “serious violations of the constitution”, three reoccurring in
periods of 10-day failures of the parliamentary majority to vote the
prime-minister, and two 15-day-attempts of the majority to elect a prime
minister in an event of non-confidence.
The Federal republic of Yugoslavia (articles 82-84, 97-98 and 103-
104) provides interestingly designed procedure to tackle a political
crisis on a federal level by the legislature “shall be dissolved at the
request of the federal government” (article 83.1), but this development
may not happen if “if the procedure for a vote of confidence in the
federal government has been initiated” (article 83.2).
Constitutions and emergencies
The government may alter economic or political rights in certain
conditions: in the state of war, in the state of emergency or in the state
of natural disasters.  In these circumstances the rights protected by
the constitution are different.  The constitutional rights that could not
be limited even in the state of emergency or in the state of war are
those rights related to human life, such as the right to access to justice
and a fair trial.
In the constitution of Poland, these rights are protected in the provisions
on private life and court trials (Article 233).  In the constitution of Estonia,
there is a similar paragraph on the rights, which may not be restricted
even in a state of emergency; the welfare rights granted by the state
are among these rights (Article 130).  However, there are constitutional
rights, which are not preserved if there are natural disasters.  In the
constitution of Poland, it is stated that the rights that may be violated in
such cases are the rights to perform economic activities and to obtain
property, as well as rights to strike and work (Article 233.3).  There are
similar provisions in the constitutional rules of Albania.
Although not very comprehensive in envisaging different developments
in a case of government crisis, all Balkan constitutions contain special
provisions on the state of emergency.  In Croatia, the constitutional
rights that could not be restricted by the government could not be the
rights to life, express thought or religious beliefs, or the right to a fair
trial (Article 17).  In Macedonia, the human rights, which are inviolable,
are the right to life and a fair trial (Article 54.4).  The constitutional
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rules of Slovenia and Bulgaria also protect several rights in the state
of war or in the state of emergency (Article 16.2 and Article 57).   The
rights respected in all instances are the rights to express thoughts or
religious beliefs.
The constitution of Albania is the most specific in these matters.  There
is a separate part on the extraordinary power of the government in the
state of war, the state of emergency and natural disasters (Part XVI,
Articles 170-176).  If the government shall decide on “extraordinary
measures”, then it shall apply the “principles of operation of public
organs, and the extent of the restrictions of the human rights and
freedom” which are set by law (Article 170.2).  The law defines the
conditions, under which the government might provide in restoring
“normal functions” of the state.  It is stated that extraordinary measures,
which the government may take, must correspond to the level of the
risk faced (Article 170.4).  Emergency statutes protect the rights that
the state may not alter.  Property rights and other rights that are related
to the different economic activities on the market, such as the right to
work (Article 175.2) are among the rights that may be restricted by the
constitution.
All these provisions are quite typical for the constitutions of European
transition countries.  Constitutions of the EU member states are far
less concerned with the cases of emergencies.  Although in the
constitution of France, for example, there is a paragraph on the state
of emergency; it is not stated explicitly, that the rights protected by the
constitution may be violated if not possible to prevent this development.
The procedural problems related to the state of emergency are also
discussed in the constitution of Germany (Article 81.3).   Similarly, the
Spanish constitution has several provisions on the rights that may be
altered by the state if the constitutional principles may not be applied
in the state of emergency or war (Article 55).
The constitutional system cannot be separated from the political
system.  It determines the structure of government powers and private
rights and the processes whereby these powers and rights are altered.
In the American constitutional studies, there is a term for those
constitutional rules, which have been applied during national
emergencies71 .  The “crisis” constitution rests on a broad ideological
base.  It is more or less normal that, if there are national emergencies,
71
 Higgs, Robert. Can the Constitution Protect Private Rights During National
Emergencies? Public Choice and Constitutional Economics. Jai Press Inc., 1988
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the institutions have different rules than the usual rules.  Then, the
principles prescribed in the constitutions would not be valid if there
were no constitutional constrains on the expected abuse of political
power during national emergencies.  The peculiarities of the Balkan
constitutions in this respect may be summarized as follows.
• Balkan constitution might be defined as “crisis constitutions” but in
a very specific sense.  They are less specific, or at least there are
significant omissions, in dealing with instances of a political crisis. At
the same time, they are thorough in prescription of government actions
in case of emergencies.  The least efficient mechanism to resolve
political crisis– the Albanian, is supplemented with the most extensive
list of emergency actions.
• Election systems are a key to constellations in political crisis.  Balkan
countries, as most European countries, vote in general elections for
party lists.  This peculiarity laid the foundations for a centralization
spin-off towards the incumbent prime ministers who, by tradition, are
also heads of political parties that gain a majority.  Thus, as heads of
both the cabinet and political party leaders, they control parliaments.
Although these spin-offs are mitigated by the direct elections of the
presidents, the presidential powers in the day-to-day management of
the country are diminished.  The case in point here is Bulgaria, but by
constellation most countries, perhaps by incident, have identified similar
solutions while others may face constitutional difficulties in sustaining
efficient government machinery.  E.g., Albania elects its president (by
a?) via 2/3-vote of the elected representative in the parliament, but as
a head of the state he/she performs functions that lift him or her above
partisan relationship.  But, vice-a-versa, in a parliament dominated by
a sizable majority, it could be expected that a dual executive could
emerge, as has happened in Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia,
and Belarus.
What is peculiar about Balkan constitutions?72
• Balkan constitutions are very specific, with extensive coverage of
the topics related to the protection of property rights.  This character-
istic is a relatively common feature of many post-Communist constitu-
72
 This part of the report is to be substantially revised due to ongoing consultations
with political scientists and lawyers from other Balkan countries.
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tional arrangements.  Former socialist countries intend to both guar-
antee against coercive oppression of individual liberties and define as
explicitly as possible constitutional rules that establish the right to en-
terprise and the right to compete on the market.
• The peculiarity, however, is that the Balkan countries have a less
systematic approach to individual property rights and entrepreneur-
ship than the United States and the countries of the EU.  Often, they
are also more specific, even redundant, in dealing with these matters
than the constitutions of the Central European countries and the Bal-
tic States, particularly Estonia.  The triple test of protection (law pro-
cess, public use and compensation) is, perhaps, enforceable without
a problem with respect to the latter two; it is easy to dispute the com-
pensation but not the hypothesis of the right to give up the property.
According to some constitutions, the government would be in a posi-
tion to expropriate a piece of property and only after that meet any
challenges in the court.
• The extensive provision for private property rights seems not to
make a difference in practice.  Even the Balkan reform leaders, Bul-
garia and Romania, which are  the only countries benefiting from their
international status with respect to the EU accession, lag far behind
Central European emerging markets and democracies.  These econo-
mies seem less flexible in terms of capital mobility, and, perhaps, there
are constitutional foundations for the current situation.  There are dif-
ferent stipulations on the conditions, under which the state might di-
vert private property rights.  ”It may limit or expropriate property only in
“the public interest.  In addition, most of the countries in transition
have been slow to liberalize capital flows.  At different stages of the
reforms, there have been restrictions on trade, money transfers, profit
repatriation, and movement of capital.  However, no constitution ex-
plicitly limits international trade and capital flows.  Balkan constitutions
are far more concrete on outlining specific government (state) exclu-
sive rights than those of Central Europe, the EU or the United States.
The inflexibility of constitutional provisions on these exclusive rights,
as it seems to be the case with most Balkan constitutions, is more
likely to imply difficult and costly legal process.  In most constitutions,
the notion of exclusives is most frequently used to describe compe-
tencies with division of powers, as in the constitutions of Spain and
Germany.
• We think that these exclusive rights, exercised over a sovereign
territory, provide the main “incentive” to seek controls over govern-
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ments and separation of territories into separate nation-states.  In the
wording and visioning of Balkan basic laws on natural resources, there
is a characteristic similar to the one observed by Stefano Bianchini.
Resources are rather perceived as national “treasure” or resource.
Similarly to landownership, the restriction on free capital flows stems
from exclusive government rights over (natural) resources and ex-
public services, i.e. monopolies that are remnants of pre-reform cen-
tral planning.  These provisions are rather exceptional by international
standards.  Again, constitutions of most Central European countries
are far less specific and some of them (Estonia) provide for equal
treatment of domestic and outside economic entities and investment.
Balkan constitutions are either vague on this issue (Bulgaria) or imply
national preference (Romania).  This constellation does not neces-
sarily mean that either option is applied as policy mix in economic
reforms.  The only EU constitution with similar thinking on these mat-
ters is the Portuguese.
• Although it is difficult to extrapolate without a specific country re-
search into specific constitutional economies, some general observa-
tions are (relatively) justified.  The more specific is the constitutional
interpretation of economic and business matters, the more compli-
cated could be the implementation.  The constitutions of Bulgaria and
Romania exemplify this principle/claim.  The former (Article 19), be-
sides provisional intention to level the playfield, contains separate hy-
pothesis for various market players.  The latter (quoted Article 134)
contains hypotheses that are, if not contradictory, at least difficult to
consolidate.  The constitutional standards aim at restricting the gov-
ernment interference in private transactions but remain fairly protec-
tive on issues presumed as public (national, government) interests.
Besides the quoted provision in the Rumanian constitution, these hy-
potheses are explicit in the constitution of Yugoslavia, though the con-
stitution does not deal with the result of activities related to the envi-
ronment that may infringe other people’s interest: “the industrial activi-
ties might be controlled if it is in the public interest to impose restric-
tions on the right to enterprise” (Article 57).
• Balkan constitution might be defined as “crisis constitutions” but in
a very specific sense.  They are less specific, or at least there are
significant omissions, in dealing with instances of political crisis but
rather thorough in prescription of government action in case of emer-
gencies.  The least efficient mechanism to resolve a political crisis,
the Albanian, is supplemented with the most extensive list of emer-
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gency actions.  Election systems are a key to constellations in a politi-
cal crisis. Balkan countries, as most European countries, vote in gen-
eral elections for party lists.   Thus, the proportional representation of
voters laid foundations for a centralization spin-off towards the incum-
bent prime ministers who, by tradition, are also heads of political par-
ties that gain majority.  As heads of both the cabinet and political party
leaders, they control parliaments.  Although these spin-offs are miti-
gated by the direct elections of the presidents, the power of the presi-
dent in the day-to-day management of the country is diminished.
• Perhaps, the explanation of the observations above is rooted not
the historical tradition but in the immediate background of the consti-
tution making.  What matters in all countries is the history of the 1980’s.
This development is obvious in the events that preceded the dismem-
berment of former Yugoslavia.  In Romania, the 1980’s were the years
of both extraordinary economic hardships and the sclerotic outcry of
outgoing dictatorship.  Bulgaria had a rent seeking position between
East and West in the 1980’s: its industry was recycling subsidized raw
materials and energy from COMECON, selling them out on the inter-
national market, and with the price difference imported hi-tech
(COCOM-embargoed) back to the East. At the same time, the gov-
ernment was borrowing at full speed from London Club members.
The beneficiaries of those “transactions” led the reforms in the com-
munist party.  Albania went through the legitimization of the new politi-
cal establishment after 1992.
What is to be expected?
With respect to the relations between the EU and the Balkans, there
are obvious parallels between Balkan constitutions and the
Portuguese73 .  However, an analogy is no evidence.  Economic
background is arguably there. What helped Portugal is the integration
of the country into the larger constitutional and market framework of
the EU.  The Balkans has this prospect but at different time and with
different conditions.  They have diverse paths towards the EU and in
general relatively bleak image. Left on their own, the individual countries’
constitutional design will not provide for gradual improvement.  What
matters is the competition among various countries to set options for
brighter future of their populace.  Market prices are denominated in
euro, and the European currency serves as a reference currency, while
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trade gravitates towards the EU; similarly, the peoples and political
establishments also gravitate towards the EU. There is no cause and
effect mechanism: it is simply where the opportunities are.
• The rule of law, as it is embedded in the constitutions, does not
provide for an efficient and equitable treatment of different forms of
property and for an individual to be protected from state takings.  This
constitutional lack of equality before the law is likely to support collec-
tivistic attitudes, which can easily be justified by misinterpreting his-
tory and recent bitter memories into nationalism and/or statism.  If
constitutions provide for some stable social (civic and economic) struc-
tures, these structures are those related to collectivistic attitudes and
aspirations.
• The constitution making in the Balkans for the time being follows
the chain of events.  This was the case with Bosna and Herzegovina,
with Macedonia, with the redrafting of the union between Serbia and
Montenegro, with the constitution making of all ex-Yugoslav states,
and with constitutional legitimization of the political establishments of
Bulgaria and Romania.  The proactive constitutional vision is a part of
the solution.  Naturally, it takes time.
• At the same time, these notions of the existing constitution design
in the Balkans do not compose any substantial peculiarity to that of
other transition economies.  On average, Central European and Baltic
states represent more concise constitutional models, but it is likely
that what matters is the political constellation and inclusion in the orbit
of comprehensive reforms.  The case in point is Estonia, which gradu-
ally reached top levels of integrity and economic freedom according to
all available international indexes.  Estonia is a country that, along
with the Baltic region, had to rebuild the statehood, reorient its eco-
nomic gravity, and break the chains of the past fifteen years.  The
difference is that the Balkans did not have supra-regional power to
reject its development from.
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Comments from Balkan experts:
Albania: Zef Preci, Albanian Center for Economic Research
and Ilir Panda, former Minister of Justice
In my opinion the written material is of an acceptable level, especially
as it concerns with the constitutional rules in the Balkan constitution
making, the factors which influence these rules, which should be more
or less equal for all the Balkan’s countries and these are related to the
private property and the freedom to engage in business, capital flows
including even that of the land ownership, the legalization of the so-
called property on the citizenship, the stability of the government
machinery.
Effectually, this written material does not only make comparison
between Central and Eastern Europe Constitutions, but it also makes
some suggestions on the constitutions of consolidated European
countries. What impresses me most is the fact that it is still not paid
the right attention to the Albanian Constitution and, furthermore, some
laws, which explain the constitutional ideas and concepts, are not made
evident.
Let’s talk about the land ownership: In fact it is given only a peculiarity
of the Albanian constitution, which list the land acquiring ways, which
are those foreseen by the Civil Code. It should be mentioned that in
the part on the protection of property rights, amazingly, both Albania
and Romania are taken as negative examples, citing here the written
material, where it is stated that “Many estimated government actions
imply an unjust compensation and a violation of the private property
by the public” This is the spirit of the Albanian constitution (article 41.5)
and of the Romanian constitution (article 41.1). Personally I don’t think
it is right, because the article 41.5 of the constitution foresees the
solution of conflicts related to the extent of compensation in the court.
Lets go through these two concepts: If we make a comparison between
the Albanian constitution in force and the law on the expropriation in
public interest, and the main constitutional provisions and the previous
law on the expropriations, there is a difference in concepts. The main
constitutional provisions had foreseen the full compensation in cases
of expropriation, while the actual constitution foresees a just
compensation. In the article 41.4 the main previous constitutional
provisions had foreseen the solution of conflicts in the court, even in
cases of expropriation of the owner, while the constitution and the
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actual law on expropriation foresees the solution of the conflict related
to the extent of compensation only in the court. Thus, if settled by the
public organs, the expropriation is compulsory and the court could
examine only the complaint that the citizen makes, in relation to the
amount of the compensation. But, what is important, is that practice
and theory of the Albanian justice accept already the triple test on the
protection, which is based on the fifth amendment of the American
constitution and which is the legal process, the property use for public
interest and the compensation. The Albanian legislation, hence, the
constitution and the law on the expropriation for public interest, foresee
these three aspects of the protection test.
Also, if we further continue with the material, we see that some
important issues are not, intentionally or non-intentionally, considered.
I cannot personally tell which, in fact, are arranged by the Albanian
constitution. In the land ownership is mentioned only the land acquiring
way according to the Civil Code, which is continuously called specific
for Albania. In fact, Albanian legislation despite the constitution, include
or has also some other laws, which are related to the property or exactly
to the land ownership acquiring way by foreigners, through the
investment of, at least, the tripled value of land. While for the agriculture
land is not foreseen to be transferred to foreigners and maybe it is not
a right estimation, because of little area of land that Albania has.
Nevertheless, this is an issue that deserves to be discussed.
In the exclusive rights where public services are mentioned, natural
resources are considered as states monopolies. The problem of the
open strategies that Albania has, regarding these strategic properties,
is not at all mentioned. Also, no recommendations are made in the
Albanian legislation and constitution, concerning the tax issues and
the guarantee of the free activity and business.
In the last part where the stability of the government machinery is
estimated, it is mentioned that the Albanian constitution approved after
1997’ crisis foresees a specific formula in case of institutional crisis
either for the Council of Ministers or for the president. But it is just that.
You already know how many discussions are hold about this subject.
Anyway, I think that the Albanian constitution practice would improve it
more.
Regarding the emergency cases, there is not any peculiarity. Albania
has passed emergencies, which have not been so problematic for the
nation, or for the government.
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Croatia: Siniša Rodin, University of Zagreb 74
I will present my commentary in three points. First, I will hint some
methodological observations. Second, I will deal with certain issues of
legal and political environment which in my opinion have to be taken in
consideration in this constitutional debate. Finally, I will comment upon
particular propositions exposed in the paper.
1. Methodology
My main methodological observation is that authors heavily rely on
descriptive contents of relevant Constitutions. Authors are aware of
this problem; 75  however, being aware of it does not bring about its
solution. Many constitutional issues can be understood only in action,
and descriptive approach can not replace practical evidence.
Descriptive approach creates a problem of overgeneralization. Though
may or may not be true that certain constitutions guarantee private
property, these guarantees may well prove to be inefficient or to use
German term, be in Leerlauf.
Second, authors refer to public choice theory as their broad theoretical
underpinning. While this is completely legitimate position it would not
hurt to approach the problem from other sides too, e.g. by introducing
institutional analysis, or law and society critique. This is more appealing
in light of social and institutional considerations that authors express,
as well as in light of the fact that post-totalitarian elite of analyzed
countries were concerned with institutional arrangements rather then
with economic efficiency.
2. Legal and Political Environment
I can easily agree with authors that constitution-making in analyzed
states often had to do with state-building. This understanding has,
74
 Professor of Constitutional Law and Jean Monnet Module on European Law,
University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law, Fulbright Fellow and Visiting Scholar at Harvard
Law School
75
  See page 71: “There is a need of further research to find how, in terms of Buchanan-
Brennan interpretation, the above-described constitutional design is being reformed
via amendments, constitutional court interpretation and laws applying constitutional
provisions.”
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however, several consequences that are detrimental to mainstreaming
of respective legal orders of these states. At the first place, legal culture
in these states does not perceive Constitution as legal document, what
in turn makes definition and protection of individual rights more difficult.
For example, in post-Yugoslav states judiciary is not accustomed to
applying the Constitution directly. In this sense, Constitution has little
to do with changing legal positions of individuals.
However, these constitutions do not operate in vacuum, but in a specific
European context. For example in 1990, public opinion in Croatia was
driven by pro-European sentiment and the same drive influenced the
1990 Constitution, more particularly its openness to rules of
international law, concept of constitutional rights, etc. However, in
practice, post-communist bureaucracy and judiciary often misinterpret
the Constitution due to what I would call post-communist inertia. So
constitution is stretched between its original intent and conservative
legal culture. It is precisely the legal culture that informs the contents
of the Constitution. I suspect similar is true in other states in the region.
Yet this culture is exposed to European and global influences and
subject to change. Therefore it has to be calculated as part of the
analysis.
Legal culture of post-communist states is generally characterized by
“legislative optimism” by which I mean the widespread conviction that
changes in black-letter law are the main and decisive contributor to
legal reform. As consequence, there is no development of  customary
constitutional law nor understanding that constitutional custom matters.
This, in turn, creates drive for frequent constitutional amendment and
destabilizes the system. It also switches political priorities from policy-
making to coalition-building in order to generate majority that would
make constitutional amendment possible. It is to certain extent
paradoxical that drives for national stability originate from outside
political system, primarily from the European Union, while destabilizing
drive originates from within.
Incompetence of political elite is another problem. Drafting a democratic
constitution is one thing, living it up quite another. Post-communist
political elates and policy makers often have communist education
background, they were educated within framework of rigid and hermetic
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monopoly of one party evolved into partitocracy that is threatening to
lock civil society out of political process and to devoid constitutional
institutions, such as Parliament or Constitutional Court of their
constitutional role.
3. Particular comments
• “Most of the constitutions in the region were born either to promote
nation-building aspirations or to reflect constellations of early post-
communist reforms.” This seems to be too narrow description.
Legitimization function should not be underestimated. Maybe it was
intention of the political actors who actually designed these
constitutions, but in broad political terms Constitutions were legitimized
by wide popular support for social and economic reform. There is,
however, a question whether these expectations were actually betrayed
by political elite.
• I would propose that protection of individual rights and minority
rights is sine qua non legitimacy. However, “constituent nation” problem
is often misinterpreted. There is no understanding in Croatia (and I
would suspect elsewhere) of difference between ethnicity and
nationality. While in former Yugoslavia all constituent ethnic groups
were granted equal protection which can be compared to privileges
and immunities clause of the US XIV amendment, or non discrimination
principle in the EU, there was only one nation (nation state) which was
Yugoslav. Following independence of Yugoslav constituent republics,
“ethnic privileges and immunities” were understood as acquired rights
and projected on constitutional level as claim for “constituent nation
status.” This was made instrumental to territorial claims.
• Croatian Constitution in fact guarantees property rights. In fact
inviolability of private property is one of the fundamental constitutional
values entrenched in Art. 3 of the Constitution.
• Issue of “exclusive rights”. This concept is indeed somewhat vague.
It seems to refer to monopolies, government control of certain
industries, natural resources, and public property, such as sea shore
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etc. While I recognize importance of transition from government control
to public regulation and/or privatization, I am not sure whether it is
productive to mix such different concepts as monopolies and public
goods. However, I would note that there is a question whether such
extensive government control over resources is self-correcting. There
is a little systemic incentive for political elite to give up their control
instead of seeking rent. This is one of areas where needs of
harmonization of national law with acquis communitaire will obviously
play role.
For market principles under Croatian Constitution see Art. 49.
• Dimitrijevi   	  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Under Art. 103 of Croatian Constitution, President of the Republic may
dissolve Parliament if budget is not adopted within 120 days after the
budget bill was introduced by the Government
Macedonia: Zoran Jacev, FORUM
The Constitutional model of the Republic of Macedonia is based on a
combination of different solutions from existing models in other
countries with longer democratic tradition, combined in a way to take
in consideration the specifics of the country.
The Constitution is designed in a way to ensure balanced share of the
power among the Parliament, the President and the Government and
balanced share of the executive power between the President and the
Government.
Macedonian Constitution defines the country as a parliamentarian
democracy with the elements of semi-presidential system, with high
level of competencies of the Government, shared in the field of
international relations and defense with the President.
The Assembly (Parliament) of the Republic of Macedonia
The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia is a representative body
of the citizens and the legislative power of the Republic is vested in it,
composed of 120 to 140 Representatives and has the following
competencies:
- adopts and changes the Constitution;
- adopts laws and gives the authentic interpretation of laws;
- determines public taxes and fees;
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- adopts the budget and the balance of payments of the Republic;
- adopts the spatial plan of the Republic;
-  ratifies international agreements;
- decides on war and peace;
- makes decisions concerning any changes in the borders of the
Republic;
- makes decisions on association in and disassociation from any form
of union or community with other states;
- issues notice of a referendum;
- makes decisions concerning the reserves of the Republic;
- sets up councils;
- elects the Government of the Republic of Macedonia;
- elects judges to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia;
- carries out elections and discharges judges;
- selects, appoints and dismisses other holders of public and other
office determined by the Constitution and law;
- carries out political monitoring and supervision of the Government
and other holders of public office responsible to the Assembly;
- proclaims amnesties; and
- performs other activities determined by the Constitution.
In carrying out the duties within its sphere of competence, the Assembly
adopts decisions, declarations, resolutions, recommendations and
conclusions.
The President of the Republic of Macedonia
The President is one of the two pillars of shared executive power in
the country and, due to the way he/she is elected (elected in general
and direct elections, by secret ballot) has relative high level of
independence in conducting his competencies. The President has two
main competencies:
- he is representing the country and
- he is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Within that two main fields of competencies, he/she:
- nominates a mandator to constitute the Government of the Republic
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of Macedonia;
- appoints and dismisses by decree ambassadors and other diplomatic
representatives of the Republic of Macedonia abroad;
- accepts the credentials and letters of recall of foreign diplomatic
representatives;
- proposes two judges to sit on the Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Macedonia;
- proposes two members of the Republican Judicial Council;
- appoints three members to the Security Council of the Republic of
Macedonia;
- proposes the members of the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations;
- appoints and dismisses other holders of state and public office
determined by the Constitution and the law;
- grants decorations and honours in accordance with the law;
- grants pardons in accordance with the law; and
- performs other duties determined by the Constitution.
The Government of the Republic of Macedonia
The Government is the main pillar of the executive power in the country
and has almost all competencies in executive power except the ones
that exclusively belong to the President. The Government has the
following competencies:
- determines the policy of carrying out the laws and other regulations
of the Assembly and is responsible for their execution;
- proposes laws, the budget of the Republic and other regulations
adopted by the Assembly;
- proposes a spatial plan of the Republic;
- proposes decisions concerning the reserves of the Republic and
sees to their execution;
- adopts bylaws and other acts for the execution of laws;
- lays down principles on the internal organization and work of the
Ministries and other administrative bodies, directing and supervising
their work;
- provides appraisals of drafts of laws and other acts submitted to the
Assembly by other authorized bodies;
- decides on the recognition of states and governments;
102
- establishes diplomatic and consular relations with other states;
-  makes decisions on opening diplomatic and consular offices abroad;
- proposes the appointment of ambassadors and Representatives of
the Republic of Macedonia abroad and appoints chiefs of consular
offices;
- proposes the Public Prosecutor;
- appoints and dismisses holders of public and other office determined
by the Constitution and laws; and
- performs other duties determined by the Constitution and law.
Balance of power among the Parliament, the President and
the Government
In order to achieve the balance of executive power sharing in the
country, Constitution provides mechanisms of interrelated limitation of
the power for both subjects - the President and the Government.
The mechanisms of limitation of the power of the President are:
- he/she doesn’t have the right to propose the laws to the Parliament;
- he/she doesn’t have any authority over the budget of the country;
- he/she doesn’t have full independence in international relations and
the security issues;
- he/she doesn’t have freedom regarding the mandate for constituting
the Government - he/she is obliged, within 10 days of the constitution
of the Assembly, to entrust the mandate to a candidate from the party
or parties which has/have a majority in the Assembly;
- President of the Republic’s answerability (impeachment) can be
initiated by the Assembly with a two-thirds majority vote of all
Representatives;
- he has an obligation to address the Assembly on issues within his/
her sphere of competence at least once a year
The President has special competencies during the state of war and
state of emergencies and during those conditions, if the Assembly
cannot meet, he has many aspects of the competencies of the
Assembly:
- If the Assembly cannot meet, the decision on the declaration of a
state of war is made by the President of the Republic who submits it to
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the Assembly for confirmation as soon as it can meet.
- If the Assembly cannot meet, the decision to establish the existence
of a state of emergency is made by the President of the Republic, who
submits it to the Assembly for confirmation as soon as it can meet.
- During the state of war, if the Assembly cannot meet, the President
of the Republic may appoint and discharge the Government, as well
as appoint or dismiss officials whose election is within the sphere of
competence of the Assembly.
On the other hand, he has and instruments to influence the Government
and the Parliament:
- he/she has the right of veto, which is a soft or corrective one, only for
the laws which are adopted by common majority of MP, but not for the
ones which are adopted by two thirds of the Members of Parliament;
- he/she is chairing the National Security Council (consisted of President
of the Parliament, President of the Government, Ministers of Defense,
Interior, Foreign Affairs plus three members appointed by the President)
and makes policy proposals to the Assembly and the Government
regarding the issues of the security and defense of the Republic;
- he/she appoints and dismisses the Ambassadors of the Republic of
Macedonia abroad;
- he/she has the right to propose to the Parliament for election judges
of the Republican Judicial Council;
- he/she has the right to propose to the Parliament for election two out
of nine judges of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia;
The Government has almost all of the prerogatives of the executive
power in the country but the Assembly has mechanisms to control it:
- the Assembly elects the Government and has the right to initiate the
procedure of voting the confidence with one half plus one vote of the
Members of the Assembly;
- the Assembly is has a control over the activities of the Government
through the Committees in the Assembly and multilevel procedures of
adoption of the Laws;
- the Assembly has the right to initiate the procedure of interpellation
for the Ministers and other office-holders;
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- Members of the Assembly has the right to ask answers from Ministers
and other office holders from their field of competence in Q&A regular
sessions of the Assembly.
The Government, also as the President has a special competencies
in the state of war and state of emergencies:
- During a state of war or emergency, the Government, in accordance
with the Constitution and law, issues decrees with the force of law.
- The authorization of the Government to issue decrees with the force
of law lasts until the termination of the state of war or emergency, on
which the Assembly decides.
Conclusions and recommendations
Although the theoretical model of Macedonian Constitutional system
seems a nice combination of other systems, during ten years of
independence and especially during the crisis it is clear that there is
need for the improvement of some of its aspects.
The general conclusion is that the system provides possibilities for
high level of politisation - high level of influence of the leadership of
the political parties and the Government over the Assembly.
Sometimes, the Assembly acts like the voting machinery of the
Government and the leadership of the major political parties in power,
even disrespecting national interest.
Also, the practice showed that there is no clear division of the
competencies in the field of international relations and defense between
the Government and the President, basically because there is no Law
on the competencies of the President.
In order to achieve better division of power in the Republic of Macedonia
there is a need for adoption of laws, which can:
- contribute to more clear division of power and clarifying the
competencies of the Government and the President
- decrease the level of influence of the ruling political parties, Members
of the government and other office-holders over the Assembly
- regulate the conflict of interest which is the base for the influence of
the executive power over the Assembly
- ensure higher level of independence and responsibility of the Members
of the Assembly.
The Constitution provides enough space for that kind of regulation
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and there is no need to do changes in it in that respect.
Macedonia: Prof. Ljubomir Kekenovski, Faculty of Economics
Property rights
1. Re: the property rights formula in Macedonian constitutions,
stipulated in Article 30.
The idea to compare the notion of property right is useful, especially if
the following underlined notions are taken into account.  Let’s use the
wording of the famous fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United
States of America: it states that: “no persons shell be deprived of …
property, without due process of low” and that “nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without compensation”.
The Constitution of Macedonia holds the acceptability test for property
deprivation provisions with some peculiarities: “public use” is translated
in Macedonian case as “public interest” (Article 30.3), and the just
price in Article 30.4 is interpreted as “rightful compensations not lower
than its market value is guaranteed”.
However, it is important to point out that “persons”, individuals, as
foundation of the civil society are not mentioned and there is also no
mentioning of the “private property” as bases of market economy; there
is only a use of the general term  “property”.
In the use of the term “public interest” Macedonians Constitution is
close to Ex-Yugoslav constitutional tradition: it is more or less just
nominal but when referred to some specific areas definitions could be
diverse.
In the decade of economic practice we have no unified and simple
definition of what is public interest in concrete sectors or areas and
there is a need to adopt best available approaches to the issue, like in
some other East European countries.  For instance, the process of
privatization in the Republic of Macedonia has been driven more by
guidelines of private political parties’ interest than by strong definitions
of public interest. This is, perhaps, the reason why “public interest” is
merely a constitutional statement without any practical use.
2. Re: taxes. There is nothing specific in the Constitution and the
respective laws; definitions correspond to those of other countries (see
Article 33). The exception is the implementation and in the tax evasion
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practices, especially in the North West of the country where the principle
of equality before the law is being eroded for nearly a decade.
3. Re: transferability of the property rights: There are very poor
definitions in our Constitution dealing with transfer of capital and profits
(see Article 59).
4. Re: landownership: Even more advanced countries believed that
land is of supreme national value. Republic of Macedonia has no strong
provisions to protect regulations of rights of lend ownerships (for foreign
subject, see Article 31).  Perhaps the reason is that above 80% of the
land is private owned. These rights in the case of Republic of Macedonia
are in strong connections with two issues. The first is the reinforcement
of the national sovereignty, and, second, these property rights are
related to the unresolved problems of the ethnic minorities in West-
North part of the country.
5. Re: the so-called “Exclusive” rights:
The Constitutions of The Republic of Macedonia contains a serious
weakness of the definitions in the area of exclusive rights in comparison
with other countries reviewed in the report. Deficiencies, however, are
roughly similar. It is obvious in the respective provisions on the so-
called natural monopolies and rights to use natural resources (Article
56).
Freedom to engage in business
6. Re: free enterprises “ per se”
About quoted Article 8 of the Macedonian constitution in Article 8, it
should be noted that it sounds good but more as a declaration.  The
article is like basket for all rights, among them economic ones.
However, the most important is last sentence; it states ”Anything that
is not prohibited by the Constitutions or by law is permitted in the
Republic of Macedonia”. This offers an opportunity for all enterprises
or private individuals, even for the state in transitional period, to abuse
the dominant positions, for corruptions, profit and rent extortion, etc.
in areas like free trade quotas, use of natural resources, environment
protections and the like – areas and sectors where there is a lack of
specific regulations.
8. Re: competition and economic activities:
Macedonia has a problem ensuring conditions for competitions,
especially after signing the Stabilizations and Associations Agreement
107
(SAA), in November 2000.  There are no definitions of “market failures”
and “public interest” in the business area, especially in some concrete
instances that are in direct conflict with duties under SAA. E.g. the
country is missing the definitions similar to Slovenian provision, which
says: “any business activities in conflict with the public interest may
not be pursued”.
Romania: Amalia Fugaru, Romanian Centre for
Economic Policies
The idea of this paper – to apply the constitutional economics to the
countries in the Balkan region- is original and comes at the right
moment. Firstly, as the authors themselves underline in the paper (p.5),
this theory was rarely applied to a region and therefore unlikely to
have been used before in an analysis for the Balkan region. Second,
the timing of the paper at least from a Romanian point of view is very
good. Indeed presently, Romania is in the process of changing the
constitution because there are provisions in it that no more correspond
to the development of the society, and moreover some of these
provisions are hampering the efficient functioning of the society.
Moreover, any reader of this paper will appreciate the effort of analysing
the constitutions of numerous countries, the in-depth understanding
of the specific conditions they were made in, and also the broad
perspective necessary for such a comparison.
The hypothesis of the study is that the provisions from the constitutions
related to the private property, movement of capital, relation between
ownership and citizenship, the stability of the government machinery
could predict the way reforms are made in these societies.
However, in most of the former socialist countries the new constitutions
were built when the economic reform was underway. Although the
basic provisions related to the aspects mentioned above were
supposed to be clearly dealt with, the political and economic interests
present at that time made impossible the simple and clear definition of
these rules76 . Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the constitution both
76
 The constitution of Poland states clearly the right to private property and the limitation
of the powers of the government. Yet, during the first years of reform in Poland the
government and the president ruled in a strong manner. Moreover, the concern of the
people from former Czechoslovakia not to have any of the chambers of the Parliament
more powerful than the other did not hamper the politicians to bypass the vote of the
people and split the country.
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in Central European Countries (CECs) and in the Balkan region to be
the instrument used for such prediction. Moreover, even if the provisions
were more clearly defined in the CECs than in the Balkan area the
enforcement, at least at the beginning of the transition period, seemed
to create numerous problem in these countries too.
Thus, one element to be admitted in such an analysis is that is unlikely
for the countries which have to build simultaneously an economy, a
civil society and sometime a state, to have a constitution which is from
the beginning the ultimate product needing no further adjustment.
However, it would be interesting to study what were the factors that
influenced the making of the constitution and if the same factors are
the ones that will trigger the change of the constitutions.
After testing the hypothesis, this study concludes that the countries in
the Balkan area, “do not provide for an efficient and equitable treatment
of different forms of property and for individual protected from state
taking” (p. 21). In the same time, the political crisis can not be solved
according to constitution provisions, despite the extensive provisions.
Therefore, the study argues that what is to be expected from these
constitution is a continuous change, triggered also by the EU accession
process, but also the danger of collectivist attitudes ending in
nationalism or a strong state.
Indeed, the second part of the conclusion is confirmed by the evolution
in the former Yugoslavia from the ‘90s.  However, such a conclusion
does not fit the Bulgarian and the Romanian experience.
In my opinion, the in-depth analysis that this study encloses as well as
the perfect analytical skills demonstrated by the authors could provide
the answer to an important question: what were the factors that
influenced the making of the constitutions and which are the elements
from the present situation of the respective countries that will trigger
the changes of their constitutions.
To answer these questions probably the best thing to do is to start with
the role of the constitution. Among its purposes the constitution, by
setting the rights in a society, establishes the legitimacy of the state
and also by forcing the government to act legally, allows the citizens to
anticipate the policies of the government.
However, the transition period imposes two opposing tendencies on
the constitution-building process. Thus, as Hellman states in the
“Constitutions and economic reforms in the post-communist
transitions”:
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- constitution is a key political precondition for the success of market
oriented economic reforms by restraining the discretionary power of
the state,
-  the adoption of necessary but unpopular economic reforms
requires a state with sufficient capacity and flexibility to push through
difficult policy choices and to outmanoeuvre political opponents.
Therefore during the 90’s it was not uncommon to see scholars like
Holme arguing that the solution to this dilemma is a “stopgap
constitution”. He conducted an econometric analysis on the economic
reform considering the time of the new constitution and if the constitution
was adopted during economic reform. His approach is that the solution
is a “stopgap constitution” because transitional systems have a “crying
need” for strong executives that can combine effectiveness and
legitimacy in a context of rapid social change.
On the other hand, Elster and Weingast voice a different opinion.
According to them if the key problem is the states’ threat to expropriate
the gains from the reform, than the most effective constitution will be
one that maximises constraints on the state’s discretionary powers to
intervene in the economy.
Therefore, it can be said from the above that the constitution making
process during the transition period had to take into account at least
two contradictions, on one hand between legitimacy and efficiency,
and on the other hand, between long and short term priorities.
If one agrees that the whole constitution making process was heavily
indebted to the economic transition it is logical to understand why the
Balkan countries can be considered to have “stopgap constitutions”.
Indeed, the analysis of the present study proves that all Balkan
countries gave priority to the intervention of the state in transition
process and this supports the conclusion of the study that in the near
future these constitutions will have to be changed.
However, presently these are exactly the countries lagging behind with
the economic reforms. The study perfectly gives the example of Estonia
having a stable constitution and in the same time being a front-runner
of the economic reforms. The explanation here has to do with the first
element considered by the authors of this study- the definition of the
property rights. As mentioned above, the definition of the rights in the
constitution legitimise the state. Nevertheless, as the authors mention,
in the Balkan countries the rights are not equally clear defined and
protected and therefore the state was forced to legitimate itself through
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a stronger intervention on the market, or otherwise put, through a longer
presence on the market.
This idea is also supported by the example given by the authors that
Poland is the only country where the constitution has a provision
whereby if the budget is not adopted the government has to resign.
Moreover, some researcher argue that the beginning of the end of
Yugoslavia started with the budget of 1990 in which member states
like Croatia and Slovenia were net contributors, whereas Serbia was
a clear net receiver and the Serb dominated central leadership did not
want to change this arrangement.
Considering the examples of the better situation of the CECs it has to
be emphasised that the changing process of the constitution that is
imminent in the Balkan region will have as a source the constitution of
these front-runners, and not only the changes imposed by the EU
accession process.
Thus, according to the above mentioned facts the economic aspects
contributed to the building of constitutions and their simultaneous rolling
with the economic reform conditions gave more chance to success to
some countries than to the others. But, in the same time this means
that once the Balkan region countries have reached a certain degree
of economic development the constitution will be changed according
to the new needs, and most probably will be transformed into long
term documents.
As to what regards the direction of the change it is likely that this will
follow the EU rules as all these countries are targeting the membership
in the EU. However, to the extent to which elements like the relation
between ownership and citizenship are concerned, probably the
provisions in the constitutions will not change until the region will be
perceived as secure.
In the end, the constitution changing process in the Balkan area is still
subject to the statement that J. Elster made, that the people responsible
for this process are like Baron von Munchausen – “they must pull
themselves out of the swamp by their own hair”.
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Serbia: Ilija Vuja, Political Science Department of Belgrade
University, and Centre for Liberal-Democratic Studies,
Belgrade
General overview
Examination of the Balkan constitutional provisions dealing with
institutions of private property rights and government machinery with
application of constitutional economics in order to derive “what pattern
of functioning democracy is likely to emerge” is an interesting and
valuable approach, unknown in the research of transitional processes
in the region. This approach is particularly important because most
regional studies until now were concerned with identity and nation
building, with little reference on perspectives of market democracy in
the region. And the very fact that all Balkan countries were first of all
occupied with identity and nation building issues, explains why also
researches were dominantly oriented towards problems of identity,
ethnicity, nationality and state.
This public choice analysis have shown that Balkan constitutions -
besides the intentions of constitutions’ makers for giving impression
of care for individual liberties, economic freedom and market principles
- have not provided the basic rules and principles of effective market
democracy (such rules as: creation of competitive environment by
removing state monopoly; lower transaction costs; a reasonable
framework for levels of the risk in order not to spread them over a vast
majority of all citizens; defined relation between allocative and
distributive efficiency in favor of the former; defined rules and not
outcomes, etc.).
Authors have demonstrated correct comparative analysis of the Balkan
constitutions itself and in relation to other East-European and EU
constitutions and have reached general conclusions fitting peculiarities
of constitutional situation in the Balkans and possible future
development. Main objective of authors of this study-paper to give
descriptive analysis of the Balkan constitutions and to derive some
observations and predictions is successfully completed. It would be
possible to get even fuller picture and to derive even stronger and
more founded conclusions if further analysis would involve wider legal
framework derived from the constitutions, having in mind the fact that
many constitutional provisions provided for further stipulations by laws
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and so opening rooms for introduction of many obstacles through
parliamentary legislation. It would be possible also to involve
investigation of economic, political and social factors which had a strong
impact on constitutions’ making processes. But, it was not the intention
of authors of this study.
The case of Yugoslav constitutional situation
In relation to Yugoslav constitutional situation authors’ analysis is correct
concerning wording of the constitution of FR Yugoslavia. But, the
analysis of the constitutional situation in FR Yugoslavia should involve
the analysis of Serbian and Montenegrin constitutions respectively in
order to have fuller picture of the constitutional situation in Yugoslavia.
The reasons for it are as follows:
a) In dealing with Yugoslav constitutional situation it would be better
to relay on Serbian and Montenegrin constitutions respectively and
not on Yugoslav federal constitution, since from the very day of its
issuing in 1992 the Constitution of FR Yugoslavia was not in effect,
decisions were made extra-institutionally and unconstitutionally.
b) If constitution did matter at all in situation of populist cezarism of
Milosevic’s regime, than there had been all the time primacy of
Serbian constitution (issued by former communists in 1990) over
Yugoslav constitution (issued by the same former communists in
1992) and Serbian constitution (framed as constitution for an
independent state) have never been adapted to Yugoslav
constitution. There were a lot of contradicted provisions between
Serbian and Yugoslav constitutions and duplicated competencies
of republican and federal governments. In that situation Yugoslav
constitution was only a piece of paper.
c) From 1997 government of Montenegro have refused obedience
to federal constitution and any federal loyalty, so that processes in
Montenegro were proceeded following Montenegrin constitution
only (particularly in the areas which are of the interest for this study)
d) Serbian constitution is still more restrictive then Yugoslav
constitution in relation to the problems this study-paper deals with.
Since Montenegrin constitution had been issued after Yugoslav
constitution and it is more in accordance with its provisions I will
list here some provisions from Serbian constitution which differ
from provisions in Yugoslav constitution:
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Art. 1
“Republic of Serbia is democratic state of all citizens, based on
liberties and rights of man and citizen, on the rule of law and social
justice.”
Art. 55
“Economic and social system is based on all forms of property; on
united market of goods, labor and capital; on autonomy of
enterprises and all other forms of organization; on management
and appropriation on the basis of property and labor; as well as on
the right of employees and the right of the other citizens to social
security.
With measures for development and measures of economic and
social policy the state stimulates, under equal conditions, the
growth of economic and social wellbeing of citizens.”
Art. 56
“Social, state, private and cooperative property are guaranteed,
as well as other forms of property.
All forms of property have equal legal protection.
Foreigner can acquire the right of property under the provisions of
law.”
Art. 60
“Natural riches and goods in public use, as goods of common
interest, as well as urban land are state ownership or social
ownership.”
e) In this moment it is obvious that Yugoslav constitutional situation
will be very soon very different than it is now. Namely, due to the
recently signed political declaration for constitutional
rearrangement of Yugoslav federation (March 14, 2002) called
Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations Between
Serbia and Montenegro, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the
process of devolution from federal state into some kind of political
union of Serbia and Montenegro. There would be two semi-
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independent states connected only in their international relations
with common representatives in international organizations, and
with two different and independent economic systems with very
slight elements of common market. The future union of Serbia
and Montenegro will not be custom union neither monetary union
(there will be two different currencies - EURO in Montenegro and
dinar in Serbia, two independent central banks, different custom
tariffs, different trade policies, different taxes, different processes
and models of privatization etc.  From the Proceeding Points it is
obvious that economy (property rights, market regulations, taxes
and tariffs) will be in competence of states and their renovated
constitutions and not of union.
These are the main reason why relaying on Yugoslav constitution in
this paper is of little significance. It is also of little significance to rely
on one of 6 constitutional proposals (Dimitrijeviæ at all) since this one
has no priority over others.
But it is quite possible that in relation to the analyzed constitutional
provisions in this study-paper there would not be any substantial
difference in future Serbian and Montenegrin constitutions in
comparison with other constitutions of the Balkan countries. Future
constitutions of Serbia and Montenegro will not opt for more effective
market democracy then other constitutions in the Balkans.
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Executive Summary
So far Albanian democracy has been understood through a transition
paradigm.  This understanding has been helpful in many ways.  At
least in its initial phases Albanian democracy could not be analyzed
away from the multiple transitions Albania was going through.  First of
all the country opened up to the world after being the most isolated
society in Europe.  Secondly, there was a transition from a centrally
planned to a market economy, a process that is still taking place.
Thirdly, there was a movement from a totalitarian, communist regime
to a democratic system.   The handicaps of the fragile Albanian
democracy were, and to large extent still are, attributed to the multiple
challenges the country was being faced with simultaneously.
While transition paradigm is valid in explaining many of the current
developments of the Albanian democracy, it is important to realize
that some of the most serious handicaps of the Albanian democratic
system can no longer be explained through a transition perspective.
These problems are becoming ingrained in the system through
repetition, creating norms and traditions that are to persist in the near
and medium future.
This is best illustrated by the history of the Albanian parliamentary
elections during the last decade.  With the exception of the 1992
parliamentary elections, that brought about a change in regimes and
not simply governments, all the other parliamentary elections have
been contested by the losing party.  This phenomenon is disturbing
since the irregularities have not simply been of a technical nature but
have stemmed from a lack of political will to conduct free and fair
elections.  Therefore a political culture is being developed in which
manipulation of the elections has become the norm, and as such the
unwritten law of the Albanian electoral system.  Under these
circumstances it can no longer be claimed that election fraud is a
transition phenomenon since now it has created a tradition of its own
that is likely to continue, in one way or another, in the future.
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Fraudulent elections have meant legitimacy crises for most Albanian
governments during the last decade.  The only government that did
not suffer from a legitimacy crises due to fraudulent elections was that
of 1992.  Yet even in this case a legitimacy challenge became pertinent
due to other more structural handicaps that have beset democratic
governance in Albania, regardless of the political party in power.
A legitimacy crises has further weakened fledgling institutions, resulting
in a vicious circle in which one reinforces the other.  However, it is the
institutional building process that has sustained institutional weakness
in Albania and further undermined legitimacy.   Elections bring about a
change in state and not only in government since every political party
that comes to power fills the state institutions, such as the judiciary,
customs, secret services, the army, and so on with its own people.
This in turn undermines both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the
institutions.  Institutions have not been built around a wide political
consensus that would have endowed them with much needed stability
and continuity.
The identification of the state with the political party in power is a
prevailing phenomena in the Albanian political scene.   This seems to
be one of the lingering communist legacies that Albania has not been
able to overcome.   One of the unfortunate consequences of the party
– state phenomena has been the collapse of the state along with that
of the political party in power.   Therefore, the constant re-making of
the state has been the main factor of state weakness and instability.
Besides the above-mentioned political factors a dysfunctional economy
that was inherited from communism and mismanaged during the past
decade has been a deteriorating factor in the state and institution
building processes.  Albania continues to be one of the most
underdeveloped economies in the region and the state is unable to
provide even basic services to its citizens on a continual basis, such
as water supply and electricity.   Unemployment is rampant and the
gray economy very large.
Given the current state of the Albanian economy and the absence of
properly functioning market institutions and employment opportunities
the state has become the main source of income for a significant part
of the population.  Privatization, customs, auctions and jobs in the
public administration provide substantial income for those who control
the state.  This is part of the reason why the political parties once in
power tend to assert their ownership of the state and deliver it bit by bit
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to their followers as if it were a piece of property.  Thus, economic
situation has stiffened the competition for power and polarized the
political scene, the choice becomes either all (the state) or nothing.
The fierce struggle of political parties for the control of the state and its
institutions combined with the way in which the state institutions have
become subordinated to and used by political parties has bred a general
popular apathy.   Apathy, as demonstrated by the shrinking numbers
of those that go to the ballot boxes, has grown as a result of the general
disappointment of the population with the political elite from both sides.
In a prolonged situation of political and economic crises a large part of
the population does not see any solutions in the present political
establishment.
Apathy has also feed upon the fact that large numbers of Albanians
have emigrated.   The impact of emigration has been twofold.  On the
one hand it has had a positive impact in reducing social tensions and
providing a much needed source of income.  On the other hand
emigration opportunities have bred apathy since a significant portion
of the population seeks its future abroad and is reluctant to participate
in domestic politics.   At the same time remittances are an important
source of income.  In this ways a large segment of the population
have lower stakes than they otherwise would in the domestic
developments, be they political or economic.   Combined with the
general distaste regarding political developments this has produced
and sustained even more apathy.  In these circumstances there is a
growing gap between the political debate and the popular needs and
in the absence of organized forms of public pressure the political
debates continue to grow away from the everyday concerns of the
Albanian citizen.
In a general setting of polarized and confrontational political climate
international community has continued to gain importance.  In its initial
phases of involvement in the Albanian political scene international
community was more of a mediating party, whereas nowadays, and
especially after the 1997 crises, its role has increasingly become that
of an arbitrator.  The latter function of the international community has
been recognized and embraced by all the political parties in the country,
especially as they seem increasingly unable to find common ground
and to accept each other.
Given the above mentioned handicaps of the Albanian democracy,
such as contested elections, weak institutions, poverty, and the resulting
119
legitimacy crises, international community has become as important
and at times an even more important source of legitimacy than the
electorate itself.   Thus, after the contested parliamentary elections of
2001 the opposition leaders (Coalition for Victory) toured the most
important European capitals and international institutions in order to
prove their claim that elections had been manipulated by the Socialist
Party.  Thus, the final word on the validity of the elections rested with
the international community, and not with any of the domestic actors.
This has created a viscous circle of dependency culture – both
economic and political – in which the local actors have become
increasingly dependent on the international community and thus the
latter has become increasingly involved in Albanian domestic politics.
In order to break free from such a vicious circle – that is detrimental to
both local and international actors - a rethinking of the role of the
international community and its relation vis a vis domestic actors is
needed.  This rethinking should aim to make local actors more
accountable and thus reduce the gap between the public and the
political elites.
However, it is important to realize that the handicaps of the Albanian
democracy cannot be dealt with only through top – down approaches.
An important challenge Albanian democracy is being faced is to
stimulate grass root participation and organization.  This would be the
only effective way to bridge the gap between the people and the political
elite.  This function has not been performed by the so called civil society
that has been quite often identified with NGOs.  These by and large
are not result of indigenous movements but donor driven and thus
incapable to voice popular concerns.  Another important component
of the civil society, the media, follows very closely on the footsteps of
the political game – that as it has been mentioned is growing away
from popular concerns.   Despite their many shortcomings political
parties remain the only successful social movements and as such
worthy of more attention.
Recommendations
• Political Parties
It is important to realize that in Albania, political parties are some of
the most important and self-sustainable institutions. So, it is important
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that more investment should be made in building the capacities of the
political parties, providing training and improving their efficiency and
democratic culture.
• Political Consensus and Institutions
At the heart of the functioning, organization, and structure of the
judiciary there should be a political agreement that should ensure the
longevity and immunity of the judiciary system. Practices in the
international arena lead us to believe that the best long term solution,
as far as the judiciary is concerned, could be a political agreement
that regulates appointments to the highest levels of the judiciary and
the justice system. Such an agreement would guarantee the
independence of these institutions from the purges that follow electoral
processes.
• Electoral Reform
The present electoral system in Albania is a SMDS one (Single
Member-District System) combined with a proportional system.  The
electoral system is primarily a SMDP one since 100 out of 140 seats
are allocated through SMDS, whereas the remaining 40 are allocated
proportionally while respecting the SMDS ratios.  Such a system tends
to perpetuate the two major political parties and does not create room
for new political alternatives to gain meaningful representation.
Therefore a more proportional electoral system should be favored in
order to enrich the political offer to the electorate.77
• Restore Parliamentary Democracy
One of the main virtues of a parliamentary democracy is that it produces
governance.  The head of the executive is also head of the winning
political party so that there is a clear line of responsibility and
accountability.  This has rarely been the case in Albania that is
supposedly a parliamentary democracy.  As the most recent crises
indicates the separation of powers between the chairman of the party
and the premiere is a recipe for future crises as both of them will
struggle for the control of the parliament and the party while shifting
responsibility to each other for any short comings of the governance.
• Fighting Corruption
The fight against corruption remains one of the major challenges for
77
 For a more detailed and elaborate treatment of the shortcomings of the SMDS and
the virtues of a more proportional system for the Albanian political scene see “Politika
e Dy te Tretave: Zgjidhja Proporcionale e Fenomenit Shqiptar”, by Henri Cili.
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Albania, and has serious implications for the future governance.  At
the present time a momentum in the fight against corruption, due to
recent political developments, is beginning to take root in the media
and the public agenda.  If the fight against corruption is to succeed
this momentum should enter governments agenda and the justice
machinery and not wane.
• Regional vs. Domestic Stability
“Greater Albania” is not a factor in the internal dynamics of the country,
consequently priorities lie with domestic challenges, such basic
services, economic development, corruption and trafficking.  Therefore,
these should be the criteria against which governance should be judged
by the international community in Albania.
• Stability vs. Democracy
In Albania due to a prolonged crises situation, stability is emerging as
the panacea of the Albanian conundrum.  However, developments
within Albania should be judged not on merit of the so called “stability
considerations” but against democratization processes.
• Consistency in Democratic Standards
One of the most important measures to be taken in order to overcome
the “stability phenomenon” and promote democratization is by
upholding consistent standards regarding free and fair elections.
Unfortunately, Albania has not yet passed the test of free and fair
elections.  A tradition of compromised, yet acceptable, electoral
processes is taking root in Albania.
The Aftermath of 2001 Parliamentary Elections
The 2001 parliamentary elections marked the beginning of a protracted
political crises in Albania, which has three major dimensions.  First of
all there is an ongoing economic crises, caused mainly by an acute
energy crises, which has been developing independently of political
dynamics.  Secondly, there is a major internal crises in the Socialist
Party, between two major factions represented by chairman Nano and
ex-premiere Meta, which resulted in a lack of governance and a total
paralyses of the administration, this in turn has deepened the existing
economic crises.  Finally, there is an electoral crises inherited by the
2001 elections and that is partly reflected in the obstacles that have to
be overcome in the election of the president.
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The current political crises reflects all the major handicaps of the fragile
Albanian democracy, while it has also brought forth some propitious
novelties. The major challenge one has to face when trying to explain
it is where to begin.  Every beginning reflects the bias of the narrator,
ours is not an exception.  Yet we think our choice to start with the 2001
parliamentary elections is justified since parliamentary elections are a
major turning point in the life of a young and fragile democracy.  The
2001 elections were of particular importance since they were the first
parliamentary elections held after the ones of 1997, which most of all
represented a way out of the 1997 crises.
Again in the 2001 parliamentary elections Albanian democracy failed
the test of free and fair elections.  These elections were not recognized
by the oppositions and they were strongly criticized by ODHIR although
they were found acceptable.78   With the exception of the 1992 elections,
that brought about a change in regimes and not simply governments,
all the other parliamentary elections in Albania have been contested
by the losing party.   Free and fair elections are still an unachieved
objective for Albania, and this became quite clear in the 2001
parliamentary elections, especially as the parties compete on a “take
it all” basis.
 The debate about the election results revolved around the question of
the extent of the Socialist victory (although this was more of a political
stand rather than a factual one).  The election results allowed the
Socialist Party to elect the president with its 3/5 of the seats in
parliament.  Therefore, the Socialists did not need to engage the
opposition in the process. Interestingly enough, the opposition being
marginalized, an old power struggle within the Socialist Party,
resurfaced and escalated between the chairman Nano and premiere
Meta.  Although in the Socialist electoral campaign Meta was presented
as the future Socialist premiere, once the Socialist Party came to power
Meta’s candidacy was challenged by Nano backed candidate.  After
Meta won by an overwhelming majority in the Socialist structures,
Nano’s position was seriously weakened.  Nano was marginalized and
his position as chairman of the party was threatened.
Almost a month after the Meta II government was formed, Nano
embarked on an anti-government campaign at the Socialist grass root
levels.  The major accusations that Nano directed against Meta and
78
 See OSCE/ODIHR Report  “Republic of Albania Parliamentary Elections:  Election
Observation”.  Warsaw, 11 October 2001.
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his government revolved around allegations of corruption and
dilettantism at high government levels, such government ministers,
and trafficking of votes within the Socialist structures.  Nano articulated
with great skill existing grievances within the population at large, a
population that was very sensitive towards the widespread phenomena
of corruption and the obvious lack of political will to fight it.  By a curious
twist of irony Nano through his campaign quite unexpectedly became
the spokesman of morality, values and the fight against corruption,
although none of these elements had been defining characteristics in
the making of his political stature.
Nano’s split with Meta cannot be simply attributed to the appetite of
these actors for power, or to a confrontational political culture, a concept
that has been used and abused in explaining most developments in
the Albanian political scene.   The split is indicative of the deformation
of the parliamentary democracy in Albania.  One of the main virtues of
a parliamentary democracy is that it produces governance.
The head of the executive is also head of the winning political party so
that there is a clear line of responsibility and accountability.  This has
rarely been the case in Albania that is supposedly a parliamentary
democracy.  Therefore the failure of governance has been blamed on
the government alone and not on the political force that was in power.
This in turn has tended to further protract and complicate political crises.
As the most recent crises indicates the separation of powers between
the chairman of the party and the premiere is a recipe for future crises
as both of them will struggle for the control of the parliament and the
party while shifting responsibility to each other for any short comings
of the governance.  Such a deformation has been both an outcome
and a cause of Albanian political conflict.  Thus, no matter who the
premiere will be such a separation of powers will breed future crises
since both the chairman and the premiere will compete for the control
of the party.  It is in this light that Nano’s campaign should be
understood.
The campaign that was baptized Catharsis by Nano, in a move
reflective of the latter’s fondness for convoluted terminology, ended
quite abruptly in a pact between Meta and Nano, after it brought down
Meta II government and placed Majko at the head of the executive.
Although the details of this pact have not become public yet, it has
become quite obvious that it did not and could not put an end to the
ongoing political turmoil in Albania.  The pact was dictated by political
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expediencies rather than by any of the values catharsis was supposedly
set in motion to promote.  In fact the pact could not be the bearer and
promoter of any values since it was agreed upon between two parties
that had forcefully and publicly accused each other of corruption, ties
with organized crime, election fraud, nepotism, abuse of power and
so on.
One important factor that has aggravated and continues to aggravate
the present political crises are the weak and politicized state institutions.
While it is an auspicious novelty that a significant part of the conflict
has developed within institutional settings, it is quite disturbing that
state institutions have become quite often instruments of political
struggles.   Instead of performing the role of the facilitator and honest
broker some of the most important state institutions seem to have
taken sides with certain political factions.  This has reduced their
credibility and eroded their legitimacy.
Thus, during the 2001 elections the rulings of the Constitutional Court
were at times arbitrary and inconsistent, as it was also noted by the
international observers.79   These rulings tended to favor the candidates
of the Socialist Party against those of the opposition.  The General
Prosecutor on the other hand after years of passivity began to
investigate only those public officials of the Meta II government that
had been publicly accused by Nano, a move that produced the outcry
of the Meta faction and brought about the discharge of the General
Prosecutor by the Parliament.   The main reason that brought about
this discharge was the fact that the General Prosecutor was perceived
to be allied  with certain political factions.  Therefore, the consecutive
ruling of the Constitutional Court that the discharge of the General
Prosecutor was unconstitutional appeared in the eyes of many as a
political move more than an institutional decision.  This ruling triggered
the resignation of the Speaker of Parliament.
The unreliability of state institutions and the polarization of the political
climate have extenuated the importance of the international factor in
the Albanian domestic developments.  Unable to find redress for its
grievances with the state institutions  the opposition leaders embarked
on a European tour to make their case heard and to win international
support and sympathy.  The international community is trying to fulfill
79
 See OSCE/ODIHR Report  “Republic of Albania Parliamentary Elections:  Election
Observation”.  Warsaw, 11 October 2001. p 16-17.
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the role of the honest broker and facilitator that the state institutions
have proved unable to perform.  Its judgment has been brought to
bear on important domestic issues such as the future election of the
President especially as the local actors seem increasingly incapable
to find common ground.
The protracted political crises, contested elections, combined with weak
and dependent institution have resulted in a major legitimacy crisis for
the Socialist rule.  The legitimacy crises have been further compounded
by deteriorating economic conditions and rampant unemployment.
Under these circumstances the political debate is continuously growing
away from the concerns of the public.  Despite the high rhetoric of the
parties involved  in the current political crises it has become painfully
obvious by now that the political scene is completely dominated by
power struggles which the politicians at this point do not even take the
pain to wrap in a veil of values or alternatives.
The growing gap between the public and the political elite has not
been bridged by the civil society.   One of the most important
components of the civil society, media, has been dominated by the
political debate to the extent that little room is left for the coverage of
other social issues.  Despite their obvious progress in recent years
the media still manifests some major handicaps and especially a
pronounced lack of professionalism.  Moreover, with few exceptions
the media has close ties with the political elites and thus has ceded
part of its independence in exchange for financial gains.
Interest groups are not well organized yet, whereas the labor unions
are closely affiliate with and controlled by the political parties.  The
NGO sector, that quite often and quite erroneously is taken to represent
the Albanian civil society, is still in its infancy despite considerable
positive developments in recent years.  The Albanian NGOs tend to
be donor driven and not financially viable in order to be truly
independent.  They seem to reflect international rather than local
priorities.  As such they have been unable to speak for and on behalf
of the general public and also unable to bring any substantial pressure
to bear on government policies.   In short, most of the Albanian NGOs
are not representatives of indigenous social movements, but rather
closed circles of elites that conduct a one way dialogue and try to milk
international donors as well as the government.
Although the Albanian political scene presents us with a gloomy picture,
certain positive developments should not be ignored.  While it is true
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that the political spectrum is very polarized and politics is still quite
confrontational it is perhaps the first time in Albanian politics that such
a large part the conflict is taking place within an institutional setting.
The political party, the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the
Office of the General Prosecutor have been in the spotlight of the
media and have turned into forums of debate as well as of confrontation.
In a sense they have regained their importance.  This is not to say that
an important part of the conflict does not develop behind closed doors
and hidden from the public eye such as the Nano-Meta pact.  Yet it is
important to remember that this has been the norm in Albanian politics
so far.
Institutions have been quite often misused and abused, but at least
not ignored or boycotted.  The opposition entered the parliament,
restoring a certain degree of legitimacy to this institution, while endowing
it with a considerable degree of importance.  It could be argued that
the opposition would have entered parliament eventually, especially
given its changed attitude and efforts to improve its relations with the
international community.  In fact, unlike in the case of 2000 local
elections, in the parliamentary elections of 2001 the opposition did not
resort to public demonstrations but has channeled its struggle within
the parliament.  Parliamentary sessions now really matter since they
do not simply serve to ratify decisions that have been already taken by
political leaders behind closed doors.  Many issues are being debated
in the parliament and many lessons seem to have been learned.
There has been cooperation between the opposition and one of the
factions in the Socialist Party in the parliament.  Meta II government
accepted the Anticorruption Platform introduced by the opposition.
Although such a cooperation might have been dictated by political
expediencies it does set a positive precedent.  So far Albanian politics
has been characterized as confrontational, and any cooperation
between the two major forces was ruled out as impossible.
It is the first time in the young Albanian democracy that conditions are
ripe and seem to warrant a consensual president.  The advantages of
such a choice could be felt both in the short and the long run.  In the
short run a consensual president could alleviate heightened political
tensions, while at the same time it could provide additional guarantees
for free and fair elections in the future.  A consensual president could
have a very positive impact on the justice system.  It also sets a positive
precedent for the institutional building process that during the last
decade has been besieged by the lack of political will to cooperate.
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The last Albanian elections also saw the appearance of a new political
party, the Reformed Democratic Party that gained a considerable
number of seats in the parliament and thus became the third political
force in the Albanian political scene. This party was formed by a faction
of Democratic Party led by the former deputy chairman of DP, Genc
Pollo in collaboration with other small right wing groups.  Its seats
were not won through ceded electoral zones as it has been the norm
with other small political parties, although the Democratic Party claimed
that part of the PDr’s victory came because it used its name and
symbols.
 Yet this party was unable to play a significant role in the latest political
developments given its own internal split and the shortcomings of the
parliamentary elections that produced some distorted electoral results.
It is conceivable that under a different scenario PDr could have played
an important role.  The emergence of PDr is a good indication of the
need for an enriched political offer in the Albanian scenario, and
perhaps reflects the need of a more proportional electoral system.
While the present crises is unfolding at an unprecedented pace, in the
general prevailing uncertainty most of the debates still revolve around
power struggles, political moves and Byzantine schemes.   Therefore
it is important to remember the opportunities that this crises provides
us with.  Each of this opportunities in itself should represent a value
beyond a short term solution.  However, in order to better understand
the challenges that Albanian democracy is being faced with we need
to take a brief look at the past.
Communist Legacy
In order to better understand present developments in Albania
it is indispensable to take a brief look at Albania’s communist
experience and its implications.  While all other Eastern countries lived
through communist regimes, it is important to emphasize the
idiosyncrasies of Albanian communism.  The major traits of the
Albanian communist regime that were far more salient as compared
to other communist countries are the following:
• A complete isolation that insulated the country for half a cen-
tury, apart even from other communist bloc countries.  In 1947-
48 Albania broke relations with Yugoslavia, later on in the early
sixties Albania broke up with the Soviet Union, and strength-
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ened its bilateral relations with China.  Finally in the late sev-
enties relations with China were severed, which meant that
the country became literally insulated from the rest of the world.
Combined with the already prior existence of the backward-
ness of economic and social developments in the country,
such isolation undermined any prospects of future develop-
ment.
• Official paranoia and propaganda of external enemies.  The
complete isolation was founded on official paranoia and pro-
paganda of external enemies. Nationalist and patriotic rheto-
ric was used to justify economic hardships and isolation.  Al-
banian nationalism was no longer based on the culture tradi-
tions and historically accumulated experiences of the nation
but on the socialist ideologies.
• Stalinization of the country.  Part of the reason for the total
isolation of Albania was the fact that the Albanian communist
leadership denounced any de-Stalinization moves.  One of
the major deteriorating impacts of such a political course of
action was the elimination of a liberal political elite that con-
sisted of western educated Albanian intellectuals.  Further-
more, a new liberal political elite, or dissident groups could
not emerge, as it happened in Central European communist
countries after certain liberalization policies were implemented
in the late 70s early 80s.  Therefore, the early 90s found Alba-
nia without a experienced liberal elite to lead transition pro-
cesses.
• An extremely totalitarian regime.  Another particularity of the
Albanian communist regime, that put it apart from other East-
ern bloc countries, was the degree of the totalitarian nature of
the regime that controlled every aspect of life and was taken
to extremes in Albania through the abolition of religious prac-
tices in the late 60s.
• The abolition of all forms of private property.  Private property
and activities were completely abolished even in rural areas.
Although in all the other communist countries property was
state owned, yet there was room left for private property in the
rural areas.  Such was not the case in Albania.
• Very harsh political persecution.  Political persecution was an-
129
other characteristic of the Albanian communist regime that
was not only taken to extremes but also never relaxed.  In a
country of less than three million, hundreds of thousands of
people suffered political persecution in one way or another.
Political persecution was not limited to individuals but also to
their family circles.  The end result was a deeply divided soci-
ety.
• The Communist New Man.  Throughout its existence the Al-
banian communist regime proclaimed the creation of the New
Man as its major achievement.  This New Man was imbued
with the Marxist – Leninist ideals, free from religious supersti-
tions, material desires and any other vices of the old capitalist
world.
Implications of the Communist Legacy
 Communist collapse in Albania was followed by the moral, spiritual
and cultural crises reflected in loss of confidence, decline in national
pride and civic morals.  Albania was going through one of the most
difficult period in its history. A general situation of turmoil prevailed as
the communist system was collapsing. Internal security had broken
and the country was experiencing a severe economic and social
dislocation that reduced Albania to total dependency on foreign
assistance.80  These phenomena were far more salient in the case of
Albania, than in other communist countries given the harsher
communist rule the country had experienced.
• Decline in national pride and morals.  Unlike in the case of
former Yugoslavia where the collapse of communism was
followed by a sharp increase in nationalistic sentiments, Alba-
nia went through the opposite experience.  As the prominent
Albanian writer puts it “ [i]n Albania there is no national hyste-
ria, on the contrary the Albanians have gone to the other ex-
treme, that of too great indifference.”81   The above mentioned
practices, such as the isolation of the country and the abusive
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employment of nationalistic rhetoric alienated the population
from anything that involved nationalism and patriotic rhetoric.
This was a general mood that characterized Albanians as they
entered post-Cold War era, despite the unresolved Albanian
national questions.
• Social cleavages that draw from the communist past.  Through-
out the Albanian transition the two major political groupings
reflected divisions of the communist past into pro and anti
communist.   Thus, the main supporters of the Socialist Party
came from those social groups that had been sympathetic to
the communist regime.  Whereas, Democratic Party would
draw, at least in its initial phases, from those segments of the
population that either had been persecuted during commu-
nism or were unsympathetic to the regime.  Recent develop-
ments have began to blur divisions along these lines, although
they still prevail in Albanian politics.  This division has contrib-
uted to the confrontational nature and the charged political
climate of Albania.
• Uncooperative Individualism. Although individualism is the
cornerstone of a Western democratic society, and it released
much needed potentials during the transition period, in the
case of Albania it also went to extremes as a reaction of an
imposed collective past, and the negation of individualism in
the totalitarian Albania.  In the absence of social cohesion
due to the aftermath of communism, there was a disturbing
imbalance between the individual on the one had and society
on the other, especially in view of weak state institutions that
would have otherwise regulated this relationship.   Freedom
was wrongly understood as the unhindered pursuit of personal
gains at the expense of society and the public good.
• Identification of the Government with the State.  One of the
deficiencies of the present democratic Albania, inherited from
its past is the identification of the state with the government,
since during communism the party was the state.  In the Alba-
nian democracy elections have brought about a change not
simply in government but in the state.
It is important to emphasize that despite the harsh communist legacy
and unstable transition, those who had suffered under communism
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did not take revenge against their perpetrators.  This was a very positive
development since it contributed to a peaceful transition.
Although one would have expected the communist legacy of Albania
to breed state dependency individual initiative and entrepreneurial spirit
thrived as it was indicated by the economic successes of the early
years of the transition.
Weak State: Weak Institutions
In order to better understand the dynamics of a weak state we shall
focus on three important elements that determine the degree to which
a state can be considered weak or strong.  The degree of legitimacy a
state enjoys is one of the most important components that should be
taken in consideration when trying to classify it as weak or strong.  A
state, by definition also has the monopoly of legitimate use of force.
For a democratic state the ability to employ coercive means is
secondary and dependent upon the degree of legitimacy it enjoys.
The greater the legitimacy of the state, the stronger the state and the
lesser the need to rely on coercive means.  Finally, efficiency of state
institutions is vital if a state is to be considered strong.   By efficiency is
understood the ability of the state institutions to fulfill state functions
such policy making and implementation.
Using the above analytical framework, one can easily conclude that
the communist regime did not have strong state.  Its strength derived
mainly from its repressive capacities, its very existence was tied to the
survival of the communist ideology.  The state was present, through
all its instruments, and especially security, in every aspect of the
people’s life.  Repressive capacity was combined with a certain degree
of legitimacy that the state enjoyed among the privileged strata of the
population.  The communist state was not an efficient machinery, yet it
did provide certain basic services.   It is important though to emphasize
that the strength of the state was founded mostly on its coercive
capacity.
 Once communism collapsed, in the early transition period. 1990-92,
the state rapidly retreated from the life of the individuals for a variety of
reasons.  The first and foremost factor that brought about the extreme
weakening of the state institutions was the demise of the communist
ideology, to which the existence of the communist state was intrinsically
tied.  The ideological collapse had its roots in the economic collapse
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that paralyzed the state, weakening it further.  These two factors
combined to reduce the coercive capacity of the state.  Citizens no
longer feared the state, their compliance with rule of law was reduced,
especially since coercion, not values, had been the major source of
compliance.
The Albanian state gained in strength after the elections of 1992
elections, once the Democratic Party came to power.  The major factor
in this was the legitimacy of the new government and the popular
backing it received.  Another important factor in strengthening the weak
Albanian state was improved economic situation, partly due to the
foreign economic aid, and mainly due to the economic reforms.  This
increased the efficiency and the capacity of the state to devise and
implement policies.  While there was little knowledge of market
economy, the hopes were high.  Yet it can be hardly argued that the
Albanian state at the time was strong.  Despite its legitimacy through
popular support the state was not present as many norms, such as
paying taxes, bills, respect for the public good, were not internalized
by the population.
The major blow to the process of state strengthening was the 1997
crises.  This marked not simply the weakening but the total collapse of
the state and its institutions.   All the elements that define a state
vanished.  The government lost control over substantial parts of its
territory.  Due to the general crises situation the state lost its efficiency,
coercive capacities, and more importantly legitimacy.  In developments
reminiscent of the 1990-1992 period, the state once again created a
vacuum, this time not through its rapid withdrawal but through its
collapse.
The 1997 crises and its aftermath are still felt day in every aspect of
the life, and especially in the perpetuation of weakness of the state
institutions, and the fear of a possible relapse.  The three main
dimensions, legitimacy, efficiency and coercive capacity, were seriously
endangered.  Although probably the only solution to the crises, the
1997 early elections did not endow the newly elected government with
the necessary degree of legitimacy needed to strengthened the
collapsed state institutions.  The economic collapse that came through
the pyramid schemes undermined the efficiency of the state.   The
coercive capacity of the state was reduced substantially as roving bands
continued to have control over substantial parts of the territory.
Increased corruption, and connections of the state officials with
organized crime further undermined and reduced the legitimacy and
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efficiency of the state.
Although considerable progress has been made ever since the 1997
crises towards strengthening the rule of law and state institutions, some
of the above mentioned obstacles that perpetuate a weak state are
still present.  Governance still lacks in legitimacy, the prolonged energy
and economic crises continue to undermine the efficiency as well as
the legitimacy of the state, which in turn weakens even further state
institutions.
Another important factor that has not been elaborated upon so far is
the history of institutional building that has a direct bearing on the
capacities of the state institutions to be efficient, functional and
acceptable.  This is what we look at in the next section.
Institutional Building
Institutional building remains a daunting task for Albania both at present
and for the future.  There is a variety of factors that beset the democratic
institutional building in Albania.  One of the major problems throughout
the transition period has been the politicization of the state
administration.  Every political party once in power has began a purge
of the state administration, replacing previous employees with its loyal
supporters, a practice which has strongly undermined the capacity
and efficacy of the state administration and institutions.
When the first opposition party in Albania, the Democratic Party of
President Berisha, came to power in 1992, many replacements were
made in the state institutions.  It has been argued that these actions
were reasonable and imposed by circumstances, since Albania was
not just changing a government, but a whole system. The changes
affected mostly the political directors of the institutions, and even though
a certain number of experts remained in the new institutions, there
occurred unmotivated or politically motivated dismissal of experts. We
should understand this in the context of lack of alternative sources of
income, and the fact that state employment remained for a long time
for many people the only source of income.
Further developments in state institution confirmed the suspicion that
the replacement in public institutions has become a de-facto system—
experts are replaced any time a new party comes to power. Hence,
when the Socialist Party—the former communist one—came to power
in 1997, it undertook a new campaign of dismissals in public
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administration for political motivations which led in turn to the further
weakening of institutions, in panic and lack of job security. A number
of experts resigned voluntarily from work for this reason in state
institutions.
A huge blow to the institutions happened when hundreds of new
specialists were dismissed for the above-mentioned reasons—many
of these specialists were educated during the first five years of transition
with funds generated by western taxpayers. The dismissals in the
Foreign Service departments occurred even in merely technical
positions. Large dismissals occurred in the security institutions, armed
forces and fiscal services. In the secret service department after the
year 1997, very few workers retained their jobs, while the replacement
of regional police commanders all over Albania was accompanied by
replacements of rank and file policemen. The turnover in the customs
is even higher. It is hard to find custom officers that have started their
work in 1992.
Institutions have become hostage to the political changes in the country,
even though the law of civil service has been ratified. These tendencies
and practices have weakened state institutions. If rebuilding the
government has been accompanied by the weakening of the state,
the reasons should be sought at the way of building institutions.
One of the most significant traits of the Albanian democracy is the
identification of state institutions with the political party that in turn is
identified with the government, which in the democratic process is
replaced periodically by the political parties through the electoral
system.   There is a very fine distinction between government and
state in the first place since the former has the authority to act on
behalf of the latter.  In the case of Albania this distinction has been
blurred to a disturbing extent.   As it has already been mentioned
elections in Albanian do not bring a change in government alone but in
the state apparatus as a whole, since politically motivated replacements
are wide spread in the state administration.  The phenomenon is not
confined to clannish practices and nepotism, still alive in the mentality
of the Albanian political elites, but has to do with the fact that political
elites, once in power, identify their party with the state, behaving as if
they own the latter.
The Albanian transition strongly reflects previous dictatorial practices
of the building of party-state. The replacement of a government, i.e.
the replacement of the party in power with the opposition party—is
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accompanied with the replacement of the state. It seems that whenever
a party comes to power in Albania, it creates its own institutions.
Therefore, the state institutions represent only a part of the society.
While for example, the state institutions in the Macedonia (FYROM) –
another typically weak state in the region—represents only a part of
the community—the ethnic Macedonian Slavs; in Albania, the state
institutions represent only a part of the community, but not on an ethnic
base but on a party base.82
Besides the communist legacy, one of the reasons why the Democratic
Party 1992-96, identified its rule with the state stems from the unique
circumstances and the results of 1992 elections. The 1992 elections
did not simply bring a change in the government but a change in the
system. Albania broke away with its communist past.  In this way
Democratic Party felt entitled to identify itself as the guardian of the
new system, becoming thus one with the state. The Socialist Party,
that was trying to redefine itself in the early 1990s, were perceived as
the bearers of the communist legacy, thus making any cooperation
impossible.
Despite different circumstances of the 1997 aftermath Socialist Party
behaved in a similar fashion. In many ways 1997 became reminiscent
of the 1992 development. The state had collapsed and the Socialist
Party took it upon itself to build the new Albanian state. Although the
Socialist formed a coalition government, that was more of a window
dressing since power remained in the hands of the Socialist Party.
Since the Democratic Party was blamed for the collapse of the state,
cooperation was again not seen as an option.  This in turn facilitated
the identification of the party with the state.
This identification has weakened and quite often threatened the very
existence of state institutions.  Institutions have become subordinate
to party leaders and those individuals that were in power. In a well
functioning democracy, political actors work and function within
institutional constrains.  In the case of Albania, the protagonism of
individuals over that of institutions has delayed institutional building
processes.  Albania has been caught in the vicious circle of weak
institutions that produce authoritarian leaders who in turn sustain and
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promote institutional weakness. One of the main factors why this has
happened and continues to happen is because institutions in Albania
are lacking in tradition and not well defined.  Added to this is the legacy
of a dictatorial past, where the protagonism of the leader in the party
was institutionalized and, as mentioned above, the party was identified
with the state.
 Thus, there was a prevailing belief in Albania that once the two major
political leaders, Nano and Berisha would leave the scene the political
climate would improve.  Most of the problems of the Albanian political
life are attributed to these two leaders.  However, given the weakness
of the state and political institutions new protagonists, showing similar
traits have occupied the Albanian political scene.
This in turn has undermined institutional independence.  Although
excellent laws have been ratified regarding institutional independence
there remain serious discrepancies between the laws as written and
their implementation.  “The need for judicial reform is one of the biggest
challenges.  There are serious problems with the independence of the
judiciary, the professionalism of judges and prosecutors and above all
the corruption which eats at the heart of the justice system.”83
As the most recent developments in the Albanian political scene
indicate institutions are quite often subordinated to political
expediencies.   Until recently they were used to support and consolidate
the rule of the political party that was in power.  A new development,
that is indicative of the extent to which state institutions have been
subordinated to political interests, is the use of these institutions by
political factions within the ruling party.   This pronounced lack of
independence has bred a phenomenon that until recently had become
one of the defining characteristics of the Albanian democratic
experience; the boycott of institutions.
After every contested electoral process the opposition has walked out
of the parliament.  Institutions have not been able to fulfil their role as
forums in which the political debate takes place and where conflict is
channeled and managed democratically. This has created a vacuum
that has produced alternative institutions, the most important of which
is the international community and especially the OSCE Presence
Mission. Other informal institutions where politicians, foreign diplomats,
opinion makers, media, and civil society representatives meet are
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luxurious hotels like Rogner or Hotel Tirana. More political activity takes
place in these informal institutions in one day than during a whole
month in the Albanian Parliament.  Of course, the strengthening of
these alternative institutions tends to weaken the democratic and
accountable institutions where the political debate ought to take place.
A Contested Democracy
One of the major reasons why the institution building process in Albania
has proved to be so difficult is because one of the pillars of democracy,
free and fair elections, is still an unachieved objective for Albania.
The first pluralist parliamentary elections in Albania were held in March
31st 1991.  Although the Albanian Labor Party (the Communist Party)
remained in power, the elections portended fundamental changes in
the Albanian society and politics.  The Democratic Party, the first
opposition force in the communist regime in Albania had won sweeping
victories in the major cities of the country.  The climate of radical
changes that had already taken place in the former communist East
forbade similar transformations in Albania.  In less than a year the
country embarked on early elections that brought to power the
Democratic Party replacing the communists who had been ruling the
country for almost half a century.   These elections were held in a
tense political climate and in some cities the police and the security
forces, although supposedly de-politicized, marred the process by
aiding the candidates of the Communist government.  However, the
elections of March 22nd 1992 confirmed the popular desire for change
and opened up the way to political, economic and national security
reforms.   The Albanian Labor Party was ousted from power after
ruling for half a century.   The 1992 elections, that were the only
uncontested parliamentary elections in Albania, are not representative
of the electoral processes that took place later on, since they brought
about a change in regimes more than a change in government. 84
In May 26th 1996 the periodic parliamentary elections were held.  This
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was the first of the many tests the fragile Albanian democracy would
fail. The Socialist Party (the former Communist Party) the major
opposition party at the time along with some other smaller parties,
such as the Democratic Alliance and the Social-democratic party
walked out of the electoral process in its concluding phase, condemning
it as an electoral charade.  The socialists and their allies did not
recognize the election results and boycotted the parliament that resulted
from these elections.
The local elections of the same year (October 1st 1996) re-confirmed
to a certain extent the results of the parliamentary elections, but this
did not improve the tense political situation and the country was rapidly
slipping into chaos at the pace of the pyramid schemes collapse.  The
Socialist Party and its allies exploited the popular resentment
associated with the loss of savings by such a collapse and placed
themselves on the steering wheel of popular protests combining their
political agenda with the public’s demand for the return of the lost
savings.
The country, once again began to prepare for early elections that were
held in a very tense and chaotic climate, which obliged the state
authorities to invite an international peace-keeping force. The
parliamentary elections of June 29th 1997, held under extraordinary
conditions brought to power the Socialist Party and its smaller allies,
the Social Democrats, Democratic Alliance, the Party for Human Rights.
The Democratic Party did not recognize these elections as free and
fair.  Its candidates were banned from entering half of the country’s
territory, that was under the control of armed gangs and/or socialist
leaders.  Of course, these elections fell quite short of any democratic
standards that define free and fair elections.  Their primary objective
was to put an end to the widespread anarchy and bring a minimum
degree of normality to domestic developments.  In fact the political
parties had a preliminary agreement to recognize election regardless
of their results.  The Democratic Party while recognizing its defeat
never accepted the elections as free and fair.  The consequent political
strategy was a temporary boycott of the parliament by the Democratic
Party, now in opposition.  A few months later the Democratic Party
entered the parliament only to walk out again together with its allies.
In October 1st 2000 periodic local elections were held.  Local
government was in the hands of the Democratic Party at the time.
These elections were won by the candidates of the Socialist Party.
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The Democratic Party did not recognize the results of these elections,
claiming that the electoral process had been manipulated and calling
on its wining candidates to boycott municipal and commune councils.
In June 24th 2001 parliamentary elections were held in a very
confrontational political climate.  This was the second test, after that
of 1996, in which domestic actors had to show whether they were
capable to conduct electoral processes that would be accepted by all
the parties involved. The preparatory period did not bode well for the
future of the electoral process.  Taking advantage of a legal vacuum,
the government tried to get an edge in the coming elections through
independent candidates.  Through this legal trick the government could
get twice the number of places in the parliament for the supposedly
independent candidates.  It was only through the intervention of OSCE
and the international community that such a move, an otherwise blow
to the electoral process, was avoided.  The first round of elections
showed that the competition was tough, none of the two major parties
winning a clear majority.  The election process continued in five rounds
and many candidates, mainly from the government, turned to the
constitutional court which in turn ruled in favor of many socialist
candidates.
Elections were postponed in one of the one hundred electoral zones.
The opposition claims that this was a premeditated action on part of
the government through which the Socialist Party secured seats in the
Parliament for its three minor allies.  During the election process in
this zone the Socialist Party delivered its proportional vote to its allies,
which could not have otherwise reached the proportional threshold to
gain seats in the parliament. More than ten MPs were elected in one
electoral zone alone.  This meant that the government secured more
than 84 seats, the necessary number to elect the President. 85
The opposition, united in the Coalition for Victory, denounced the June
24th parliamentray election results, claiming that the process had been
manipulated.  The opposition has set as a precondition for its entry
into parliament the return of those seats that it considers stolen by the
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Democratic Governance
Given the slow and often failed institution building process,
governance in Albania has not been democratic so far.  It has not
promoted political dialogue, nor has it succeeded in mitigating
the tense political climate in the country.
Thus, during Berisha’s government although the country enjoyed
considerable stability, democratic governance was undermined by
some questionable acts of the Berisha administration. “The flaw justice
provided in trials of former communist leaders, included socialist party
leader Fatos Nano for corruption or misuse of power... Overshadowed
the question of the actual guilt of those charged”.  The removal of the
chief of the Court of Cassation Zef Broci by questionable means in
Socialist Party claiming as its strategy the institutionalization of the
free vote.
Lack of Legitimacy
As mentioned above, contested elections and weak institutions have
meant reduced legitimacy for all the Albanian governments during the
transition period.  In order to better understand and evaluate legitimacy
as a phenomenon in the case of Albania we shall focus on three main
elements that vest a government with legitimacy: Democratic
Procedures, Democratic Governance and Efficiency.
Democratic Procedures
One of the most important elements in democratic procedures
are free and fair elections. As it has been shown above, in the
Contested Democracy section, free and fair parliamentary
elections, with the exception of the 1992 ones, have not yet
become a reality in Albania.  Therefore, every government that
has come to power, especially after 1996, has been lacking in
legitimacy in this respect.  Moreover, elections that do not meet
democratic standards are a tradition in Albania, they feed on and
breed a permanent state of crises.
141
1995 heightened concerns about the independence of the judiciary.”86
Also the Law on Genocide which denied to former high ranking
communist officials the right to compete in elections.
During the Socialist governance a blow to the political climate of the
country was the arrest of six former high ranking officials of the
Democratic government, among whom the former minister of defense
Safet Zhulali, in August 1998.  They were accused of genocide and
crimes against humanity.  This action took place at a time when the
tense political climate in the country had just began to normalize and
when a debate on the draft constitution and its ratification was
underway.
However, the final blow to any prospects of normalization that
brought Albania to the threshold of new anarchy was the murder
of Azem Hajdari, head of the Defense Commission in the Albanian
Parliament.  A former leader of the student movement that
generated the creation of the first post-communist opposition,
Hajdari was brutally murdered in front of the Democratic party
headquarters. The fragile stability was wrecked, disturbances and
riots broke out in the capital and DP supporters clashed with the
police force while attacking Premiere’s Office and other state
institutions.
The 2001 elections did not bring any substantial improvements to
democratic governance, despite some initiatives to cooperate with the
oppositions, such as in the area of anti-corruption.  Yet it is fair to say
that this is due more to political expediency, in view of the present
Socialist crises, rather than genuine political will, which would have
been demonstrated in a revision of the serious shortcomings of 2001
elections.
One of the most serious obstacles to democratic governance has
been a corrupt, inefficient and dependent justice system.  The
judiciary system has failed in two aspects: 1) It has failed to be
Independent, and 2) It has failed to fulfill its constitutional mission
and legal obligations.
The failure in the reformation of the judiciary can be attributed to
both the executive and the judiciary itself.  The executive has
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obstructed the creation of an independent judiciary in order to
use it for political ends.  The judiciary on the other hand has not
been reformed due to its high levels of corruption, a level of
corruption that has been sustained through the political immunity
the executive has vested it with.  For this reason government
failures in fighting corruption and illegal trafficking have been
blamed onto the judiciary.  The latest dismissal of the Chief
Prosecutor, although made on charges of failure in the fight
against crime, corruption and trafficking was above all a political
maneuver, made at the very time when this office began to
investigate certain abuses by high ranking officials. Given the
timing and the fact that the prosecutor begun to investigate only
those officials publicly accused by Nano, he was perceived as
part of the political struggle.
Corruption in itself cannot be fought without a functioning and clean
judiciary.  Corruption has become a malaise of the Albanian system,
widespread at all the levels of the administration has become a serious
obstacle to efficiency, thus undermining legitimacy.    There is a
widespread popular belief that Albanian politicians are very corrupt,
this in turn has reduced public trust in the government and state
institution, combined with the above mentioned corrupt and
dysfunctional state institutions the efficiency of the state in collecting
revenue, implementing and making policies, has been undermined.
Despite the reportedly alarming levels of corruption and the abun-
dant anecdotal evidence that points to its widespread presence,
corruption has still to be clearly defined, at least for the general
public.  Right now corruption is being identified as the cause
and effect of all evil, extending into the political, economic and
social domain.   Nevertheless, a serious study of any possible
discrepancies between public perceptions of corruption and its
actual levels has still to be undertaken.  In absence of such knowl-
edge perceptions of widespread corruption might beget even
more corruption.
Lack of efficiency as demonstrated by the low economic performance,
inability of the state to provide basic necessities, such as electricity
and water-supply, the absence of development policies and strategies,
combined with an unstable political situation and weak institutions have
eroded the legitimacy of the domestic actors, that of the political elite
as well as that of government.  Under such circumstances, especially
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after 1997 crises, international community has become a very important
source of legitimacy for the Albanian governments.
International Community
First of all it is important to emphasize that the international community
has become increasingly involved in Albanian domestic politics since
early nineties not only due to the collapse of communism, but also
because of security considerations, such as the prevention of the
southward spread of the Yugoslav conflict.  After the 1997 crises the
International community has become an important player in the
Albanian political scene, as indicated by the depth and spread of the
OSCE presence not only in the capital but also in several major cities.
This has happened due to the inability of the local actors to deal with
domestic challenges and cooperate with each – other.
In its initial phases the international community performed a mediatory
role between the two major political parties that given the acute crises
refused to cooperate with each other.  Later on, since the domestic
actors remained unable to find a common language in the continuous
unstable political situation in Albania, that required further presence of
the international community, the latter’s role was transformed from a
mediator’s into an arbitrator’s.
From Mediator to Arbitrator
Such a transformation should be primarily attributed to the tense political
climate in Albania since the 1997 crises.  The confrontational nature
of Albanian politics, the continuous inability of the Albanian political
elites to cooperate with each other, the shortcomings of the electoral
processes, the alienation of the opposition, as well as the internal crises
in the Socialist Party, that has also been reflected in governance and
the paralyzed the administration have created a climate in which the
verdict of the international community tends to be considered as final
by both political parties.
Third Party Dependency
While the contribution of the international community should not be
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understated, it has been argued that the international community has
developed a third party dependency in the Albanian political scene.
Four years after the 1997 crises Albanian politics has grown even
more dependant on international mediation and arbitration.  This has
undermined institutional building processes since Albanian politicians
have become increasingly prone to rely on international interventions
rather than sit and negotiations with each other.
This in turn has meant that the Albanian political elite has become
even more reluctant to search for consensus or compromise, while
devoting more time and efforts to winning the sympathy of important
international actors and institutions.  This situation has deteriorated,
partly due to domestic structural factors such as weak institutions,
and partly due to the absence of an exit strategy by important
international actors
Remote Governance
There is a widespread perception in the general public that most of
the important decisions about Albanian politics are taken with the
blessing of the international community.  The omnipresence of foreign
diplomats in government and political activities is one of the factors
that has bred such perceptions.  Furthermore, in the absence of
domestic development strategies, the Albanian government seems
unable to negotiate with foreign organizations regarding the
implementation of their policy recommendation, but rather it takes these
recommendations at face value, adopting them as its own.   In view of
a very poor tradition of public participation in governance, this process
has further undermined public initiatives to participate in governance.
The decision making process has become so remote that the general
public feels it is beyond its reach.
International Agenda vs. Local Priorities
The degree of Western involvement in the Balkans has been
proportional to the destabilizing potentials of the region.  Therefore,
stability in the region took precedence over democratization.  Although
western countries do view democratization and security as interrelated
and interdependent its short run policies have given precedence to
stability over democratization processes given the acute security threats
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in the region.
In this context Tirana was viewed as an important actor in the Balkan
politics in view of the unresolved Kosovo question and the large
Albanian minority in Macedonia.  Thus, one of the top priorities in the
agenda of the international community has been the stabilizing role of
Tirana in the Balkans.  Therefore, one of the main criteria against
which Albanian governments have been judged has been Tirana’s
foreign policy with regard to the Albanians living abroad. As long as
the Albanian government played “a constructive role in the region”,
other deficiencies, such as undemocratic practices, corruption and
trafficking, were overlooked.
Had there been a better understanding of the internal Albanian
dynamics by the international community, it would have become clear
that the above approach was unjustified.  Local priorities in Albania do
not include expansionism or a preoccupation with the national question.
Governments are not voted in or out of office because of their foreign
policy stands.  The Macedonian crises of 2001 was the best example
in this respect, since it did not even make it in the debates that preceded
the June 24 parliamentary elections.
It is important to emphasize that a partial shift has taken place in the
international agenda after the 11th  September attacks, more emphasis
being placed on the fight against terrorism and trafficking.  These
highlighted priorities of the West coincide with certain domestic priorities
such fighting corruption and illegal trafficking.
Yet, the unresolved Kosovo question and the fragile stability in
Macedonia have tied the international community to a regional stability
approach, which is not justified.  The Albania question in the Balkans
does not appear in the traditional form of a mother country that is
pursuing irredentist goals. Throughout its history Albania has never
played the role of a mother country. A weak and vulnerable state,
Albania has always been preoccupied with its own survival. The best
way to achieve this was by not focusing on the national question. This
was a clear dimension of the Albanian foreign policy during the interwar
period as well as during the communist era. The Albanian foreign policy
became more assertive following the collapse of Yugoslavia and
communism. However, even in this case the prevention of the conflict
remained the overriding concern.
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Recommendations
In view of the  present state of democracy in Albania and its
experience in the last decade of transition, below are some
recommendations regarding steps and policies that should be
implemented in order to promote democratization and hence
stability.
• Political Parties
It is important to realize that in Albania, political parties are some of
the most important and self-sustainable institutions. Neither, the
judiciary nor any other institutions are the guardians of the Albanian
democracy as much as the two major political parties.  Whenever
opposition weakened, Albanian democracy weakened. Greater
democratization within these parties will be eventually reflected in the
democratization of other state institutions, and vica-versa.   So, it is
important that more investment should be made in building the
capacities of the political parties, providing training and improving their
efficiency and democratic culture.
• Political Consensus and Institutions
In reaction to political problems in Albania, and the decline of public
trust in the ability of the Albanian politicians to cooperate international
community has promoted policies that promote the independence of
institutions from political tutelage. It was thought this “independence”
would guarantee fairness and credibility. However, in two very illustrative
cases such as Central Electoral Commission and the Judiciary this
did not turn true. One of the reason why this happened is that the civil
society in Albania has not yet developed capacities to perform the
functions of credible arbitrators. Civil society organizations in Albania
are not products of civil movements that could endow them popular
legitimacy. They resemble more parallel bureaucratic structures to the
state bureaucracy. Democratic and Socialist Party are the only
successful civil movements of the Albanian transition. Thus the success
of the electoral processes and the functioning of the judiciary does not
depend on the legislative improvements alone, but first and foremost
it depends on the political will of the main players.
At the heart of the functioning, organization, and structure of the
judiciary there should be a political agreement that should ensure the
longevity and immunity of the judiciary system. Practices in the
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international arena lead us to believe that the best long term solution,
as far as the judiciary is concerned, could be a political agreement
that regulates appointments to the highest levels of the judiciary and
the justice system. Such an agreement would guarantee the
independence of these institutions from the purges that follow electoral
processes.
In the same fashion it should be recognized that the Central Electoral
Commission is a political institution. The emphasize should not be on
creating an independent institution, which could prove to be very illusory,
but rather in creating a representative institution where political
alternatives fairly participate.
• Electoral Reform
The present electoral system in Albania is a SMDS one (Single
Member-District System) combined with a proportional system.  The
electoral system is primarily a SMDP one since 100 out of 140 seats
are allocated through SMDS, whereas the remaining 40 are allocated
proportionally while respecting the SMDS ratios.  Such a system tends
to perpetuate the two major political parties and does not create room
for new political alternatives to gain meaningful representation.
Therefore a more proportional electoral system should be favored in
order to enrich the political offer to the electorate.
• Restore Parliamentary Democracy
One of the main virtues of a parliamentary democracy is the
concentration of power.  The head of the executive is also head of the
winning political party so that there is a clear line of responsibility and
accountability.  This has rarely been the case in Albania that is
supposedly a parliamentary democracy.  As the most recent crises
indicates the separation of powers between the chairman of the party
and the premiere is a recipe for future crises as both of them will
struggle for the control of the parliament and the party while shifting
responsibility to each other for any short comings of the governance.
• Fighting Corruption
The fight against corruption remains one of the major challenges for
Albania, and has serious implications for the future governance.  At
the present time a momentum in the fight against corruption, due to
recent political developments, is beginning to take root in the media
and the public agenda.  If the fight against corruption is to succeed
this momentum should enter governments agenda and the justice
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machinery and not wane.
• Regional vs. Domestic Stability
While the support and assistance of the international community
remains crucial to the future prospects of Albanian democratization, it
is important to emphasize that governance in Albania should not be
appraised in terms of its destabilizing potential in the region.  As it has
been shown above the myth of “Greater Albania” is not a factor in the
internal dynamics of the country, consequently priorities lie with
domestic challenges, such basic services, corruption and trafficking.
Therefore, these should be the criteria against which governance
should be judged by the international community.  In fact Albania has
become a destabilizing region not in the “Greater Albania” framework,
but when governance has failed to accomplish the above priorities.
The 1997 crises stand witness to this fact.
• Stability vs. Democracy
In Albania due to a prolonged crises situation, stability is emerging as
the panacea of the Albanian conundrum.  Therefore, quite often
democratic procedures, standards, and governance have been
sacrificed to stability considerations.  This in turn has resulted into a
stultifying and unsustainable stability which in return has amplified and
perpetuated a climate of crises.  Stability became a status quo approach
that postponed and did not resolve the issues.   Therefore,
developments within Albania should be judged not on merit of the so
called “stability considerations” but against democratization processes.
• Strong Institutions vs. Strong Individuals
Until recently, there was a prevailing belief that Albanian politics was
being held hostage by certain powerful political actors.   Their withdrawal
from the political scene was viewed as a prerequisite to the
normalization of the country.  Yet, support for change was channeled
through individuals and not institutions, perpetuating old political
phenomena, undermining institutional building processes.
• Consistency in Democratic Standards
One of the most important measures to be taken in order to overcome
the “stability phenomenon” and promote democratization is by
upholding consistent standards regarding free and fair elections.
Unfortunately, Albania has not yet passed the test of free and fair
elections.  A tradition of compromised, yet acceptable, electoral
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processes is taking root in Albania.  Such a phenomenon seriously
undermines Albanian democracy.
Annex I.
Civil society and media
Despite the progress made during the transition period,  Albanian civil
society remains weak and not well organized.  One of the reasons for
this is that Albania was one the countries where the  state had absolute
control and  penetrated every aspect of the society.  This legacy has
been and still is one of the major obstacles to a thriving civil society
where individuals come together to have a say on and influence
government decisions that directly affect their lives.
The Albanian State at present is very weak.  This has impoverished
the interaction between the civil society on the one hand and
government on the other.  Very weak state institutions have been
detrimental to a thriving civil society since they could not guarantee
the necessary rule of law vital if civil society is to grow.
Albanian civil society has not been able to assume the role of the
honest broker.  Its still reflects divisions that are prevalent in the Albanian
society, and at times it carries with it the confrontational nature of such
divisions.  At times Albanian civil society tends to be an extension of
certain political elite.
For quite some time Albanian civil society was identified through small
groups of peoples or individual communities sharing the same ideas
and closed to individuals with alternative views.  The impact on the
Albanian society at large was negligible since the civil society did not
become the source of alternative views and approaches to the
challenges Albania was being faced with.   Thus, the Albanian civil
society remained a closed, unrepresentative circle for quite some time,
having thus little impact on the Albanian society.
The contribution of the Albanian civil society during the transition has
been limited also due to the fact that political elite neither encouraged
nor were willing to accept this contribution.  Even when they did they
tried to manipulate and distort it to their own interests.   In the case of
the Democratic Party rule for example, independent civil society
organizations were looked upon with suspicion by the Democratic Party,
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and at times were considered supporters of their political enemies.
The Socialist Party on the other hand both when in government and in
opposition has had a different approach towards civil society.  The
Socialist Party has not expressed enmity towards independent civil
society organizations.  Yet it seems that more than attracting qualified
thought from these organization the Socialist Party has been interested
not to alienate these organizations and make peace with them.   This
strategy has been reflected in the fact that civil society representatives
have been offered high ranking positions in the Socialist administration,
in order to show cooperation with civil society rather than to implement
any alternative views and thoughts.
Despite the above mentioned difficulties certain citizen initiatives and
ideas put forth from the civil society have taken root.  Dozens of NGOs
in the fields of human rights, media and research have been
increasingly influencing both the policy makers and the public at large.
Especially during the last five years Albanian civil society has been
growing in strength and importance, trying to create its own alternative
voice.  This voice is still too weak to influence decision makers, however
it is having its impact on democratic developments in Albania, even if
only by the mere virtue that it exists.
One of the major problems Albanian civil society is faced with at present
is the lack of funding needed to make it sustainable.  Most of the
funding, if not all, comes from international donors, which has bred a
dependency relationship.  A relationship that is very disturbing since
there is a tendency on part of civil society organizations to
accommodate in their projects the objectives of the donors rather than
the priorities and needs of the country.87
Media
The effects and assistance of media in the processes of
democratization in Albania have been visible and appreciated in the
first decade of the transition. The emergence of the opposition press
in the beginning of the 90s has been a historical event for a country
where the bunker symbolized the communist press. Press has provided
huge assistance to the democratic processes in the beginning of
transition. The pluralist press served as a forum for open debates and
87
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as an instrument that mitigated social tensions. The press uncovered
the hidden truths about communism to the Albanian public after 50
years of totalitarian regime. The controversies were therefore dealt at
the press rather than having ugly manifestations of revenge on the
streets.
Tendencies that reflect communist mentality and aimed at the total
control of the media re-surfaced later on. The government exercised
specific control especially on the national public television, leaving little
to no space to the opposition party.
During the past four years, we have seen a visible progress in both
print and television media. Practically it is not anymore possible for
the government to retain control over the television media since several
private channels have developed in Albania.
If the recent parliamentary elections had significant improvements, it
is mainly due to the development of private television media. Many
debates among the candidates in the political elections in both the
local and central levels occurred in these private media outlets. Apart
from mitigating possible conflicts, media provided the public with the
chance to know better the candidates and their alternative programs.
According to the final report of ODIHR on the parliamentary elections
held in June 24th “Albanian private media gave in general quite balanced
coverage of all political entities, as opposed to previous experiences.88
The print media has also improved significantly. The role of the party-
affiliated press, which is dominated by the two main political parties in
the country, DP and SP, has been reduced lately. There is however an
effort to form the professional independent press in Albania, which
has not succeeded yet.
Financial unsustainability and inadequate management of the media
outlets are major obstacles to creating a professional independent
media. Local medias, particularly outside the main towns, suffer the
most from conditions of poverty. Economic pressures can be easily
translated into political ones, as well.
From a legal point of view, press in Albania is free, but this freedom is
often abused. As the press has not developed a proper sense of
responsibility, the quality of coverage varies a lot. Since there is little
respect for the code of ethics, human rights and other liberal democratic
88
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values are not ingrained in the journalist’s work.
Further legislative initiatives are needed to raise the media standards
in Albania. There are currently indications from the government that it
will undertake such initiatives. The recent parliamentary elections and
the current crisis within the Socialist Party are hampering this process.
Annex II.
“The Myth of Greater Albania”
Although it has been traditionally viewed as the motherland of all the
Albanians living outside its borders, Albania has never been able to
live up to this image.  A very weak and vulnerable state, Albania’s
major concern has been to ensure its own survival.  The best way in
which this could be done was not to get involved in the Albanian national
question.  This has been a clear dimension of the Albanian foreign
policy both during Zog I and the communist regime.
The Albanian foreign policy became more assertive following the
collapse of communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. However,
even in this period the prevention of the conflict remained the overriding
concern. The war in Yugoslavia presented an ominous threat from
Serbia. If the war spread to Kosova, then Albania would have, ultimately,
been dragged into it as well. Such a development would have been
chatastrophic for Albania whose “armed forces were grossly inadequate
for the country’s defence”,89  and in addition, was going through one of
the most difficult periods in its history. A general situation of turmoil
prevailed as the communist system was collapsing and the country
was moving toward pluralism. The internal security had been broken
and the country was experiencing a severe economic and social
dislocation that had reduced Albania to total dependence on foreign
assistance.90  The avoidance of war became the overriding foreign
policy objective. In addition, as noted earlier, the policies of the
Communist regime in Albania had weakened the nationalist feelings
among the population. The government could not mobilize the
population to wage a war. The attitude of political parties in Albania
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toward Kosova was not a factor that influenced the election results.91
In the same fashion Albanian foreign policy could only be aiming at
promoting stability in Macedonia while avoiding any disturbances that
Belgrade could exploit. Although the disintegration of Yugoslavia further
fragmented the Albanians in the Balkans, the establishment of an
independent Macedonian state was in the interests of Albania and
Albanians in general.  The decision of Macedonia not to remain in the
Rump Yugoslavia weakened the regional standing of Serbia and
separated Greece and Serbia.  In addition both Albania and Macedonia
had similar interests since they were both being squeezed by the
Greeco-Serb axis92  and could offset some of the pressure by
developing close economic and political ties.93   Due to this
considerations Tirana strongly supported Macedonia’s stability and
independence and urged the Albanians of Macedonia to work towards
this end.  While Albania showed interest in the well being of the
Albanians in Macedonia the issue was not the main factor shaping
bilateral relations. As we trace the development of Albanian –
Macedonian relations we notice that the overriding security concern –
stability of Macedonia – prevailed over other concerns.  This was
obvious even before Macedonia became officially recognized by Tirana.
Thus, as it was already shown above, Tirana and Prishtina did not
support the referendum for territorial autonomy of the Albanians in
Macedonia.
Notwithstanding Macedonian authorities’ failure to address any of the
Albanian grievances Tirana was one of the first states to recognize
Macedonia. This dimension of Albanian foreign policy toward
Macedonia remained unchanged. During the critical period when
Greece imposed an embargo on Macedonia, which combined with
the UN embargo on Yugoslavia proved disastrous for the Macedonian
economy, Albania (and Bulgaria) provided Macedonia with alternative
trade routes without trying to capitalize on Macedonia’s weakness.
Although the relations between Macedonian authorities and Albanian
in Macedonia provided considerable room for intervention Tirana did
not exploit it.
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The 1997 disturbances in Albania following the collapse of pyramid
schemes brought to light an important dimension of the Albanian role
in the inter/intra-Albanian relations.  Immediately after the 1997 crises
Albania not only ceased to be a factor in Balkan politics, but also
presented to the world the image of a country that was unable to govern
itself, which undermined the quest of Albanians in Kosovo for statehood
and that of the Albanians in Macedonia for greater rights.  However,
the collapse of the Albanian state did not force the Albanians in Kosova
and Macedonia to reconsider their objectives.  Their political agendas
reflected this community’s historical experiences and the dynamics of
power in their particular and immediate environments.  It is for this
reason that the programs of Albanians in Kosova and Macedonia differ
from each other.  The first pursuing independence, the other equal
rights within the state.
To conclude the Albanian national question in the Balkans does not
appear in the traditional form of a mother country that is pursuing
irredentist goals. The impetus for changing the status quo did not come
from Tirana, but from Albanians in Kosova and Macedonia.94  Because
Albania has never been able to fulfill its role as the mother country, the
political class of Albanians in Prishtina but also of Albanians in
Macedonia, cannot accept a paternalizing attitude from Tirana.
Therefore the answers to the Albanian question should be found in
Prishtina and Skopje.
Annex III.
The Albanian Transition Economy
Introduction
As a result of the economic and political self-isolation for almost two
generations, Albania entered a deep economic and financial crises in
the late 80s and early 90s.  The 80s were years of an accelerated and
serious decline in production, of major macroeconomic imbalances,
both internal and external,  a general crises in management and
infrastructure, and a drain in the foreign exchange reserves as well as
the creation of an external debt for the country.
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to note that for the Albanians of Macedonia any changes of the status quo were to
take place within the framework of a Macedonian state.
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Albania’s experience, like that of some other transition economies,
showed that some reforms could be effected quite rapidly; markets
could be liberalized, obstacles to businesses and foreign exchange
controls could be removed.  All these reforms took place in Albania by
the end of 1992.  Macroeconomic stabilization was established at a
fast pace through a limited number of fiscal and monetary measures
(see Table 1).  As the figures indicate, budget deficit and inflation were
brought under control by the government within a relatively short period
of time.  Despite this preliminary measures Albanian economic
transition has shown that the implementation of structural reforms and
market institutionalization are difficult long term processes.  While
privatization processes might be effected in the short term, changes
in corporate governance require much more time.  In the same fashion,
developing market institutions, such as financial and legal systems,
are processes that can only take place in the very long run.
Macroeconomic stability, a prerequisite for sustainable economic
growth, is a necessary but not sufficient conditions for a thriving market
economy.  Strong institutions, clearly defined and well established
property rights and an effective judiciary are vital components of a
well functioning market economy.  The stabilization process and the
progress of reforms began in 1993 came to a halt in 1997.  The collapse
of pyramid schemes in 1997 and the consequent disturbances
paralyzed the economic life of the country.
Economic Growth Performance
According to EBRD (2001) assessments, by the end of 2000 Albanian
economy reached pre-transition production levels.  With the exception
of 1997, production grew in real terms, at a yearly average of 9%.
During 1997-2000, GDP growth was at a yearly average of 7.7%, as
compared to 3.8% in Bulgaria, -0.2% in Romania, and 3.9% in
Macedonia. 95
Although the above figures rate Albania in the category of countries
with a certain degree of economic success, they should be evaluated
within the Albanian context.  First of all GDP per capita in Albania
remains one of the lowest in the region (at around 1100 USD at the
95
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end of 2000).  Economic poverty is wide spread and thus remains a
serious issue as reflected by inequalities in the distribution of income
(Gini coefficient was 0.43 for 2000). 96   Unemployment is still very
high, and remittances from emigrants working abroad remain the major
source of income for a great number of Albanian families (Shehi,
Gedeshi, 200; Beka, 2001). 97
So, economic growth has resulted through extensive production means,
boosted by the privatization process and the promotion of the private
sector. Technology continues to remain backward, technologic
renovation being still in its embryonic phase.
Structural Reforms
As far as structural reforms are concerned , the average transition
indicator (EBRD, 2001) rates behind other transition economies (with
the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina).  The major shortcomings are
in the areas of massive privatization, restructuring of state enterprises,
market competition policies and the reforms in the financial system.
Privatization
The process of the privatization of state industrial and commercial
enterprises can be considered completed by the end of 1999, while
this process has now been extended to those economic sectors of a
particular importance for the Albanian economy (strategic sectors),
such as the banking, telecommunications, mining, and energy sectors. 98
Taking into consideration the existing administrative capacity as well
as the level of development of markets and financial institutions, the
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massive privatization process applied in Albania was simple and
different from that applied in other transition countries.  Taking into
account the scarcity of domestic capital such a privatization process
aimed a quick and egalitarian transfer of property in order to increase
the credibility of reforms.  An accelerated privatization was deemed
necessary in order to thwart any resistance on part of employees and
other interest groups.
However, in spite of the initial fast pace of  privatization, the lack of
clear and comprehensive plan constitutes one of the major
shortcomings of the process.  It had an ad hoc nature and its was
implemented through a series of decisions by the Council of Ministers
instead of a Privatization Law.  This indicates that the architect of the
privatization program did not pay due attention to all the implications
of the process.  Furthermore, the lack of a political consensus from
the very beginning of the privatization process, as well as consequent
changes in the privatization strategy, indicate a serious lack of
coherence in this regard.
The Financial System
Albania  created a two-tier banking system in 1992, transferring the
commercial banking activity from the Bank of Albania into the National
Commercial Bank.  The Rural Commercial Bank of Albania covered
the agricultural sector, whereas the Savings Bank had practically the
monopoly of the deposits by citizens.   By the end of the last decade
there were 13 commercial banks operating in Albania, of which only
the Savings Bank continues to remain under state ownership.
Nevertheless, the percentage of the assets owned by foreign banks
that operate in the country is only 35.2%.
One of the major problems in the Albanian financial system is the low
degree of intermediary services offered by the financial sector in the
country’s economy.  One of the paradoxes in the Albanian financial
system is also the fact that on the one hand there are substantial
savings by the population, and on the other the credit level in the private
sector is very low.  Increasing budget deficits have had a crowding out
effect on private investment.  Thus, the strategy of privatization of the
Savings Bank that has a large weight in the banking sector, and the
development of a banking market, are essential objectives in order to
create effective intermediary financial services.
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The Degree of Openness of the Albanian Economy
In order to assess the degree of openness for an economy, current
economic literature measures the volume of foreign trade as a
percentage of total economic activity (GDP).  The larger this number,
the more open and connected to the outer world the economy is.
Degree of openness to international trade; imports + exports as a  % of GDP.
The decreasing degree of openness of Albanian economy does not
bode well for future economic growth.  The promotion of the export
base would lead to an increase of the above indicator, so that Albania
could at least reach the levels of other regional economies.  An increase
in exports is necessary so that the country can finance its chronic
current account deficit.
Although the openness indicator has been decreasing over time, it is
important to note that Albanian foreign trade with EU has been
increasing steadily during the transition period.  Currently, Albania
conducts 80% of its economic commercial transactions with EU
members.  Economic commercial activity with Balkan economies (with
the exception of Greece) on the other hand is very low.  This indicates
that the Albanian economy is mostly connected to and integrated with
the EU economies.
Therefore, economic developments in the neighboring Balkan countries
have an indirect effect on the Albanian economy.  The political situation
in the Balkans during the last decade, combined with some historical
factors, became an obstacle to any serious initiatives for regional
cooperation.  Currently Albania is concluding its negotiations with
Macedonia for a free trade agreement in the framework of the
Memorandum for the Liberalization of Trade signed in June 2001.
Regional trade and cooperation is expected to take a boost once
projects on regional infrastructure that are part of EU programs for the
region take place. In the long run regional integration and regional
economic interdependence can be expected to be enhanced
simultaneously with the institutionalization of internal markets.
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Albania 58 38 35.7 43.7 37.1 33.5 32.9
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The Corruption and Informal Economy.
One of the major obstacles to Albanian economic development is
corruption.  According to EBRD (1999), businesses in Central and
Eastern Europe pay a corruption tax that varies from 2% of yearly
income in Croatia to 8% in Georgia.  Although there are no definitive
studies on current corruption levels in Albania, it is very likely that the
figures for Albania are much higher.  Anecdotal evidence regarding
high levels of corruption is abundant.  Also the public perceives
corruption to be very high among state officials.
There also is a very large informal sector in the Albanian economy.
Some estimates place this figure at more than 50% of the economy.
According to an independent study the informal sector constitutes at
least 68% of the internal market.  It is mostly present in small trade,
transport and construction.  Also most of the businesses (73%) declare
that they do not declare their real profit because of taxation.   The
same study reports that employment in the black market occupies a
large share of the labor market. 99
The large share of the informal economy is also evident in the value of
smuggling that takes place in Albania.  According to a study of the
Bank of Albania regarding the level of contraband in foreign trade, the
undeclared value of contraband in customs is 40-60 % of the total
value of trade.
Annex IV.
Corruption and Organized Crime in Albania
Corruption
For most countries in transition corruption is not an unknown
phenomenon.  Yet in the case of Albania, corruption has become a
threatening phenomena not only for the economy but also for the
stability of the country.  Most independent sources, the media,
investigating bodies and analysts all agree that there has been a
substantial increase in briberies at all levels of the state administration.
More prone to this phenomena are customs, taxation agencies,
99
 Qendra Shqiptare për Kërkime Ekonomike, 1999 “Sektori informal në Shqipëri:
raport empirik”, “Ekonomia dhe Tranzicioni” nr. 1 (19).
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insurance balances, agencies that issue licenses for private
businesses, education, health services and the justice system.  There
have been numerous instances when officials in fiscal services or
customs have paid sums of money much larger than their yearly income
in order to be placed, at times in advanced positions, within these
structures.
The widespread  corruption in Albania is due to a variety of factors.
One of the most important ones is the existing widespread poverty
which makes the taking of bribes a necessity in order to make a living.
Briberies in the lower levels of administration, where employees very
low wages, perform the process of income redistribution while  having
serious deteriorating effects on the society as a whole.  Such a
phenomenon has a direct impact in lowering the work ethic and morale
in all the levels of society, and thus it makes the fight against corruption
extremely inefficient.
The overgrown bureaucracy in the high and medium levels of the state
administration is another factor that promotes corruption.  Businesses
and citizens are forced to pay bribes in all the levels of the administration
in order to save time.  Generally speaking, the process of application
and approval for licenses and other important permits is very long,
bureaucratic and thus leaves room for corruption practices.
It is important to note that while corruption is a major threat to economic
development and to those values that a democratic society holds dear,
in Albania one can argue that corruption has reached the status of an
institution.  High unemployment, lack of security and the scarcity of
investment needed to create new jobs, and the slow paste of the
economic reform, high living costs and the absence of political stability
have all contributed to the high levels of corruption in Albania.
The fight against corruption has become a prerequisite for democracy
and a functioning market economy in Albania.  In order to fight
corruption through independent and effective institutions certain
mechanisms need to be developed.  Such institutions are nonexistent
in Albania.  The Attorney’s office does not have a department, the
structure or the necessary means to fight economic crime.  The General
Attorney of Albania assented publicly to the inability of his office to
fight the economic Mafia and crime in December 6th, 2001, only one
day after the majority leader publicly accused high government officials,
including three ministers, for corruption, financial abuses and other
major economic crimes.  He declared that no investigation will be
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conducted for the accused officials since his office did not have the
means, the necessary staff and the ability to conduct such an
investigation100 .
Other institutions that investigate economic crime, corruption and
abusive financial practices, such as the Department of Internal Auditing,
have not been effective. The Department of Internal Auditing has been
more of a political tool, rather than an institution that monitors the
abuses of government funds and tax payers money. During 1992 –
1996, when the Democratic Party was in power, Department of Internal
Auditing was mainly used against local government officials that came
from the opposition, the Socialist Party.  During recent years, 1997-
2000 its activity has been focused again on local government officials
that belong to the opposition, or against socialist ministers embroiled
in political conflict with the Socialist leadership.
The Albanian government has set up a department specialized to fight
corruption, even at the ministerial level, but its functioning has remained
at the theoretical level.  This agency has produced unreliable data and
information that could not be sustained at the court and was later on
placed into the archives, without having a real impact against corruption.
One of the paradoxes is that even when customs officers or high
ranking officials were dismissed on charges of corruption, almost none
of these cases was taken to court.
The inefficiency of the justice system is reflected in the number of
officials that have been dismissed on allegations of corruption.
According to the statistics of the Ministry of Justice in 1998 only nine
officials have been sentenced on charges of abuse of power.  These
numbers have been one and five for 1999 and 2000 respectively. Only
one official has been sentenced on charges of bribery in 1998, one in
1999 and another one in 2000.101   It is important to remember that
these numbers are for the same time period in which Albania has
been enlisted as one of the countries with highest corruption levels in
South East Europe.
Government officials sustain that numerous administrative measures
have been taken against corrupted individuals.  During the last 5-6
years a number of customs officers, policemen, and other officials of
100
 Declaration of the General Attorney’s Office, ATA, 6 December 2001
 101
 Ministry of Justice, Yearly Bulletin 2000.
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the state administration have been dismissed on charges of corruption
and abuse of power, however in none of these cases there were legal
proceedings.  Because of such a phenomenon, along with the fact
that these officials have close ties with the upper decision making
levels of the state administration, and also in the absence of a legal
status for the state employees, some of those officials that have been
dismissed on charges of financial abuses have been appointed in
parallel state structures, regaining immunity before undergoing any
legal proceedings.
The width and depth of corruption, briberies, even in the highest levels
of state administration and governance has distorted developmental
policies, resulting in high unemployment and economic stagnation in
many production sectors as well as high environmental pollution levels
and chaotic urbanization.  The first to suffer is free and honest
competition since entrepreneurs with have to adopt to these practices
in order to ensure the survival of their businesses.   In recent years
very few small enterprises and businesses have been created.  This
has happened in spite of the fact that Albanian legislature has been
improved, there is almost a decade long experience in dealing with
businesses, consumption has increased and labor force has become
cheaper.  The corrupt and informal business environment has forced
entrepreneurs to apply a system of mixed formal and informal practices
in running their businesses, rather than sit and wait for the state to put
an end to unfair competition and informal economic activity.
Such a business environment is also very unattractive for foreign
investors, and in fact foreign investment in Albania has fallen
significantly.
Corruption and Security
International condemnation against corruption, trafficking and organized
crime in Albania reached its peak in the Albanian-USA and EU –
Albanian relations.  In October 2001, the USA State Department
published a list of countries in which the above phenomena were
widespread.102  The State Department also issued a warning that unless
Albania  takes the necessary measures to move out of this list by
2003, it will be placed under economic sanctions.  EU on the other
102
 State Department Declaration, USA October 2001.
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hand, took advantage of the long negotiation process of stabilization
and association agreement for Albania in order to step up its criticism
of the inefficiency of Albanian authorities to control and fight corruption.
Both of these are very telling examples about the negative impact that
corruption has on Albania’s future prospects.
At the same time, corruption, briberies and other similar abusive
practices have a direct deteriorating impact on national security.  The
events of 1997 clearly indicated that when a government has been
implicated in abusive practices with the income of its citizens, when a
number of its officials are corrupt, with a justice system  that has been
paralyzed by corruption and political influences, national security
becomes seriously threatened.
Although important steps have been taken since 1997 in building
efficient and professional institutions of economic reform, in improving
national defense, public order and justice systems, these institutions
are still fledgling and not independent enough to guarantee political,
economic and social stability. There still exist major destabilizing
potentials.  High levels of corruption in the justice system, police and
other important institutions has a very weakening effect on their efficacy,
lowers their credibility making them unable to guarantee internal stability
and security for the country.
Organized crime
There have been numerous forms of organized crime in Albania during
the transition period.  Here again, just like in the case of corruption,
organized crime seems to be far more developed and disturbing in
Albania as compared to most other transition countries.
Although arms trafficking reached unprecedented proportions at the
threshold of the Kosovo crises in 1999, and later on during the
Macedonian conflict, the most aggravating phenomenon for the
Albanian society ever since transition began has been the smuggling
of refugees and prostitutes.  Moving from a very conservative and
isolated society into a liberal one where extreme poverty forced people
into new venues of material gain, Albania for a long period of time
became the main country in the region in refugee and prostitution
trafficking.  According to the information released from the Albanian
police force most of the nationals smuggled in prostitution trafficking
come from Eastern European countries such as Moldavia, Romania
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and Ukraine.103   Most of those smuggled as refugees on the other
hand come Asian countries.
Child trafficking has also been growing to disturbing proportions.  This
has not simply been part of the refugee of prostitution smuggling but
part of a Mafia network that makes profit out of transplant organs and
street children.  During 2001 more than 75 children in Italy or Greece
were found to be working for such a network, whereas the number of
children whose whereabouts are not known by the police is much
greater.   Terre des Hommes a French NGO that works with Albanian
children that have been smuggled to beg in Greece asserts that only
in Thessaloniki there are more than 1000 children that beg or work in
the street, while they claim that there are more than 3000 such Albanian
children in Greece104 .
Its weak border control and protracted crises situation have made
Albania the ideal ground for Balkan criminality to thrive, and especially
drug trafficking from East towards the West.  Only during 1999, 6.5
tons out of 60 tons of marihuana confiscated in Western Europe are
thought to have been smuggled from Albania.105   Thus, Albania and
Morocco are considered the two major drug suppliers of Western
Europe.
Sources of Organized Crime
Besides the absence of an effective police force, absence of the rule
of law and a functioning judiciary system one of the reasons for the
spread and depth of organized crime in Albania is the widespread
poverty.  Due to the scarcity of new jobs and the lack of opportunities
to make an honest living organized crime becomes the source of
income for substantial segments of the population.  Revenue from
organized crime becomes crucial for the economy especially in view
of declining domestic and international investment.
Another source through which organized crime sustains itself in Albania
is through the connections it has established with similar criminal
networks from neighboring countries, such as Italy, Bulgaria, Romania
103
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and Yugoslavia.  Crime has outsmarted governments in the Balkans
as far as regional cooperation is concerned.  More than 300 people
that were being tracked by Interpol or the police of Western countries
for having committed grave crimes, were living in Albania in 1998.106
This shows that for these criminals Albania had become a safe haven
where in the absence of a strong state and strong institutions they
could comfortably perform their criminal activity.
One of the major sources that promotes and sustains organized crime
in Albania  is its connections in high political circles.  Enormous
revenues from drugs, trafficking, prostitution and other criminal activities
are not only invested in the economy but also go into the pockets of
high ranking state officials and politicians.  Quite often members of
the Albanian political elite, including members of the parliament,
ministers and premiers have publicly supported and interacted with
individuals that later on were found to be heads of economic Mafia,
trafficking and organized crime in Albania.
Given its ties with the political elite, the rule of law has not been applied
against organized crime effectively.  Time and again the international
community has asked for more efforts and cooperation on part of the
Albanian judiciary in the fight against organized crime.  The USA
ambassador in Tirana, Limprecht remarked in a meeting with
representatives of the Albanian judiciary that “attorneys should better
cooperate with the police force, while avoiding the politicization of the
legal proceedings.  Sentences issued by judges should be proportional
to the crime that has been committed.” 107   Limprecht’s remark touches
upon a very delicate deficiency in the Albanian penal code.  In the
latter there is a lot flexibility regarding the severity of the sentence for
a given crime, which means that a lot depends on the will and the
professional judgment of the judges, neither of which has lived up to
the necessary standards needed to effectively fight organized crime.
Besides these shortcomings in the Albanian legislature another serious
obstacle in the fight against organized crime is the lack of cooperation
between the judiciary and the police force.  The lack of cooperation
combined with the low professional capacities of both these institutions
has meant that during the last four years only nine individuals have
been sentenced for human trafficking, and even fewer have been
106
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sentenced for drugs and prostitution trafficking.108
Annex V.
Voter Turnout and Elections Results for the Albanian
Parliamentary Elections 1991-2001
1991 Parliamentary Elections
Voter Turnout: ....................................................................... 98.92 %
Elections Results as % of Seats in the Parliament
Albanian Party of Labor ......................................................... 67.60 %
Albanian Democratic Party ........................................................ 30 %
Omonia ........................................................................................ 2 %
National Veterans Committee .................................................... 0.4%
Source: Zeri I Popullit, 16 October 1997, pp 1-5.
1992 Parliamentary Elections109
Voter  Turnout ....................................................................... 90.35 %
Elections Results as % of Seats in the Parliament
Democratic Party .................................................................. 65.71 %
Socialist Party ....................................................................... 27.14 %
Social Democratic Party ............................................................... 5 %
Union for Human Rights........................................................... 1.43%
Republican Party ...................................................................... 0.71%
Other Parties ......................................................................... no seats
Source: The Official Gazette of the Republic of Albania, no 2, May 1992, p. 99.
108
 Ministry of Justice, Yearly Bulletin 2001
 109
 First Round of Voting, 22 March 1992
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1996 Parliamentary Elections110
Voter Turnout ......................................................................... 89.00%
Elections Results as % of Seats in the Parliament
Democratic Party ................................................................... 87.00%
Socialist Party .......................................................................... 7.00%
Republican Party ...................................................................... 2.00%
National Front ........................................................................... 1.50%
Union for Human Rights........................................................... 2.00%
Source: Rilindja Demokratike, 22 June 1996, p. 2 and 3, July 1996, p. 2.
International Republican Institute, IRI Observation Report on the Albanian
Parliamentary Elections of May 26, 1996 (Washington, D.C., 1996), p. 32.
1997 Parliamentary Elections111
Voter Turnout ......................................................................... 72.96%
Elections Results as % of Seats in the Parliament
Socialist Party .......................................................................... 65.1%
Democratic Party ..................................................................... 15.5%
Social Democratic Party ............................................................. 5.8%
Union for Human Rights............................................................. 2.5%
National Front ............................................................................. 1.9%
Legality ....................................................................................... 1.3%
Democratic Alliance ................................................................... 1.3%
Republican Party ........................................................................ 0.6%
Social Democratic Union............................................................ 0.6%
Christian Democratic Party ........................................................ 0.6%
Democratic Union Party ............................................................. 0.6%
National Unity Party .................................................................... 0.6%
Agrarian Party ............................................................................ 0.6%
Source: Central Electoral Commission, Bulletin: Rezultatet e Zgjedhjeve
Parlamentare, Qershor 1997 [Bulletin: The Results of the June 1997 Parliamentary
Elections] (Tirane 1997), pp. 62-63, and 69.
110
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 111
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2001 Parliamentary Elections112
Voter Turnout ......................................................................... 55.59%
Elections Results as % of  Vote and Number of Seats in the Parliament
% of vote Number of Seats
Socialist Party 41.00 % 73
Union for Victory (coalition) 36.81 % 46
Made up of: Democratic Party, Legality Movement Party, National Front
Party, republican Party, Liberal Union Party
New Democratic Party 5.80 % 6
Social Democratic Party 3.64 % 4
Union for Human Rights Party 2.61 % 3
Agrarian Party 2.57 % 3
Democratic Alliance Party 2.55 % 3
Independents 2
Source: Central Elections Commission
Note.  The above data has been mostly taken from official sources.
However, OSCE has quite often cited the government of Albania for
inadequate voter lists, which in turn put into question the accuracy of
statements regarding voter turnout.
112
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BULGARIA: COUNTRY REPORT ON THE STATE FOR
DEMOCRACY AND A ROADMAP FOR REFORM
Institute for Regional and International Studies
STATE OF DEMOCRACY
The period since 1997 has been one of enormous dynamism and
reform intensity. This period can usefully be subdivided into two
segments: one encompassing the time until late 1999 and the other
stretching to late 2001. The former is marked by the rapid
implementation of an extensive reform programme, the enhancement
of institutional stability through legal codification and enforcement,
extensive public support for reform, firm anchoring of Bulgaria in the
EU and NATO enlargement scenarios, stability of party system and
little electoral volatility. The end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000
provide a turning point in the recent evolution of Bulgarian democracy.
The main reasons for the shift can be sought among the following: the
continued inability of the political system to deliver public goods in a
setting of extensive economic and administrative reform; emergence
of a heightened sense of personal insecurity; subsequent decline in
public support for radical reform, continued social and economic
stratification exacerbated by persistent perception of improper
privatization and distribution of budgetary funds.
1997 – 1999 – DEMOCRACY RENEWED
Following the collapse of the socialist government in early 1997 and
the massive street protests which helped bring its downfall, there
ensued a time of sustained strengthening of Bulgarian democracy.
The emergence of a stable, reformist governing majority swept into
power by a massive electoral majority allowed the implementation of a
programme of radical reform in economy and society. Macro-economic
stability, resumption of moderate economic growth, extensive
privatization and re-structuring and tax reform – these are a few of the
items on a loaded agenda of economic reform. These were
accompanied by the complete overhaul of the administrative system,
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reform of the social security system, health care, pension system and
educational reform. The country was firmly anchored in the frameworks
of EU and NATO enlargement coupled with a very active regional policy.
Organized crime was contained and crime reduced over this period.
Export of organized crime from the conflict areas of the region was
largely prevented. In polity, the values of Euro- Atlantic integration were
further internalized by the political elites. The party system continued
to be predictable as the main opposition, socialist party sought to further
anchor itself in the reform agenda. Over the period, public support for
reform was sustained at comfortable levels.
The latter part of 1999 saw the beginning of a shift in public attitudes.
The continued inability of the political system to deliver effectively public
goods, the increasing magnitude of economic hardship due to
unemployment and restructuring, the low levels of income even for
individuals in employment, the extensive reform of all systems of
insurance contributed to a heightened sense of insecurity of individuals.
This was exacerbated by the continued social and economic
stratification further worsened by the persistent perception of improper
privatization and distribution of budgetary funds. The governing Union
of Democratic Forces (UDF) began to be perceived as an entity firmly
divided in camps whose interests are advanced in the process of
privatization and government. The sequencing and intensity of reform
had abruptly re-defined central social and economic footholds of
individuals, thereby placing them in a situation of extreme volatility.
These parameters of developments persisted and worsened through
to 2001. Individuals found themselves in a situation of extreme volatility
of all major systems accompanied by a sudden reduction and visible
ineffectiveness of the involvement of the state and consequently
reduced their expectations of state and polity to an extent of extreme
political detachment and apathy. Thus, in the summer of 2001, the
political system found itself in a situation where the support for the two
main parties had shrunk to around 20% each with the remainder of
the electorate unwilling to be engaged in politics. There was little
credibility for the established political elites beyond their immediate
constituents. The vacuum was filled by the movement of the former
king, Simeon II on a wave of populism and promise of immediate relief
as well as a new morality.
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PRESENT STATE OF DEMOCRACY
The contours of the current state of democracy have already been
provided and the present challenges can be examined at four distinct
levels: volatility of social framework, crisis of representation and
legitimacy, crisis of values of public interaction and crisis of the political
system. These can be examined in turn.
Volatility of Social Framework
Volatility of social framework has increased due to the continued effects
of the misfit between the reform agenda and the short- and mid-term
expectations of citizens. The radical and extensive programme of
privatization and economic re-structuring has led to unprecedented
levels of unemployment and the virtual wipe-out of entire sectors of
the economy and the social networks underpinned by economic activity.
There has been a systemic process of impoverishment in numerous
sectors of economy and society. In addition, there are sectors of society
which seem completely unable, in the short and medium – term, to
resume employment. Economic recovery has been patchy, in and
around the major cities of the country. This has taken place in a context
of extreme monetary restriction, which has virtually prevented the
employment of many pro-active instruments by the state. The much
necessary overhaul of the social insurance, pension and health care
systems has resulted in the undermining of basic pillars of social
reference and existence, producing enormous personal insecurity and
psychological volatility. This has translated into a notable mistrust in
the capacity of government to provide a set of services and frameworks
which ensure predictability and well – being. In such a mindset, the
political is predominantly perceived as the site of improper redistribution
and individual enrichment rather than a provider of basic services.
Yet, this mistrust has proved compatible with a disposition to expect
positive changes in welfare through major, abrupt shifts – mainly
through redistribution.
Crisis of representation and legitimacy
The misfit between the requirements of radical reform and expectations
of citizens has already been mentioned. This misfit has been worsened
by the delay in reform and by the restrictive monetary framework,
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thereby further intensifying the negative impact of the shift. The
subsequent inability of the political system to deliver public goods and
ensure personal security has led to a legitimacy crisis, which found its
expression only in the middle of 2001. This is also a crisis of
representation, which is difficult to counter for a series of reasons.
Firstly, reforms tend to initially disaggregate groups and interests. This
has been highly visible in the creation of a rather amorphous group of
“losers of reform”. Secondly, group and interest differentiation proceed
with the pace of reform and tend to increase towards the completion
of reforms with the crystallization of new configurations of interest and
grouping. Thirdly, it continues to be seen precisely what forms
representation will assume in settings where previous patterns of social
linkage have largely disintegrated and economies have been de-
industrialized.
There is a larger question that needs to be highlighted here. It is the
question of the actual structure of post – transition society and its
modes of representation. Structure here could be defined through
income, distribution of employment, value frameworks, etc. Bulgarian
transition has produced a society largely depleted, through emigration,
of its most active and innovative members, a large group of unemployed
people through de-industrialization, a slowly expanding, city – based
entrepreneurial group of individuals and a large group of retirees. While
this is a sketchy description, it provides the elements of post – transition
society. The 2001 UNDP Report on Human Development provides an
adequate snapshot of structure by employment. 20% of the people
are employed in services while 12.1% are employed in industrial
production. 4.4% of all individuals own their businesses and only 2.2
% derive their income from employment in agriculture. 2.4% define
their occupation as housewives while 2.1 % are employed in either
seasonal work or in what they define as casual work. A full 35.4% of
the population consists of retirees while 16.5% are unemployed. 4.1%
are either in school or in higher education. What emerges is a diverse
picture of employment with very high numbers of people who are either
past their retirement age or unemployed. On the other hand, the number
of individuals in industrial production has declined notably while
employment in services, as share of total employment, has continued
to rise. Organization membership provides a further important
dimension. Only 10.5% of the population is members of a trade union.
Within this percentage, individuals in state and industrial employment
are much more likely to join a trade union. Those individuals employed
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in the private sector and in service industries are much less likely to
join such organizations. Given the steady decline in state and industrial
employment, the catchment area of unions and their capacity to
represent effectively their membership will further decrease in
importance.
Other trends in group membership confirm the reluctance of citizens
to participate in collective forms of organization. 8.1% of the population
is members of a political party while 4.8% have joined their local cultural
centers. 4.6% are participants in the work of non – governmental
organizations and 4.1% have joined various clubs. Importantly, only
2.3% have become members of their professional or business
organizations. Low membership undermines both the capacity of these
organizations to ensure effective representation and their legitimacy
within the very communities they seek to represent.
This attitude is confirmed by the opinions of respondents in relation to
intermediary structures. For instance, only 12% of individuals hold the
opinion that non – governmental organizations defend public interests
while 15 % are firmly convinced that these organizations seek to protect
solely their own interests. Similar distrust in the actual protection and
representation of interest can be found for other intermediary
institutions. A reflection of the sense of distrust in intermediaries can
be detected in the opinions of individuals on the reasons for civic non
– participation. 85.6% of respondents hold the view that “they will not
be heard” while 75% find a tendency whereby a few individuals “hijack
the agenda” to their own benefit. 69.2% of all individuals do not
recognize an institution, which is sufficiently capable or willing to
represent their views in the public arena. When they have a grievance,
51.7% simply do not know which institution to approach.
It will come as little surprise that in such a setting, citizens have a
marked preference for direct engagement. Asked which institutions
they would rather have as their representative, almost 44% of all
respondents in the UNDP 2001 Report express their preference for
the local media. Around 30% would prefer their union to be the active
part while 29% expect their local cultural center to be the subject of
interest representation. On the question of forms of engagements, an
interesting statistic appears. 68.7% of all individuals find referenda as
very appropriate in conveying opinion while 68.2% find elections as
the most suitable means. Surveys are the preferred option for 40.1%
of the people while 36% are in favour of public meetings and
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discussions. It is interesting to note that a large group of people (around
42%) recognizes the need to organize collectively in order to present
a bill to Parliament. Further evidence of the preference for direct
engagement can be found in the attitudes towards the Ombudsman.
While there is insufficient awareness of the precise functions of the
Ombudsman and its location in the system of institutions, there is
widespread support for its introduction. Only 24.7% of respondents
think that there are a sufficient number of institutions that deal with
grievances. A full 75.3% hold the opinion that there is a clear need for
the institution of the Ombudsman.
The issue of emigration has been touched upon only briefly. Yet, this
has proven to be a central feature of the evolution of society over the
past 12 years. While estimates on emigration vary, a consensus seems
to exist that close to 1 out of 10 people have left the country since
1989. Understandably, this has mostly involved individuals in the 18 –
30 age group. Moreover, there is now a persistent propensity to view
emigration as one of the major options for personal development.
According to the UNDP 2001 Human Development Report, 36.5% of
all respondents express a readiness to leave the country with the
remaining 63.5% declaring no intention to emigrate. It should be noted
that only 8.5% of those declaring an intention to emigrate do not intend
to return to the country. The remaining 28% seem more interested in
short – term emigration, possibly linked to potential employment in
another country. The statistics for the 18 – 38 age – group do, however,
present a worrying picture. 67.7% of respondents from this age – group
declare their intent to leave the country. 18.8% of those declare that
they do not intend to return. The remaining 48.9% express an interest
in emigration, which is short – term and purpose – oriented in nature.
What has emerged is a society distrustful of intermediaries and with a
distinct preference for direct contact with administration and
government. It is a society whose members see little purpose or utility
in group membership. In economy, they either seek employment in
the public sector or prefer complete self – reliance. In society, they
spend little time or effort beyond the nuclear or extended family. In
such a setting, it remains a challenge to define the forms and modes
of functioning of representation, which would enhance democracy.
Clearly, we are not witnessing the emergence of the classical modes
of representation around employment, religious and political affiliation.
This accounts partly for the difficulties in representation and legitimacy
in the post – transition period. The introduction and improvement of
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functioning of the forms of direct engagement are one likely source of
greater system responsiveness. New skills of the political and
administrative elites seem to be required in a situation where interest
aggregation and representation are diffuse and emerge in new ways.
The crisis of representation has been exacerbated by the continued
ineffectiveness of public administration and the judicial system. The
system of public administration has undergone a transformation, which
was long overdue. The adoption of a comprehensive package of
legislation introducing clear criteria for entry and promotion, paths for
career development, clear separation between the administrative and
political levels and stability of legal norm has been very useful.
Nevertheless, this process has not halted the continued ineffectiveness
of administration and the provision of services. Citizen interaction with
public administration remains a source of dissatisfaction. The judicial
system has been marred by numerous allegations of corruption and
systemic inability to handle grievances in a manner, which ensures
fairness. Backlog, inefficiency and lack of transparency have meant
that access of justice has been severely limited. As a result, one of the
main structures of a functioning democracy, ensuring the rule of law
has been severely discredited in the opinions of citizens.
Public Interaction
At another level, these phenomena have contributed to a volatility and
crisis of core values of public interaction and life. Decline in the basic
trust of public interaction, in the ability to define a meaningful time
perspective, decline in trust in its sustainability, volatility of pillars of
social reference, undermining of the trust in the capacity of public
interaction to effect change – these features of society have produced
an environment of intense discontent with an irrationalist twist. The
ensuing extreme anxiety and personal insecurity produce a situation
where rational public and policy discourse and expectations are
superceded by a disproportional, irrational expectation in “magical”
interventions, which will lead to sudden change of fortune. In addition,
these circumstances re-activate modes of traditional interaction. We
see the re-emergence of the traditional, immediate, inter – personal,
family – based mode of solidarity. What emerges is a mixture of
traditional solidarity and extreme individual atomization in any
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circumstance beyond the familial. The main expressions of this
disposition include the following: tendency to abstain from public and
political activity and abstention from voting; increasing volatility of
electoral behavior among those groups with weak party identification
and tendency to invest a disproportionate amount of expectation in
populist, “quick – fix” political programmes followed by intense
disappointment upon failure to deliver in the very short – term.
On another note, it continues to be difficult to see the “march through
the institutions” of the “1989-generation”. The involvement of the groups
and individuals who were at the center of political change at the turn of
the decade has been sporadic and difficult to evaluate. To derive an
adequate understanding of social change, it is important to be able to
evaluate the roles that new generations have played in society, polity
and economy. It is crucial to examine the impact that such groups
have had at the level of professional communities, administrative
institutions, political parties, in business – in all walks of life. Such
knowledge has been difficult to obtain through sociological surveys.
Change at the level of small groups could rather be examined through
anthropological analysis. An estimate of the extent to which new
generations have been able to influence the assumptions, values and
modes of functioning of various groups and levels of social life could
provide important insights.
Crisis of the Political System
In politics, the above – mentioned phenomena have been translated
into support for a type of legitimacy based on personal charisma. In
2001, this has been personified by the former king, Simeon II whose
movement was swept into power during the elections in June. His
“National Movement Simeon II” managed to attain a level of electoral
support in the 40 percentile in just over two month’s time. Such
movements are a pre-party form of political organization whose
cohesion is ensured by personal charisma rather than commonality of
vision or interest. In most instances, such movements are predicated
on corporatist assumptions about social and political organization. As
such, they often espouse an anti – party ideology, positing a critique of
factionalism and lack of unity of purpose. The movement of Simeon II
claims that it seeks to bring forth a deeper, truer reality of the social
body and give expression to its aspirations. The movement employs
an organic type of discourse, its whole presence ultimately posited on
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a father – figure who is in possession of a unique capacity of knowledge,
direction and means. The reluctance to register the movement as a
political party then comes as little surprise. The insufficient democratic
mechanisms within the movement and its Parliamentary group are
another notable feature. Personal charisma is notoriously prone to
volatility and is most often short – term in nature. The level of support
for the movement has decreased markedly within less than four months
in office. According to the UNDP 2001 Report, just over 22% of the
electorate would support the former King were elections to be held in
November 2001. The rate of approval for his government has also
slumped. According to the December 2001 Survey of Alpha Research,
a sociological survey agency, the current rate of approval for the
government stands at 56%. This is to be contrasted to the 81% rate of
approval in the month of August 2001. While the level of support for
the government of the charismatic figure of the former King might be
expected to stabilize for the short – term, it is crucial for institutions
and political parties to begin to function effectively in order to restore
at least a semblance of rational, legalistic legitimacy.
Another element of this crisis is to be found in the emergence of political
apathy. Notable electoral apathy has already been evident in the
Presidential election in November 2001 (42% turnout in first round
and 55% turnout in second round). In December 2001, the new mayor
of the city of Sliven was elected with 13% of the vote. As has already
been mentioned, there is an increase in the reluctance of citizens to
engage in civic and political action. What is emerging is the perception
that only through direct engagement can one reasonably expect to
obtain desired outcomes. The salience of such a disposition can have
important political implications. One might involve further erosion of
the legitimacy of intermediary institutions such as political parties. A
further consequence might involve the increase in degree of citizen
readiness for direct action and immediate expression of discontent.
Short – term, it has implications for parties in transition or initial
structuring. This would entail the adoption of strategies of dialogue
and interaction with citizens and groups at the local level and on specific
issues. Still, the readiness to participate in elections remains relatively
high. According to the 2001 UNDP Report, 62.7% of respondents
confirm their firm intention to vote in a next round of elections. Only
10.6% definitely intend to stay away from the polls while 21.9% are
undecided and are still to make their choice.
As implied, viable political parties are a crucial element of stable
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democracy. The party landscape is presently in need of urgent
reconstruction. The parties have been very ineffective in aggregating
interests and ensuring compatibility of the reform agenda with the
emerging stratification of society. They have also been largely
unsuccessful in recruiting able individuals to senior party and policy
positions, thereby creating an image of politics as a field for failed or
prematurely retired professionals from other walks of life. The Union
of Democratic Forces (which governed the country between 1997 and
2001) has managed to survive the electoral onslaught incurred to
governing right – wing parties of reform in countries such as Poland
and Romania. At the June 2001 election, it still managed to capture 18
% of the votes. The patterns of group configuration within the party
are presently being played out once the “glue of government” is no
longer there. This has meant the establishment of a new splinter party
– the Union of Free Democrats. There is a clear need for change of
leadership, recruitment of local informal and formal leaders, widening
of its appeal to individuals who have not been among the “winners” of
the transition and translating the language of EU and NATO integration
into a tangible, perceivable reality.
The left Bulgarian Socialist Party also continues to face a number of
challenges, including the need to renew its leadership structures with
individuals possessing solid social – democratic credentials, the need
to reach beyond its narrow electoral base of retirees and unemployed
and to ensure compatibility between the reform agenda and the
immediate aspirations for significant re-distribution among many of its
voters. At the June 2001 election, it gained 17% of the vote.
The governing movement of Simeon II has declared its firm intention
to register as a political party. The movement faces a number of
difficulties: establishment of clear, recognizable set of ideas, creation
of structure which ensures sufficient cohesion beyond the personal
charisma of the leader, containment of emerging competing camps,
establishment of mechanisms to ensure separation of party structures
from those of government, etc. The challenges, facing parties as
institutions of democracy have already been highlighted. There will be
little long – term stability of the democratic system without a successful
attempt to establish modes of dialogue and representation vis-à-vis a
skeptical public with a deepening disposition to “go it alone”.
The Bulgarian party system has long been described as a two – party
system with a significant ethnicity – based party, which may hold the
balance of power in situations of electoral proximity between the two
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major parties – the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and the
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Quite clearly, the emergence of the
national movement of Simeon II and its success at the last
Parliamentary elections have led to a radical disruption of the party
system. The previous two main parties have collectively gained less
than 40% of the total vote. Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether the
last elections represent an aberration or a sign of systemic change. It
remains to be seen if the movement of the former King does have a
future as a political party or whether difficult reform and governmental
instability might not lead to a fragmentation and subsequent distribution
along the axis of the UDF – BSP. The clear split of the vote at the last
Presidential elections between the candidate of the BSP, Mr. Georgi
Parvanov and the incumbent President, Mr. Petar Stoyanov, supported
by the UDF, seems to point in this direction. Yet, the increasing number
of voters who change allegiance and the reduction of size of the core
of the vote for the two main parties do suggest an opening for new
political parties.
A distinct feature of the present state of democracy is the increase in
electoral volatility. It has already been mentioned that the previous
main parties gained less than 40% of the vote at the June 2001
Parliamentary elections. The reduction of the core vote of the two main
parties since 1989 has already been well documented. Clearly, there
is a process of weakening party identification. There is further evidence
of volatility. Respondents to the 2001 UNDP Report were asked if they
had voted for the same political party at the last two Parliamentary
elections. Only 35.4% of the voters responded in the affirmative while
32.7% stated that they had supported different parties at the last two
elections. The increasing propensity of voters to change allegiance
and the increasing number of individuals who decide how to vote during
the pre – election campaign point to a steady increase in volatility.
This will continue to make elections less predictable. A somewhat
unrelated issue does provide some clues as to what type of political
parties are likely to enjoy electoral prominence. Respondents to the
2001 UNDP Report were asked to decide on the proper mode of
decision – making for the compilation of party election lists and 51.9
% of them regarded public meetings open to all citizens as the best
mode of choosing party candidates. Only 8.3% of the interviewed
thought that these decisions should best be left to the party leadership
and a meager 1.7% thought that the party leader is best placed to
make these decisions. Such attitudes do suggest that the capacity of
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parties to manage to conduct effective dialogue with citizens and social
groups and propose detailed policies will receive electoral backing.
Party identification and ideology seem to matter less to an increasing
number of voters.
The appearance and present prominence of the movement of the
former king Simeon II brings into focus yet another important issue –
the continuation and replacement of political elites. Public opinion is
often at odds with itself on this question. On the one hand, voters
quickly grow tired of the political elite as reforms begin to take their toll
and a demand for partial replacement of the political elite gain in
prominence. On the other hand, voters do want to see the emergence
of a competent, professional and stable political elite, which is capable
of good government. The perceived exhaustion of the political
programmes of the UDF and the BSP and the appearance of the
movement of the former King has also meant the partial replacement
of the political elite of the country. A number of young professionals
have been appointed to positions of high rank in the present
government while an entirely new group of individuals from various
walks of life have entered Parliament. It is too early to assess whether
these are new, long - standing members of the political elites or
individuals solely in pursuit of private aims by political means. The
BSP has just appointed a 35 – year old, reform – minded person to
lead the party and the UDF will be electing a new leader in early 2002
with the intention to bring forth younger, less well – known individuals
of the post – 1989 generation. It is quite clear that the ability of parties
to continually bring forth capable, fresh recruits to the political elite will
enhance the stability of the political system and will help ensure a
proper balance between stability of elite, capacities of good government
and responsiveness to social expectation.
CAVEATS
Caveats are needed. The described series of crisis are of an entity in
democratic consolidation rather than democratization. These are crises
produced by the consequences of democratic and market reform rather
than by the dynamics of democratization. They are a product of
implementation rather than suspension of reform. Some of the causes
are inherent, while others reflect the pace and mode of management
of reform.
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A central implication of the analysis is that the present difficulties could
usefully be considered within the conceptual framework of theory of
development rather than theory of democratization. This will take into
consideration that democracy is being consolidated and that the
success of this enterprise will be further ensured by a series of
measures, which produce growth and development. In other words,
the above – described crises do not constitute a systemic threat to
democracy. They do, however, represent a threat to the capacity to
continue consolidation and reform at a sufficient pace which, coupled
with a developmental approach, will ensure long – term stability of
democracy. In addition, this observation takes into consideration the
fact that the most difficult decisions of reform have already been taken
and that the post – transition contours of democracy and economy are
firmly in place. Public support for EU and NATO membership remains
to be solid and successive governments have implemented policies
of responsible and constructive international and regional engagement.
The regional context also needs to be highlighted. Bulgaria has
withstood pressures emanating from the regional areas of instability
and conflict. Spill – over effects such as international organized crime
have been contained and do not constitute a significant source of
instability. Nevertheless, continued strife and volatility hinder the
emergence of a regional context where democracy and development
will constitute the main grid of interaction. In this sense, persisting
conflict and weak statehood do have a negative impact on the efforts
of Bulgaria to attain integration in Euro – Atlantic institutions and
sufficient level of development.
Events and developments over the last few years have led to the
emergence of a specific mindset. Prolonged reform and the
concentration of the most radical elements of reform within the short
timeframe of the last four years have contributed to a heightened sense
of personal insecurity and volatility. This has produced, on the one
hand, a deeply skeptical public distrustful of intermediaries and, on
the other, a disposition of continued expectation of growth and advance
through abrupt, major shifts in economy and society. If persistent, such
dispositions could have an extremely negative impact on democracy
beyond the odd instance of support for personal charisma. The potential
impact of these dispositions on electoral support distribution, readiness
to engage in direct protest, readiness to challenge the reform agenda,
etc. has already been highlighted and needs to be observed closely.
Due attention should be given to another phenomenon. There is, at
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present, a firm perception that transition ends with integration in the
Euro – Atlantic institutions. Whether this is an adequate analytical
evaluation cannot be examined presently and will be of little relevance
to public perceptions. What has emerged is the conviction that
membership seals the processes of transition to democracy and market
economy and constitutes the final act of legitimation to the transition
project. This perception has provided an important pool of patience as
the reform agenda was being implemented. From this point of view, a
double disappointment vis-à-vis Bulgaria’s bids for EU and NATO
membership in 2002 could have a serious destabilizing effect. There
is sufficient public awareness of the fact that there is no complete
overlap between the agendas of reform and Euro – Atlantic integration.
Thus, a disappointment in 2002 might have as a consequence the
increased insistence on the divergence between the agenda of reform
and these of Euro – Atlantic integration.
ROADMAP FOR REFORM
The above-made analysis and caveats form the background of a
possible roadmap for reform. The suggestions for reform may be
divided in various segments:
I. Reforms in politics and government
• Re-legitimation of democratic institutions and political parties.
This task might be accomplished by enhancing the capacity of parties
to aggregate social and economic interests and ensure sufficient and
effective representation. One avenue to be explored is that of improved
dialogue on policy with branch and interest organizations as well as
civic organizations. A further important task could be the enhancement
of parties and their leadership to present policy measures in terms,
which relate and link policies to social groups and citizens. The opening
of parties to civil society and local communities is yet another area of
reform. Recruitment to political and administrative office of capable
members of local communities is of particular importance.
• A political debate on the effective scope of state and
governmental intervention. While the extent of state intervention is a
vital distinguishing characteristic of politics, it is necessary to define
the minimum of public services, which can be supplied effectively and
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usefully. Special care will then need to be taken to ensure that such
services are provided in a manner, which strengthens the perception
of government as an effective tool.
• An open process of policy formulation and implementation.
This entails improving the capacity of Parliament and Executive
(ministries and other state agencies) to conduct dialogue with interested
parties in the process of policy formulation and implementation. It will
ensure better representation of interests and provide important
feedback on the effectiveness of legal norms and the need to modify
them.
• Increased intensity of efforts to ensure integration in Euro –
Atlantic structures. This will allow the benefit of membership to begin
to take its course and will, at the same time, provide more space for
government in policy formulation and structuring of agenda.
• A system of governance, which is closer to the citizens of the
country. This will entail a measured reform of local government
providing tax collection and management powers to this layer of
government, thereby ensuring a greater degree of decentralization. A
further option is the introduction of an Ombudsman at the various level
of government ensuring direct points of entry for citizens.
• Improvement in functioning of administrative structures.
Further efforts to improve administrative capacity and effectiveness in
the provision of public services through introduction of managerial
techniques and qualitative and quantitative measurements of efficiency.
A further option is the introduction of greater transparency in all state
agencies relating to monetary collections and the reduction of
administrative hindrances to market entry and economic activity.
• A strategy for further training of local political and administrative
elites, thereby ensuring successful decentralization. This will involve
the elaboration of multi – faceted programmes for management training,
political and administrative skill, public dialogue, representation of
interest, etc.
• Continued attention to improvement of the actual exercise of
civil and political rights and implementation of policies, which facilitate
the exercise of the rights protected by the Constitution. Effective access
to justice needs particular attention.
• Completion of the reform of the judiciary. This will have a
positive impact on economic activity and ensure access to justice for
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citizens. Particular emphasis will have to be placed on the streamlining
of court administration, greater efficiency, better knowledge of EU and
international law, training of judges, etc.
• Implementation of a comprehensive strategy to tackle
corruption, which could be linked to the reform of the judicial system.
This will entail effective enforcement of legal provisions, successful
prosecution of corruption – related criminal acts, adequate
administrative structures, decreasing tolerance to corrupt practices,
sustained engagement by the media, etc.
• Continued extension of practices of political dialogue and
linkages between the largest political parties and the Movement of
Rights and Liberties whose main constituents are of Turkish ethnic
origin. Continued dialogue with political and non – political organizations
of the Roma minority.
• Drafting and implementation of pro-active media strategies
by state agencies ensuring improved policy understanding. This will
entail greater attention to explanation and justification of policy decisions
through the media and professional and interest organizations.
• Sustained assistance to local cultural centers. This could be
done through targeted tax exemptions, a system of moderate direct
subsidies, information campaigns, etc.
II. Reforms in economy and society
• Introduction of a moderate policy of demand stimulation while
ensuring the preservation of the currency board until Bulgaria joins
the EU. These might entail targeted tax preferences, public works,
training of unemployed, state guarantees for loans, infrastructure
investment, etc.
• Implementation of a policy of export support for Bulgarian
companies and a policy of support for certain growth industries in the
country. Support could be extended to industries, which show growth
potential, employ large groups of individuals and represent significant
contributors to the state budget.
• Implementation of a tax and incomes policy, which allows
individuals to maintain high levels of disposable income in a context of
notable mistrust in the capacity of institutions to deliver public goods.
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This is to be accompanied by stability of legal and institutional
framework in the functioning of the reformed systems of social security,
health care and pension.
• Concerted attempts at foreign debt re – scheduling, which
would notably decrease budgetary pressures and provide funds for
demand stimulation. These efforts are to be coupled by prudence in
the use of bond issuance as a means of capital accumulation.
• Completion of the process of privatization through a series of
transparent deals bringing to an end this element of reform. The
completion of privatization will lead to a reduction of the potential
sources of corruption. This is to be coupled with further reform in public
procurement legislation and its implementation.
• Further improvements in investment policy, including tax
preference, improved and simplified administrative infrastructure,
efficient judicial system, etc. Such measures might additionally be
targeted at growth sectors of the economy, which have the potential to
generate long – term, high – income employment. An additional element
would involve a region – by – region approach, thus tackling the
enormous disproportions of employment within the country.
• Implementation of sustained regional policy, which takes into
consideration the vast regional disparities in economic opportunity and
development. In addition to tax preference, this could entail state
support for information campaigns in foreign countries representing
the investment opportunities in particular regions.
• Encouragement of dialogue with trade unions and branch
organizations and groups of interest ensuring better representation
and trust in the political system. This will entail consultation in the
process of drafting and implementation of legislation, impact analysis
of legislative and policy measures and post – policy adoption dialogue,
thereby ensuring a more inclusive mode of governance.
• Encouragement of further investment in the media by well -
established international media companies, thereby improving the level
of political and policy debate. This will contribute to further diversity of
informed opinion and greater presence of non – sensationalist
programming and publications. Increased attention to the work of the
local media represents an important new element. Greater dialogue
between central and local government and the local media also
deserves due attention.
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• Continuation and expansion of all programmes of minority
integration, short of positive discrimination, including additional
appointments in local administration and law enforcement structures.
This could involve the extension of “community policing” to all regions
of the country.
• Training programmes and “Stay in school” programmes for
ethnic minorities coupled with possible public works projects for
targeted regions and cities. These programmes could be conducted
in consultation with local businesses and in accordance with local labour
markets.
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KOSOVA: COUNTRY REPORT ON THE STATE FOR
DEMOCRACY AND A ROADMAP FOR REFORM
Ylber HYSA
Kosova Action for Civic Initiatives, Prishtina
Kosova: Challenges of the Institutional-Building after the
Elections
Introduction
Kosova has undergone significant changes after the establishment of
the UN protectorate and arrival of KFOR forces in the ground. The
first period of the establishment of the mission was more based on the
improvised agenda rather than in the harmonized strategy. But this
period is over-came during the first phase of the first SRSG B.Kuchner,
who understood the need of the better cooperation with domestic
political factors, and due to this fact the joint interim institutions were
formed: JIAC and KTC, that have played a role in better understanding,
in mutual work and preparation for the future institutional-building
process that have resulted with two first free and pluralistic elections
ever held in the history of Kosova.
• In this sense, Local elections for 30 Municipal Assemblies in
Kosova held on October 28th 2000 has marked a significant change
in the second phase of the UNMIK trusteeship. This election, despite
many objections from some contries* , has been considered as the
best on in the region. LDK has won with 58%, and two other former
KLA emerged parties: PDK (27%) and AAK (8%) followed.
• But, despite god performance of political culture of Kosovar
voters, the Implementation of the electoral results was not easy
process.113
*
 Official Moscow has reacted strongly against this elections
113
 See: Municipal Assemblies, Local Government in Kosova: Challenges of
Institutional Building, An Evaluation of the Work of Municipal Assemblies in Kosova
after October 2001, KACI, 2001, Prishtina
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Lack of experience, some times tense relation between the position
and opposition in Municipal Assemblies and the relationship between
the elected domestic officials and appointed international administrators
in combination with limited competencies, have produced not a very
positive and immediate results in some municipality structures. Despite
this, in general, establishment of the local governance is step ahead
in the institutional-building process in post-war Kosova.
• Election for Kosovar parliament held recently (November 17th)
has also shown very successful process with the quit and democratic
atmosphere during the election campaign, as well as the E-Day. These
elections were also successful because they were transparent (more
than 13.000 international and domestic observers) and inclusive (Serbs
and other minorities has participated in elections).
New phase in the institutional-building process:
As a result of the complex electoral system with seat a side seats,
electoral results has shown that none of the parties could have mandate
to form a government in its own. As a new element in the kosovar
political scene coalitions seem to be necessity and this is new and
important challenging factor for the Kosovar political scene. Although
the process of negotiations is not yet producing final results, the
Inaugural session of the Assembly of the Provisional Institution of Self
Government of Kosova is called for December 10th.
Is very important element that came out of the electoral system and
results Serbs has won 22 seats (10 seat a side plus 12 in direct polling)
and this has brought new element into the new political scene of
Kosova. Serbian coalition “Povratak” (Comeback) this way is the third
political group in the new Kosovar Parliament and this is going to bring
new political dynamism in the institutional-building process of Kosova.
Other minorities have also benefited from the seat a side seat and
they are very well represented.
Security and other risk reporting aspects
After the war Kosova has faced difficult situation. Entering a chaotic
environment that bore the marks of a terrible war- 850.000 returning
refugees (no deported people in modern history has ever returned to
a post-war country more quickly than they did), with as many as 120,000
houses destroyed and 500,000 persons displaced – the UNMIK mission
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faced enormous challenges. In addition, economic hurdles resulting
from Belgrade’s colonial policies and its policy of apartheid in Kosova,
where for ten years Albanians had been fired from their jobs in factories,
police and the administration, further complicated UNMIK’s task.
In this aspect immediate concerns were:
• Lack of institutions to dill with general crimes (more than six
months took international police to complete its capacity
building to start mission in Kosova).
• Organized crime and the lack of domestic capacities to dill
with it (have also produced another aspect of security
concerns).
• Lack of harmonized strategy to dill with inter-ethnically based
crimes.
Establishing a Secure Environment
The Kosova operation is a complex mission that has its civil and military
sides. In these circumstances, if one side fails, regardless of the latter’s
success, the mission will still have to be considered as a failure. In
Kosovo’s case, in a post-war, post-communist and post-apartheid
society, the objective of providing law and order was severely tested.
There were virtually no policemen out in the streets for the first five
months after the war.  To the local people this was seen as a problem
at the same level as the lack of electricity and to some extent water.
The lesson to be learnt from Kosovo’s example in view of international
missions is the need to better integrate the military, civilian and police
services. In particular, the police function may prove to be the most
difficult; after all, NATO does not have a police counterpart.
International policing capacities is based on the capacities of different
countries. National police are not organized in the same way as
militaries and may not be in a position to undertake a task within an
international mission. National police forces may not have the
necessary training for or understanding about the situation they are
entering. Further, national police methods may not be appropriate when
transported to a foreign environment, in particular relating to the use
of firearms and other coercive arms. A police force consisting of
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policemen with different experiences and practices that are not
standardized is not always very helpful for missions like the international
police mission in Kosova. The policemen in this mission come from
more than 50 different countries - starting from the American police,
to the Europeans, police from former communist countries in transition,
police from the Far East and policemen from post-colonial countries
in Africa. These policemen differ from each other, starting from their
perception of the role to be played by the police in a democratic society
to their understanding of when and how weapons are used.
The slow progress in building a local police force and the fact that
international police are not fully-operational led to many criminal cases
remaining unsolved. This low “clearance rate” of criminal cases at the
beginning of the mission can cause the population to lose confidence
in the international effort as a whole. An additional obstacle in this
respect is the lack of knowledge when it comes to the local language
and mentality, which impeded efficient and normal operations of the
international police. The Kosova experience suggests that the police
role is just as important as the military one in post-conflict situations.
Soldiers are not trained to carry out policing tasks, a fact they made
clear during their mission in Kosova. Militaries do not feel comfortable
with duties beyond their established mandates.
But, after two years and half Kosova Police Service seem to be more
in place and this development of domestic capacities has produced a
new policy acting as civil servants type, closer to the western standards
of the police functioning.114
Of course much need to be done in the general improvement of the
security in Kosova, but situation has been largely improved compared
with the first year of the post-war Kosova.
Security for minorities
The real challenges are still remaining for the security for minorities.
While the general situation for the security and integration for all
minorities is improving, for Serbian community it is still very difficult.
Lot of combined security measures with concrete strategy to improve
this situation is also needed. This includes over all improvement of
114
 Public surveys have shown great deal of confidence among local population for
KPS. This institution is regarded as most trustful in KACI’s survey finished on
November 12th. To be published son.
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political situation and functioning institutions, as well as more
harmonized work towards the reconciliation process.
This involves:
• Addressing the War crimes problematic (better cooperation
with ICTY and improvement of the domestic courts. No serious address
for the war crimes in post-war Kosova has negatively affected the
inter-ethnic relations).
• Institutional-building capacities (harmonized work of judicial
system, police and other security aspects, improvement of law
enforcement capacities, etc).
• Improvement of the political situation (functional work of new
Kosovar institutions: legislative and executive. It is very important that
new Parliament and government of Kosova include as much as it
possible Serbs in the institutional work).
• Reconciliation (Democratization process and more vibrant civil
society involving multi-ethnic and multi-cultural programs and
exchanges, as a first phase. In long-term more harmonized strategies
should be involved also through different educational process.)
Kosova after November 17th: Challenges of Institutional-
building:
Elections results has brought very interesting post-electoral situation,
in which parties will need to produce coalitions. LDK, that has won
less than 51 percent, but still has the biggest parliamentarian group of
47 seats, theoretically could enter in two party coalitions (with PDK or
with Coalition “Povratak”) or three party coalitions (Pan Albanian
coalition LDK- PDK- AAK).  Other possibility is to have grand coalition
that will be multi-ethnic as well (Three main Albanian parties and
“Povratak”).
But solutions will have pro-s and con-s. Coalition between Albanian
parties (two party coalitions) might produce better chances for better
executive and institutional-building, but still it will have negative
approach in which Albanians might be perceived as being in position
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and Serbs in the opposition. Any kind of disagreement in long-term
might effect democratization and even suggest negative models of
partition Kosova.
In this sense it is interesting that in fact, based on the Interim
Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-governing it is foreseen
one ministerial seat for Serbian representative and another one for he
representative of another minority. This is de facto power sharing
reserved for minorities. So, in one or another solution Serbs will be
part of the governing structures. This means that power sharing in the
new governmental structures of Kosova will be multi-ethnic one.
Formalization of this power sharing in producing de facto coalition could
have very good effects for the future.
Judging from the lack of the concrete results from the negotiation
process between parties, it seems that no agreement will be reached
about coalitions prior to the inaugural session of the new Parliament
of Kosova (December 10th). This might produce political tensions and
period of the party rivalries among the parliamentarian groups that
might effect the appointment of the main functions: President, Speaker
of Parliament, Prim-minister and Government.
This can mark a period of political tensions and lack of he functioning
of new institutions in the important initial phase (in combination with
Christmas and New Year holidays this can take months).
Out of Kosova factors and its reflections in the security
and institutional-building process after Elections
In this aspect it is very important that initial phase of the work of
Parliament and later of the government should produce concrete effects
that provide parliamentarian groups with the possibility of contribution
in the new self-governing institutions.
In this aspect some obstructions from some Serbian MPs might also
be expected. Coalition ‘Povratak’ seem not to be very cohesive as it
looks like and its different positions are reflecting the rivalries in
Belgrade and DOS coalition, between Mr. Kostunica and Djindjic. List
of MPs of coalition Povratak is changed three times and in last
intervention that is attributed to Mr.Kostunica, seven MPs in the top
are from northern Kosova, where Serbs are living in strong divided
enclaves directly linked with Serbia. In this sense, a number of MPs in
the Kosova Parliament will more reprsenr Belgrade, or better to say
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Kostunica’s DSS line, rather than an original and authentic Kosovar
Serb policy and agenda orientation. This can produce tensions in the
parliament and also in public opinion, especially because some
exponents of the Northern Kosovo Serbian enclaves has openly
advocating for partition of Kosova, that can be perceived as the most
dangerous scenario affecting direct instability in the region, that with
domino effect could reach other problematic parts of the Balkans
(Mostar, Macedonia, Presheva Valley etc.).
In fact, part of the MPs from the coalition “Povratak” are directly linked
with Kostunica’s DSS and this can reflect rivalries coming out of different
situations also from the Belgrade-Podgorica’s relationship (Referendum
in Montenegro), but also possible rivalries in the DOS (split of he DOS
coalition, early elections in Serbia, or political combinations over the
empty chair of the President of Serbia after Milutinovic, etc)
This way different political rivalries from Serbia, or Serbia-Montenegro
relationship might involve indirectly also the normal work of Kosovar
institutions in the obstructing agendas of the group o MPs in “Povratak”
In this aspect one of the out of Kosova negative factors can be seen
also Macedonian situation. After the conflict there and vacuum that is
taking place from the acceptance of the Ohrid agreement to the next
parliamentary elections in spring, might also produce implications for
Kosova’s institutional-building process. In the same manner, problems
with Presheva Valley can easily obstruct or shift the democratization
agenda of new Kosovar institutions to be more nationalistically
motivated agenda.
Macedonia: Negative developments could shift Kosova’s
democratization agenda to nationalism
After the approval of the Ohrid Agreement by Macedonian Parliament,
a risky period for the renewal of the fights seems to be more limited.
But, lot of other challenges remains down the road, until normalization
and normal re-functioning of the institutions will work out.
In this aspect several serious obstacles are foreseen:
• Political and security vacuum from the changes in Macedonian
Constitution until the new parliamentary elections.
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• Activities of ANA (Albanian National Army) and Macedonian
paramilitary units (“Lions”, etc.).
• Question of not completed amnesty and social rehabilitation
of the for former NLA.
• Lack of free movement for all citizens and ethnic groups and
complete control over the Macedonian territory.
• Establishment of he new police and security forces based on
the Constitutional changes.
• Establishment of the new local government structures based
on the changes in Constitution.
• Possible delay of the new elections after spring 2002 might
bring new challenges for the political process, internal security, reforms
and implementation of the constitutional changes.
For main Kosovar political forces and generally for public opinion as
well as main printed and electronic media Macedonian crisis is finished
with the changes of Macedonian constitution. There are no major
political forces or public reactions towards the agreement of Ohrid
and the final political settlement and changes in the Macedonian
constitution, as well as to the demilitarization of the NLA.
In this aspect, Albanian radical forces seems to be absorbed with the
political settlement in Macedonia and elsewhere in the neighborhood
of Kosova. In this sense, there are no major movements expected out
of this frame. Albanian nationalistic forces will react just if another
provocations and armed conflict will restart in Macedonia and
elsewhere, which might seriously threaten the democratization of
Kosova but, also the security and stability in the region.
For Kosovar internal developments, it is of great interest that
Macedonian crisis goes towards the path of normalization and
stabilization. Any further armed provocation in Macedonia will shift
political energy from the democratization agenda to a more nationalistic
one. This is why the vacuum of inter-regnum in the Macedonia (from
constitutional changes to the new elections in spring) should go
smoothly and without major provocations.
Different scenario, that of the renewal of the armed conflict, might
easily trigger serious reactions and challenge new instability in the
region with perspective of the major bloody disintegration of the existing
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states and creation of the greater mono-ethnic states, followed by new
bloody conflicts, change of the borders, new refuges fleeing around.
This possible fait a comply situations are the most dangerous nightmare
scenarios for entire region. That’s why stabilization and implementation
of the reforms after the changes of Macedonia constitution are of the
great importance not just for Kosova, but also for the stability in the
region.
Albania: No major involvement in Kosova’s political,
economical and social life
Albania has undergone serious reforms last years, especially after the
problems of the ’97 crisis. During the Kosova war majority of the kosovar
refugees (more than 4.000.000 of them) were based in Albania, one
of the poorest countries in Europe. This has helped a lot in overcoming
the lack of normal communication that has existed between Albania
and Kosova for many decades. This period has marked wit the great
cooperation of the Albania and Euro-Atlantic structures.
Immediately after the war, during he establishment of the UN mission
in Kosova and deployment of the KFOR troops Albania has played
cooperative role with international community. Albanian office is opened
in Prishtina and the other political presence and economic activities
have been present in last two years after the conflict. In these aspects,
especially after the Macedonian crisis erupted, trade with Albania has
been growing, although in very limited capacities due to the serious
problems with infrastructures linking Kosova and Albania.
From kosovar perspective, Albania is facing different problems:
• Political instability after the elections (Serious political rivalries
in ruling party, between the President of the Socialist Party of Albania
Mr. Fatos Nano and Albanian prime-minister Mr.Ilir Meta)
• Week state mechanisms to dill with organized crime and
corruption
• Problematic segment of the Albanian state institutions remains
justice and law enforcement agencies
• Problems in the border control and specially in the Northern
part of Albania, in the Tropoja region bordering Kosova
• Economic problems: Inadequate infrastructures, consistent
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gray – economy, weakly functioning market mechanisms and
instruments.
Albania, although from the perspective of foreigners very close to the
Kosovars (same ethnicity, language, culture) still is not very present in
the post-war Kosova’s political, social and economic life.
Kosova is suffering from the lack of infrastructure with Albania, one of
the most serious economic problems of Kosova. Better infrastructure
probably will help a lot kosovar economy to be linked with Durresi
harbor at the Adriatic costs.
One of the problems is also an organized crime, especially in the border
region, in the North Albania and its eventual penetration in Kosova.
In fact, existing political problems in Albania could not have direct
reflections in the Kosovar political life.
In any case, stabile Albania will just help to the overall stability, not just
in Kosova but, also to the Balkan region.
General Comment
Kosova is undergoing most significant and challenging path after the
establishment of the international administration. Elections of
November 17th have shown great success of kosovars to take part in
the political life with political means and civil participation. But
implementation of the electoral results might be more challenging than
elections itself.
Support of the main international agencies and factors, like Euro-
Atlantic structures and Quint countries are also very important for the
future development of the democratic institutions of the self-
government.
This is marking so-called mid-term phase of the international
protectorate in Kosova, reflected in the institutional-building process.
The first phase of the UNMIK protectorate was establishment of the
mission and organization elections for new democratic kosovar
institutions. Last phase is that of definition the final status. The mid-
term phase, that of the organization and functioning democratic
institutions is most important challenging period that can both lead
towards successful self-governing and power sharing process with
UN trusteeship, or further complicate the already achieved successes.
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This is why enormous energy and attention should be paid to this
process.
Out of Kosova factors and its reflections in the security and institutional-
building process after Elections.
This way different political rivalries from Serbia (Kostunica-Djindjic and
other DOS rivalries), or Serbia-Montenegro relationship might involve
indirectly also the normal work of Kosovar institutions in the obstructing
agendas of the group o MPs in “Povratak”.
Problems with Presheva Valley can also obstruct the democratization
agenda for Kosova.
The serious problem also remained with the divided city of Mitrovica,
in Kosova, that needs to be resolved in the long-term perspective.
For Kosovar internal developments, it is of great interest that
Macedonian crisis goes towards the path of normalization and
stabilization. Any further armed provocation in Macedonia will shift
political energy from the democratization agenda to a more nationalistic
one. This is why the vacuum of inter-regnum in the Macedonia (from
constitutional changes to the new elections in spring) should go
smoothly and without major provocations.
In fact, existing political problems in Albania could not have direct
reflections in the Kosovar political life. In any case, stabile Albania will
just help to the overall stability, not just in Kosova but, also to the
Balkan region.
Needless to say, the establishment of the functioning self-governing
institutions in Kosova is in the interest not just of Kosovars but it is
also interest for the more stabile region in the Southeastern Europe.
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MACEDONIA: COUNTRY REPORT ON THE STATE FOR
DEMOCRACY AND A ROADMAP FOR REFORM
Forum - Center for Strategic Research and Documentation
1. Introductory notes
When we take the Republic of Macedonia into consideration every
analysis/synthesis is faced with a number of unavoidable difficulties
from the very beginning. Having no ambition to be absolved some of
these difficulties should be listed and others will have to be elaborated.
The Republic of Macedonia according to its territory, population, natural
and other resources is a relatively small country. In no research it
could be used as a landmark but also one cannot find too many similar
countries that could be used for a possible comparison. Macedonia is
a country with a complicated ethnic composition, which is a sufficient
topic in itself for analysis. It is also an especially difficult situation in
creating state institutions in regard to the speed and the price of its
prosperity. In many of the elements of its existence, survival and
progress as a state the newly created Macedonian state has been
directed towards the states that emerged after the disintegration of
former Yugoslavia.
Macedonia is a state with only ground borders. Its neighbours are
mainly countries with their own deep interior and exterior problems
and contradictions. And most usually one of the problems of the
Macedonian neighbours is the Republic of Macedonia itself.
1.1. Regional context
One of the central topics in the analysis of the Republic of Macedonia
is its regional context. Without that analysis any attempt to understand
the situation in Macedonia would be incomplete, superficial and would
lead towards wrong conclusions. This methodological imperative
should always be taken into consideration when attempting to analyse
the Macedonian situation.
According to Hegel the small states draw their own interior and exterior
stability from their neighbours. In the case of Macedonia it has shown
to be completely true. The Macedonian state is in the centre of two
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very important Balkan, but also Euro-Asian historic, geographic, political
and strategic transversals.  Those are the North-South and East-West
directions. The significance of these directions was defined in the
Roman period (Via Militaria and Via Ignatia). The history has confirmed
that that significance exists to this very day and it is very possible that
it would be the case in the near future as well. That role of Macedonia
has been codified and articulated most precisely in the documents at
the Berlin Congress in 1878. At that Congress the new European forces
at the Balkans (Germany, England, France, Austro-Hungary, Russia)
for the first time in history tried to clearly identify their interests at the
Balkan Peninsula, by dividing their positions. The European forces
opposed to Russia established a relation that included certain
concessions towards Russia at the expense of the Ottoman Empire
which was characterised as “very ill”. The Berlin Congress revised the
consequences from the Russian-Turkish war and the San Stefan Peace
Agreement that resulted from it on 3 March 1878.
Among the other topics at the congress there was interest also for
Macedonia and the aspirations of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia towards
it. But the neighbours of Macedonia were not alone in their aspirations.
After the military defeat of Turkey the Russian Empire created an
autonomous state of Bulgaria, which included the territories of the
Vranje area in Serbia, Korca in Albania and the entire territory of
Macedonia. The great European forces opposed this: Austro-Hungary
looked upon that as an obstacle for its Balkan aspirations towards
Thessalonica, Germany was not satisfied because of similar reasons
and Great Britain took this Russian penetration in the Balkans as a
threat towards its domination at the Mediterranean. For these reasons
the Berlin Congress was organised, primarily as an attempt to reduce
the Russian influence at the Balkans and also to prevent a total collapse
of the Ottoman Empire having in mind that it would created a great
misbalance of forces at the Mediterranean. That imbalance symbolised
through the exit of Russia – through the Balkans and Tricia, as well as
through the Bosphorus onto the Mediterranean it would have been
impossible for the European forces at the time to control.
At the meeting the stratification of the forces has begun and probably
that is the first serious step (in both military and political sense) towards
the formulation of the existence of a bipolar world which after an almost
century now is gradually disappearing. Today’s meeting, i.e. clash of
civilisations, the mass in regard to the new situation in the world, the
globalisation as well as the global poverty might be the end, i.e. the
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consequences of the first division of power and influence in Berlin. It
was achieved with two world wars and one cold war.
In this Berlin context Macedonia had its 100 years of labour troubles
under the vigil eye and always open appetites of the Balkan states at
the time which exist today in this or that shape (Albania, Bulgaria,
Greece and Serbia and their constant or temporary allies). From the
Macedonian point of view even today it is very easy to locate the Balkan
positions and ambitions of these states. In that sense it seems that it
is too early to state, at least in regard to the Balkans that the bipolar
world is dead. As an illustration we could use several concrete
examples…
1.1.1. Serbia / FR Yugoslavia
Until the 5 October 2000 Serbia was one of the few last states in the
world which has existed and incited wars in the Balkans in the last ten
years thanks to the logics of the bipolar world. Even though Russia
has never openly taken its side it always, even in the most difficult
moments of the controlled disintegration of the USSR during the Boris
Yeltzin’s time found ways for both direct and indirect encouragement
of Slobodan Milosevic to obstruct the international mechanisms and
often in regard to the Balkan issues it quantified its cooperation with
the international community (NATO, EU, UN) with appropriate financial
benefits.
It is a paradox but in those years the Serbian policy had never shown
any ambitions towards Macedonia. It realistically believed that the long
existence in a common Yugoslav state (70 years) is a sufficient
investment for the future plans for Greater Serbia. Apart from that
Serbia left in Macedonia sufficiently big and qualified network of
supporters and collaborators. That human infrastructure in a situation
such as this (the end of the 2001) represents a significant advantage
compared to the other protagonists in the Balkan political, military and
other games.
Even though today in Serbia the division and the difference in the
concepts for the future of that state are clearly obvious, it is also easy
to notice that different structures, groups and institutions are not at all
indifferent in regard to the Republic of Macedonia. One should know
that parts of the Serbian administration (military and police) or at least
some of its services function totally independently from the civil political
control. Their operating in regard to Macedonia is different from what
could be heard on a rhetoric level by the Serbian officials.
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1.1.2. Bulgaria
Undoubtedly in today’s Bulgaria in regard to its place in the
contemporary world dominate the structures that see Bulgaria in the
NATO and EU structures. Seen from the Macedonian point of view
Bulgaria is a state that gives an impression of a very mobilised and
evidently successful state in regard to its Euro-Atlantic ambitions. But
if in Serbia regarding Macedonia there is a case of “postponed division”
(kind of a “schizophrenia”, in the political sense of the word), in Bulgaria
that division is very current. Over there, not only in the political parties
but also in the administration, there are circles which have been
tolerated in an interesting way by the government and who have been
fostering regularly patron-tutorial activities in the past 100 years. From
a Macedonian point of view it is astonishing that these structures (just
like the Serbian) still foster dreams for a certain “Russian resultant”
that would help in accomplishing their ambitions, i.e. for a different
role of Russia in the Balkans.
The examples of these two states, neighbours to Macedonia illustrate
not only the analysis of the Macedonian interior situation but in a certain
way they show the entire complexity of the bipolar world and its
“disintegration”, they speak of the exterior shapes of this process
especially in the context of redefining the national and geo-strategic
interests dictated by the imperatives of the globalisation. This is
especially important having in mind that the successes/failures of the
political elites in Serbia and Bulgaria to take their citizens closer to the
standards of the developed world in the passed decade ended with
serious threats on the political concepts and their bearers who insisted
on Euro-Atlantic integrations.
The different concepts (anti-NATO, anti-EU) in these states are capable
of engaging potentials that surpass the borders of these countries.
The ten years long international struggle with Milosevic’s regime and
the forces that stood behind him had much wider influence and
consequences than the territorial perimeter of the Balkans itself. Within
that context the negative political influence on Macedonia should not
be underestimated.
However, in regard to the attitude of Bulgaria towards Macedonia there
is one symptomatic constant that has been sustained in the passed
decade, no matter which of the parties is in power in Sofia. Namely,
Bulgaria as a state has been fostering very cooperative relations only
with one party in Macedonia – VMRO-DPMNE. We have no intention
to start analysing the reasons and the history of this phenomenon, but
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it is worth noting that because of this relation the interstate relations
between Skopje and Sofia depend on the party ruling in Macedonia
that harms the long-term relations between the two nations.
1.1.3. Greece
From the aspect of the Macedonian context it is paradoxical that Greece
is presented together with states that until recently belonged to the
communist world and according to very understandable reasons that
have a huge historic vacuum in building the system of democracy and
its institutions according to the standards of the realistic western
civilisation to which Greece belongs. This paradox is due to the fact
that Greece at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century took
part in a hyperactive Balkan creation – the expression is ultimately
ambivalent – of the “Macedonian situation” even though it is a member
of the two most important alliances, NATO and the EU. Starting from
partially understandable positions, Greece fiercely opposed the
existence and the future of the Republic of Macedonia. This opposing
in certain elements was completely irrational (like in the case with the
name “Republic of Macedonia”) both as rhetoric but also as a practice.
In the first moments of its independence the Republic of Macedonia
was faced with a physical blockade (closed borders) by its southern
neighbour. Then a fierce political obstruction on an international level
followed. Greece defending its position managed to provide at times
silent and at times explicit support by the EU member countries.
This Greek blockade incited enormous economic and political
consequences in Macedonia. The Macedonian citizens as well as some
parts of the international community for the first time were faced in a
brutal way with the global ambitions of the small Balkan states, this
time promoted by Greece. Consequently Macedonia was slowed down
in building the state in a very delicate initial phase of the development
of the economic and political pluralism, in the process of privatisation
of the economy and changing the entire public system of values.
In a “sandwich” between the Greek economic blockade and the
obligatory implementation of the UN embargo against Serbia/
Yugoslavia Macedonia in the first half of the last decade was brought
in a situation to take care of its sole survival. Its democratic political
elites and transformed institutions were created and built in extremely
difficult environment. Great energy was spent on the process of survival
– starting from heating of the kindergartens and schools up to
procurement of elementary repro-materials and fuels for the industrial
production. Mechanisms were searched that would avoid the two
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embargoes. In one portion those mechanisms meant breaking both
the domestic and the international laws and rules of conduct. During
those years the Macedonian society started gradually to become an
ally and very often a hostage to obscure social structures (criminals
and similar people who knew how to find their way around) in
Macedonia but also in Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, etc. Still
opposite to Greek wishes the Macedonian state managed to survive.
This Greek attitude – as the only country in the region which is a
member of both NATO and the EU – by many in the Macedonian
surrounding was interpreted as a signal to foster some fantasies about
the future of Macedonia. That meant development of a specific regional
“geo-policy” in regard to Macedonia. The consequences of this bad
Greek “investment” in Macedonia were most obvious in the middle of
last decade. The Macedonian citizens were completely confused who
was playing that dangerous game with them where their national identity
and physical integrity were being put on for gambling. They understood
the EU mechanisms and standards the way Greece practiced them.
The blue European flag with yellow stars was the first flag they would
see after they left their own country towards south.
The Greek policy did not amnesty the failures and the non-democratic
and criminal behaviour of the Macedonian political elites. However the
analysis of the Greek behaviour is necessary in order to show some
evolutions as well as permanent positions of certain structures both in
Macedonia and in its neighbouring countries. Namely after 1995 certain
movements and practice of different methods towards its northern
neighbour happened in the Greek policy. After they had realised that
with the open animosity against Macedonia they did not achieve their
goals, in the next phase the Greek policy towards Macedonia was
directed with intensive and huge participation in the Macedonian interior
transitional processes. It meant participation in the process of
privatisation of the Macedonian economy, creation of new economic
and political relations, etc.
Nevertheless, Athens even in this phase of its policy towards Macedonia
draw certain moves with negative repercussions not only towards
Macedonia but the region in general.
With a capital which partial sources could be located in cheap funds
formed by EU programmes for supporting Greece, the Greek
businessmen assisted by the Greek state services managed to
penetrate in Macedonia very high in the structures of the government.
The Macedonian political elite was already corrupted and criminalized
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enough though it was not too difficult for it especially in the cases of
mega-privatisations (the Oil refinery OKTA, Macedonian Telekom, the
second mobile operator, the biggest Macedonian bank-Stopanska
banka, etc.) to provoke cases of obvious mega-corruptions. This trend
contributed for the other cases of corruption to be treated se quite
“normal”: all the standards of conduct and the laws were relativised,
and the political elites turned into an arrogant group in power, similar
to the corrupted elite in South America. Greece became the Balkan
crossroad of mega-smuggling of cigarettes, and Cyprus undoubtedly
the European centre for money laundering.
Finally in the context of the events in 2001 in Macedonia Greece
manifested, on the first sight, confusion with moves that go from one
extreme to the next. In Greece there political and party regrouping,
exchange of arguments and conflicts of concepts, primarily on the
interior Greek situation. In such a context, on one side completely
archaic moves are manifested towards abroad (which include
suggestions for division of Macedonia, in all the variants, with
associations from inside Macedonia, and at certain moments by some
Bulgarian circles), and on the other hand politically quite rational and
productive moves (which include the reaffirmation of the role of the
Stability Pact, assistance in building and reaffirming the capacities and
the institutions of the Macedonian state, etc.).
1.1.4. The Albanians in the Balkans
The ethnic Albanians especially from the aspect of an easily noticeable
ambition-expansion towards the mainland do not represent anything
new on the Balkan geo-political maps. The Prizren League that was
held the same year as the Berlin Congress (1878) very clearly
demonstrated these ambition of the Albanians even though in those
years there was no state-legal subject in the shape of an Albanian
state, but beginnings of the Albanian national awakening. Namely, in
Prizren (today’s Kosovo) the top people of the Albanian ethnos gathered
over there: intellectuals, tradesmen, prominent heads of big families,
etc. Over there they formulated, as an announcement towards the
European forces, their ambition for presence in the Balkans as a state.
Those borders are e typical product of the Balkan political mind:
according to the Prizren League the future Albania should have covered
starting from north towards south Montenegro (almost entire) down to
Larissa (Greece), and in the west-east direction from the shores of
the Adriatic Sea up to Vranje (Serbia), Kumanovo (Macedonia) and
Thessalonica (Greece).
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The Prizren League still exists as a political platform, which is very
suitable for manipulation. This vague idea is used to create alleged
consensuses in the texture of the Albanian ethnos on which basis
anyone with bad intentions could incite crises in the Balkans. It is
symptomatic that even though at that time the intellectual critical mass
that created the political conscious among the Albanians was in the
towns that are part of today’s Albania, the Albanian political activists
still directed their political action and expansion towards the territories
of the neighbours (in today’s sense of the word) in the region.
The statistics from that time about the situation of the population show
that in the towns in Kosovo, and especially on the territory of today’s
Macedonia the Albanians had an insignificant presence. It is much
more precise to talk about the Albanians on these territories as typical
nomads mainly related to the movement of the cattle in the mountain
areas. Still the Albanian political activists and their advisors were looking
much further in regard to the process of disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire. They were quite clear that Russia through its standardised
relations with Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, with the Serb element in
Bosnia as well as the manipulations with the Macedonians was
preparing a new approach on the Balkans and the Mediterranean.
Even though these were top quality geo-political anticipations these
ideas in time were weathered out in the undefined social texture of the
Albanian ethnos, as well as in the unclear ambitions and unformed
national conscious. The peak of the shortsightedness is the
participation of the Albanian pro-fascist regime of King Zogu in
Mussolini’s operations, the formation of units with clearly fascist
symbols, as well as their participation in all the military operations
undertaken by Mussolini’s Italy. The ideas of the Prizren League were
the basis for that entire policy.
After the Second World War thanks to the short-sightedness of the
policy of Tito’s Yugoslavia (the Albanians were on the way of any kind
of Serbian-Russian adventure towards the Mediterranean), even
though with completely grotesque national state-legal creation behind
them (Enver Hoxha’s Albania), the Albanian ethnos was given a chance
for expansion towards the mainland and establishment of an
anachronous political mentality and methodology. This supported the
attempt for continuation of the ambitions of the Prizren League.
It is interesting to know that even today some leaders of the Albanians
in Macedonia and Kosovo speak openly that “we are living the last days
of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire”. For them the processes
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of the post-bipolar world and globalisation have not started yet.
In this sense today’s Albania is most indicative. There just like in Serbia
and Bulgaria there are still certain political structures that are active
and who understand and implement the state-legal subjectivity in an
archaic way. They act with no visible control of the authorities but it is
completely clear that they are tolerated by it. Even though Albania as
a state shows high level of cooperation with NATO, it is probable that
certain extremist structures among the Albanians in the Balkans find
their shelter and encouragement in Tirana.
1.1.5. The fall of Slobodan Milosevic’s regime and its
consequences
In order to understand the regional processes in the past 10-12 years
it is necessary to analyse the appearance, growth and the fall of
Slobodan Milosevic’s regime. In this occasion because of
methodological reasons Milosevic will be used as a notion-
quintessential of an extremely complex historic, social and political
process.
At the time of the appearance of Milosevic at the Yugoslav political
scene in 1987 the processes of disintegration of the already
degenerated social systems/states, including the USSR had already
started. The very operation of devastation of the SFRY was carried
out by Milosevic through at the time quite unclear hysterisation of the
Serb national feelings. He used the Serb element in Croatia and Bosnia
as a reason for totally irrational demands for redefining the Yugoslav
federation. At the same time he carried out a brutal aggression over
the Kosovo Albanians as constant guilty parties for the situation in
Serbia. The reminiscence in the Serb public and media regarding the
“Kosovo myth” about “the historic injustice over the Serbs”, the endless
repeating of the historic facts - in shape of nationalistic legends - of
clero-fascist slay of the Serbs during the II World War in Croatia, the
claims of the alleged Muslim domination in Bosnia and their cooperation
with the catholic Croats, etc., they speak of a process of preparation
of a sufficient crisis potential that the world would later have to deal
with for whole 10 years engaging incredible capacities.
Milosevic managed to mobilise a very wide structure of orthodox Slavs
with sufficient anti-Muslim and anti-catholic feelings in order all the
peaceful solutions especially with political means to fail. Milosevic and
his military-political strategists and encouragers very carefully and
skilfully spilled the crisis from one to another region. The goal was for
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the crisis to last as long as possible. It began in Slovenia (1991), then
it moved to Croatia (1991) and the military turmoil followed in Bosnia
(starting in 1992) (to mention the variations: Montenegrins and
Herzegovians attacking part of Dalmatia, especially Dubrovnik area;
Muslim-Croat war; Muslim-Muslim war in Bosnia, etc.).
After the Dayton Peace Accords were signed (1995) Milosevic kept
the attention and the capacities of the world upon the situation in
Yugoslavia (elections, forgeries, breaking of human rights in both Serbia
and Kosovo, real robbing of the economy and the citizens, clash of the
alleged autonomous ambitions of the elite around the President of
Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, etc.). At the beginning of 1998 an
obscure extremist-liberation armed formation appeared in Kosovo,
called the UCK. Its proclamation goal was not only liberation from the
Milosevic’s regime in Kosovo but also independence of this Serbian
province. Some political analysts warn that the UCK was namely a
new provocation created in Milosevic’s “kitchens”.
(Digression: It is very important to have in mind that the international
community, i.e. the West was completely surprised and not prepared
for the beginning of the process of disintegration of socialism. The
most one could hear during those years from the West was self-
satisfactory exaltation from the fiasco of socialism and the victory of
the values of the western democracy. The “Partnership for Peace”
project followed as the first concrete move with many years of delay,
with numerous weaknesses, slowness and improvisations. It was a
unique opportunity for gradual and organised involvement in the
structures of the former socialist states.
At the same time the West had no answer for the “Milosevic” process.
They allowed having a region with big and long-lasting crisis capacities
in the heart of Europe. Yugoslavia was almost disintegrated and the
West was still operating with diplomatic meaningless sentences: “We
support the territorial wholeness of Yugoslavia”, etc; The Yugoslav
army was already the occupying force in Croatia, and the West was
having doubts whether to recognise the sovereign Croat state; Sarajevo
was faced with severe shellings and the West was stuck in the
labyrinths of the UN procedures; the paramilitary Serbian structures in
Bosnia carried out operations of ethnic cleansing on daily basis and
the West almost assisted them with their abstention from acting
(Srebrenica, Gorazde, etc.). Unclear international formations of
volunteers were entering Bosnia to help the Muslim side and the West
treated them as their allies. Later on before the eyes of the entire
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world from the territory controlled by the international community the
crisis from Kosovo metastasised into Macedonia and the West was
paralysed by the EU and NATO decision mechanisms. It is a terrible
slowness, bureaucratic inertia, self-satisfaction with no real reasons
and incompetence in all areas.
This was necessary to mention in order to underline all the forms of
delay as an indication of the essential contribution of the western
mechanisms - or their absence - in creating a situation not only in the
Balkans but also in the other regions. Now it is clear that in the future
serious disturbances of the stability and the peace are possible not
only outside the state borders of the western states but also within
themselves as well.)
With feverish efforts and with the assistance by structures from
Macedonia and Albania, NATO managed to be present in Kosovo within
the UCK structures. As a result Milosevic’s plan for his own infiltration
into the UCK in order to provoke a greater Balkan crisis failed.
No matter the defeat in Kosovo Milosevic still had sufficient capacities
to represent a threat for the region. As a result a new action was
necessary, this time inside, from Serbia. The end of 1999 and the
beginning of 2000 provided an extremely good position for that but at
the same time with many hidden dangers in it. In Serbia and outside
the shape of the grand coalition against Milosevic was already visible.
Just as before in similar occasions that coalition was heterogeneous.
Apart from the citizens of Serbia who definitely saw the weariness of
all their moral and material resources, all the western countries
participated in that coalition as well as certain structures such as the
UCK and some groups of Macedonian Albanians for whom nobody
could claim with certainty that they are on the right side of the law; also
some groups of Albanians from Kosovo, allegedly outside the structures
of UCK; the Muslims from Sandzak, etc.
During that time in Kosovo an entire year was spent without the former
“liberators” to be redirected to work within civil frameworks. Very strange
mechanisms were established for sustenance of the existence of the
population. The international administration together with thousands
of humanitarians and other international volunteers in order to transfer
the situation from pre-political to political they were dealing with
distribution and redistribution of the foreign donations with the
participation in obscure activities of the former “liberators” with unclear
and immature expectations that the situations would be settled on
their own, i.e. with false hopes that the Kosovo politicians have enough
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authority to act in direction of prosperity. It is very obvious that in Kosovo
there is a strange “balance of the fear” between KFOR on one hand
and the disunited Kosovo politicians and “commanders” on the other.
Nobody is bold enough and with sufficient knowledge to overcome
that completely unnatural situation.
The rest of it is well known: Milosevic primarily thanks to the citizens of
Serbia and the skilfulness of some of the leaders of the Serbian
opposition (that the West has invested in the past several years) was
brought down from his ruling position. After the 5 October 2000 the
reasons for the existence and tolerating of the numerous armed groups
in Kosovo and Southern Serbia disappeared. The West was again
faced with the bills of the “fighters” against Milosevic, and the payment
of those bills has proven to be a very complicated task and with many
consequences. If until then the bills were being paid by tolerating some
illegal activities (smuggling of all different types of goods, including
drugs and people) it was very clear that this was going to be a big bill
- Kosovo, an independent one, something that nobody in Belgrade
would ever discuss even if UCK ethnically cleans Kosovo completely.
(Macedonia has been paying its bills regularly through fostering the
so-called interethnic coalitions in the Government, brought down to
coalitions between criminal oligarchies of Macedonian and Albanian
ethnic origin.).
Macedonia and the new government in Serbia with a “blitz” move by
the diplomacies of the two states in February 2001 (after a decade of
previous futile negotiations with the Milosevic regime) defined their
own borders, including the part along the Kosovo border. From the
aspect of the short-term ambitions of the Kosovo  “liberators” composed
of networks of criminal groups in Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and
Western Europe, such an inter-state border demarcation did not suit
them. Namely it was already possible to feel that the West, which
assisted in achieving the border agreement, made regional moves
that provoke the other side to act.
The action followed in January 2001. Encouraged by some “emigrant
Albanian circles” in Switzerland, the USA, Germany, Belgium and other
western countries who deal with different, mainly criminal activities a
completely phantom organisation called the “National Liberation Army”
(NLA) began military operations against the Republic of Macedonia.
The West in the phase of “paying bills” tied with the fall of Milosevic,
one cannot say that it was surprised by these activities by the NLA.
However the Macedonian government was, even some structures of
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the Albanian political parties in Macedonia.
Namely, even though some of the NLA connections were completely
clear and even though part of the Macedonian intelligence structures
were warning that with small “guerrilla” groups on small areas there
will be a controlled spill over of the crisis and the crisis potential from
Kosovo and Southern Serbia towards Macedonia, the surprise of the
Macedonian authorities allowed the spill over of the militant groups.
Many of the defence mechanisms of the Macedonian state failed (the
reasons will be elaborated later on). The West showed again that it is
very difficult for them in dealing with complicated Balkan situations
that make it difficult to differ the real liberators from the “liberators”.
1.2. Summary of the introduction
Macedonia is presented within a regional context pointing out only
some of the elements of the other participants in the entire regional
situation. The elements that are related to the non-typicality of the
case have been underlined, and Greece is introduced as an additional
Balkan negative factor. When it is the case of Macedonia one should
have in mind again that everything in this region happens according to
the principle of connected vessels. The analysis/synthesis and concrete
moves have to have a regional tuning.
2. Macedonia in the ’90s of the 20th century
2.1. Terminology framework: Transition
Even though this includes several parallel social processes the notion
of transition - nevertheless the exaggerations in its flexible use - it is
the most appropriate for diagnostics of the situation in almost all post-
socialist states.
The transition has the usual meaning: it means passing from socialism
to capitalism; transition from a state of a directed economy to a state
of free market; transition from a society with dominating public/state
ownership to a society with dominating private ownership; starting
processes of new privatisation of all and primarily the economic
resources of the state and re-division of the public wealth; establishment
of a pluralistic parliamentary democracy; building institutions of
democracy; establishment of mechanisms that have as priority the
position of the individual - the citizen and they would abstract the
211
sovereignty of the state and the community from him/her; building
standards for protecting the individual and collective rights, etc.
However apart from these benevolent meanings the notion of transition
in Macedonia (and in the region) states also centralisation of the
economic-financial resources in certain democratically chosen
structures of the government. These structures deal with these
concentrated resources in a voluntarily and non-transparent manner.
The transition is also a process of transition that most usually means
devastation of properties and the capacities of the companies to be
quickly taken over by private owners for free. The new political parties
regardless of the obligatory addition of “democratic” in their names
they are built upon and led according to the mentality and the traditions
of the old communist structures. The individual-the citizen is completely
ignored and it is brought down to political meaningless sentences with
a usable value only during the pre-election periods. The political elites
are inclined towards manipulations of the citizens in a fierce struggle
for influence in the area of media. Any kind of system of values is
disintegrated in order to release themselves of any scruples. The state
administration and the public services and companies employ people
according to the rigid party criteria. The international community is
manipulated and used for interior political goals. The institutions instead
of being patiently built up they are disintegrated. A spirit of anomy
spreads. And so on…
(The meanings of the notion transition are presented here on purpose
in their extremes in order to have a more clear understanding and
diagnostics of the situation.)
2.2. Pluralism
Macedonia entered the world of democracy at the end of the 80s of
the 20th century. The first political groups outside the Union of
Communists appeared at the end of the 90s so that at the first elections
in November 1990 the Macedonian political scene was defined in the
main political frameworks that are present even today.
At the elections in 1990 political parties appeared formed by members
of the national minorities (Albanians) and on the opposite side (the
Macedonian) there was significant presence of parties that based their
political approach on the nationalistic rhetoric. The former Communist
Party deeply wounded by the general, in the Yugoslav framework,
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actions by Slobodan Milosevic, with deep erosion in its party
mechanisms and massive leaving by its membership divided itself
into several new political groups. Some called themselves liberals,
others socio-democrats, third democrats, etc.
The common nominator of all the newly created parties was that they
all in their platforms were rudimentary with unclear vision of the political
pluralism and democracy. Those parties did not have visions about
the essential problems of Macedonia with the exception of the efforts
of, according to the electoral results after the first multi-party elections,
the biggest party VMRO-DPMNE which in Macedonia was trying to
open a big and militant front in the function of its separation from
Yugoslavia. However, this politically principle and correct view lacked
few things. Namely it was quite clear that such a front would bring
Macedonia into an open clash with Milosevic and the Yugoslav People’s
Army (JNA) which was on Macedonian territory with extremely
unpredictable and expensive result for the Macedonian state itself.
Hence the politically more moderate groups (former communists,
headed by President Kiro Gligorov, elected by the Parliament, together
with the liberals and some of the smaller parties) managed to save
Macedonia from those risks. With a referendum on 8 September 1991
the independence of the Republic of Macedonia was proclaimed.
Simultaneously with the activities for gaining independence and
sovereignty the Macedonian Parliament using standardised
mechanisms and procedures (the Constitutional Commission
consisting of members of the Parliament, as well as other experts)
after few months of debating and in a completely correctly managed
process, on 17 November 1991 passed the new Constitution of the
independent Republic of Macedonia.
2.3. The constitutional framework from 1991
The Constitution was adopted with majority votes by the MPs of the
ethnic Macedonian and citizens’ political parties. Because of “reasons
of principle” - because of the definition of the sovereignty of the
Macedonian ethnos in the Preamble of the Constitution - the MPs
from the Albanian parties did not vote for that constitution. However,
that Constitution because of the obstructions by Greece and the un-
principled attitude of the other EU member states, through a completely
unordinary - and when we take into consideration the European
practice, it could be qualified as scandalous - precedent by the arbitrage
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of European experts it was reviewed and proclaimed as relevant and
quite sufficient as a founding law for any country, as well as multiethnic
Macedonia.
The constitutional framework defined all the important institutions of
the democracy (Parliament, Government, President of the Republic,
Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, Judicial Council, etc.). The 1991
Constitution defined the status of the citizens and its rights, freedoms
and obligations in a very satisfactory manner. In that spirit also the
collective rights were defined.
One should mention the position and the role of the Constitutional
Court as one of the more successful examples of built up institutions.
Right after the adoption of the Constitution the highest judicial body
was activated and in the current practice it acted as a real corrector in
shaping the legislation in Macedonia and the practice emerging from
it.
The parties of the Albanians even though they were very clearly against
the newly adopted Constitution they based their further political life on
the provisions of the Constitution and the legislative practice emerging
from it.
On 17 November 2001 after a decade of existence the 1991
Constitution in compliance with the provisions from the Ohrid
Framework Agreement changes to the first Constitutions were adopted
by the Macedonian Parliament, which in some of its elements are
significantly different from the previous constitutional solutions.
(Enclosed: The Ohrid Framework Agreement)
2.4. Institutions
2.4.1. Parliament
At the moment after the parliamentary elections in 1998 in Macedonia
we have the third parliament since the country gained independence.
The first two parliaments from 1990 and 1994 were elected according
to the majority principle - direct elections in 120 electoral units, and as
a result there were 120 MPs. The 1998 Parliament was elected
according to a mixed model of both majority and proportional elections.
One portion, 85 parliamentary seats were elected according to the
majority model in 85 electoral units, and 35 seats were elected
according to the proportional model according to which Macedonia is
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one electoral unit. The model was changed in 1997 with a clear intention
by the political top of the Macedonian political parties to be able to
become members of the Parliament and to maintain their positions
since the lists for the proportional model were created by the
leaderships of the parties. At this moment in Macedonia there are
discussions on the new electoral model, and there are different
modalities on the table.
From a formal-legal perspective the first Parliament was elected at
the time of the Socialism, and the second and the third were elected
according to the provisions of the new 1991 Constitution. It was a
typical transitional Parliament. Having in mind the obligation that the
society undertook to pass over to parliamentary democracy, free market
and private ownership as soon as possible, as the foundations of the
economic prosperity of the individual and the community, all the
parliaments until now managed to pass more than 700 new laws out
of which some are basic (on Local self-Governance, on State
Administration Bodies, Criminal Law, etc.), and some are laws that
cover smaller areas of the life of the community.
Even though for the functioning of the Macedonian Parliament the
Macedonian public regularly has remarks, two things need to be
divided. Firstly, the Parliament mainly debates and passes laws that
are almost 100 percent proposals of the Government elected by the
parliamentary majority. Secondly the public makes its negative
assessments in regard to the parliament based on the (dis)satisfaction
from the overall situation in the society. The guilt for that situation is
generally subscribed to the politicians, and mostly to the parties
belonging to the parliamentary majority from which ranks the
Government is elected. In this case the Parliament as an institution is
unjustly burdened with the conduct of the MPs-politicians, outside the
parliament, in their electoral units where they with an entire bunch of
“transitional” activities threaten not only their reputation and the
reputation of the party which candidate they are, but they contribute
towards the decreasing of the reputation and the capacities of the
entire state. It is amazing that the political parties at the 1998 elections
included at their party lists (majority and proportional) so many of their
proscribed MPs. Thanks to the electoral model and the pre-election
manipulations they managed to be re-elected to the Parliament.
Because of such an undefined position, according to the public opinion
polls, the Macedonian Parliament is not so respected by the public.
One of the reasons for that is the profile of the “people’s delegates”.
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They are usually “party soldiers”. The most important criterion is to be
loyal to the party and not the knowledge or the personal integrity of the
candidates. That makes the Parliament “a voting machine” with a party
dictate; sometimes even against personal and professional believes
by some of the MPs.
Because of that conditions are created at the Macedonian Parliament
for a Machiavellian fight for changing the ratio of the forces in it. In the
current Parliament about 20% of the MPs have changed parties or
have become independent MPs even though they were elected from
the party lists. The media and the political parties who lost MPs assess
this process as creation of a MP Stock Exchange in the Parliament
where the majority could be bought in the literal sense of the word
either with money or by satisfying some of the MPs’ interests.
2.4.2. The Government
In compliance with the Constitution and the current legislative practice
in Macedonia the Government is an institution with the biggest and
widest authorities in the state. According to the 1991 Constitution
Macedonia is a centralised state where the mechanisms of
decentralisation have not started functioning yet (at this very moment
for the preparation and agreeing of the new law of local government,
those changes are underway). The political parties that compose the
Parliament regardless whether they belong to the opposition or the
government majorities, they have not shown any interest for
decentralisation, i.e. creation of a state that would be easy to manage,
and the citizens would have almost a daily insight in the way parts or
the entire state are managed. Also one should clearly note that in all
these years of independence the Macedonian political elite has not
shown neither knowledge nor interest to produce projects that would
produce clear and modern laws for the state administration and the
state and other public institutions.
The role of the Government as an agent in the contemporary
economies is recognised in 4 segments:
(1) The Government is a regulator of the economy - i.e. an active
creator of the economic system (the regulatory framework and the
institutional structure through which every economic system “pulses”);
(2) The Government is the stimulator of the economy - i.e. an active
creator of the economic policy (an ambiance for domestic business);
(3) The Government allocates the economic wealth;
(4) The Government is the consumer of the economy.
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The distortions that create the weak state (public) institutions in
achieving their role given under point one (1) and the distorted economic
policy and the unsuitable general market ambiance expressed in the
role of the government given under point two (2), create a surrounding
which is very suitable for corruption development. From a practical
aspect it is carried out through the given functions (3) and (4) of the
role of the Government in the modern economy. Hence, there is one
very important discovery: if it was possible for the Government to be
deprived of its roles of allocator of the wealth and consumer in the
economy, the effect would lead towards the destruction of corruption.
However, since it is impossible the only solution remaining is for those
two roles of the government to be reduced. A constellation of
undistorted economic system and adequate economic policy should
be created.
The Macedonian 1991 Constitution by delegating the Government
almost unlimited authorities provided the political elites with extremely
comfortable position and very pleasant “wind in their back” during the
transition - planned and understood in accordance with the negative
transitional connotations that have been previously elaborated.
The government-MPs composition planned with the so-called party
structures (party functionaries and activists chosen according to party
criteria on senior or junior positions within the state administration) in
the past ten years created a state which is not capable of delivering
elementary public goods and functions such as functioning of its social,
educational, health and other public services, nor to provide elementary
protection of its territory, physical security for its citizens, state-legal
subjectivity in both the interior and foreign policy, as well as
communication with the international community, etc.
The main source of this spreading of lack of perspective and of
corruption in the society is the Government, i.e. the political parties
(both ethnic Macedonian and Albanian) that stand behind it with their
parliamentary majority.
The engagement and the spending of budget or other public means in
the developed democratic systems have a specific meaning. In many
western and developed states there are special procedures regulated
with high legal acts (laws, by-laws, regulations, etc.). The goal is to
provide maximum transparency and at the same time to prevent
different deviant misuses of the function in determining the needs, the
ways and the realisation of the public procurements.
In Macedonia the legal structure of the way and the procedure for
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engagement and spending of budget funds (state, previously public)
could be found several decades before. In the previous public system
the budget funds (at the same time all the funds of the business
enterprises) were treated in the category of public owned means.
After gaining sovereignty the public procurements are legally regulated
for the first time in 1996 with the “By-law on Public Procurements”
(this by-law requires announcement of a tender only if the value of the
procurement is higher than 50,000 DEM so the corrupted civil servants
were very careful to even divide the bigger procurement on a number
of smaller ones under the given sum which requires a tender). A more
serious attempt for legal regulating of the public procurement have
been made by passing the Law on Public Procurements in 1998 that
covered all the state bodies, public institutions, public companies, the
local self-government and other institutions and companies that use
budget means. The practice of the implementation of this law under
conditions of further changing the legal and economic system of the
Republic of Macedonia as a state in transition showed that many of
the solutions included in the Law are already part of the past. The
expert analyses show that some of the provisions in this Law promote
corruption or misuse of the function in the public procurements.
2.4.3. The President of the Republic
The President belongs to the executive authority and as such he draws
his political authority and influence from the fact that he is elected on
direct elections and behind (theoretically) him there is one or more
political parties. With the current constitutional solutions the authorities
of the President of the state are precisely determined and separated
from the Government and the Prime Minister, especially in the area of
the foreign affairs and defence. It creates conditions for conflict of
authorities and insufficient coordination especially when the President
on one side and the Prime Minister and the Government on the other
do not belong to the same political party or coalition so they are forced
to cohabitate. Because of that the “wide area” for acting by the President
depends on his capacities and capabilities as well as the capacities
and the capabilities of the elite that would support him. This supports
the current Macedonian experience.
The first President, Kiro Gligorov, was a politician from the Tito period.
He had been a senior functionary in the federal Yugoslav framework
for many years (former President of the Yugoslav Federal Parliament,
former Federal Minister of Finances, etc.). His basic goal as President
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of independent Macedonia was to save the state from possible military
destruction. In his time he succeeded in that. Because of the enormous
political experience, the developed political and other connections in
the society, as well as the great international support he managed on
a domestic level to impose himself on all the political parties, to
harmonise certain differences and to suggest certain decisions. His
strength among others was due to the unreserved support that he
always received from the governing parliamentary majority that in
conditions of relatively modest constitutional framework provided him
an extremely comfortable systematic position.
All these lasted until 3 October 1995 when there was an attack on
Gligorov’s life. The instigators of that act had obvious reasons: to
eliminate the man who represented a unique political cohesive structure
in Macedonia, a unifier of different tendencies and the main milestone
for the Macedonian efforts towards joining the Euro-Atlantic structures.
The investigation of the attack has not discovered, yet any concrete
traces. There have been several speculations, which seem to be more
in the function of the attack itself and not for successful closing of the
investigation.
Gligorov did his job successfully even though many, maybe justifiably,
consider that he was too cautious with Belgrade/Milosevic, and that
he was too afraid from deep and more substantial efforts in the defence
and the security of the state. However, it was proved that the areas
where the Macedonian state acts the least or it acts most inappropriately
the other actors are more agile and more successful. For the first time
this was very obvious at the moment of and after the attack upon the
life of Gligorov. The weakness of the Macedonian security structures
was also confirmed in the time of the war crisis in 2001 when the
armed Kosovo criminals in co-action with the local Macedonian
criminals inflicted serious losses in the Macedonian defence structures.
Still, in the devastation of the defence structures apart from Gligorov
also the Macedonian governments, in continuity starting from the very
first day of the independence until today have played their role.
The current President of the Republic, Boris Trajkovski, took over the
presidential position after the scandalous, irregular and for the
democracy offensive elections. This disabled him form the very
beginning in doing his job, burdened with the (realistic) feeling of a
political debt towards certain structures from the Albanian camp of
political parties in Macedonia (Arben Xhaferi and DPA) as well as to
some structures of his domicile party, VMRO-DPMNE.
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However, having in mind the galloping degeneration of the political
elite in Macedonia it is very paradoxical but still certain that the current
president has managed to impose himself as the only state institution
that could be trusted at least a little bit. That feeling is growing having
in mind that for the international community he is the only person from
Macedonia they could build relatively constructive communication with.
Because of that in an era of some radical constitutional efforts and
redefining the system, the danger of ideas for increasing the authorities
of the President on the account of the Government is growing.
2.4.4.  Ministries and governmental agencies
What was previously said about the government fully applies for the
ministries and the governmental agencies. They are only the concrete
articulator of the ideas, or to be more precise of the actions and the
activities of the powerful people in the party, reflection of the party
leadership and the business lobbies close to it.
2.5. Administration
When we talk about the state administration one should make a
distinction between two things.
First of all from a formal perspective the administration includes the
Military and the Police (both civil and uniformed personnel), but
according to the authorities and the responsibilities they are completely
different from the rest of the administration. The Army of the Republic
of Macedonia (ARM) and the Police originate from the former security
services in Yugoslavia. Some parts of these services still act and think
in the way as if they are still part of a bigger federal system. Even
though individuals working in these services do that with completely
clear motives, most of the employees in these services have a
completely indifferent attitude, withdrawing before the attack of the
fantasising party cadres. Others take part in intensive political activities,
something that would be unthinkable for states with built up democratic
mechanisms and administration, which is most directly forbidden to
be involved in politics. The Macedonian laws in that sense are “liberal”.
They even allow the policemen to be involved in politics - but only after
hours (?).
Furthermore because of the system of financing the professors, the
teachers, the physicians and the other medical personnel are quite
unnaturally classified within the state administration. Because of the
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limitations established by the processes of stabilisation of the
Macedonian economy these two areas (including culture and science)
are devastated and brought down to very low levels on the social scale.
In conditions of high level of corruption and social acceptance of
corruption the metastasising of this “illness” in these two areas becomes
alarming.
Finally the administration also includes the other services at the
ministries as well as the public servants in the local self-government.
They are appropriately profiled to the negative political dictate of the
ruling political elite.
In the Macedonian case there is one symptomatic data. More than 5%
of the overall population in the state (i.e. 100,000 citizens) have
University diplomas. Big portion of them are employed in the state
administration. The issue that is being imposed here is how it is possible
for a state with such a high level of education in its own administration
to have so bad performances?
In that direction - even though important in some other, codified context
of a professionalised state administration - the remarks on the ethnic
composition of the state administration are now completely irrelevant.
However, only in the context of the professional administration,
classified and grouped according to certain determined scales the
reforms that would realise the imperatives of the Framework Agreement
would be possible in a civilised state.
After Macedonia gained its independence the process of establishment
of the administration began almost from scratch based on the
Republic’s administration from the federative system of SFRY that
had relatively modest authorities. The construction and the
development of the administration was brought down to mainly physical
“building up” without paying sufficient attention to the quality of the
personnel and the procedures for its functioning without a unique
concept for that. That incited great amplitudes in the number of
ministries and the governmental institutions, frequent personnel
changes that were usually based on party-nepotistic basis that resulted
in partisation of the state administration. The atmosphere of political
division is more and more present in the wider society and it creates
high level of politisation among the citizens.
The mediocrities holding different positions in the state apparatus -
positions that they would hardly get based on their real qualities without
the party position - brought about a situation where this personnel is
blindly obedient to the top of their party. The instructions from the party
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superiors are always carried out even if it means breaking laws and
regulations. Most appropriate and at the same time most grotesque
illustration of that is the scandalous establishing of diplomatic relations
between Macedonia and the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1999. The
operation was carried out by a very narrow circle of people on high
governmental positions coming from the same party (Democratic
Alternative), completely non transparent and under suspicious
conditions and motives without informing the authorities such as the
President of the Republic and the Parliamentary Commission on
Foreign Affairs.
After relatively long ruling (over 6 years) of coalitions led by the same
party (SDSM) in 1998 for the first time since the independence of the
Republic of Macedonia there was change of power. The new ruling
coalition led by VMRO-DPMNE simply continued the previously
established path of partisation of the administration. After they came
in power they simply “wiped out” the management personnel in all the
state institutions and bodies down to the lowest levels of the
administration. This has incited significant discontinuity in the work of
the state apparatus, and created “interior opposition” in the state
apparatus directly moving the political fight where it was the least
needed and desired.
This situation was additionally complicated with the division of the party
elites on national basis no matter whether they have a good cooperation
in the governing or the oppositional coalitions. What connects them
and enables their survival is the desire to conquer or stay in power. In
such conditions the symbiosis of the former most severe opponents
and today’s coalition partners-the two most right oriented parties from
the two national camps - VMRO-DPMNE and DPA (Democratic Party
of the Albanians) became possible. Still, on an operative level, in the
organs of the administration, the cooperation between the functionaries
belonging to different parties both in the past and today is burdened by
lack of trust, communication and teamwork.
All these shows elements that the Republic of Macedonia could be
placed in the category of “weak states” which are not able to offer top
quality public goods and to regulate them well and to guarantee the
social and the state processes. The need of deep reforms is obvious.
The regular flow of the social processes that could bring about imposing
of a necessity of such “tectonic” efforts will be a long and unpredictable
process and it might be passed over in time by the challenges for the
stability of the Republic of Macedonia. This was shown with the crisis
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in 2001. Because of that there is a need of an engagement by the
international community that would provide support (financial and
expert), direction, acceleration and control of the quality of the reforms.
2.6. Economy
In conditions of a blockade as well as in conditions of losing the organic
link with the Yugoslav market that all the economic projections in the
past 70 years were built upon, the Macedonian socialist economy with
public ownership (partially privatised according to the completely
uneconomic logic of the last Yugoslav government - “Ante Markovic
Model”), entered the independent and sovereign Macedonia already
quite devastated. But that was only the beginning.
Having in mind the time imperatives at the end of 1992 a process of
real privatisation began. One should underline that in such a situation
the bank institutions were still under some indirect state (government)
control. What happened? In an environment of lack of new foreign or
domestic investors, so-called managers in the companies - the former
socialist directors - in the process of privatisation in most of the cases
they imposed on the workers the model of “management buy of the
right to manage”. The model is quite simple. The model is registered
at the Privatisation Agency as a way of privatising the company.
Together with the model an estimate of the value of the company is
presented (previously with bookkeeping mechanisms and other
methods with deliberate unpaid debts its value is decreased). This
estimate of the value of the company is supported with certain political
arguments by the political opportunists connected to the managers
based on business interests. After getting an approval by the Agency
to start the privatisation, the managers as legitimate company
managers put up bank mortgage on the entire or part of the property
of the company, they take a credit that they use to pay the estimated
value of the company. Certainly, the credit is paid off by the workers
since it is presented as production expenditure. At the same time with
the growth of the financial power of the managers they buy off the
stocks given to the pension funds, they buy off stocks from the so-
called small stockholders who live on the verge of poverty, etc.
But certainly the goal of the privatisation never and nowhere has been
to establish an ideally just model of division. The primary goal of the
privatisation, the Macedonian one included, was to establish the least
unjust model and for the companies that were being sold they were
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supposed to provide social security for the workers, gradual restarting
of the production leaning on the capability and the knowledge of the
managing teams. But having in mind the fact that the banks were
under complete control of the politicians (and the managers close to
them) in the implementation of the policy for appointing credits the
money were thrown away on bad credits, often to support operation
for breaking the embargo towards Yugoslavia, participation in the
international chains of smuggling of cigarette, drugs, etc. portion of
the money were used for buying “social peace”, i.e. giving low salaries
to the unproductive employees in the destroyed companies.
In the decade that is behind us the Macedonian state spent over 3
billion DEM for these purposes, out of which only small sums of money
reached the citizens and most of it went to the accounts of the banks
or the criminals.
This created an ambiance where the political elites were thinking lesser
and lesser of the interests of the citizens, i.e. the state. The reforms
stopped in mid nineties and then the legal projects were produced in a
way that satisfied the formal aspects without a real interest for the
community could benefit from it. The political elites penetrated deeply
in the oligarchic structures that were created with the “managers and
the heads in the Balkan criminal and smuggling chains”.
In the entire operation of privatisation, carried out in an environment of
organised breaking of the embargo against Yugoslavia and organised
overcoming of the consequences of the Greek embargo, there was
not left much of the Macedonian economy. The companies that
successfully carried out some of the privatisation models are not so
many. Thanks to the real private initiative as well as foreign help that
even though modestly was presented by some specialised foreign
agencies, today in Macedonia exist about 100 small companies (up to
100 employees) that have real production, real and legal businesses
and their workers belong to the category of best paid and best protected
workers.
The rest of the companies that function are either public companies -
in a monopole position - or companies that have certain advantages in
their work simply because they are close to the oligarchic structures in
the state.
2.6.1. Privatisation
The privatisation in the Republic of Macedonia started in 1989 (with
the Law on Public Capital in Former SFRY), however the process
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reached its top in the second half of the nineties, i.e. after passing the
Law on Transformation of the Companies with Public Capital.
According to this Law there are many methods for privatisation that
differ depending on the size of the company. The small companies
could be privatised according to the following methods:
• By being purchased by the employees;
• By selling of an ideal part of the company through auction.
The medium and the big companies could be privatised with:
• Privileged purchase via tender;
• Issuing stocks for gaining additional capital, carried out with a
tender;
• Simple selling of stocks at an auction;
• Through conversion for justification of debts.
Apart from this other methods of leasing of the goods could be used
as well as privatisation through a procedure for bankruptcy and selling
of the overall property of the companies. In 1999 a method for direct
selling through direct negotiations with the strategic investor was
accepted, that proved to be non-transparent and easy to misuse for
financial frauds.
Having in mind that the privatisation is not a goal to itself but it should
be used to achieve certain goals apart from achieving effective, as the
basic goal of this process, other goals of the privatisation are: increasing
the credibility and acceptance of the economic and the social reforms,
attracting foreign capital, establishing stabile and permanent
development, providing development of the capital market, productive
engagement of the domestic savings that are kept outside the banking
system, etc.
According to the official data from the Privatisation Agency since the
beginning of the process until 2000 more than 1600 companies were
privatised. The total number of companies that should be privatised is
1700, which means that the process is almost finalised. According to
the assessment of the carried out privatisation until now public capital
with nominal value of 120 billion DEM is sold, for which selling 4.5
billion DEM have been received. Apart from the big discounts that for
some state stocks were 70% and for others even 90% from their
nominal value in the privatisation procedure numerous irregularities
have been noticed as well as incompliance with the existing legal
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regulations. This refers especially to the incompliance with the legal
obligation for transparency in the privatisation and announcement in
the daily papers the offer of stocks at the stock exchange as well as
selling of the public capital on a credit which regardless of the legal
prohibition for that kind of transaction it turned into a regular practice.
At this way the privatisation in the Republic of Macedonia has not
achieved the wanted effects not only from the aspect of gaining effective
that would be further invested in the economy but it also incited quite
opposite effect in regard to the credibility and the acceptance of the
economic and social reforms, attracting of healthy foreign capital,
establishment of stabile and permanent development, development
of a capital market and productive engagement of the domestic savings.
The non-transparency, direct deals, high provisions, buying of
companies and banks by the political parties and persons close to
them, tax evasion in the procedures of changing the owner, great
discounts and other financial malversations that happened within the
framework of the privatisation in the Republic of Macedonia incited
complete mistrust among citizens towards this process.
2.6.2. Direct foreign investments
The direct foreign investments have always been considered as an
important part of the process of privatisation. In that part during the
entire period of transition the Republic of Macedonia has been faced
with bad political and security conditions in its surrounding expressed
through blockades, embargoes, war threats, etc. The potential investors
consider the area to be risky for investments and as a result it is the
employees and the managers the usually bid for the companies and
thus the employees own most of the companies.
Until the end of 2000 33 companies were privatised with a total value
of the foreign investments to be about 104 million US$. In the post-
privatisation phase by selling stocks to strategic investors additional
130 million US$ of foreign investments have been realised.
The trend of liberalisation and deregulation was also implemented in
the regulative that refers to foreign investments. The foreign investors
have an equal status with the domestic ones, and because of certain
tax and customs relieves they have even a privileged position compared
to the domestic investors. There are no restrictions in regard to the
industry that allows foreign investments, as well as no restrictions in
the percent of the capital that could be owned by foreign citizens, and
the repatriation of the profit is guaranteed by the Constitution.
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Apart from the steps for legal relief for the direct foreign investments
that have been undertaken in the past ten years compared to the other
states in Southeast Europe, the Republic of Macedonia notes a very
small input of foreign capital. This is due primarily to the situation in
the surrounding but also to the insufficient activities of the plan for
presenting Macedonia as a possible place for investments. However
as a significant factor that strongly influences this sphere one should
emphasise the bad interior ambiance expressed with the insufficient
level of law governance and respecting of laws, mistrust in the judiciary
and high level of corruption in the state administration.
2.7. Organised crime
In a situation of existence of different both objective (the situation in
the region, refugees crisis, etc.) and subjective (the interests of the
individuals in the leading structures of the ruling political parties for
personal wealth, the efforts to keep apparent social peace,
strengthening of the financial and by that of the political power of the
ruling parties) reasons and interests, for a long time in Macedonia the
creation of a quality legal framework for prevention of the contemporary
forms of crime has been avoided. This includes organised crime of all
types, financial frauds, money laundering and corruption. Also the
creation of legislation for international cooperation in this area has
been avoided. This situation has contributed for delaying or avoiding
the creation of specialised, well-equipped and manned services for
efficient prevention and fight against these types of crime.
The relevant data point out the current situation in the area of crime, in
the area of concentration of the financial power in one individual and
creation of conditions for corruption for endangering the democracy
and the rule of law. It is not so much talked about confiscation and
creation of conditions for confiscating illegal financial incomes. Also
the conditions that foster money laundering and contribute towards
incorporation of illegal incomes in the legal financial flows are not
sufficiently analysed. The analysis of the possibilities for efficient
inclusion in the international fight against these phenomena that the
national legislation offers is marginalized. Everything is brought down
to declarative satisfying of the daily political needs or irregular
satisfaction of pressures from abroad that happen from time to time.
The official data show a few times growth in all types of crime. For
example if in 1991 24 cases of drugs trafficking were registered in
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1999 that figure went up to 210 cases. If in 1991 40 pieces of illegal
arms were confiscated in 1998 the figure of illegal arms was 3,000
pieces. The number of discovered cases of illegal cigarettes trade for
example is doubled every year. If we have in mind the methods for
determining the dark figure in these types of crime the discovered
cases represent only one third of the overall real crime. The level of
criminal infection is high especially in the area of forbidden trade, drugs
trafficking and economic and financial crime. If one takes into
consideration the situation in the area of crime like violence, illegal
immigration and the growing trade with people and prostitution, it is
clear that in Macedonia there are organised criminal groups that are
active in new highly sophisticated forms of crime.
On the other hand the events in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001
increased the need of arms. The emphasised unemployment in the
countries of the former socialist block and Macedonia itself contributes
for further growth of the illegal immigration and prostitution as well as
the increased profit from drugs trafficking. This leads towards further
increase of the interests for operating of the organised criminal groups.
Nevertheless the lack of empirical material on which basis one could
draw up exact conclusions regarding the presence, the methods used
and the subjects participating in the process of money laundering, the
increased presence of crime creates great sums of illegally gained
incomes that are turned legal in different ways.
In this situation the thing that imposes great damages is the vagueness
of the legislation, the weak regulatory control of the banks, the financial
institutions and other non-financial institutions that offer different kinds
of financial services. The state has no control over foreign currencies
entering Macedonia. There are no legal provisions to control the
investments and the transfers of money. The possibilities for carrying
out a top quality investigation are limited as well as the international
cooperation in the area of investigation, bringing charges and
confiscating the incomes gained with criminal activities. The reforms
in the criminal-legal area and the legislation in the area of finances are
intentionally slowed down or misdirected. That enables for the criminal
needs and interests of the ruling structures to be satisfied.
2.8. Political parties
The Macedonian political parties date mainly from the first half of the
90s of the last century. This refers both to the parties of the so-called
Macedonian political camp and the parties of the so-called Albanian
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political camp. As it was already mentioned it is a group which members
used to be members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia/Macedonia
and who understand and articulate the process of pluralism with simple
replacing of the party membership books. Thanks to the role and the
power of the politics, especially when the political structure is close or
in power, the political parties function according to the rigid Bolshevik
principles and according to the rule of absolute power of the party’s
chief and those around him.
The mechanism for building and sustenance of such parties is so
perfected that in the biggest three or four parties even mentioning the
name of the party’s leader or some other person close to him is done
with special modulation in the voice. Some kind of changes,
responsibilities, resignations or similar democratic practices are not
even mentioned even though the two biggest parties from the
Macedonian camp had real political fiascos in the past - SDSM was
catastrophically defeated at the parliamentary elections in 1998 and
at the Presidential elections in 1999; VMRO-DPMNE almost lost the
country (this story has not ended, yet) and they had a heavy defeat at
the local elections in 2000. The problem of the interior party democracy
in the Albanian political camp of parties is even more emphasised
having in mind the more rudimental forms of party activities, leadership
and organisation of these parties where the use of arms in the mutual
interior party and inter-party “democratic” clearings is quite present.
The great financial means necessary for the functioning of the party
apparatus and the participation at the elections are significantly bigger
than those that could be collected legally. The difference in the sums
is provided from the big business, in cash outside the official party
accounts. The financers understand it as an investment that would
pay off with interest. The only way to have their money back is to be
given a privileged position in the public procurements, avoiding the
financial obligations towards the state, securing good credits, being
privileged in the process of privatisation, etc.
The Republic of Macedonia went a step further - in order to avoid the
need of financing the parties from the business. Some political parties
started establishing political companies. The Constitutional Court
stopped such practice but the decision was avoided by passing the
ownership of the companies to leading party personalities.
We should mention one moment. Since the establishment of the first
government of independent Macedonia until today a principle has been
introduced that in certain situations has proved to be extremely
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productive. Namely all the Macedonian governments starting from the
first one until the one today are coalition governments and there are
always several ministers from one or more parties from the Albanian
political camp. The usefulness of this model referred primarily to
building constructive inter-ethnic climate and ambiance of trust. The
Government has been the place for prevention, i.e. resolving of some
of the current or potential conflicts. Having in mind the structure of the
Government in the Macedonian political system the political elites of
Albanians very soon realised the lucrative moments of the interethnic
coalitions. Accordingly to the Macedonian side with mild delay but still
rapid pace (this is specially emphasised in the coalition that came to
power in 1998), with given doze of pluralism that is necessary when
we speak of the population of Albanian ethnic origin, the Albanian
political and business oligarchies very soon joined their Macedonian
partners. At the same time when SDSM was in power in Macedonia
together with PDP the criminal brotherhoods were more discrete.
However, after the 1998 elections these brotherhoods reached its peak
accompanied by mutual escalated statements about how “relaxed the
interethnic relations in Macedonia are”, non critical policy towards
certain UCK structures in Kosovo, etc.
These developments were supported by a certain regional constellation
(NATO war against Serbia; the big wave of refugees from Kosovo to
Macedonia; the big transfers of different kinds of goods from and
through Macedonia to Kosovo; the money of the international
community for support of Kosovo, etc.).
The desire to come to power starts unscrupulous fights between the
political parties at the elections that become more and more irregular
and violent. The last local elections in 2000 apart from the numerous
remarks by the opposition parties and the negative assessments by
the international observers brought about many physical conflicts and
use of firearms, especially in the election units where the competing
candidates were of Albanian ethnic origin.
Finally, the Macedonian citizens (regardless of their ethnic origin) got
political elites, which are capable of anything and completely
irresponsible for their own deeds. It has been proved that the models
of pluralism, i.e. articulation of the political will and interests only through
political acting of the parties and the elites are already used up in all
the possible combinations and at all levels of the political map (right,
left, centre, half-left, half-right, alternative, etc.). This only additionally
pushes the citizens towards depression, passiveness, etc.
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In such a situation Macedonia was faced with a military conflict with
criminal-politicised and encouraged groups. As a result of that conflict
in the days behind us Macedonia in the political field was working out
the obligations from the Framework Agreement signed in Ohrid.
The diagnosis is clear: the Macedonian democracy is on a very low
level with discredited and devastated institutions and political elites.
Most of the political platforms have been spent or discredited (liberal,
social-democratic, people’s, national, demo-Christian, Islam, green)
etc. The dilemma is the following: What should be done, i.e. what
should the Macedonian citizens do? They won’t get any help from
politics. The only field at which they will have to face their conscious is
the civil society. Only though the build up networks and mechanisms
of the civil society the sprout of a quality progress related to state
ruling is possible. Only a civil society would be able to keep the
Macedonian policy in a “sanitary cordon” with minimum possibilities to
produce damages not only in its own country but also wider.
2.9. International community
Under this abstract notion the citizens of Macedonia understand not
very clear and defined things. It is a variable with very instable standards
of conduct.
For example in the case of Greece it was shown that that international
community (EU and NATO) is capable of working to their own harm
since the metastasised Macedonia is the centre for “infections” that
could easily surpass its regional borders.
It seems that for the international community is difficult to find its way
around in border cases (borders of military blocks, borders of
civilisations, borders that were drawn in Yalta, etc.) such as the case
of Macedonia. One should have in mind that the international
community (NATO and EU) based on their own conduct either lacked
good enough insight that there is a controlled disintegration of socialism
underway, including the USSR or because of inexplicable slowness in
all the critical phases and moments of that fall it acted late.
The international community suffers from another weakness and that’s
its insincere homogeneousness. Namely, it is clearly obvious that in
regard to the subtle situations (such as the Macedonian military crisis)
the relations between the members of that community are insincere,
that there are solo-politics and that all that goes at hand to the “other
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side”. Also certain political and security structures in the neighbouring
countries of Macedonia got signals that they interpreted quite wrongly.
One should emphasise that the international community in very
inexplicable but very clear situations have never managed to recognise
the real individuals and groups and to support them accordingly. As a
result in Macedonia groups and individuals that rudely forged the
elections, and used democracy only for personal and group interest
got both political and financial support.
As a result of a thoroughly prepared and worked out theoretical
approach the Stability Pact project appeared. The Pact increased the
general inter-state communication in the region and brought back the
Balkans on the agenda of the international organisations, especially
the European Union. However, apart from the criticisms from the very
beginning that these were inappropriate projects, the ones that the
Pact refers to got the least concrete help no matter that it is very true
that the Balkan states (including Macedonia) are mainly unprepared
to accept assistance for the given purposes for which it acts.
The assistance of the international community understood as
associations (NATO, EU, UN, Stability Pact) or as individual states
(mainly members of G07) on a political level has almost always been
carried out within the framework of the following rule “The right people
in the wrong time”, i.e. “The wrong assistance in the right time for the
wrong people”.
In regard to a wider network of international humanitarian organisations
the problems are different. The foreign humanitarian organisations,
foundations and agencies under the patronage of some states, have
realised many successful programmes. (The programmes for
assistance of the small size businesses have already been mentioned,
we should mention the programme for support and development of
the cattle business and diary industry, then the actions of some
investment funds and their investments in already successful
companies, etc.). These organisations spend about 50 million Euros
a year in Macedonia.
3. What’s to be done?
It is very clear that Macedonia needs a fast, efficient assistance directed
to the right place. It is very clear that that assistance must be kept far
from any influences or in touch with any of the political structures i.e.
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the politician-individual. Those who help will need to establish a system
of rigid but still dignified control of the spending of money. In choosing
the controllers they should be extremely subtle so that the controller
would not be taken as a commissar. The foreign donations should be
used most urgently for repairing, finishing and building of as more as
possible of infrastructure (by engaging Macedonian companies and
foreign supervision). The state, i.e. the political elite should insist on
legislation projects that will not be only formal but will also foster and
improve the essence of the regulated area (law on state administration,
law on institutions, etc.).
The civil society will have to be help as rapidly as possibly in order to
be capable of imposing itself on the politics. In that sense the education
of young cadre needs to be helped, as well as their material and moral
support. A new circle of assisting the media as the basic pillar of the
civil society needs to be opened.
The efforts of the international community are significant and should
be greeted but the occasions when it acts in a routine manner and
without sufficient knowledge of the characteristics of the country are
not rare. On the other hand in some of the administrative structures a
passive resistance exists towards the changes as a result of the desire
to maintain the commodity of their functioning. The resistances in some
parts of the reforms emerge from the attitude of calculating by the
parties in power in regard to whether the reforms would incite
dissatisfaction among the electorate. The confirmation of the need for
such calculations is the fact that in the region in the last ten years
none of the Governments that carried out deep structural reforms were
ever re-elected.
Because of that the international community should go into planning
and assisting the reforms in the Republic of Macedonia, in a more
essential and courageous manner and with more concrete support.
In doing that it should lean upon the third, non-governmental sector,
which ideas and proposals could be of great help because of many
reasons - significant portion of the intellectuals are not members of
political party or part of the administrative life, the non-governmental
sector is not burdened by the need to calculate with the voters, as well
as the fact that in many of its international contacts it has accumulated
a significant quantity of information about the reforms in the other
Balkan and Eastern European countries.
The described environment is not an appropriate atmosphere for the
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process of reforms and getting closer to the EU and NATO standards
that the Republic of Macedonia as well as the other Balkan countries
must pass. The Macedonian administration and the Parliament are
trying to find their way around the numerous laws and sub-legal acts,
structural changes in the organisation and the efficiency of the state
apparatus and they do that with noticeable oscillations. A key role in
paving the path towards restructuring and integration of the Republic
of Macedonia could also be played by the administration of the EU,
NATO and the rest of the international organisations and integrative
processes with a coordinated and well-prepared diplomatic pressure
for reforms.
The political elites should be told directly that every individual who will
be especially active in the transitional machinations will be on the list
of unwanted and the domestic (Macedonian) public will be informed
about that. “Some circles” in the neighbourhood will be very sincerely
and very openly presented with the intention for Macedonia to become
a healthy tissue and that everybody could profit from such a healthy
tissue.
On the contrary, divided and weak Macedonia will be damaging for
everybody, and especially to its neighbours.
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MONTENEGRO: COUNTRY REPORT ON THE STATE
FOR DEMOCRACY AND A ROADMAP FOR REFORM
CEDEM, Center for Democracy and Human Rights
State of Democracy and Potential Obstacles
After the transition which has formally been going on for already eleven
years - it is the time that has passed since the first multi-party elections
were held - it is not easy to assess the state of democracy in
Montenegro in a simple manner. It is a little bit easier to present the
different periods of what Montenegro has gone through during these
eleven years. Conditionally speaking, three main periods can be
observed:
• The period 1990-97 in which  Montenegro existed mainly as a
part of the system of rule of Slobodan Milosevic in the FR Yugoslavia,
with relative autonomy and just slightly softer political order than the
one in Serbia, although based on the monopoly pattern of rule by the
then undivided Democratic Party of Socialists (the DPS) within the
formally competent, multi-party system.
• The period 1997-2000, in which the earlier undivided ruling
DPS fell apart, the anti-Milosevic stream became dominant and won
first at the presidential (1997) and then the parliamentary elections
(1998). This was the period of significant liberalization of political order,
the beginning of first serious systemic reforms and adoption of a clear
pro-Western course in the foreign policy orientation. This period was
marked with a harsh three-year fight between the pro-democratic
government in Podgorica and the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, often
at the verge of an armed conflict. The most dramatic moment of this
period was certainly the three-month NATO intervention against the
FRY, when Montenegro proclaimed factual neutrality in the strife, and
in fact acted as an indirect ally of the Western Alliance, admitting at its
territory 79.000 Albanian, and after that over 30.000 Serbian refugees
from Kosovo. Unlike in the previous period of monopoly rule, in this
period the DPS adapted to a new reality and showed readiness to
share rule within a coalition government, but still remained the
predominant party and kept its most significant prerogatives of rule. In
this period another significant change happened – a trend towards
state independence grew significantly, both within the political elite
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and the voting body, and so the idea of state independence, which had
been a minor idea, became, at least, a slightly predominant one.
• In the period from 5 October 2000 until now, after the Milosevic
regime in Belgrade was toppled, Montenegro has been losing the
previous importance it had in the international community as one of
the key links of the anti-Milosevic front, and at the political scene the
issue of state independence has become predominant over all other
issues. This issue caused a government crisis and early parliamentary
elections in April 2001, at which the voting body was divided to the
pro-independent majority (54%) and the federal minority (46%). The
dominant party (the DPS) has been forced to a less convenient form
of rule than in the previous period – to a minority government which
depends on support of the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro. This period
has been marked by slow manoeuvring regarding the issue of
independence, both between Podgorica and Belgrade and within
Montenegro itself. The unsettled issue of state position has become
an increasing burden both to Montenegro and Serbia, with an extremely
unfavourable influence on the realization of necessary reforms.
If we try to define the state of democracy in Montenegro after eleven
years of the multi-party system, we could still make use of certain
useful distinctions. After breaking up with the Milosevic regime in 1997,
Montenegro has not functioned as an authoritarian regime, or any of
its versions. Even besides the fact that president Milo Djukanovic
represents a dominant figure and accumulates power stronger than
has been constitutionally provided for his position, and the fact that
the DPS, within the coalition minority government, represents a
predominant party with greatest power, the political system is in essence
competitive, and elections at all levels, besides all insufficiencies, still
have the character of uncertainty and leave possibilities for shifts at
the ruling positions. It can be said that in Montenegro, from the
standpoint of regular electoral procedures, democracy has become
“the only game in town”. All relevant research of public opinion (including
the one conducted by the CEDEM) corroborate this statement, because
over 80% of citizens support democracy and the multi-party system.
An indirect contribution to this opinion can be found in the percent of
citizen turn-up at polling places (between 70 and 80%), at all electoral
levels.
Like many post-communist countries, in this sense Montenegro
functions as an electoralistic democracy, with certain elements of liberal
democracy. Still, it is a fact that Montenegro has still not become a
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legal state, i.e. it has still not established the rule of law in the usual
sense of that word.
Although even in the developed liberal democracies in the West there
are no absolute guarantees that these democracies cannot be
endangered, engaged in a kind of involuntary process or even
destroyed, these risks are even greater with electorialistic democracies.
If we try to foretell things, we could say that it is more probable that in
the years to come Montenegro is going to take the course of
strengthening of the democratic system, and that the apprehension of
a retreat to a kind of undemocratic system is less probable. Still, the
threats to the democratic process spring from several potential sources,
which are not unbridgeable, but which should be seriously taken into
consideration.
The greatest burden to functioning of democracy in the usual sense is
the already mentioned unsettled issue of state position and a rather
deep division of the voting body. The issue of the Montenegrin state
position, i.e. the character of its state relation with Serbia, belongs to a
group of problems of the so-called long duration. This issue has not
ensued only after the breakdown of the communist Yugoslavia, but it
has deep historical roots dating back to the end of the 19th and the
beginning of the 20th century, when, in the confusion of the World War
One, Montenegro lost its statehood and was annexed by Serbia. This
problem was not seriously considered during the 70 years of existence
of Yugoslavia, but has been actualised when Yugoslavia fell apart in
1991, when a new Serbian-Montenegrin federation (the FRY) was
established, and it has been especially emphasized by the authoritarian
nature of the Milosevic regime.
However, unlike for example Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, where
the convincing pro-independence majority was never questionable,
the Montenegrin population has been almost equally divided regarding
the issue of state independence. Based on numerous polls of public
opinion, as well as on the results of the most recent elections (April
2001), at this moment it can be concluded that the pro-independence
block has a slight majority and a bit better chances to win at the potential
referendum on independence. However, this majority is not convincing,
which at this moment turns the solution of the state position into one of
the potential threats to Montenegrin democracy and stability.
Still, we do not believe that this issue can represent a threat to peace
in the Republic and that it can generate violence. Such a capital threat
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is most probable to have perished together with the collapse of
Milosevic’s regime. Today, despite divisiveness regarding this vital
issue, there are no significant political powers ready to engage into
violence.
The new DOS (the Democratic Opposition of Serbia) government in
Belgrade, although it favours the survival of the federation, has no
interest in war adventures in Montenegro. The Government in Belgrade
has already stated that it would accept any solution chosen by the
citizens of Montenegro. It’s priority is the renewal of Serbia and
complete return to the international community, and it will, eventually,
rather renounce Montenegro than involve into new problems. The
Yugoslav Army is, besides all problems with the personnel from the
Milosevic period, controlled by civil authorities and it will not act against
the will in Serbia and the federation of the ruling DOS.
Both main political blocks in Montenegro – independistas and
federalists – also do not have motives or interests for violent imposing
of their solution to the other side. These two blocks, i.e. their main
parties (the DPS and the SNP) will remain politically strong in any
version of the solution of Montenegrin state position, and hence the
game to get “all or nothing” regarding the issue of Montenegrin
independence brings them nothing but a great risk.
Finally, the most important countries of the international community
factually already lead two complicated and potentially long-lasting peace
operations in the region (Bosnia and Herzegovina – SFOR, Kosovo –
KFOR/UNMIK) and each new instability or crisis does not suit them.
However, although the violent scenario can almost be excluded, the
statehood issue threatens democracy and stability in Montenegro in
other ways. Namely, both Montenegro and Serbia should define the
state framework within which the necessary economic and political
reforms are to be realized. The very defining of the state framework
does not automatically imply successful reforms, but it is quite certain
that the current situation of state “limbo” – neither a federation nor two
independent states – greatly restricts reforms. Without necessary
reforms, the population would generally lose confidence in the
elementary ability of political elites, which has always represented a
favourable ground for various demagogic political formulas, populist
and retrograde political forces. This at the same time includes latent
threats to definitive stabilization of the democratic order.
One of the extremely unfavourable versions for Montenegro is the
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scenario of a creeping parting from Serbia, with constantly present
political conflicts, without minimal agreement both between Belgrade
and Podgorica and within Montenegro itself. Such a scenario would
keep a relatively high level of political tensions, additionally block the
reforms, and could also result in organization of a referendum on state
independence without agreement of the main political forces and after
much uselessly spent time.
Such a scenario could be indirectly or unintentionally stimulated by
the leading countries of the international community, if they remain
steady in their standpoint about “democratic Montenegro in democratic
Yugoslavia”. Of course, this can be a legitimate preference of the USA
and the EU, but only provided that the federalists do not use this as a
basis for their threat to boycott the referendum and to set the conditions
the other side simply cannot accept. In such a situation the pro-
independence block would be forced to organize a referendum on
independence, even without reaching an agreement on procedures,
because it is not realistic to expect that the block which has the majority
in the Parliament and which won the elections on the platform of state
independence, is suddenly going to give up its basic programme aims.
Of course, a referendum which would not be a result of an agreement
between the two main blocks, but boycotted by one, and maybe even
unrecognised by the international community, would cause a long-
term political instability and political conflicts. In this sense the active,
but neutral position of the international community is of great
importance, which, unfortunately, has not always been the case
regarding this issue so far.
It is particularly important to provide conditions for the referendum on
independence to be carried out in a fair and transparent way, with
participation of all interested parties and previously taken obligations
to respect the result, no matter what it is like. Only in such case the
solution of the state position would not be contrary to stabilization of
democratic order in Montenegro, but would support it.
The long-term problem of Montenegrin democracy could be connected
with an absence of strong reform and modern alternative to the current
rule. The Democratic Party of Socialists (the DPS), i.e. its part which
emerged as a winner after the schism in the party in 1997, has been
continually in power for twelve years. First it was the heir of the
Communist Party, then Milosevic’s ally, after that its opponent and
finally, in the post-Milosevic period, a leader of the pro-independence
block. It would be wrong to deem that today it is the same party. It has
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changed together with the changes in its policy. After the schism in
1997, a serious and positive turning point happened, where the more
modern oriented members of the party elite, as well as younger and
more educated party members, remained with the anti-Milosevic side.
Still, the years long rule has created various forms of political and
economic monopolies, including corruption and participation or
patronage of illegal businesses. In accordance with the circumstances
or needs of the times, the DPS accepted the necessity of sharing the
rule with coalition partners, but it remained the predominant factor of
the overall political system. Even in the most developed and most
democratic countries, such a system with a years long and many
elements of monopoly domination of one party (for example Italy,
Japan) creates clientism and introduces instability in the democratic
order. In a country in transition, like Montenegro, a years long rule of
one party can additionally slow down the stabilization of the democratic
order.
However, the problem with a credible, strong, modern and reform
oriented alternative, i.e. opposition, is even more emphasized in
Montenegro. The main opposition party in Montenegro is the Socialist
National Party (the SNP), also emerged from the earlier undivided
DPS, out of which it separated as the pro-Milosevic fraction. The new
party gathered conservative officials and members. Its predominant
voting body has the same characteristics. This party has also been in
power for twelve years – either in the Republic government within the
former undivided DPS, or in federal authorities after the schism in the
DPS. Although after 5 October 2000 the SNP turned its back on its
former ally Slobodan Milosevic, it still participates in the federal
government even today as a compulsory coalition partner of the DOS,
and despite the fact that its attitudes comply with the current political
preferences of the international community (“democratic Montenegro
within democratic Yugoslavia”), this party (and the coalition “For
Yugoslavia” led by it) does not represent a reform alternative to the
DPS. The values of its voting body are mainly anti-modern and often
anti-Western directed. Nationalism, and even chauvinism towards non-
Orthodox minorities in Montenegro, could also be heard at their pre-
electoral meetings. From this standpoint, taking all the risks of using
analogies and comparisons, we could say that a victory of the SNP
and its allies at potential elections in Montenegro would look like
potential victory of communists in Russia. Or, in order to be closer to
reality, it could be compared to a return of Iliescu’s party on the ruling
positions in Romania.
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All this is not just about the SNP, but about a very unfavourable
phenomenon – the party in power has considerably spent its potentials
and energy, and an opposition representing a hope for changes is
inexistent. It could be even spoken about a crisis of the overall political
elite in Montenegro and its spent potentials. Such states can have
long-term unfavourable consequences for development of the
democratic order.
If we add to this the typical illnesses of various post-communist societies
– slow establishment of a system of independent judiciary, largely non-
transparent economic transition creating the monopolistic “new
classes”, huge administration whose serious reform has not even
started at all, etc. – we have a picture of a society which has to
overcome numerous obstacles – some more difficult, some easier, in
order to reach what is called a consolidated democratic order.
Regional Context
The challenges of democracy in Montenegro can also come from the
regional level, concerning the fact that this has been a region of crisis
and instability for a whole decade. The last decade of the last century,
the breakdown of “great” ideas and ideologies and the end of the
communist experiment in vivo, revealed, as opposed to global analyses
and forecasts, that at the geo-political map of New Europe the last
focus of regional instability (with potentially global consequences) was
at the territory of the former Yugoslav “socialist utopia with a human
image” and slightly more to the south. The first year of the century with
an even more seducing ambition – to finally achieve democracy and
spread its planetary virus – just additionally confirms this statement.
So, at the end of such, quite unexpected and unplanned end of the
century, the end of communism, the end of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav
idea, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo got a much greater role
and significance, logically, or perhaps ironically, by historical fate, than
they could have got under other circumstances. This fact has been
and is, at least for some more time, at the same time their potential
chance and their latent risk.
The differences and similarities between these three entities are almost
fascinating. Macedonia – de facto and de jure, is an internationally
recognized state and a UN member, but without the right to its name.
It is quite unclear why and even more unclear until when!? Montenegro
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– de facto independent for several years already, but without
international recognition and without much inclination to be admitted
this right, disregarding the majority will. It is quite unclear why and
even more unclear until when! Kosovo – both de facto and de jure a
more or less classical international protectorate with absolute ambitions
of the absolute majority and complete political elite to take the way to
independence. The alternative is a return to the corpus of Serbia, the
state whose leaders, only yesterday supported at plebiscites, are in
The Hague, and because of whose monumental crimes the NATO
intervened, and Kosovo became exterritorialized and put under
international protectorate. In the case of Kosovo everything is unclear
and even more unclear until when! Supposedly, that is why there is
the fourth entity called FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), a state
which de jure exists, which is internationally recognized and is a UN
member state. However, the FRY does not de facto have the rule at
the territory of its constituents. Here it is clear why, but not until when
this state is going to last and how this is going to be overcome!
This lapidary and possibly simplified outlook of the current political
and constitutional limbo in which Macedonia, and especially
Montenegro and Kosovo, have found themselves, indicates clearly
enough that already in the sphere of unclear and unfinished international
legality and legitimacy of these three political communities lies one
(not, of course, the only) of the most serious sources and potentials of
their inner non-freedom, democratic insufficiency and instability. In the
neighbourhood and in the region, which have never been spared from
similar problems, the inner instability, regardless of its real causes
and roots, generates instability in relations with neighbours almost
according to a natural law. This instability between neighbours is, again
as if by a law, reflected on the wider region with more or less immediate
implications on the global map of geo-political relationships and
constant, but variable interests of the most powerful countries. This is
why the international community spent so much time (not always quite
successfully) in dealing with the Balkans and its South at the end of an
Era, which last decade was, more or less, filled with self-complacency
because of a too early conclusion about the historical and irreversible
triumph of Euro-American values.
The essential, structural and real causes of the still lasting instability in
the south-east Balkans (including, of course, Serbia, Albania and
Bosnia and Herzegovina) represent at the same time prerequisites
and unavoidable suppositions of new regional stability of this part of
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Europe. Briefly: democracy and its institutionalisation, rule of law,
realization and protection of a wide range of human and civil rights
and freedoms, individual and collective, ethnic and religious tolerance
and co-existence within and out of borders of specific countries, a
stronger economic and industrial growth and development. If these
fail to appear or if they are slowed down, the region will go through the
agony of traumatic and unsuccessful post-communist transition for
still a long time. It will also represent, for quite a long time, a latent
source of regional instability and potential conflicts. In an opposite
case, it is realistic to expect perhaps not a spectacular, but reasonably
fast process of integration of these countries and regions in European
integrating trends. This would gradually lessen the space and motives
for conflicts, as sources of instability in the region.
Macedonia has relatively painlessly, without an external conflict and
without a serious inner trauma, gone through a great ordeal of the
breakdown of former Yugoslavia - thanks to circumstances, but also
thanks to serious and competent contemporary political elite. The
construction of the new state and its democratic institutions went more
or less successfully, apart from serious economic problems and
growing social tensions. There ensued a shift of the governing elites
at the elections and in the Parliament, without tensions and threats.
The process of integrating into Europe was accelerated and
institutionalised. There was an impression that the first, most vulnerable
and most dangerous phase of the transition was successfully coming
to an end. Suddenly, or maybe not, the “Albanian question” came to
surface in a very turbulent way. It turned out that almost one third of
Macedonian citizens, mainly ethnic Albanians, were dissatisfied with
their factual and constitutional position in the Macedonian society and
the Constitution of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The
crisis which has already resulted in human victims and announced
new thousands of refugees, was stopped, fortunately, at the very verge
of an abyss. However, it revealed all porosity, frailty, insufficiency and
inefficiency of democratic institutions of the new Macedonian state,
and its political elites, both Macedonian and Albanian. It is not only the
survival of Macedonia, but also the fate of its communities, that depend
on the level of responsibility of these elites, and their readiness to face
the burden of historical responsibility for the fates of communities they
represent, disregarding political consequences. Successful solution
of this problem in Macedonia would have a manifold and very positive
influence on the solution of the complicated rebus called Kosovo, it
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would help Albania to take care of their compatriots living outside
Albania with less prejudices and traumas, and it would certainly facilitate
the problem of inner emancipation of Montenegro.
There is no doubt that in all future analyses of understanding the causes
of the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, and even more of its bloody
and tragic epilogue, Kosovo is going to take an important, maybe
even central position. This province (in the constitutional sense with
significant statehood attributes – legislative, executive and judicial rule)
had relatively harmonious inter-ethnic relationships and a relatively
steady development in the period of Tito’s “democrature”, besides the
ever sensitive demographic-ethnic complex. In the decade of
Milosevic’s Cesarean omnipotence, Kosovo was turned into a political
and spiritual camp for prisoners (the non-Serb, mainly Albanian
population) and their wardens (numerous representatives of Milosevic’s
regime, which, it is true, and disregarding the demographic defect,
had plebiscite support both in Belgrade and in Pristina). Kosovo was,
thus, both the fuse and the great last explosion of the Yugoslav state
illusion. After all that happened in Kosovo during the last decade, and
especially after the spring of 1999, it is improbable to expect that this
region is soon going to become an oasis of democracy, rule of law,
tolerance, co-existence and economic prosperity. This is why Kosovo
is an international protectorate today. And this is why, doubtlessly, it
will remain so for a long time. The October elections for the Kosovo
Parliament and constitution of new organs of authority reveal a new
chapter, bring a chance, but also represent a new, not at all simple
challenge, this time for the leaders of the Albanian majority in Kosovo.
If they manage to get rid of revenge-seeking and not fall in the trap of
same illusions, myths and stereotypes like their Serbian predecessors,
Kosovo could have a chance to survive as a sustainable, civilised and
well organized community, which passes and observes laws. The
burden of proving such a possibility now lies absolutely with the ruling
Albanian majority and the new political elite. A democratic, stable, safe,
prosperous and, to the possible extent, multi-ethnic Kosovo, could
represent the key factor not only for essential pacification of the south-
east Balkans, but a major direction towards its permanent safety and
stability. It remains to be seen whether, after all that happened, this
aim could be easier achieved through the project of independent state
of Kosovo or through a still unclear and undefined regional collective
arrangement.
Finally – Montenegro. In the first years of the Yugoslav breakdown,
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the smallest and least developed Yugoslav republic was a faithful,
though not always active and passionate, ally and fellow of the Serbian
regime and its leader. Distancing from Milosevic’s order and projects
started in the middle of the 1990s, at first discreetly and silently, and
then suddenly and loudly. It entered the phase of painful and
complicated political and economic transition with a delay and amid
the strife with Milosevic, risking to engage into a conflict with the dictator,
but also into serious inner dangers. (The almost Biblical episode of
rescue dates back from this period: when hundreds of thousands of
Albanians, fleeing from Kosovo, found shelter in Montenegro, at which
territory the Yugoslav Army troops were stationed, then commanded
by Milosevic! This episode, without precedent in the region, later
became the basic value in relationships between Montenegro and its
autochthon Albanian minority, but also the state of Albania.) To the
international community, which offered significant help to Montenegro,
it served more as an additional weapon to weaken Milosevic’s order,
and less as an authentic example of positive evolutionary step ahead
in the region. Such an approach naturally slowed down and obstructed
the just commenced processes. At the same time, the following
processes were going on: the process of inner emancipation,
introspective national and state self-maturing, encircling of the re-found
and woken national identity. A new state strategy striving towards
complete independence and return to the position of international legal
subjectivity was being articulated. Today, Montenegro is neither a
member of the federation nor an independent state. It is on the way of
transition, with significant elements of democratic infrastructure and
institutions, but also with serious deformities, inner resistances and
social traumas – not only because of the mentioned episode, but also
because of historical experience and tradition, not idealized, but
harmonious and tolerant relationships with minority nationalities and
religious communities.
Montenegro is in the regional context small, without imperial
pretensions and territorial conflicts, led by logic of survival and
development and open to integrations, and hence it is rather a point of
reconciliation than a source of new instabilities. The cheap, politically
and propagandistically abused thesis on Montenegrin “domino effect”
has broken to pieces all by itself. The Kosovo tragedy happened despite
the fact that Montenegro was not in the federation, violence and war
moved to Macedonia even though Montenegro still hasn’t proclaimed
independence. Hence, Montenegro could represent rather a
consequence or a victim of another domino effect (Kosovar,
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Macedonian, Serbian-Albanian, again!) than be its cause. Even this
does not seem too probable!
Naturally, no possibility is to be underestimated. One of them is the
potential “Macedonisation” of Montenegro. This phrase refers to a
possibility of similar action taken by political forces belonging to the
Albanian minority in Montenegro, like the one that happened in
Macedonia. From today’s perspective, this possibility does not seem
realistic. The Albanian minority makes about 7% of the Montenegrin
population, and it has been traditionally/historically loyal to the
Montenegrin state throughout the 20th century, and has been solidly
integrated in the political system.
Its leaders showed enviable temperance in the last decade, probably
also because of the fact that this minority has a rather good amount of
rights, including the special clause in the electoral law on its participation
in the Parliament, schools in Albanian, etc. Some rights, on the other
hand, like participation in administrative and judiciary rule are not at a
good level, but they represent a topic of regular discussions and
searches for solutions. Among Albanians in Montenegro there doesn’t
seem to be any forces turned towards any kind of political extremity.
Furthermore, in all previous electoral cycles in the last three years, the
Albanian population secured more mandates for multi-ethnic parties
(the DPS, the SDP, the LSCG) than to “their” national parties. Such an
example does not exist almost anywhere else in the region.
Still, the attempt to “export” the crisis is not to be excluded. If it really
happened at a certain point of time, it would be a significant loss for
the democratic order and stability in Montenegro. However, such a
possibility, according to the current state of affairs, seems only
theoretical.
Road Map to Reform Graphic
representation of
reform attempts
in Montenegro in
the previous
decade.
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I. Illusion about Changes
The overcome socialist order in the former SFR Yugoslavia and the
beginning of reforms in the anachronistic and unproductive political
and economic system (in the period 1987-1990), caught Montenegro
in conditions which could not guarantee any significant social changes.
The strong influence of the inherited conservative collectivistic
consciousness and absence of reform potentials led to establishment
of a populist post-communist government.115  Apart from the fact that
the concept of political and economic reforms initiated by the federal
authorities116  included Montenegro too, the ranges of proclaimed
changes in practice were insignificant and without any serious effects.
The construction of the so-called new society117  in Montenegrin political
circumstances soon turned into a generally accepted rhetoric without
obvious results and with insignificant effects.118  Such state policy very
soon became a natural ally to destructive nationalism and anti-reform
militaristic demagogy.119  Instead of entering structural changes of the
overdue and inefficient political, legal and economic system, this made
Montenegro enter the enchanted circle of Milosevic’s wars and overall
social decadence within the framework of the newly constituted
Serbian-Montenegrin state community (FR Yugoslavia, April 1992).
The idea of the new society which would enable its citizens a more
prosperous life was all of a sudden turned into a tragic political
grotesque.
Blocking of economic reforms, distancing from democracy and the
115
 At the first post-communist elections held in 1990, the ruling communist party
won the reform opposition with a convincing result (over 60% of won mandates).
116
 The first reform Yugoslav Government of president Ante Markovic initiated thorough
changes of the inherited socialist system, (introduction of the multi-party system, equality
of private property, de-monopolisation of industry, etc.), which nominally included all
parts of former Yugoslavia.
117
 The used euphemism for democratic community and free market.
118
 Even three years after the proclaimed reform policy, Montenegro remained a
collectivist and monopolistic society, marked with one-party rule and state control over
industry. The multi-party system and economic pluralism lingered at the margins of
society.
119
 After the start of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, Montenegrin authorities took the
side of Slobodan Milosevic, and his genocide policy focused on the plan of constituting
a greater Serbian state and forced dissolution of Yugoslavia.
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idea of free market, meant for Montenegro not just a too expensive
waste of time, but also a direct way into the collapse of national
economy. Although it belonged to the most undeveloped part of
Yugoslav industry (besides Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina), Montenegrin economy managed to provide an average
standard of its population and to develop rather good foreign trade
potentials. According to official data120  from this period, the national
product per capita in Montenegro amounted to 2.300$, with a tendency
of double growth until the beginning of 2000. At the same time,
Montenegrin export economy sold its main products and services
(aluminium, iron, coal, timber, tourism, navigation) to foreign countries
or other Yugoslav republics.
In the years preceding the breakdown of SFR Yugoslavia, Montenegro
exported goods and services worth about 600 million $, while the import
was slightly bigger and amounted about 700 million $. In this way,
even though undeveloped, Montenegro still managed to provide a
bearable foreign trade negative disparity of only 6,26%. Unlike the
permanent deficit in dealing with the rest of Yugoslavia, as early as
1982 Montenegro had a positive balance of exchange with foreign
countries, realizing a surplus of over 100 million $. Together with the
collapse of Yugoslavia, Montenegro lost business communications with
four former Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia), experiencing great losses (especially in
tourism) and simultaneously reducing economic links to one-sided
relationships with Serbia. At the same time, the anti-reform and,
politically speaking, the majority in Montenegro, together with
Milosevic’s Serbia, joined the new federal community consisting of
two member states, thus binding its industry to the Serbian market
and significantly reducing its own foreign trade resources. Following
the Serbian state policy, besides the already advanced process of
destructing its own industry, the state in Montenegro was additionally
worsened by economic sanctions imposed by the international
community,121  which, along with the earlier loss of the Yugoslav market,
led to a dramatic devastation of Montenegrin economy and an
enormous decline in the standard of living and the gross national
120
 Statistic yearbook of the SFRY.
121
 As a part of FR Yugoslavia, between 1992 and 1997 Montenegro suffered strict
sanctions of the international community, which were significantly eased only after the
political victory of anti-Milosevic forces at presidential elections in October 1997 (victory
of M. Djukanovic).
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product.
Montenegrin national product halved in comparison to the period before
sanctions (from 1.6 billion $ to about 700 million $), while the national
product per capita drastically decreased (from 2.300$ to 800$).
Sanctions of the international community froze the industrial growth in
Montenegro, inflicting a long-term harm to Montenegrin economy,
disabling the process of privatisation and vitally needed reforms,
stimulating grey economy and reducing foreign trade to dependence
on the Serbian market. To make the things even worse, besides the
foreign sanctions, as early as 1995 Montenegro started to suffer from
inner trade sanctions imposed by Serbia, which until 1999 escalated
to a complete closure of the Serbian border with Montenegro. The
flaming of the trade war against Montenegro, as a consequence of
changed Montenegrin policy, led to additional losses in Montenegrin
industry, which were for this period estimated to over 50 million$.122
The breaking of trade connections between Serbia and Montenegro,
accompanied with foreign economic sanctions imposed by the
international community, disabled any kind of recovery of Montenegrin
industry and additionally affected the stopping of development of market
economy, pauperising the population at the same time and
impoverishing Montenegrin economic potentials. On the other hand,
the Serbian trade blockade forced Montenegrin entrepreneurs to look
for alternative markets, which had a strategically positive consequence
of renewing economic connections with Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo,
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.
The wrong choice of the state position and the regional position in
circumstances of violent breakdown of Yugoslavia, led Montenegro in
an economic sense during the eight long and lost years (1990-1998)
to a loss in national product of over 5 billion $.123  Besides, average
salaries decreased more than four times, the unemployment rate
increased to around 40%, the national product per capita decreased
more than 3 times. When speaking about certain branches of industry,
Montenegro suffered enormous damages in the maritime trade fleet,
which had been very profitable, bringing an income of over 120 million
$ annually. At the end of 1998 this fleet was reduced to only one fifth of
earlier number of ships, and burdened with enormous losses (over 50
million $). The Montenegrin tourism, as the main export branch of
 122
 Official data.
123
 Estimations of independent experts and non-governmental organizations.
249
industry, which used to have a profit of over 150 million$ annually, also
lost almost 1 billion $ during the last eight years.
Generally speaking, instead of a reformed economy and real social
prosperity, Montenegro has had enormous losses in the previous
decade, its economic substance was greatly damaged, and it found
itself in a situation much worse than at the moment of the end of
communism. All in all, the beginning of real economic reforms caught
Montenegro in much worse circumstances than those characteristic
of the local industrial structure in 1989. However, unlike the dominant
one-party consciousness from those years and minor civil initiatives,
contemporary Montenegrin society has been democratically
strengthened and certainly more ready for necessary reform
changes.124 The illusion about the reforms from the end of the 1980s
has been turning at the beginning of this new century into an inevitability
of real changes and unavoidability of real reformation of this political
community delayed in many aspects.
II. Delayed Transition
When speaking about structural social changes, the last ten years in
Montenegro have mainly represented a period of difficult survival in
circumstances of devastated and monopolized economy and
retrograde post-communist political system.125  Between 1990-1997,
Montenegro represented a classical example of a post-communist
society incapable to distance itself from destructive political interests
(facade democracy, fictional multi-party system, threatened human
rights, etc.).
Only after breaking up with Milosevic’s policy (autumn 1997) and
establishment of intensive connections with the USA and the European
Union, has the process of inherited socio-economic structure slowly
started in Montenegro, as well as the creation of conditions for
overcoming the phenomenon of the “delayed transition”.
124
 Today, Montenegro is administered by the three-member coalition (the DPS, the
SDP, the LSCG), while numerous reformist civil initiatives from the sphere of civil
society and non-governmental sector are in a state of permanent increase.
125
 In the period 1990-1997 the nominal multi-party system in Montenegro functioned
as a one-party rule of transformed communists (the DPS), who had a dominant position
in the quasi-democratic political order thanks to their property and economic monopoly.
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1. Hibernated Privatisation
Keeping the industrial structure from the socialist period and engaging
only into administrative transformation of the former social industry 126
(the so-called managing and property transformation controlled by para-
state public funds), with slight privatisation effects (only about 6%),
the Montenegrin state policy stimulated the so-called hibernated
privatisation in the last decade. Weak ranges in the area of privatisation
not only disabled structural economic changes, but also directly
influenced the sustaining of the para-democratic political system and
thwarting of establishment of an efficient legal state.
2. Facade Democracy
Survival of the mechanism of controlled and collectivist industry, with
marginal entrepreneurship initiatives, indubitably expressed itself in
the political sphere through sustaining of undemocratic political forms
and general manner of rule according to the measure of late
communism. Besides the nominal constitutional order which
guaranteed democracy and political pluralism, practice in many of its
aspects denied the possibility of sincere reform of political institutions,
organizations and structures. Slow transition of Montenegrin political
society and many years lost in this respect, represented an extreme
obstacle for commencement of authentic social reforms.127
3. Legal State
Besides the constitutional definition of independent judiciary authorities,
we cannot speak about establishment of the rule of law in the last
decade in Montenegro, nor is it possible to consider that the
prerequisites for breaking up with the communist concept of a party-
state have been available. Partly and partial control of the process of
election of judges, bad material circumstances in Montenegrin judiciary,
significant systemic influence of executive rule regarding legislature,
resulted in great problems in providing the system of division of rule,
and directly discredited the idea of legal state. 128
The increase of crime in society as a result of war in the surrounding
126
 Para-state industry still earns more than 60% of gross national product (GNP).
127
 Dominant political forces and a great part of the opposition personified for a long
time undemocratic party organizations, charismatic methods of leading parties and
promotion of practice typical of nationalistic and communist parties.
128
 Research of public opinion in the last three years has almost constantly pointed to
weak confidence of citizens in judiciary rule (between 30% and 35%).
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and inner negative relationships, as well as an intensification of the
phenomenon of corruption in the work of state and para-state organs
and institutions, i.e. inappropriate and weak reply of the judiciary rule
to increased forms of numerous untypical but serious criminal offences
(war crimes, drug trade, various forms of illegal trade, sex-trafficking,
racquet, etc.), contributed to discrediting of judiciary authorities and
police organs.129
In any case, the problem of establishing a legal state represents a
priority and the focal point of the reformist rearrangement of social
relationships in Montenegro.
4. Potentials
Montenegro has got enough potentials which could provide a productive
period of active transitional policy. At the relatively large territory (13.812
square km) regarding the number of inhabitants (680.000), and with
obvious natural resources (waters, bauxite, timber, coal, salt) and an
attractive combination of continental and maritime landscapes (the
length of the coast is 293 km), the frozen industrial growth and low
GNP which have characterised Montenegrin transition so far are
paradoxical.
A more active and conceptual attitude towards its own potentials
represents one of the main conditions for realization of quality reform
policy and dynamic overcoming of numerous transitional problems in
Montenegro in the period to come.
Supplement:
a) The number of inhabitants in Montenegro and the neighbouring
countries
129
 In an even more radical manner, the police was in the previous decade under direct
political control, which disabled the transformation of this significant state organ into a
professional public service.
No. Country Population
1 Montenegro 680.000
2 Serbia (with Kosovo) 10.000.000
3 Albania 3.490.435
4 Croatia 4.282.216
5 Italy 57.634.327
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.835.777
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Graphic representation:
b) The area of Montenegro and the neighbouring countries
No. Country Area
1 Montenegro 13.812 km2
2 Serbia (with Kosovo) 88.412 km2
3 Albania 28.748 km2
4 Croatia 56.538 km2
5 Italy 301.230 km2
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 51.129 km2
Graphic representation:
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c) The GNP and the rate of industrial growth130  for Montenegro and
the neighbouring countries
130
 Data for 2000. (CIA World Fact Book/ official statistic for Montenegro)
131
 The coalition (the DPS, the SDPCG, the NS) that won at the parliamentary elec-
tions in May 1998 enabled the beginning of a limited reform process in Montenegro.
No. Country GNP bil. $ GNP - per capita ($) Industrial growth
1 Croatia 23,9 5.100 0%
2 Bosnia and
Herzegovina
6,3 1.770 5%
3 Serbia 12,0 1.300 0%
4 Albania 5,6 1.650 8%
5 Italy 1.212,0 21.400 1,3%
6 Montenegro 0,900 1.300 5%
Graphic representation:
III. The Way into Reforms
1. The Start of Reforms
Reform changes in Montenegro were initiated only after the breakdown
of the one-party rule of the DPS and after distancing of the official
Podgorica from Milosevic’s  destructive greater-Serbian policy (1997/
1998). By forming the multi-party coalition,131  which in its programme
focused on the necessity of general social reforms, with considerable
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support of the international community, adequate changes in various
fields were initiated in Montenegro. However, the radical complication
of the constitutional crisis (legal state position of Montenegro and
political relationships with Serbia ruled by Milosevic) during 1998/99,
and the NATO intervention caused by Milosevic’s apartheid policy in
Kosovo, significantly lessened the effects of the first reformist steps
and factually considerably limited the overall reform process.
Besides, objective limitations, weakness and inefficiency in the work
of the coalition government, additionally slowed down the proclaimed
way into reforms. 132  However, the years in which the state policy
decided to approach democratic values of Western societies in reality
represent just the beginning of structural changes in Montenegro.133
2. Economic Reforms
In the three previous years, economic reforms in Montenegro were
mainly concentrated on enlivening the process of privatisation,
liberalization of foreign trade, free regime of prices, monetary changes
and balancing of the budget policy. Although within Montenegrin
privatisation there came to the first cases of foreign investments and
foreign management (selling of the control package of shares of the
only Montenegrin brewery for 25 million DEM, presence of foreign
management in the key industry of aluminium in Podgorica, selling of
the minority package of shares of the health centre in Igalo to an
American pharmaceutical company, etc.), the controversial privatisation
contracts, certain scandals in privatisation transactions, as well as the
generally slowed down privatisation process, significantly delayed the
efficient realization of economic reforms. In this sense, neither the
current process of mass voucher privatisation (free distribution of
vouchers to over 450.000 citizens), which has been going on without
significant problems from the legal-technical point of view and which
will lead to a considerable change of property structure in
Montenegro,134  does not represent a possibility for a soon recovery of
132
 Exhausting itself in the dangerous conflict with Milosevic’s destructive policy,
Montenegrin pro-reformist government considerably neglected the need of a more
intense attitude towards the changes of the neglected social structure.
133
 The period 1998-2001.
134
 Mass voucher privatisation should provide domination of private property in
Montenegro and initiate a more intensive development of the financial market.
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national economy.
However, the biggest changes in Montenegro were realized at the level
of monetary reforms, because during the last three years Montenegro
introduced the German mark as a means of payment, formed its Central
Bank and passed new banking legislature. The changes in this area
have contributed to stability of prices, decrease of earlier drastic inflation
and creation of systemic conditions for a more efficient macroeconomic
policy. Finally, the monetary reform is still not completed, because
Montenegro is to enter the so-called EURO area, after which the official
currency of the European Union is going to become the official currency
in Montenegro, too.135
Within the price policy in Montenegro, significant steps have been taken
regarding the reduction of the control role of the state, so that today
less than 2% of prices are under the control136  regime. In this way the
need for establishment of free market was emphasized. Also,
determining the average customs rate to 5%, Montenegro broke up
with the earlier non-stimulating federal customs regime and arranged
a relatively stimulating customs and foreign trade system.137
Finally, the introduction of treasury into state finances and determination
for balanced budget policy (which still hasn’t disabled a significant
budget surplus 138 ), besides a positive attitude towards the need of
real-non-inflation sources of financing, faced the Montenegrin state
with problems of regular and updated servicing of public consumption,
which is a direct consequence of unfavourable current economic trends.
It is quite certain that Montenegrin economic reforms are still at the
beginning, that they have been going on in an imbalanced manner
and with obvious structural disparities (breakthrough at one level and
weaknesses at other ones). This is why the plan of consistent and
carefully planned changes in the industrial sphere is one of the key
prerequisites for the overall transformation of social structure and
creation of a democratic state, legal security and free market.
135
 From January 1, 2002, EURO will be the official currency in Montenegro.
136
 Here we mean prices of electric energy and services in the area of telecommuni-
cations and water supply.
137
 Import of over 95% of products is free.
138
 Montenegrin budget has a permanent deficit of over 50 million DEM.
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Supplement:
Macroeconomic figures in 2000 Indicators
1) Gross National Product
GNP 900 million $
GNP - per capita 1.300 $
GNP – the rate of growth 5%
2) Branches of industry
Agriculture (percent in the GDP) 20%
Industry (percent in the GDP) 50%
Services (percent in the GDP) 30%
Agriculture – the rate of growth 1%
Industry – the rate of growth 0%
Services – the rate of growth 40%
Annual production of electric energy 2,6 billion kwh
Annual consumption of electric energy 3,3 billion kwh
Investments 32 million DEM
3) Foreign trade relationships
Export 250 million $
Import 330 million $
Main export products services, metal, timber
Main import products Oil, food, textile
Foreign trade surplus 80 million $
Main export partners Switzerland, Serbia, Italy
Main import partners Serbia, Slovenia, Italy
4) Foreign debt
Total foreign debt 305 million $
Foreign debt per capita 500 $
5) Public consumption
Public consumption (percent in the GNP) 55%
State budget (percent in the  GNP) 45%
6) Monetary policy
Official currency DEM
Rate of the official currency 1 DM=2,2 $
Monetary mass 157 million DEM
Credit mass 45 million DEM
Inflation 19%
7) Employment
The number of the employed 114.749
The number of the unemployed 84.700
The rate of unemployment 40%
The rate of growth of employment 0,1%
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8) Social policy
The number of socially supported families 7.950
The number of users of subventions for people incapable
of taking care of themselves
4.598
Displaced persons 60.330
9) Wages and pensions
Average salary 200 DEM
Average pension 188 DEM
The number of pensioner 84.782
10) Education
High education 23.154 (5,0%)
Higher education 17.559 (3,8%)
Secondary education 160.735 (35%)
Elementary school 135.545 (29,5%)
No school diploma 40.724 (8,9%)
1-7 grades of elementary school 75.062 (16,3%)
The number of illiterate over 10 years of age 30.443 (5,9%)
Graphic respesentation of the educational structure:
3. Legal reforms
One of the greatest obstacles for establishment of an authentic
democratic society is the absence of efficient mechanisms of legal
protection. Independent judiciary rule, competent and uncorrupted state
administration, professional police, well-organised and considerably
independent local administration, as well as a high quality legislative
framework for carrying out of structural social changes, represent an
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irreplaceable condition for a successful social transformation of each
post-communist state community. All these relevant aspects of legal
reform have for years been the weakest link in the Montenegrin reform
process. Continual delaying of essential changes in the domains of
functioning of legal-administrative authorities greatly diminishes the
reached results in other social domains and at the same time
significantly slows down the realization of complete reforms.
Summarizing the state in legal and administrative institutions
and the organization of public rule in Montenegro, it is possible to state
the following:
• Besides the constitutional principle of division of rule, posi-
tive legislature and inherited political practice greatly limit the ranges
of the nominal independence of legislative authorities (judiciary and
attorney organs);
• The Constitutional Court, as a respectable state organ pro-
tecting the constitutionalism and legality of legal acts in the previous
practice has not represented a significant factor in defence and affir-
mation of those constitutional solutions which are fully compatible with
the idea of democracy, free market and development of civil society;
• The police has greatly functioned as an organ dependent
on political authorities, with insufficient professional credibility and fail-
ing confidence with the widest public;
• State administration symbolizes an obtuse and inefficient
centralized management, with all failures of the former socialist sys-
tem, a considerable number of employed civil servants (about 12% of
the employed financed from the state budget) and a net of managing
institutions (33) controlled by the Republic Government;
• Local self-management has extremely reduced capacities
due to the fact that the organization of rule in Montenegro is centralist
to a great extent, it is dominantly influenced by political parties, which
excludes a quality communication between citizens and local authori-
ties, and is greatly burdened by the inefficient and anachronistic work
of local bureaucracy and the number of its members (about 2.000
employed);
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Supplement (illustration of hypertrophied state administration):
The Scheme of State Administration in Montenegro
GOVERNMENT
Managements Ministries Sekretariats
Direction of Public
Income Ministry of Justice
Secretariat for
Legislature
Direction for
immovable property
Ministry of the
Interior
Secretariat for
Information
Ucustoms
Management
Ministry of
Finances
Secretariat for
Development
Managing
Organisations
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Secretariat for
Sports
Bureau for geodetic
property-legal
affairs
Ministry of
Education and
Science
Statistical Bureau Ministry ofCulture
Weather Bureau Ministry ofIndustrie
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Seismological
Bureau
Ministry of Navigation
and Traffic
Direction for
Reserves
Ministry of Agriculture,  Forestry
and Water Resources Management
Direction for
Public Works
Ministry of
Tourism
ZAMTES
(International Cooperation)
Ministry of
Trade
State archive Ministry of Health
Agency for development
of small and medium
companies
Ministry of Environment
Protection and Regional
Planning
Ministry of Labour
and Social Care
Agency for
Anti-Corruption
Initiative
Ministry for Protection
of Members of
National and Ethnic
Groups
Agency for
Telecommunications
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4. Political Reforms
Besides the fact that during the last three years significant changes at
the general political level139  happened in Montenegro, many issues
relevant for establishment of an authentic democratic community are
still open. Contemporary Montenegrin political system is characterised
by a series of limitations and obstacles, which represents a sufficient
reason for reforming the actual political structure. The mentioned issues
include the following:
4.1. Constitutional-Legal Framework
The unsettled (conflicting) state position of Montenegro and different
concepts of political rule at the federal (councillor government) and
the republic levels (parliamentary government), i.e. the unclear
framework for development of constitutional democracy in Montenegro,
represent a great obstacle for creation of a rounded and consistent
reform atmosphere. This is the basic obstacle for strategic defining of
reforms in Montenegro.
4.2. “Partyto-cracy“
The communist heritage, the long duration of the one-party political
model in circumstances of unfinished transition, and finally the
formation of dominant multiparty structures in several previous years,
led to the establishment of a typical party-cratic democracy in which
the central point belongs to political parties. Such a concept of rule
greatly marginalised the positions of civil society and a citizen as a
source of political rule. At the same time, the valid electoral system
counter-constitutionally superimposed140  the rule of parties on the
principle of ignoring the voters’ will to a certain extent. Furthermore,
the anachronistic law on association of citizens141  is still in power in
Montenegro. This law partly treats the principles of political organizing,
which establishes the activities and financing of parties in an overcome
way unacceptable for modern societies.
139
 Removal from the greater-Serbian state and nationalistic policy, cooperation with
Euro-Atlantic states, the beginning of social reforms and rearrangement of one-
party political system.
140
 Although the Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro guarantees independence
and irrevocability of the deputy function, the Constitutional Court enabled political parties
with its decision to change and bring new deputies disregarding the will of citizens.
141
 From 1990.
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4.3. Human Rights
The last decade in Montenegro was marked with numerous examples
of violation of human rights. Although the legal order offered possibilities
for protection of the greatest part of internationally recognized human
rights, the court practice142  is still very scarce in this area, while the
overall social climate is often controversial. Disregarding the fact that
significant steps ahead in this domain were made in Montenegro in
the last few years in comparison to the earlier period,143 , it is still not
possible to talk about a realized degree of human rights according to
the principles of generally accepted international standards. However,
the fact that the ruling Montenegrin policy in many aspects corresponds
to the system of protection of basic human rights and freedoms is
quite encouraging.
5. Civil Society
During the greatest part of the 1990s, civil initiatives and independent
media in Montenegro had a marginal social status with no possibilities
to take significant part in reforms of the anachronistic social structure.
Still, the breakdown of Milosevic’s policy and the defeat of his followers,
as well as the commencement of the process of transformation of
Montenegrin society in 1998, conditioned an explosion of civil initiatives
and various media houses. Thanks to the presence of numerous
international non-governmental organizations and donors, for a
relatively short period of time there came to a recovery and stronger
functioning of the most relevant segments of civil society in Montenegro.
Local and foreign non-governmental organizations, private press and
electronic media, as well as various voluntary activities of individual
and general importance, have contributed to a beginning of real
transition in the domain od civil relationships and private civil initiatives.
This has greatly enabled the commencement of the transition of the
overcome political system into a democratic political and economic
order. With changes of legal regulations in a series of domains
significant for the development of civil society, and especially with
passing the Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (July 1999), in
Montenegro started a process of construction of a positive legal
142
 Capacity of the Constitutional Court.
143
 Regarding the respect of human rights, Montenegro is still one of the positive
examples in the region.
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framework, which should provide a minimum of stimulation for forming
institutions of civil society in transitory social circumstances.
The initial steps ahead in the domain of civil society in Montenegro
offer hope for the possibility of permanent establishment of serious
civil institutions and quality initiatives, which will not be able to be ignored
by state and political structures, and which will decisively contribute to
constitution of perspective Montenegrin democracy with the force of
positive example. In this sense, the following elements will be of
supreme significance for development of civil society in Montenegro:
further development of voluntary civil actions and initiatives,
development of professional private media, establishment of a greater
number of non-governmental organizations in all domains usually in
capacity of state organs, creation of legal framework which will lead to
a productive social connection between the profitable (commercial)
and the non-governmental sector, as well as the development of partner
projects between the state and the institutions of civil society.
The speed of constituting a respectable democratic order in
Montenegro, as well as providing of necessary conditions for integration
of Montenegrin society into the European political structure, will greatly
depend on the development of the civil sector.144  In this context the
greatest responsibility lies on the Government of the Republic of
Montenegro,145  which is obliged to provide a productive atmosphere
for strengthening of civil society institutions, as well as to stimulate
with direct support the activities of the non-governmental sector
irreplaceable in the process of forming an open civil community and a
democratic state.
IV. International Support to Reforms
Introduction
Since 1998 Montenegro has started to enjoy considerable help of the
international community (financial, in products, professional, etc.),
 144
 Thanks to stimulating regulations, over 1.200 non-governmental organizations
were registered in Montenegro , out of which almost 100 are foreign.
145
 Unlike the period 1998-2000, in 2001 the Government showed a more negative
attitude towards the civil sector, especially in the area of financial support and obvious
disagreement (and silent rejection) with reform laws and initiatives proposed by nu-
merous non-governmental organizations.
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without which the recovery of national economy would be impossible,
and without which there would be no significant steps ahead at the
level of democracy and structural reforms. The fact that during 1999/
2000 Montenegro received the greatest help given by the USA to a
foreign country (per capita), excluding Israel, tells enough about the
degree of this help.
Besides the direct financial and humanitarian help by the USA and the
EU governments, numerous international and national non-
governmental organizations considerably supported the establishment
of political stability and initial development of democratic and
entrepreneur initiatives. All positive steps ahead which ensued in
Montenegro in the last few years could not be possible without support
of the international community and various donating lines which had a
decisive influence on the economic and political stability and initiation
of reform changes.
In the period 1998-2001 Montenegro received about 800 million DEM
of international help, which enabled stable functioning of state rule,
servicing of budget deficits and financial support to a series of projects
of reform importance.
Supplement no. 1:
I  Help by the EU and the SAD to Montenegro in million DEM
Donor 1999 – 2000 2001 2002
European Union 215,4 117,6 29,4 +
humanitarian help
The USA 268,9 162,0 89,0
Total: 485,3 279,6 118,4
Graphic representation:
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Supplement no. 2:
II Structure and amount of help in the period 1999 - 2001146
146
 In the period 1999-2000 Montenegro received financial help for stimulation of reforms
from the American Government and the Western governments worth almost 200 million
DEM. At the same time, the Euro-Atlantic financial support to the state budget, social
policy and refugees amounted to over 450 million DEM.
No. The Structure of Help Amount in Million DEM %
Humanitarian help 103,6 13,5%
1 European Union 68,6
2 The USA (USAID – food for peace) 35,0
Infrastructure 97,0 12,7%
1 European Union (renewal+education) 97,0
Re-structuring of Industry 54,1 7,1%
1 The USA (USAID – industry+private sector) 54,1
Democracy 43,2 5,6%
1 The USA (USAID) 40,2
2 European Union (media) 3,0
Finansijska podr{ka 467,0 61,1%
1 The USA (various help) 255,8
2 The USA (agricultural products) 45,8
3 European Union (special help) 78,4
4 European Union (food help) 61,5
5 European Union (for refugees)  25,5
Total Support 764,9 100%
a) Graphic representation of support to reform projects:
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b) Graphic representation of support to the state budget
Supplement no. 3:
III. International governmental and non-governmental
organizations with the function of key donors and bearers of
various forms of support to reforms in Montenegro:
No. The Name of the Organisation
1 OSI (Open Society Institute)
2 USAID/OTI
3 NDI
4 Charles Stewart Mott Fondacija
5 Norwegian National Support
6 UNICEF
7 World Vision
8 ABA/CEELI
9 Danish council for refugees
10 Charity Know How
11 Lan O’ Lakes
12 Fridrih Ebert
13 Konrad Adenauer
14 Nansen Dialogue Centre
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Graphic representation of support to civil society in 2000:
Stability Pact
Joining the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, Montenegro
considerably improved the chances of intensifying the reform processes
and stimulating the most important structure changes. In this respect
the Work Table II is particularly important, i.e. the “Investment
Agreement” whose implementation has already started, and which
includes:
Phase I of the Agreement:
• policy of direct foreign investments;
• strategy of promotion and programmes of direct foreign
investments;
• development of small and medium companies;
• privatization;
• reform of the fiscal and tax systems;
• bribe and corruption;
• cooperative management;
• accounting regime and practice and development of financial
sector;
Phase II of the Agreement:
• development of specific recommendations for reform of poltics
for countries and designing of regional initiatives in the domain
of politics;
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Phase III of the Agreement:
• monitoring of the progress in implementation of policies,
improvement of investing conditions and realization of
investments in South-East Europe.
In any case, realisation of the Stability Pact is of special significance
for development projects in Montenegro and a successful completion
of all aspects of reforms. Support to structural changes in the financial
and consulting portfolio of the Stability Pact is of vital importance for
an efficient transformation of Montenegrin society.
Reform Donations
At the recently held donor conference in Brussels147  Montenegro was
promised about 120 million $ for infrastructural and reform projects,
which represents a high share of 10% of total means approved for the
147
 The Conferrence was held in Brussels on 29 June 2001.
FRY (Serbia/Montenegro).
Summary
Evaluating the support of the international community, we can
state the following relevant aspects:
• financial and expert support of international organizations and
governments of western countries had a decisive significance
for stabilization of economic and political circumstances in
Montenegro and for reviving of reforms;
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• material support to the non-governmental and private media
sectors was decisive, both regarding the survival of a series
of projects and regarding the development of institutions and
organisations of civil society;
• the amount of invested money and spent energy in reform
programmes is still not proportionate to results, which is a
consequence of inconsistent approaches, inexperienced
foreign councillors and frequent absence of a quality link
between local government (non-government) partners and
foreign organizations;
• the greatest problems regarding foreign support were obvious
in the area of defining reform legislature with frequent
examples of imposing inappropriate foreign normative
solutions, which in practice leads to inapplicability of legal
norms or to denial of formal nature of the local legal system;
• a great failure in the work of international organisations can
be observed in the insufficient cooperation with the civil sector
regarding stimulation and development of reforms, i.e. in the
uncritical and incompetent forms of cooperation with the
government representatives;
• finally, a long-term presence of Western governments and
international non-governmental organisations has got a
strategic significance for a successful completion of the
transition process in Montenegro and for realization of
sustainable and elementary successful reforms.
V. Consistent Reforms
The reform policy in Montenegro in the years to come has to focus on
tight cooperation of its inner potentials and international institutions
and organisations. Only an open and competent state policy and an
integrative concept of civil society can provide quality cooperation with
the international factor and create an atmosphere for a successful
realization of commenced reforms.
Bearing in mind the current circumstances, ranges of actual changes
present limitations and failures, as well as the emphasized sluggishness
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of the reform process, it is possible to consider the creation of a
No. Content:
1 Definition of the national constitutional-legal framework
2 Regulation of the status of political parties
3 Construction of electoral legislature ruled not only by political parties
4 Introduction of the institution of Ombudsmana
5 Institutionalisation of parliamentary democracy
consistent reform framework through priority implementation of the
No. Content:
1 Completion of the process of privatisation of para-state industry
2 Establishment of financial market (stock-exchange activities)
3 Completion of the monetary reform (the EURO system)
4 Creation of a stable and liberal business framework for companies, banks
and foreign investments
5 Re-arrangement of off-shore business
6 Modern arrangement of the regime of concessions and free trade zones
7 Abolishment and control of inherited monopolies
8 Further liberalization of the currency, customs and foreign trade regimes
9 Establishment of a stimulating and comparative tax system
10 Protection of economic interests of consumers
11 Reduction of public consumption
following key ideas and transition projects:
No. Content:
1 Modernisation, staff renewal and implementation of conditions for
independent work of legislative authorities (judiciary and attorney organs)
2 Transformation of police into a professional service
3 Reduction, staff renewal and efficient organization of managing authorities
4 Decentralization of state rule and establishement of local self-government
5 Adopting of anti-corruption regulations
6 Taxing of monopolistic and privileged extra-profit
7 Partial restitution
8 Re-definition of the rule on basic property relationships
9 Market adaptation of obligation norms
10 Arrangement and protection of intellectual property
11 Changes of criminal legislative
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1. Political Reforms
No. Content:
1 Cooperation with international instituions and organizations
2 Support to reform processes through legislative initiatives and public
campaigns
3 Critical control of political structures and organizations
4 Stimulating systemic framework
5 Media freedoms
2. Economic Reforms
3. Legal Reforms
4. Civil Society
Let us conclude: all key aspects of reforms in Montenegro
have to be regarded as a part of a single process, which at the same
time implicitly includes removal of current disparities in implementation
of reform solutions and creation of a strategic approach to structural
changes of Montenegrin society. A consistent approach, unified
initiatives of the non-governmental and the governmental sectors,
permanent cooperation of Montenegro with regional and international
institutions and organizations, open and critically positioned discourse
of reforms, represent the only right choice in the further implementation
of policy, whose final balance should be an establishment of a
prosperous state, stable society, solid democracy and propulsive
market economy.
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SERBIA: COUNTRY REPORT ON THE STATE
FOR DEMOCRACY AND A ROADMAP FOR REFORM
Belgrade Center for Human Rights
A year after the October 2000 democratic changes, the political
landscape of Serbia has been altered considerably when viewed
against the earlier period of the rule of Slobodan Milosevic, politically
pluralist in name but in reality authoritarian, manipulative, populist and
increasingly repressive as it neared its end.
The international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, made
up of Serbia and its tiny partner Montenegro, experienced the most
dramatic change: after years of isolation, followed by an almost all-out
confrontation with the democratic segment of the international
community, the country has been brought back into the fold of
international organisations and has renewed diplomatic ties with all
the leading powers.
However, is characteristic of both the period of isolation and that which
followed it that the country has gradually been brought down to its real
size and that the illusions about the “central role in the Balkans,” the
pivotal geo-strategic position of the country and the consequent need
to afford it special treatment in the international community have given
way to realistic assessments and conclusions that Yugoslavia is a
relatively small and economically neglected country with its place in
south-eastern Europe and a European Union perspective, but one
which cannot count on inheriting the special status enjoyed by the
former Yugoslavia, which derived its strategic significance not so much
from its might as form the skilful policy of balancing between the two
opposed military and political blocs. At the same time, this return to
reality and the diminished possibility of employing foreign policy skills
to make up for political and economic shortcomings demand that the
affirmation of the country take place through comprehensive political
and economic reforms leading to the creation of a stable civic society
and an economy capable of surviving the tough conditions on the
increasingly integrated and demanding European market.
The achievements of the past year’s time in this area should not be
sneezed at. The first of them took place at the ballot boxes, albeit with
the help of mass protests staged after the election victory was disputed.
Contrary to many disaster scenarios, the democratic turn took place
in a manner closer to the central European Czech model than a Balkan
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- Romanian one. This capital should be invested in the continuation of
the reform process, in which adherence to democratic values and the
rule of law should take place in parallel with a radical break with the
past.
Important political capital is also derived from the fact that the October
2000 victory was achieved on the basis of a unification of all opposition
forces. Although the consensus was more one based on Unity Against
(Milosevic) than Unity For (reforms), it nevertheless represents an
accomplishment which must be protected and preserved until all the
essential reforms are completed.
However, a negative aspect of the October change is that in the critical
days which followed it, in order to ensure the victory of the democratic
forces, certain compromises and deals had to be struck with a segment
of Milosevic’s apparatus of repression, the army and police - this is a
political burden for the new regime and is hardly appropriate to
genuinely democratic societies. What is even worse, the alliances made
at the time are still being used in political duelling within the democratic
coalition - this is a serious weakness of the new democratic authorities
and serves to inhibit reforms in the police and armed forces.
One of the characteristics of the democratic revolution is the key, some
say even crucial, role of the non-governmental sector. During the years
marked by repression and a disunited opposition,  the non-
governmental sector was perhaps the only bright light in Serbia’s
political life. This was noticed by the international community, notably
France, who directed much of their support for the democratic forces
following the NATO intervention towards the non-governmental sector,
contributing to an increase in political activism and, especially among
young people, awakening the opposition from its stupor and mobilising
it to join forces and to act together. Although the role of the non-
governmental sector in the democratic changes was also important in
some other countries - for example in the processes of dismantling
the Meciar government in Slovakia and Tudjman’s regime in Croatia -
the role of that sector in Serbia is in many ways exceptional in nature,
because even after the democratic turn in October, most of the leading
reformist figures and forces in the government (especially the economy
and foreign policy departments) come from the non-governmental
sector. This achievement needs to be nurtured, as preserving the vitality
and influence of the non-governmental sector is among the key
catalysts in the process of establishing a civic society in Serbia. Some
Yugoslav and foreign analysts (for example the International Crisis
Group) say the country’s most powerful pro-reform force is the G17plus
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organisation, which rallies economic and political experts, and that
the influence of organisations dealing with the protection and promotion
of human rights is also strong. (The Belgrade Centre for Human Rights
has come out with a comprehensive draft of a new constitution, while
the Yugoslav Jurists’ Committee for Human Rights has launched an
initiative for changing the Law on the Army of Yugoslavia and reducing
compulsory military service and shortening the duration of civilian army
service to an equal term).  This lasting activism and commitment by
the non-governmental sector most probably led some influential
international organisations, notably the International Crisis Group, to
recommend to the western governments that in their support to the
reforms in the FRY they should rely on the non-governmental sector
much more than on political parties.
But the activities of the non-governmental sector need to be combined
with a strengthening of parliamentarianism - in a democratic system
the parliament must be the central arena where political parties vie for
power and the directions of a country’s development are defined. Some
non-governmental organisations have clearly come to realise this. The
G17plus and some others are considering reshaping themselves into
political parties, but this could be a double-edged sword for them - it
might not strengthen the parliamentary sector sufficiently but at the
same time it could weaken and compromise the non-governmental
sector, which is still needed as an alternative to the traditional forms of
political life.
Another positive accomplishment of the past year’s time is certainly
an element which is difficult to measure but is nevertheless still indirectly
deducible from the manner in which the Serbian public has been
reacting to certain important political manifestations and events. It is
the rise in democratic consciousness, a shedding of the fear of
repression and assumption of a role of active citizens. It might best be
seen in the rapid marginalisation of the once sacrosanct absolutist
leader Slobodan Milosevic (which took place even before his arrest, in
fact immediately after his defeat at the presidential election), and the
results of the December 2000 parliamentary vote in Serbia, in which
the electorate overwhelmingly rejected the political option represented
by his party or their even more extremist allies, such as the Radicals.
This speedy fall into obscurity can of course also be interpreted as
(voters) shedding personal responsibility for the lengthy survival of
Milosevic’s regime. But in any case a tendency to favour authoritarian
leaders and champion the “defence of the dignity of the country” are
no longer factors capable of rallying a large number of Serbian citizens.
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The indifference of most people in Serbia to Milosevic’s subsequent
arrest and handover to the War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague, and the
absence of major protests therafter are also illustrations of the way in
which the Serbian society has been maturing politically.
Another positive aspect is the fact that the Serbian public has not been
exhibiting uncritical support for the new political leaders or a tendency
to create new leaders, this time democratic ones. Amidst the euphoria
created during Milosevic’s overthrow last year, it initially appeared as
if the public might elevate his replacement Vojislav Kostunica to a
similar status, as his popularity ratings were extremely high (over 70%),
based on public perceptions of his personal modesty, integrity,
incorruptibility, patriotism, anti-communism and adherence to the
Serbian Orthodox Church. But with the passage of time this support
dropped to a more realistic level, although president Kostunica remains
the most popular political figure, albeit with ratings closer to 40%, as a
result of a cooling of emotions among the people and a return to coping
with every-day problems, even more acute in the current economic
transition phase, but also of certain shortcomings of Kostunica, such
as insufficient resolve to radicalise the drive to eliminate the negative
heritage burdening society.
In what is another positive indicator for the status of democracy, the
support of the public has been shifting towards “technocrats” - people
characterised by a pro-European orientation and unreserved
commitment to economic and political reform and full co-operation
with the international community, including the Tribunal at the Hague,
such as the federal deputy prime minister in charge of economic
reforms and foreign economic co-operation, Miroljub Labus, federal
foreign minister Goran Svilanovic, Serbian minister of finance Bozidar
Djelic, National Bank of Yugoslavia governor Mladjan Dinkic and others.
These are definitely not charismatic figures, at least in the way charisma
is perceived in the Balkans - they are genuine professionals and experts
in their fields who are open to the world and keep a certain distance
from party politics (as yet another manifestation of the importance of
the non-governmental sector in Serbian society). Another illustration
of the new political matureness in Serbia is the majority rejection of
the idea of restoring the monarchy, in spite of the flirting of some political
forces with it and even the openly pro-monarchy platforms of some
parties in the ruling coalition (the Nova Srbija, the DHSS, and even
Kostunica’s DSS), as well as the growing efforts of the Karadjordjevic
family and its head, Prince Aleksandar, to promote and present himself
as “Serbia’s new host”.
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The progress made in the field of ethnic relations and the higher level
of ethnic tolerance achieved are yet more features of the positive post-
October record. The situation differs enormously from that in the past
ten years, when ethnic tensions ran high and some national minorities,
notably the Kosovo Albanians, but also ethnic Hungarians and Croats
in Vojvodina and Bosniaks in Sandzak, were exposed to repression
and pressures aimed at driving them into migrating away from their
homes. The media were dominated by ethnic intolerance and often
bigotry against minorities, which were described as unreliable and
sometimes even hostile elements. The autonomy of the provinces,
Vojvodina with its significant national minority population and Kosovo
with an overwhelming Albanian majority, had been reduced to a formal
level in the case of Vojvodina, and suspended altogether in the case
of  Kosovo, while some regions with considerable national minority
populations had been split among Serbian-dominated administrative
entities. Finally, the status of some “new” minorities created as a result
of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, such as the ethnic Croats
and ethnic Bosniaks, had not been regulated, or was made conditional
on the conclusion of bilateral agreements with Croatia and Bosnia
and the regulation of the status of the Serbs living there. It is also true,
however, that the regime never went as far as banning the activities of
the national minorities’ political parties, such as those representing
the ethnic Hungarians, Bosniaks, Croats or Bulgarians, which took
part in elections and participated in power at local level.
Already in its election campaign, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia
(DOS) included some minority parties (ethnic Hungarian and Bosniak)
which were consequently part of the victorious coalition. Practically all
national minority parties backed the DOS. After the formation of the
new authorities, their representatives took up important government
posts – the head of the leading ethnic Hungarian party became a deputy
prime minister in the Serbian government, while the president of a
Sandzak Bosniak party is now the federal minister for national
minorities. In what is another step in the right direction, a number of
diplomatic representatives of the FRY abroad, including some
ambassadors, are members of other ex-Yugoslav peoples and national
minorities.
Another important step towards improving the position of national
minorities has been taken on the legislative plane - the draft of a new
law on national minorities has been prepared, in co-operation with the
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Council of Europe and the OSCE. International experts say the bill
offers a high standard of guarantees for the protection of the rights
and status of minorities, as well as a foundation for local self-
administration and cultural autonomy for the national minorities. But it
must be stressed that some influential DOS members, notably the
DSS, are still none too happy about the idea of decentralisation and
local self-government, and especially autonomies, and this can slow
down progress in the area of upgrading the position of the national
minorities.
The growing tolerance in Serbia’s society of other minority and
alternative groups, not just the recognised national minorities, is also
manifested by the increased understanding for and less exclusivist
attitude towards other ethnic and minority groups, such as the
Romanies, non-Orthodox religious communities, sexual minorities,
feminist organisations and some others. But verbal and even physical
violence which some minorities (Romanies) have suffered at the hands
of right-wing extremists and the existing aggressive attitude towards
“religious sects” indicate that the level of tolerance that has been
achieved is still not high enough and that the suppression of ethnic,
racial and religious prejudice must be the subject of a constant and
vigorous campaign.
The efficient and speedy elimination of the international isolation and
promotion of bilateral relations with neighbours and the Western
countries, as well as the re-integration into international organisations,
are without a doubt among the brightest achievements of the new
democratic government. But some of the credit must also go to the
hand of freindship which has been extended by the international
community, in particular the leading Western countries, which invested
their political capital in the organisation of the democratic opposition
and promotion of changes.
The gates to re-admission into international organisations were opened
by the simple act of the new authorities of relinquishing the hitherto
insistence on continuity with the former state, the SFRY, and
acceptance of the status of a successor with rights equal to those of
all the other ex-Yugoslav states. Although the act itself was simple,
the new authorities, including president Kostunica, must be praised
for performing it without delay, even bypassing a parliamentary
procedure which would have slowed down the process of applying for
re-admission to the United Nations.
But it also needs to be pointed out that Yugoslavia was re-integrated
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very quickly in those organisations where membership does not require
special legislative or other reforms, but only acceptance of their basic
documents, like the UN (accepting the Charter) and the OSCE (the
Final Act, the Paris Charter and the other documents), and which are
universal or pan-European in character, anyway. Membership in the
UN ensured that admission to its specialised agencies and similar
organisations would take place without major problems (UNESCO,
UNICEF, the Interpol, others). Yugoslavia also relatively quickly joined
other regional initiatives, such as the Pact for Stability of South-Eastern
Europe, the SECI, and the Central European Initiative – where its place
had been reserved in advance, pending democratic changes. In fact,
some of those organisations - the Pact for Stability and the SECI -
were set up with the intention of exerting pressure for political changes
in Yugoslavia and underscoring the isolated nature of the Milosevic
regime on the regional plane, where he had been counting on certain
Balkan alliances, especially in the initial phase of his rule (Greece,
Romania, and even Bulgaria).
But admission to those international organisations with stricter
membership conditions - legislative changes - has still not been
realised. The most important is the Council of Europe, where Yugoslavia
has been granted special guest status in the parliamentary assembly
(enjoyed by the former Yugoslavia in 1991), but where full membership
necessitates a number of reforms, in particular in the judiciary, the
media and human and minority rights legislation. The duration of this
process remains uncertain, but if the reforms or the legislative process
are not slowed down, for example by the unresolved problem of the
Serbia-Montenegro relations, admission to the Council of Europe could
realistically be expected to take place by the end of 2002, which is not
an excessively long period of waiting when compared with those of
some of the other countries in transition, especially other former
Yugoslav states, like Croatia, which became a member in 1995, four
years after its independence, while Bosnia-Herzegovina is in a situation
similar to that of the FRY, as its admission should be expected next
year - a full ten years after independence (although it should be noted
that the delay was caused by reasons forced upon Bosnia-Herzegovina,
to wit the 1992-95 war).
In the case of those organisations with the strictest conditions for
membership, like the European Union, whose demands are both
economic (economic stability, a balanced budget, a relatively high GNP,
monetary stability) and political (fully-developed democratic institutions,
harmonising legislation with the “achievements of the Union,” the
279
resolution of all outstanding disputes with neighbours), then the
admission to that organisation is a medium-term (5-10 year) or even
longer-term prospect, and depends not just on the pace and success
of the reforms in the FRY, but also on the Union’s expansion strategy
and its approach to the south-eastern European region as a whole.
The EU recently began talks on an agreement on stabilisation and
association with the FRY, already signed with Macedonia and Croatia.
The FRY is therefore at the beginning of a process which could lead to
an associate status and candidacy for membership within two years.
Once hopelessly lagging behind the other countries of the region in
the race towards the EU, Yugoslavia is in the opinion of analysts now
on its way to reducing the gap to two or three years behind Croatia.
On the bilateral plane, the new authorities have made a giant step in a
rapid re-establishment of ties with the leading Western countries, where
we also need to stress the reciprocal efforts of the other side. It is
nevertheless important that the Federal Government boldly and
unhesitatingly initiated the restoration of ties with the leading NATO
member-countries - the Unites States, Germany, Great Britain and
France - which had been broken off by the former regime during the
NATO intervention, while intentionally disregarding the fact that the
formal verdicts against leading Western political and military figures
issued in stage-managed trials during the intervention were still
effective. In any case, the new authorities encountered from the very
start the full readiness of the West to restore ties and took full advantage
of their chance, albeit with varying gradation of the closeness in relations
with some of the countries. There was noticeable reluctance, at least
in some circles, to renew close ties with the US and Britain, and partly
also Germany, while France came in for more benevolent treatment,
given the traditional friendship (also with some other Western countries,
like Norway, Switzerland and Italy). Some even stressed that Yugoslavia
was returning to the international community with dignity and its head
held high, and high-ranking figures even called for maintaining balanced
relations with Washington and with Moscow - somewhat reminiscent
of the late president Tito’s non-alignment policy - but this approach
soon proved itself to be an anachronism in the uni-polar world of today.
Viewed objectively, although the animosity towards the leading NATO
countries could not be expected to vanish entirely barely three years
after the bombings, it is nevertheless no longer a serious political factor,
and is targeted more at NATO as an organisation than its individual
member-countries. If the West were to continue its energetic economic
and political support for the reforms in the FRY, and if this were to
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result in increased prosperity in the country, it is possible that the attitude
towards the leading Western countries could evolve in a manner similar
to relations between Germany and the USA following World War Two,
when the two countries took a relatively short time to progress from
bitter opponents in war to firm allies.
An indication of this course of development of the relations between
Serbia and the Western countries could also be the settlement of the
crisis in southern Serbia, where ethnic Albanian extremists launched
an armed campaign in an effort to destabilise the ethnically mixed
region and annex it to neighbouring Kosovo. Through a combination
of diplomatic negotiations and resolute yet restrained police actions,
in co-operation and coordination with NATO, the crisis was brought
under control, and the manner in which it was resolved has been
described in Western circles as a model for handling similar problems
in the region, for example in Macedonia. At the same time, the co-
operation with NATO helped increase the level of confidence between
the new authorities and the military and security forces of the FRY, on
the one hand, and the Western political circles and the NATO military
organisation, on the other. This led to the establishment during the
crisis of a practice of holding meetings between the two sides, in
southern Serbia as well as NATO headquarters in Brussels, while
General Krstic, the commander of the joint security force, has become
in a way a figure NATO believes might help initiate reforms in the
military and bring the FRY closer to NATO, in particular the Partnership
for Peace.
In relations with neighbours, although the situation has improved
considerably, progress has not been unambiguous and the future
prospects are not inevitably bright. It is indicative, although not
surprising, that in relations with neighbours like Croatia, where mutual
recognition and the establishment of diplomatic ties took place during
the Milosevic and Tudjman eras, albeit to a large extent based on the
similarity of thinking of the two authoritarian leaders and their aspirations
in regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, progress has slowed down
somewhat, and the diplomatic relations are yet to return to the
ambassadorial level they were at before the NATO bombing. The
slowdown is a result of the efforts invested by the new authorities on
both sides in exhibiting a higher level of commitment to the principles
of justice than their predecessors. Croatia sees an obstacle to a
normalisation of bilateral relations in Serbia’s reluctance to come to
terms with the burden of the aggression the former JNA (Yugoslav
Army) committed against Croatia, with Milosevic’s support, to prosecute
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those most responsible for crimes, such as the “Vukovar trio,” and
exclude from the government figures like General Momcilo Perisic,
tried in absentia in Croatia and found guilty of war crimes against the
civilian population (in the shelling of the coastal town of Zadar). On
their side, the new Yugoslav and Serbian authorities have been showing
more concern for the position of the Serb refugees from Croatia, whom
Milosevic abandoned after initially inciting their uprising, and are
insisting that their return to their homes should be made easier and
that they should receive compensation for destroyed property. There
is also an outstanding dispute between Yugoslavia and Croatia over
the Prevlaka Pensinsula on the entrance to the Bay of Kotor (it will
probably be taken off the agenda relatively easily after the Serbia-
Montenegro relations are resolved), as well as disputes over the border
on the river Danube, although these are much more technical than
serious territorial problems. The legacy of the war crimes, as well as a
certain political rivalry which exists between the two closely-related
peoples, and now between two neighbouring states, going back to the
times of Austro-Hungary and the pre- and post-World War Two
Yugoslavias, will, however, be a factor likely to encumber bilateral
relations for some time to come, until generational changes take place
or until the two countries are re-united, this time as part of a broader
European community. In spite of the above, we can expect in the
meantime improvements in economic relations, communication,
cultural co-operation etc.; this means that there is little chance of the
two countries once again facing each other in confrontation, except in
the event of a broader crisis in the region (for example a disintegration
of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and a withdrawal of the international
community, which isn’t very likely to happen.
On the other hand, the political shift in Serbia has resulted in a complete
turnabout in relations with Slovenia. Full diplomatic relations at
ambassadorial level have been established, and both sides, particularly
Slovenia, have expressed an interest in economic co-operation, which,
given the complementariness of the two economies and the traditional
significance of the Serbian market for Slovenia, forms a good basis
for a considerable expansion of economic ties; it would therefore be
no surprise at all if in a few years Slovenia were to become one of
Serbia’s chief economic partners (already the case in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where Slovenia is the biggest foreign investor). The fact
that the countries are not territorial neighbours, that the problem of
close ethnic relations and that of the “curse of small differences” do
not exist, and that the episode of the brief (and some say rigged) June
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1991 war has been mainly forgotten (with an appropriate transfer of
responsibility from the two sides on to the then federal authorities and
the JNA), represent a favourable basis for continuing the development
of Serbo-Slovenian relations, already reflected in the fact that a certain
level of co-operation exists between the two countries in international
forums (the Slovenian foreign minister has offered his country’s services
in lobbying for Yugoslavia’s integration in various international
institutions, in the process of approaching the EU); this also has roots
in history and is reminiscent of the political alliance between Belgrade
and Ljubljana at the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This does not
mean, however, that the relations between the two sides are problem-
free - the succession of former Yugoslavia, the strict entry visa regime
Slovenia continues to implement and the status of the Serb community
there remain unresolved issues, albeit unlikely to have a significant
bearing on the positive prospects for the development of relations
between Slovenia and Serbia.
The normalisation of relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina and
establishment of diplomatic ties at the level of ambassadors is another
significant achievement of the new authorities because implied in it is
an unambiguous recognition of the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and a limitation of co-operation with the Republika Srpska (RS), the
Bosnian Serb entity, to within the confines of the “Dayton framework”
(although a number of “grey zone” elements remain, notably military
co-operation with the RS army), as well as a cessation of the insistence
that Bosnia-Herzegovina withdraw the genocide suit against the FRY
it has filed to the International Court of Justice. The other side naturally
also showed flexibility, given the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina was
without a doubt a victim of an aggression, supported by the Milosevic
regime, and that in contrast to the Croatian authorities it has not insisted
on some form of official apology from high Serbian or Yugoslav state
officials. There also exists interest in economic co-operation - both
countries’ economies have shrunk (Serbia’s because of the sanctions
and NATO’s intervention, and Bosnia’s on account of a war lasting
almost four years) and the weakened economies can seek in bilateral
co-operation, which was well developed in the former SFRY, an
alternative to the tough competition they would have to face on third
markets, for which they are still not ready.
Relations with Macedonia, which were stable in the Milosevic period,
mainly on account of a feeling of solidarity in the face of the Albanian
separatism, are even closer after the political shift in Serbia, after
Macedonia, which had avoided violence for a full decade, was suddenly
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rocked by an armed uprising of its ethnic Albanians and felt itself even
closer to Belgrade. In that context, a framework for closer military co-
operation has been established (the FRY plans to make arms deliveries
to Macedonia), and the common interest in suppressing the ethnic
Albanian rebellions in southern Serbia and northern Macedonia has
made the two countries strategic allies. Similarly to the situation with
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia see a need to restore
their once thriving economic co-operation and to upgrade it.
Another major although perhaps unexpected step forward is the
establishment of diplomatic ties with Albania, in a situation where the
Kosovo problem remains open and when ethnic Albanian extremism
has spread to southern Serbia. But the level-headed approach by the
new authorities in Belgrade and Tirana’s formal distancing from the
Kosovo Albanians’ demands for independence have eased the heavy
burden of Albanian-Serb relations and paved the way, with the open
support and encouragement of international factors, for a new approach
to be tested in which the current as well as inherited problems will be
resolved in a broader context of regional co-operation in south-eastern
Europe, such as the Pact for Stability and other regional initiatives.
Relations with other neighbouring countries - Hungary, Bulgaria and
Romania - which were relatively stable in the Milosevic era, have taken
an upswing. Although Hungary, freshly admitted to NATO in 1999,
effectively and in any case logistically took part in the NATO intervention
against Yugoslavia, while Bulgaria and Romania, traditional Serbian
friends but also candidates for NATO membership, offered open
support, this did not provoke a break in relations, as the former regime
was not interested in isolating the country even further, as Hungary,
and to some extent also Bulgaria and Romania, represented access
doors towards the world.
However, as Bulgaria and Romania were ruled by pro-Western liberal
governments at the moment of Milosevic’s downfall, it was welcomed
in those countries, and the political closeness with the democratic
opposition movement in Belgrade, with mutual interest in promoting
economic co-operation and consolidating regional stability, represented
a good foundation for the further development of relations. This is
especially visible in the case of Hungary, where the aforementioned
positive factors are joined by another - the fact that ethnic Hungarians
in Vojvodina through their parties and participation in the government
represented a political ally to the new authorities in Belgrade, but also
because during the anti-Milosevic struggle, the democratic opposition
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and the non-governmental sector enjoyed a refuge in Hungary for their
numerous actions and initiatives and for co-operation and coordination
with foreign partners (one example was the launching in Hungary of
the so-called Szeged Process, an association of free opposition-ruled
towns during the Milosevic period).
Looking at the big picture, the sector of international co-operation, i.e.,
the lifting of the isolation, admission to international organisations,
restoration of ties with the Western countries and promotion of co-
operation with the neighbouring countries represent an impressive
achievement, probably the biggest of the new democratic authorities,
although it must be stressed once again that those results were
achieved with the open support of the international community and its
desire not to allow a European country to remain an international
outcast.
In the economic sphere - reviving the economy - an important
prerequisite for ensuring the stability of the democratic processes -
the record of the new authorities is not so impressive, but then their
task was much more difficult and its very nature requires long-term
activity not able to yield results promptly and directly. Certain very
important steps were nevertheless taken, creating a foundation for
continuing reforms and rejuvenating an economy devastated by the
corruption-riddled and social-rhetoric policies of the former regime, its
funding of the war and the effects of the international sanctions.
Although it has still not succeeded in reviving industrial production to
any major extent, the new government has managed to bring the
country back into all important international financial institutions
relatively rapidly - the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development etc.
Agreement was reached with the Paris Club of creditor countries to
write off almost 67% of the public debt, while talks with the London
Club of privately-owned financial institutions on the rescheduling of
debts should begin in the near future.
Thanks to strict monetary discipline and a policy of a firm exchange
rate of the dinar, hard currency reserves have tripled in a year’s time -
from under 300 million dollars to about a billion. Inflation has still not
been beaten, but has been reduced to an annual level of about 40%,
down from the triple-figure rates recorded in the past years. Regarding
systemic economic laws, what foreign experts say is a very good
privatisation law has been adopted. But the privatisation process is
still to come, and it remains to be seen what will be achieved. A relatively
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difficult process of rehabilitating the banking sector also lies ahead. If
all projects are realised - inevitably attended by social upheaval and
austerity - it would be realistic to expect increased interest by foreign
investors in the Serbian economy, in fact the only way it could ever
catch up with the world economy. Although the economic reforms are
moving in a positive direction, no major direct foreign investment
interest has been shown, which is probably not just the result of a lack
of economic motivation, but also of the unsettled political situation in
the country (differences within the ruling coalition, uncertainty
surrounding the survival of the federation), as well as the absence the
requisite stability in the region on account of the unresolved status of
Kosovo and problems with ethnic Albanian separatism in southern
Serbia and Macedonia. Nevertheless, if the reforms continue and the
situation in the region does not deteriorate too badly, foreign investment
should be expected to start flowing in. The inflow has so far taken
place only in the form of assistance and donations (about 600 million
Euros in a year’s time), but this is not the type of help able to kick-start
the economy, but only to solve some of the problems existing in the
public sector and social welfare.
Finally, positive results have been achieved on the media plane, where
a certain level of pluralism did exist almost for the duration of the
Milosevic era, albeit with increasing pressure as the years passed,
before and after the NATO intervention. This resulted not only in the
introduction of a restrictive media law and harsh fines handed down to
and closure of some media, but also direct pressures on newspeople,
including physical liquidation (the assassination of the editor of the
Dnevni Telegraf daily). At the same time, the media controlled by the
regime (newspapers and the state TV) were the champions of an
aggressive and primitive propaganda, and even a language of hatred.
Although vestiges of the old manner of thinking have survived in the
media (stereotypes about the West’s globalist policy, with allusions to
“conspiracy theories” and similar fiction), the language of hatred has
been expunged, the political lynching vocabulary eliminated and the
instrumentalisation of the media for political purposes reduced. But
genuine independent journalism has still not taken root, except in the
traditionally opposition media, and a sycophantic approach to the new
authorities and leading political figures is also visible, especially in
those media trying to clear their image after faithfully serving the former
regime. The road to truly independent media, which will voice the
conscience of society and scrutinise official policy, will be a lengthy
one, but it is important that the necessary preconditions for reforms in
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the media are being created. One of the key moves will be the adoption
of a new information and broadcasting frequency law, expected to
take place soon.
Looking for any failures or insufficient achievement by the new
authorities in the process of democratisation and reforms, it needs to
be stressed that in diagnosing the situation we should take into
consideration the fact that only a year’s time has passed since they
assumed the helm and that the reforms are taking place in a situation
where the model of the federal state remains undefined, as well as in
what is still an unstable situation in south-eastern Europe. Nevertheless,
it is also true that in some important areas expectations have still not
been realised.
In regard to the strengthening of the democratic institutions, there is
an evident imbalance between the executive branch, which is the
engine of reforms (particularly the republican government and those
parts of the federal government in charge of foreign policy and foreign
economic relations) and the legislative branch, whose importance has
been marginalised, which is something of a paradox, as the DOS holds
a convincing majority in the Serbian Parliament and a sound majority
in the federal one (although compelled to act in the latter in a coalition
with the Montenegrin opposition, once one of the pillars of the Milosevic
regime). However, owing to the growing rifts in the DOS, but also the
desire for increasing the efficiency of the government of the state and
management of the economy and implementing the reform measures
and laws as fast as possible, there is no genuine debate on important
systemic questions in the legislatures and they have instead been
turned into voting machines or arenas for petty political squabbling. All
major political decisions are adopted after being coordinated within
the DOS and then simply passed through parliament; sometimes the
legislature is even bypassed and decisions are issued in the form of
government decrees.
A serious weakness of the parliamentary system is the fact that under
the existing election laws deputies represent their own parties and not
voters directly, so that the link between the electorate and the parliament
is lost and there exists loyalty to parties and their leaders, rather than
to voters. Such a position and treatment of the parliament shows that
Serbian society lacks a genuine parliamentary tradition - the creation
of such a practice and tradition is also burdened by the fact that even
in established democracies parliamentarianism, at least in its traditional
form, is the subject of a crisis and re-assessment. But the question of
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parliamentarianism is still a serious shortcoming of the young
democracy in Serbia without whose resolution a full affirmation of
political pluralism and creation of a civic society will not be possible.
Although parliamentarianism will probably take firmer hold after several
election cycles, certain changes are still needed both in election statutes
and the manner of operation of parliament (upgrading the role of
parliamentary committees and deputies’ initiatives) in order to
strengthen parliamentarianism, which is still in the early development
stage. But the problem lies in the fact that the very need for speedy
economic and other reforms inherently results in strengthening the
executive branch and delaying elections for as long as possible - this
is a dilemma with which Serbia’s democracy will have to come to terms,
therefore it will probably, at least in the short term, satisfy itself with the
current level of parliamentarianism, or perhaps an only slightly improved
situation.
The parliamentarianism crisis is also a reflection of the conflict within
the ruling coalition, where the disputes, i.e., conceptual but also tactical
differences between eighteen parties very different both in size and
outlook, are a problem which will be impossible to overcome in a simple
manner. The collapse of a coalition of this kind is certainly inevitable
sooner or later, but what provokes concern is not the certainty of the
break up but the fact that the leading parties have no clear strategic
programme orientations as regards both internal and foreign policies.
There are on the Serbian political stage no leftist, rightist and centre
parties in the true sense of the word, owing to the non-existence of the
corresponding social segments which would be found in a developed
civic society - instead, political programmes and objectives are defined
by the party leaderships and not through a development of political
ideas emanating from the memberships. Parties have no deep roots
in the electorate, leading to mass opportunistic influxes and outflows
of members, into and out of parties very different in outlook (witness
the stampede from Milosevic’s Socialist Party to the DSS). But this is
another phenomenon not intrinsic to the young Serbian democracy,
as it has already been seen in transition countries, and earlier also in
some Western countries, where the votes of the left flowed over to the
right and vice versa, with the democratic centre remaining relatively
isolated and weak. This is of course no consolation or an alibi for
shortcomings in building up parliamentarianism, but should be viewed
as a warning to the leading pro-reform forces in the country that the
build-up of parliamentarianism should be placed alongside the reform
targets among the coming political priorities.
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The absence of genuine and authentic political ideologies in Serbian
society is also reflected in the uncritical attitude seen in a large segment
of the government towards the Serbian Orthodox Church. Seeking to
attract voter support and attach to their political activities a legitimacy
of “concern for the nation and tradition,” many political parties are trying
to outdo one another in identifying themselves with the values
advocated by the Orthodox church, or flirting with the church
opportunistically, granting it privileges in the sphere of education,
restitution of property etc. Restoring the status of social equality to the
Orthodox church is of course not disputable, but doing so in a manner
devaluating other religious communities or atheists in the ethnically-
mixed Serbia and Yugoslavia could have serious consequences for
democratic processes and slow down integration with the West,
towards which much, if not the bulk, of the Orthodox hierarchy have a
negative or at least suspicious attitude. This is why, although it is at
this moment not a major challenge to democratisation, the regulation
of the relations between church and state in a manner in line with
contemporary practice in Western democracies must be placed among
the reform priorities.
Insufficient distancing from nationalism is another factor slowing down
democratic reforms. While the former regime took opportunistic
advantage of nationalism in its most aggressive form - an ideology of
belittling and subjugating other nationalities, and affirming national
homogeneity as a supreme ideal - forces within the new authorities,
especially those seeking inspiration from the Orthodox traditions, pan-
Slavism and anti-leftism, hold that settling accounts with the former
regime, branded as neo-communist and anti-national, also implies the
affirmation of nationalism in its authentic, “democratic form” - concern
for one’s nation. Although this “authentic nationalism” appears at first
sight to conform to values existing in some Western democracies,
albeit characteristic of earlier periods - in the context of the demands
of democratic reforms and the affirmation of values characteristic of a
Europe working on the unification project, they are nevertheless ideas
diverging from the values of modern democracy. Continuing to insist
on authentic nationalism could compromise the idea of a civic state
and revive the movement for a national state, which could be fatal not
only for the future of democracy in Serbia, but also for relations with
neighbouring countries.
One consequence of the “national state” concept already seen is the
attitude towards the decentralisation issue in Serbia. Reducing the
powers of the state, especially its central authorities, as well as
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decentralisation and local self-government, are elements of democracy
in the Western countries. Limiting the extent of decentralisation and
local government to an administrative diffusion of competencies would
only further topicalise the problem of relations between regions in Serbia
and Belgrade. This is one of the issues where the ruling coalition has
not exhibited a sufficient level of agreement, and has in fact shown
profound conceptual differences - from championing the idea of a
centralised state (modelled after France, but turning a blind eye to the
fact that even France is being decentralised), characteristic of the DSS,
Nova Srbija and some other parties, through readiness for some
reforms, including those aimed at extending the autonomy of Vojvodina
(Democratic Party, Civic Alliance), all the way to demands from some
parties (from Vojvodina, but also Sandzak) for what can only be
described as a federalisation of Serbia. Decentralisation is thus very
likely to be one of the major problems of democratic reforms, and one
on which the authenticity of parties’ commitment to reforms will be
tested.
The insufficient reach of the reforms is also visible in the state
administration, the judiciary and police, where some results were
achieved initially, but then progress ground to a halt. The problem of
reforms in these areas is a personnel as well as systemic one.
The new authorities could not avoid reliance on professional staff from
the former regime in state institutions, but the problem lies in the fact
that this was not done only for the sake of maintaining continuity in the
discharge of essential state and public functions and preserving the
requisite level of professionalism and know-how, but also because
the new authorities, or at least some parts, feel they “owe a debt” to
certain state institutions (the police, army, intelligence services), which
by transferring their loyalty in the October 2000 events away from the
Milosevic regime and towards the democratic movement allowed the
latter to assume power fast relatively fast and without bloodshed. But
if this deal concluded by the democratic authorities and certain existing
structures can be understandable and justified as a necessary evil of
the transition stage in the short term, the symbiosis between the new
authorities and some elements from the established structures,
especially winning them over for alliances in fresh rivalries within the
democratic authorities (the reported loyalty to the police to the
republican prime minister and the army to the federal president), cannot
represent a sound foundation for the new democracy. This makes it
obligatory to develop and employ new and uncompromised professional
cadres, perhaps also to consider the need to implement a sort of
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lustration in the state authorities.
Some reforms have already been initiated - the process of replacing
compromised members of the judiciary is in progress. Police reform
projects sponsored by the international community (the OSCE and
the Council of Europe) will form the basis for a comprehensive reform
of the service.
Reforms in the said state services are an important precondition for
success in facing what could be the most serious challenge before
Serbia’s society - organised crime and corruption. Information
uncovered about various scandals and irregularities in the past decade
proves the existence of strong links between the regime and organised
crime - a significant part of the funding of the state came from illegal
and criminal activities, from which individuals in the political and state
structures made fortunes. In a situation of war and sanctions, all moral
inhibitions were set aside and crime was justified by higher interests
of the state. Corruption became an integral part of the functioning of
the state, economic and public services, from the local level all the
way to the top. What is worst, parts of the opposition who took and
held power at local level at the time of the former regime also
succumbed to this temptation. All this has made corruption and crime
an accepted model of behaviour in many segments of society. The
democratic shift has not brought about the expected crackdown on
the criminal underground, but instead attempts by that segment to buy
off the new government, or at least parts of it. In a poverty and crisis-
riddled situation where social might is identified with wealth, it was
difficult to resist that temptation, and compromises have obviously been
made, dulling the edge of the fight against crime. Although an anti-
corruption body has been established and some prominent individuals
(the National Bank governor, for example) have initiated a campaign
against the most privileged profiteers in the 1990s, the battle is in its
initial stages and will certainly require the engagement of internal
political forces but also international co-operation and support, because
the corruption and crime problem flows across national frontiers,
especially in south-eastern Europe. It is indicative that the Serbian
interior minister recently described organised crime and corruption as
a more serious threat to democracy in Serbia than unresolved political
questions, such as the status of Kosovo or relations with Montenegro.
Finally, in the area of reorganising the armed forces, reforms are also
in an embryonic stage. The democratic authorities have accepted the
need to reform the military, and the armed forces leadership has
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extended verbal support for that idea, but the reforms themselves are
still insufficient. Some parts of the new authorities believe radical
reforms in the army are a delicate matter and even premature in a
situation where the problem in southern Serbia remains pressing,
together with the effect of the events across the border in Macedonia,
where the status of Kosovo remains an open problem, and where the
relations within the federation are still undefined. The lack of will to
initiate reforms is partly also the result of the fact that public support
for the military is traditionally high and that the army almost always
tops the list of institutions enjoying public confidence. Part of the Serbian
public also sees reforms in the military as a concession to the West
and giving in to its efforts to weaken and “punish” the army which
some say “successfully resisted the NATO aggression”. All the above,
as well as the fact that some people in the authorities are grateful to
the military leadership for siding with the people in the October events,
does not seem to create a very favourable environment for
comprehensive reforms, especially at a moment when in the wake of
the September 11 events military force has once again assumed the
position of a factor on which Western governments will rely in the
struggle against international terrorism, and one which is not as open
to public scrutiny as other institutions.
Placement of the Yugoslav Army under democratic control is part of
Yugoslavia’s obligations proceeding from membership in the OSCE
(especially the document entitled “Code of conduct in the political and
military aspects of security”), as well as a condition that the country
has to fulfil for membership in the Partnership for Peace. The Yugoslav
Government and the Ministry of Defence have launched initiatives for
joining the programme, while the issue of democratic control is the
subject of debates in the military leadership and the defence ministry
in which NGOs are also involved. The army has shown readiness for
reforms, but it sees control primarily as civilian and not so much as
democratic supervision - the position still very much present is one
according to which the military is subordinate primarily to the President
of the Republic and the Supreme Defence Council and not the
parliament, so that parliamentary committees in charge of defence
and security still lack adequate insight into military matters such as
defence doctrine, national security strategy, reorganisation of the army
and the issue of the openness of the budget. The ministry of defence,
although headed by a civilian, still lacks in practice a full range of
competencies towards the army, as its personnel are mainly armed
forces officers. By tradition, the biggest authority in regard to military
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matters remains the army General Staff, whose Chief communicates
directly with the President of the Republic, so that the powers of the
federal government and defence ministry are still much more formal
than real. Finally, armed forces reforms and particularly the initiation
of the process of joining Partnership for Peace are also affected by
the position of the Supreme Defence Council, so that the question
cannot be placed on the agenda before the resolution of the problem
of the relations in the Yugoslav federation. But in spite of all the
obstacles, the process of reforming the military has been started, and
the involvement in this issue of the public - parliament, political parties,
NGOs - is growing, so that the process of change is bound to pick up
pace sooner or later. One of the steps signalling this is an initiative by
NGOs for shorter conscript service and equal duration of civilian service
which is already in parliamentary procedure, and another initiative by
the non-governmental sector for an improvement of the human rights
situation in the army and publication of handbooks listing instructions
in that context.
Another problem facing the new authorities in the process of
democratisation is resolving the issue of responsibility for war crimes.
A major step in this process was taken with the handover of former
president Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal and securing the
voluntary surrenders of some other war crimes indictees who took
part in JNA operations in the Dubrovnik area in 1991, as well as the
recent arrests on Yugoslav territory of two indictees from Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s Serb entity. But all these moves were accompanied by
political disputes inside the ruling coalition, and the impression could
be gained that they were made under pressure from the international
community and in order to ensure that financial aid from the West was
not broken off and that the process of reintegration into international
financial and other organisations continued. Consensus has still not
been reached in the coalition on the adoption of a law on co-operation
with the War Crimes Tribunal, although the law is not a necessary
precondition for handing over suspects, as that obligation stems from
the very fact that as a member of the United Nations, Yugoslavia has
a duty to co-operate with the body.
Insufficient co-operation in the process of bringing war crimes suspects
to justice is also shown by the failure to hand over three former JNA
officers indicted for war crimes in the siege of Vukovar, as well as
insufficient co-operation in efforts to arrest the former RS army
commander, General Ratko Mladic, who tribunal sources say often
spends time on Serbian territory.
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A significant step in coming to terms with the problem of war crimes
was a police investigation of several mass graves containing the bodies
of ethnic Albanians killed in Kosovo during the NATO intervention
believed to have been the victims of Serb police or paramilitary forces.
But although the action was hailed in the democratic public as one of
the clearest indicators of the readiness to highlight the problem of war
crimes, the search for the perpetrators has so far given no results and
appears to have lost impetus.
On the moral plane, the war crimes issue was topicalised by the initiative
launched by President Kostunica for the formation of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission modelled after similar bodies in South
Africa and some other countries which had passed through periods of
repression and state terror. But the commission’s work is still in a stage
of infancy and was from the very beginning burdened by certain
dilemmas around its mandate and objectives, so that no forecasts
can be made on its possible contribution to raising awareness about
responsibility for war crimes in the past decade.
The question of the war legacy therefore clearly remains one of the
tasks the new authorities will have to face and one of the conditions
for continuing democratisation.
Finally, the process of democratisation in Serbia will depend on events
in the region. As has been said, the process of normalising relations
with neighbours has already yielded tangible results and should not
be expected to burden the democratic reforms further. Any regression
of democratisation in the neighbouring countries or a rise in nationalism
or extremism there (for example in Bosnia or Croatia) would be likely
to encourage similar tendencies in Serbia. But no such developments
seem likely at the moment.
The only serious threat to reforms would be a dramatic deterioration
of the situation in Kosovo or a radicalisation of the ethnic Albanians’
demands for its independence, which would win the support of
international factors. But after the parliamentary elections in the
province in which the Serb community took part, such a course of
events is not likely. Any renewed fighting in Macedonia could also cause
fresh instability in the region and a revival of the “Greater Albania‘
idea, but this is also not likely following the adoption of constitutional
changes in Macedonia and the extension of the NATO forces’ mandate.
The fundamental obstacles to the development of democracy therefore
proceed from internal processes in the country such as the dispute
around the future of the federation between Belgrade and Podgorica,
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a possible disintegration of the ruling democratic coalition in Serbia,
slowdowns in the development of parliamentarianism, insufficient
reforms in the police, army and the state administration, failure to come
to terms with the war heritage and crimes, failure to suppress organised
crime and corruption, etc. Although the resolution of these problems
depends primarily on the engagement of domestic political forces, aid
from the international community is still necessary, in the form of
financial and professional assistance to the democratisation projects,
as well as a clear commitment of the international community to retain
a constant presence in this part of Europe. Its withdrawal or the erection
of a wall between the EU and this region would most certainly be a
factor with the direst possible consequences for the future of democracy
in Serbia and Yugoslavia, as well as other countries of south-eastern
Europe.
Road Map for Reform
The overthrow or peaceful dismantling of authoritarian and totalitarian
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the holding of free multi-
party elections was an essential step on the way to building up
democracy, but only the first step. All post-communist countries have
either completed or are still passing through the stage of transition
from totalitarianism to democracy, and their experiences are quite
similar: the priorities which appeared after the overthrow of their former
systems were organising genuinely fair and free elections, liberation
of the media, reform of the judiciary, upgrading parliamentarianism,
reform of the repression apparatus (army and police), and the
development of legislation covering human rights protection and
promotion. The reform strategy models were also similar, which of
course was no surprise as they had been largely taken over or inspired
by Western experiences and solutions, or carried out according to the
recommendations and standards of organisations like the Council of
Europe, the OSCE or the numerous Western foundations and
institutions for the promotion and upgrading of democratic values and
standards. But we know that regardless of the similar “recipes,” and
even formally similar results in the build-up of democratic institutions,
the status of democracy in some Central and Eastern European
countries and their records in the achievement of democratic standards
are not the same (just as the preceding one-party systems were not
equally repressive in all the communist countries).
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Without a possibility of entering into comparative analyses of the
reasons for the different degrees of democracy in the said countries
(which are even expressed exactly through various indicators of the
democratisation record offered by some organisations, like Freedom
House), we wish to point out that the factors which influence this were
the historical legacy, the level of economic development, the level of
organisation of the democratic forces, especially NGOs, the level of
co-operation with the democratic international community, and even
some human factors, such as the characteristics and commitments to
democracy of the leading political figures in those countries. This leads
us towards a simple conclusion - everything does not depend on
institutions, but above all else on the level of democratic consciousness
of the citizenry, and particularly the commitment to democracy of
politically active individuals and groups.
Having all this in mind, and especially the fact that the degrees of
democracy in the post-Yugoslav countries are extremely dissimilar,
regardless of the fact that several generations had lived in the same
country (for seven decades), the inevitable conclusion is that the level
of democratic culture in society is of decisive significance for the
development of democracy.
In that context, one of the priorities of democratic reforms in Serbia
must be increasing the democratic consciousness of the people, a
long-term endeavour demanding not just the engagement of political
parties and help from international organisations, but also total
commitment by all existing democratic forces, especially those in non-
governmental organisations, but also educational institutions. Those
in charge of international assistance should therefore also bear in mind,
as one of the priorities, this aspect of democratisation, which has so
far not been the case to a sufficient degree.
However, just as raising democratic awareness is a long-term and
lasting goal, so is full democratisation not possible without other and
more immediate objectives, which are an imperative of transition
towards democracy for the post-communist countries and which should
be realised within a short- or medium-term temporal framework. These
priorities proceed on the one hand from the demands made by the
international community, and on the other from domestic action plans
which should be closely tied to those issues in which democratisation
has still not yielded the expected results.
Keeping both of these factors in mind, priorities in the coming period
must include a reform of the judiciary and legislation dealing with the
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protection of human rights. This activity is taking place in close co-
operation with the Council of Europe, which will assess the results
achieved and in keeping with its findings recommend the admission
of Yugoslavia into that oldest European institution, which, if the
necessary reforms are realised, should take place in 2002. Within the
reform of the legislation, special attention should be focused on the
protection of minorities and regulations providing for the freedom of
expression and political activity, protection of personal integrity,
particularly from abuse by the state authorities, and protection of private
property.
Among the priorities must also be a constitutional reform leading to
the drafting and adoption of new constitutions for Serbia and the federal
state, in accordance with the agreement reached with Montenegro.
Special attention needs to be paid in the constitutional reform to
decentralisation of the state, striking a balance between the executive,
judicial and legislative branches, and the protection of elementary
human rights and liberties. Although help from international
organisations in the drafting of the new constitutions is not excluded
(especially in connection with the experiences in regard to
decentralisation of some ethnically-complex countries in Europe, such
as Switzerland, Italy or Spain, or the model applied by Finland to the
autonomy of its Swedish minority), the biggest contribution in this
process must come from domestic non-governmental organisations
and experts.
It also needs to be said that constitutional reforms in Serbia could be
speeded up without waiting for the resolution of the dispute at federal
level. It is also essential that the democratic forces focus their activities
on the adoption of constitutional solutions which would be lasting and
in conformity with the principles of the civic state, respecting the
traditions of autonomy and modern demands of decentralisation.
The affirmation of parliamentarianism and upgrading the efficiency of
the parliaments’ work are also conditions necessary for the
development of democracy. This requires, as one of the priorities, the
adoption of a new electoral law which would establish a stronger and
more direct link between voters and deputies (who would thus no longer
be simply delegates of their parties, but instead true representatives
of their electoral districts), more fair and favourable conditions for the
political representation of national minorities’ parties, as well as a
revision of the minimum requirement for parliamentary representation,
so as to give smaller parties a better chance to enter parliament. In
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the reform of the electoral law, all provisions must be harmonised with
the standards applied by the Council of Europe and the OSCE, which
means that co-operation with those institutions in its adoption is
essential.
Reforms of the military and police are also important priorities in the
democratic reform process. As we have already noted, international
organisations - the OSCE and Council of Europe – have already
provided comprehensive recommendations for reform of the police,
and we should expect that important elements of those
recommendations are adopted in the final documents. It is important
that the police should become, as far as it is possible and to a degree
seen in most Western countries, a public service rather than an
apparatus of repression. To that end, the cadre renewal of the police
must feature education in human rights issues. Some international
organisations have already initiated a number of projects in Serbia, in
co-operation with the authorities – training programmes for multi-ethnic
police in southern Serbia – which could be useful as a model in a
broader sense in the overall reform of the police (one of the project’s
elements is increasing the participation of women in the police force).
Also of importance for the status of democracy, especially for an even
fuller eradication of the pervasive fears which characterised society in
the former regime, is reorganising the intelligence services and their
placement under parliamentary control and judicial supervision in the
event of abuses.
Continuing reforms of the military, and especially the introduction of
full democratic control of the armed forces (by the parliament and
government, rather than just the president), is another of the conditions
for ensuring full democratisation of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Although
the success of the reforms also depends here primarily on the
engagement of the authentically democratic forces in the country,
especially the maintenance of a consensus within the DOS in favour
of such reforms of the military, the desired reconstruction of the armed
forces will be far easier to accomplish if the procedure of applying for
membership in the Partnership for Peace is initiated and speeded up,
as meeting the necessary conditions for admission to that programme
will inevitably necessitate a more radical approach to military reforms,
including a personnel renewal. It is thus essential that se political
consensus in the DOS in favour of Partnership for Peace membership
should be transmuted as soon as possible into operational decisions
in that context at government and federal parliament levels.
298
Considerable progress has already been made in the reform of the
media, thanks among other things to the contributions provided to the
drafting of legislation dealing with the sphere of information by
international organisations (OSCE, Council of Europe), but also a
certain tradition of free journalism and the engagement of independent
media organisations. The activity needs to be finalised as soon as
possible, as free media and investigative journalism, still in its infancy
here, are essential elements of democracy and a corrective mechanism
even for democratically elected governments and parliaments, as
shown by extensive experience with the role of the media in the West.
Finally, although it sounds unpopular, some thought might be given to
carrying out a certain cleansing of the media environment, given the
extremely negative role played by some media in the past decade,
especially their spread of a language of hatred and glorification of
wartime exploits. If this were to be accepted, the lustration should also
not be allowed to bypass state institutions, and perhaps even scientific
ones. Making compromises with those who lent a note to the past
decade’s repressive and aggressive policies, and especially opening
up new room for those forces, who are now recommending themselves
as champions of “authentic” nationalism and even victims of the former
regime, would be fatal for the further course of democratisation and
the democratic legitimacy of the new authorities.
In order to create a more favourable environment for the continued
implementation of democratic reforms, it is necessary to take even
more resolute steps on the restructuring of the economy and its revival.
This will not be possible without expanding relations with the European
Union, so that an agreement on association and stabilisation must
remain one of the priority political objectives of the democratic
authorities, whose aim should be its conclusion by the end of 2002.
Another objective also linked with the revival of the economy and the
planned economic reforms should also be membership in the World
Trade Organisation (WTO). All available frameworks for co-operation
in the economic and other spheres on the regional plane should also
be utilised – the Pact for Stability for south-eastern Europe, the Central
European Initiative, the SECI and others. Adaptation of the economy
to the conditions existing in the EU should also be helped by joining
the  Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), which
represented a very positive experience for the most successful
transition countries, which are now on the threshold of the EU.
Another essential precondition for successful co-operation with both
the EU and other international organisations is fulfilment of the
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obligations towards the War Crimes Tribunal. But co-operation with
the tribunal at the Hague represents much more  - it is one of the basic
elements in the process of coming to terms with the war crimes legacy
and reconciliation with our neighbours. Full regulation of co-operation
with the tribunal - on the basis of a corresponding law, if required by
internal political reasons - is therefore one of the main priorities of the
authorities in Belgrade in the immediate future. Reconciliation with
neighbours, but also the consolidation of the democratic processes
within the country, would be helped by the formation of non-
governmental and independent truth and reconciliation commissions
not just on the national plane but also on the regional one, as well as
debates on the war legacy held by historians and legal and other experts
from the former Yugoslav states.
Organising joint projects and other forms of co-operation among young
people and academic institutions would also help upgrade co-operation
in the region, and especially the affirmation of democratic forces in the
individual countries. An initiative which should be mentioned in that
context is that for a revision of history textbooks in the lands of former
Yugoslavia, in a manner similar to that already done in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and paying heed to the experiences of some Western
countries, such as France and Germany.
The accomplishment of a full democratic transition in Serbia therefore
calls for continuous activity on the national plane, attended by full co-
operation with neighbours on joint projects, as well as with a
corresponding contribution by international organisations. The year
that has passed has shown that the role of international organisations
(in particular the Council of Europe and the OSCE, but also a number
of other international and non-governmental organisations) is an
important factor in the democratic reform process. The record does
not contain just the expert assistance, although that does have primacy,
but also the political message implied in that international assistance
– that the international community is co-operative rather than
antagonistic, and that it has no intention of forgoing the region. On the
other hand, the impression sometimes voiced that the assistance is
conditional or limited to imposing finished products must be avoided.
Although membership in international organisations does imply that
all member-countries accept equal standards, practice has shown that
their application nevertheless has to respect certain specificities. In
the final instance, the reach of democratic reforms in Serbia will depend
mainly on the level of engagement by domestic political forces and
their readiness and capacity to respond to the challenges of
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democratisation. This also means that alongside the build-up and
consolidation of democratic institutions, one of the main objectives
should be a permanent strengthening of the democratic consciousness
- democratic culture, where the bulk of the burden must lie on internal
social and political forces. They will decide whether the democratisation
process will be successful and whether they will bring the country within
a reasonably short period up to a level now enjoyed by the most
successful countries in transition - the status of a realistic candidate
for membership in the European Union.
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THINK TANKS INVOLVED IN THE
PROJECT:
BASIC INFORMATION
Albania:
ALBANIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (AIIS)
ORGANIZATION
Albanian Institute for International Studies was established in
September 1997. It is a non-governmental, not for profit, independent
institution on international public policy issues. Its research is non-
partisan and non-proprietary.  The Institute is established based on
the respective law of the Civil Code of the Republic of Albania and
exercises its activity in the territory of the Republic of Albania in
accordance with the present Albanian legislation and international
experience.
AIIS is founded under the initiative of an academic group, experienced
diplomats, and analysts of international relation, international policies
and security issues, well experienced in these fields.
AIM & PRIORITIES
Albanian Institute for International Studies is dedicated to analyses of
contemporary issues and their political impact. It is focused on the
study of international relations as well as domestic develpoments in
Albania. It aims to address particularly the Euro-Atlantic and Balkans
issues on development and prognoses of political, economic, security,
ethnic, cultural and religion questions, identification of conflicts, their
sources and origins and especially conflict prevention and conflict
avoidance.  AIIS tends to engage Albanian scholars and attract the
qualified international thought and expertise on the issues Albanian
society is faced with, in order to help it meet the complex challenges it
will face through the path of civil society and market economy.  Given
the changing nature of security concerns the AIIS has been having an
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increasingly domestic focus regarding political and economic
developments in Albania.
Publications
• “Democracy and Security” AIIS, 1999, (in English).
• “Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Case of Kosova”, AIIS,
By Enver Hasani, 2000.
• “Stability Pact – Just around the Corner” AIIS 2000,
(Both Albanian and English).
• “Kosova Futures” (ed.), AIIS, forthcoming, 2001.
• “Albanians in the Balkans” AIIS, 2001, in Albanain.
• “Albania –1914 The six  months Kingdom” AIIS 2001,
(both English and Albanian).
• “Albania - A Weak Democracy, A Weak State”, by B.Kajsiu,
A.Bumci, A. Rakipi, Tirana, 2002.
(both in English and in Albanian)
• “The Politics of Religion in the Reconstruction of Identities -
The Albanian Situation” by Albert Doja.  AIIS October 2001,
(Both in English and Albanian).
• “Macedonia and the Albanians: The Confines of Ethnic Politics”
by Aldo Bumci.  AIIS, December 2001,
(Both in English and Albanian).
• “Shumica qe na Mund”, by Henri Cili, AIIS, Tirana, 2002,
(in Albanian).
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Bulgaria:
CENTRE FOR LIBERAL STRATEGIES (CLS)
CLS is an independent, non-profit think-tank organization. It was
formally registered with the Court in 1994 and reached its present
state of operation in 1995. Its six full-time researchers combine
academic background with direct involvement in the political process,
civil sphere activity, and governmental institutions.
CLS’s guiding idea is that in the present East-Central European context
the organizational form of the think-tank is a powerful instrument for:
• Promoting the public debate,
• Exercising influence on the decision-making process,
• Resolving various social and political crises.
Areas of Expertise
CLS provides expertise in the following major areas:
• Politics and polity, Political risk assessment, Political parties.
• Foreign and Integration Policy.
• Constitutional policy and state institutions.
• Election campaigns, Electoral attitudes, Electoral process.
• Sociological surveys and analysis.
• Media and politics.
• Macroeconomic analysis, Economic history.
• Institutional economics.
• Fiscal policy.
CLS develops and implements projects addressing various aspects
of the social, economic and political situation in Bulgaria. It organizes
workshops, conferences, and seminars with local and foreign experts,
politicians and public figures. In recent years, the following major
projects have been administered by the CLS:
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• Agenda for Civil Society “The Blue Bird” (2000-2003).
• The Inflexibility Trap: Frustrated Societies, Weak States and
Democracy, 2002.
• Study on the Stability Pact (with East-West Institute), 2001.
• Political and Economic Orientations of the Bulgarians
Ten Years After the Beginning of the Systemic Change, 2000.
• Facing the Future: The Balkans in Year 2010, 1999.
• NATO’s Expansion: Illuminating the Grey Zone, 1998).
• Regional Cooperation Prospects in South-East Europe, 1997.
• The City of Sofia. Human Development Report, 1997.
• Political Risk Assessment for Bulgaria, 1997.
• Primary Presidential Elections in 1996.
• Draft for a New Electoral Law, 1995.
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INSTITUTE FOR MARKET ECONOMICS (IME)
General information
IME is the first independent economic think tank in Bulgaria (non-
profit corporation Reg. #831344929 — March 15th, 1993, 729/XI/VI, p.
169). IME mission is to elaborate and advocate market approaches to
the problems Bulgaria is facing in its economic transition.
IME objectives are to provide: independent assessment and analysis
of the government’s economic policies; a focal point for an exchange
of views on market economics and relevant policy issues; and an
internationally supported Bulgarian think thank which is widely
respected for its expertise.  For more information, please, visit IME
website and especially 2001 Annual Report (www.ime-bg.org ).
In June 2002, IME received 2001 Annual Award of the Government of
Bulgaria for it’s “its overall contribution to the development of the
country”.
2001-2002 Priorities
• Competitiveness: Sector Analysis and Case Studies in Wines,
Tourism, IT, Finance, Textile & Apparel, Canning and
Microeconomic Conditions
• Decentralization, Regional Development, Private Provision of
Public Services, Innovative Management Tools for Firms and
Public Governance on Local level
• Creation of a ITCC to promote Applied Economics Research,
Improvement of Economic Information and Education in
Decision Oriented Managerial Approaches
• Regulation Impact Analysis and Legislative Corrections
Studies
• Growth and Prosperity in the Balkans: Trade Facilitation,
Initiation of Change, Monitoring and Advocacy.
International
• IME is an initiator and co-founder of the Balkan Network of
public policy institutes to study fragmented capital and finance
306
markets, quasi-fiscal subsidies and informal labor market,
impacts of different crisis situations and embargoes,
disseminate ideas for regional cooperation and exchange.
• IME is a co-founder of the 3-E-Net (Emerging  European
Economies Network), a joint venture of seventeen policy
institutes from eleven countries in the region to advocate
market reforms.
• IME is a member of the Economic Freedom Network, and
co-publisher of Economic Freedom of the World Annual
Reports.
IME Advocacy
In a coalition or alone IME contributed to the following:
• Information Disclosure and Anti-Fraud Provisions in Securities
Regulations (drafted by IME and US SEC)
• Introduction of the Currency Board (advocacy and public
awareness campaign)
• Deposit Guarantee Act (drafted by IME)
• Tax Reforms in 1997 and 1998 (advocacy and cost-benefit
comparisons)
• 1998 SMEs Strategy (drafting sections on equal opportunities,
competitiveness, fair government practices, low transaction
costs)
• Competition Defense Act (three provisions ensuring better
implementation)
• Draft Mortgage Bonds Act (drafted by IME)
• 1998 Reduction and Applicability of VAT and Social-welfare
Taxation (drafted by IME)
• 2001 Regulation Impact Analysis, Legislative Corrections
Studies and Corruption as a Systemic Phenomenon (grafting
a Cabinet Decree and Provisions for the New Normative Acts
Bill)
• 2002 Drafting Economic Activities Bill (an act to reduce
administrative barriers to business).
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INSTITUTE FOR REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IRIS)
IRIS is based in Sofia, Bulgaria, is an independent, non-partisan and
non-profit think tank. IRIS is dedicated to developing regional strategies
for democratic policy making in South Eastern Europe and increasing
international understanding of emerging Balkan issues. The mission
of the Institute is to establish a link between academic and policy making
and to stimulate democratic development by generating policy analyses
and recommendations for regional cooperation, security, interethnic
relations, conflict management and resolution, economics and foreign
policy. IRIS has established successful partnerships with policy
institutes throughout the region. Some of the key activities undertaken
by the IRIS are focused on fostering dialogue and cooperation by
conducting international conferences and roundtables. IRIS works
closely with international organizations, the National Assembly of
Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the University
of Sofia.
MAJOR IRIS PUBLICATIONS
• Bulgaria for NATO 2002, (in English).
• Security Challenges and Development of Southern Balkans ,
2002, (in English).
• Enhancing Public Influence and Exercising Control over the
Decision-Making Process, 2002, (in Bulgarian).
• How Do We Design an Advocacy Campaign in Bulgaria?, 2002
(in Bulgarian and in English).
• International Fact-finding Mission to the Republic of Macedonia,
2001, (in English).
• IRIS Quarterly Policy Report – Summer/ Autumn 2000,
(in English).
• IRIS Quarterly Policy Report - Spring 2000, (in English).
• Security and Reconstruction of Southeastern Europe: A Policy
Outlook from the Region (2000), (in English).
• Topography of Power in Bulgaria (2000), (in Bulgarian).
• Perspectives on the Development of the Relations between
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Bulgaria and Macedonia (2000), (in Bulgarian and
Macedonian).
• Geopolitical Systems (1999), (in Bulgarian).
• Regional Infrastructure Projects in Southeastern Europe
(1999), (in English).
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Kosovo:
KOSOVA ACTION FOR CIVIC INITIATIVES (KACI)
KACI-Kosova Action for Civic Initiatives, founded in May 1998, is a
research group and think-tank based in Prishtina, Kosova. Its primary
goal is to help in the understanding of Kosovar politics and international
developments in regards to the question of Kosova, through research
and analysis. KACI is also an action council for civic initiatives,
suggesting ideas for the development of Kosovar civil society and
helping civic initiatives and NGOs get in touch with their counterparts
in the world.
After the entrance of NATO forces in Kosova and with the adoption of
Resolution 1244 in June 1999, a complex mixture of local and
international factors is governing Kosova. KACI, in a watchdog role, is
committed to observing and analysing this governance and informing
the citizens of the political developments in Kosova and the implications
these may have on their lives, on Kosova and the region in general.
Almost every aspect of KACIs activities results in well-researched,
informative, useful and agenda-setting publications. Our numerous
continuing publications have resulted in a library of over ten reference
publications, which is one of the most extensive within the Kosovar
NGO sector.
KACIs quarterly magazine, Kosova and Balkan Observer is the journal
that addresses general and specific, recent and more long-term issues
that affect Kosova and the Balkans in general. The issues discussed
range from local to regional; from political to social, cultural and
economic. It is the regional reference point and virtual discussion forum,
with contributions from international and local stakeholders and
observers of the Kosovar and the wider Balkan development process.
KACI is in close cooperation with NGOs from the Balkans and countries
in transition in general. An exchange of experience and ideas is regular
amongst KACI and NGOs from Montenegro, Serbia, Croatia,
Macedonia and Bosnia. KACI is also part of the IDEE Centers for
Pluralism network and SEEPIN. It has taken part in trainings and
exchanges with countries of Central Eastern Europe and the CIS.
In initiating, developing, implementing and monitoring its activities, KACI
is always committed to developing local capacity for its projects. By
creating and supporting a solid local foundation for civic initiatives and
activity, KACI aims at ensuring that this activity continues even when
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international support and attention is minimal. Thus KACI contributes
towards a long-term, durable and self-sustainable civil society, which
is committed to entrenching democratic and civil society values
permanently within Kosovar society.
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Macedonia:
FORUM - CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND
DOCUMENTATION (CSRD)
Forum-CSRD is non-governmental, non-partisan and non-profit think-
tank from Skopje, Republic of Macedonia.
The Center works on the issues of security, economy and
democratization in two levels:
Within Macedonia:
• promotion and building the civic society in Macedonia;
• strengthening of democratic processes in Macedonia;
• strengthening of inter-ethnic dialogue in Macedonia;
• support of activities towards reaching the standards for
Macedonian  integration in Euro - Atlantic institutions.
Out of Macedonia:
• further development of the influence of the civic sector and
countries from South Eastern Europe;
• maintaining closer cooperation among the countries from the
region of South - Eastern Europe;
• strengthening of the processes of democratization in the
countries from South Eastern Europe;
• support of activities towards reaching the standards for
integration of the region in Euro - Atlantic institutions.
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Montenegro/FRY:
CENTRE FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (CEDEM)
Center for Democracy and Human Rights  is founded in July 1997 as
a non-profit association of citizens (NGO). Main goals of CEDEM from
the very beginning have been the following: to advance and spread
conscience on importance of a proper and successful democratic
transition; to research, analyze and monitor the process of a democratic
transition; to influence by its activities, as much as possible, transition
process in Montenegro; to contribute in strengthening of civil society
and democratization process as a whole; to contribute in education in
human rights area and in protection of basic human rights.
CEDEM acts mostly as a think-thank group. Its main activities are the
following: a) conducting regular quarterly public opinion polls on main
political currents in Montenegro and publishing results and comments;
b) publishing quarterlies on transition process in Montenegro and
annual reports on human rights; c) organizing seminars and other
educative forms for Montenegrin legal practitioners in the human rights
area; d) acting in order to improve legal status and surrounding of
NGOs in the Republic (CEDEM was an author of the first NGO law in
Montenegro); e) making different types of analyzes and policy papers
in the field of democracy and human rights in Montenegro; f)
coordinating the biggest NGO network in Montenegro “Akcija”, founded
in the beginning of 2002, which main goal is to campaign for political,
legal and economic reforms in the country.
CEDEM has developed very broad international
communication and cooperation. It is a member of the global
democracy network ”World Movement for Democracy” (WMD) from
its foundation (1999 conference in New Delhi, India); member of the
network of East European NGOs ”Centres for Pluralism” (CfP) and a
member of regional human rights NGO association “Balkan Human
Rights Network” (BHRN). CEDEM also successfully cooperates in the
network of regional think-tanks (CIS-Albania, CLS-Bulgaria, KACI-
Kosovo, Forum-Macedonia, CEDEM-Montenegro, BCHR-Serbia).
Members and associates of CEDEM are mostly: scholars,
academics, legal advisers, attorneys, political analysts, journalists, and
economists. Director of CEDEM is: Srdjan Darmanovic, assistant
professor in Law School, Podgorica, Montenegro.
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